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This crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born;
in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.
(Antonio Gramsci, 1971: 276)
In this vision, the framework of decollectivized, deregulated, and deinstitutionalized 
neo-liberal labour law is here to stay because it matches the basic needs of a globalized 
capitalist market economy and of liberal democracy. Yet at the very moment of its apparent 
triumph, individualized market labour law faces political, industrial and judicial challenges.
(Bob Hepple, 1996: 626)
Labour law evolved in response to … worker resistance to injuries and injustices visited 
upon them by industrial capitalism … [with a] vocation ‘to address and seek to relieve a 
fundamental social and economic problem in modern society: the subordination of labour 
to capital, or of employee to employer’.
(Karl Klare, 2002: 3, referring to Hugh Collins, 1989)
This study is about the process of creation and enforcement of social and 
labour rights, in the form of labour law, in Indonesia; and how this has 
reflected the actual broader process of social and political change, and strug-
gle, in the country. It is not a sweet and cosy process. Three decades of rapid 
economic growth under the so-called ‘New Order’ was achieved by extreme 
political and economic subordination and exclusion of many of those who 
made it happen. Low wages, poor working conditions, and high levels of 
informal employment marked the daily lives of millions of Indonesian 
workers. Indeed, Indonesia under the New Order was notorious for its harsh 
and unsympathetic behaviour towards working people (see, e.g., Indoc 
report series, 1981-1988; Harris, 1995). Seeking to provide an appropriate 
framework within which policies of industrialisation and economic growth 
could be pursued, the New Order used the concept and structures of corpo-
ratism to control labour. The strong authoritarian state managed to tame 
most of the resistance. Meanwhile, a corporatist labour law framework was 
specifically designed to assure managerial ascendancy and the restraint of 
labour costs, often with repressions, for the sake of ‘economic growth’ under 
the broad term of ‘development’.
The fall of President Soeharto in May 1998 marked a new epoch for the coun-
try. The powerful authoritarian New Order state was suddenly no longer 
there, leaving the way open for different forces to influence the formation of 
the country’s new social and political structures. Habibie, the Vice President 
and Soeharto’s intimate, was appointed as the successor president. Despite 
some doubts about his government’s willingness to bring about reforms, 
Habibie’s government, mainly due to the desire to separate itself from the 
previous regime, initiated some reforms (Bourchier, 2000), including labour 
policy reform. The cabinet’s Minister of Manpower, Fahmi Idris, played an 
important role; starting by releasing a Ministerial Decree concerning Trade 
Union Registration, and allowing workers more freedom to establish unions, 
after three decades of single and government dominated union structures. In 
June 1998, one month after his appointment, Habibie decided to ratify Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. This complemented 
ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, which had been ratified in 
1956, although without implications in practice. Within only six months of 
Soeharto’s fall, in December 1998, the transitional government of President 
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2 Introduction
Habibie launched the so-called ‘labour law reform programme’, under the 
auspices of the ILO, with the ambitious goal of changing the whole struc-
ture of Indonesia’s labour law regime towards one that was more ‘modern’ 
and ‘relevant’ with the ‘changing times’ and the necessity of the ‘free market 
economy’ (ILO, 1999).
There is little doubt that Indonesian labour law reform was neo-liberal in 
nature, in the sense that the main aim of the reform was to make the labour 
law system a means by which to promote economic efficiency, by, among 
other things, reducing costs through a flexible labour market. It is apparent, 
moreover, that this reform was a requirement of economic and market liber-
alisation, which accelerated greatly in Indonesia (and throughout the region) 
with the onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 (Rosser, 2002). This 
was due particularly to the need to follow the prescriptions of the interna-
tional financial institutions, notably the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), which became the main actors in Indonesia’s efforts 
to regain its economic development and growth. Having been relatively 
untouched for more than three decades under the New Order,1 Indonesia’s 
labour law regime was thus suddenly transformed from a corporatist labour 
law model with a strong and powerful state behind it, towards one that 
was largely market-oriented. Although the development of a market-based 
economy had begun in the early 1980s and 1990s, it was only in the last few 
years, under the so-called Reformasi (reform) era, that the law changed dra-
matically. As the new political arrangement began to emerge, the Indonesian 
economy shifted from guided or state-led development to market-oriented 
reform and external liberalisation.
All of this suggests a typical neo-liberal transition, but the present research 
examines whether that is the whole story. Despite the neo-liberal and mar-
ket-oriented labour law reforms many pro-labour regulations have actually 
been adopted; giving space for the development of a trade union movement 
within the country. While some outcomes of the reforms include the shifting 
of responsibility from the executive to other institutions – such as the judi-
ciary – the government still appears to be involved in many labour relations 
issues. How can this development best be understood? How have these 
developments arisen, and why? What are the implications for labour? What 
challenges and opportunities come up for the country’s newly (re-)estab-
lished trade union movement? What lessons can we learn from the develop-
ment of these changing labour laws, in regards to the relationship between 
labour law and economic development in Indonesia?
1 The idea of changing the labour laws had actually been discussed quite intensively in 
the late 1970s (Oesman, 1981), during the early phase of the New Order government’s 
effort to further contain trade unions’ activism in the country. For reasons that will be 
discussed further later, this did not eventuate until recently.
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The present study seeks to address these questions, and to explain the labour 
law reform process. In so doing, it is divided into two major parts. The first 
section presents an empirical analysis about the development of labour law 
in Indonesia, historically and politically, and offers suggestions about what 
can be learned from the development of Indonesia’s labour law. The discus-
sion in this part of the study will be informed predominantly by theories 
from the fields of political economy and law; and analyses the roles of labour 
laws in a comparative way. Here the study will base its discussion upon 
various comparative labour law approaches, in order to locate and analyse 
Indonesia’s labour laws within a wider perspective.
The second part of the study focuses on the three most important issues in 
labour law: (1) the trade union; (2) the minimum wage; and (3) the Industrial 
Relations Court. These three issues will be examined in separate chapters. 
The trade union is crucial in any modern industrial capitalist society, as it 
represents one of the few institutions capable of promoting some measure 
of equity and social justice in society. The minimum wage is an important 
subject in labour law because it is a policy tool for poverty reduction that can 
also be an indicator of the extent of a government’s commitment to social 
justice. The Industrial Relations Court is important because it is the mani-
festation of the instrumental aspect of law; which requires enforcement as 
well as formal examination and adjudication in the event of a dispute. Each 
issue also involves the two main facets of labour law, i.e. collective labour 
law (trade union, minimum wage) and individual labour law (minimum 
wage, industrial dispute settlement), and will be examined using three dif-
ferent illustrative cases related to the three major pieces of labour legislation 
enacted since the Reformasi. The historical background and theoretical con-
siderations discussed in the first section of this book will inform the discus-
sion of these three cases. On this basis the final chapter provides provide 
reflections, lessons and recommendations.
1 Labour law and development: ‘competing conceptions’
The main issue of the study is the relationship between what is gener-
ally known as the role of labour law and the development process. It has 
been argued that there is a close relationship between the two (ILO, 1974; 
Schregle, 1982). Traditionally and conceptually, labour law has performed 
a protective function, consisting of setting standards for the protection of 
workers in their jobs and workplaces, as well as affording them a minimum 
level of living conditions.2 There is another function of labour law which 
may be particularly important on this regard, which is to establish a frame-
2 As we will discuss further later, the works of Hugo Sinzheimer and his disciple Otto 
Kahn-Freund and their supporters inspired this approach.
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work within which constructive industrial relations can occur between 
employers and workers and their organizations, as well as the government, 
in order to achieve maximum benefit for the parties and society (ILO, 1974: 
25).
History has shown us, however, that such ‘idealistic’ notions of labour law 
and its relationship with particularly the latter function appear difficult to 
realise in practice. These ‘competing conceptions’ of labour law (Deakin and 
Morris, 2001: 4) to protect the fundamental social and economic rights of the 
workers on the one hand, and on the other to promote economic efficiency – 
have often ended to the benefit of the latter. It is evident that labour law has 
often been used and manipulated as a tool to restrict the freedom of workers 
(for example their freedom to organise and to bargain collectively), further-
ing managerial rights and investment interests (Deery and Mitchell, 1993). 
This phenomenon takes place both in developed countries (e.g. Deakin and 
Morris, 2001: 1-55) and in developing countries (e.g., Siddique, 1989). The 
developing countries’ workers, however, probably face more challenges 
than their counterparts in developed countries, due to the different histories 
of the development of labour legislation in the two worlds. In developing 
countries, labour law was already in place before the growth of industry and 
economic planning. Unlike in the developed countries, the labour legislative 
patterns there were not indigenous to the social requirements of the country 
but inherited, borrowed or transplanted from abroad (Cooney et al., 2002; 
Thiagarajah, 1986: 24).
Despite these obvious differences, there are also similarities between the two 
worlds’ labour laws, namely the dominant notion of ‘collectivisation’ and 
‘protection’ for labour, which has marked the mainstream development of 
labour law in the course of the 20th century.3 Analysis of the history of the 
development of the legal system and labour law regimes in Indonesia sup-
ports this proposition. During the early development of labour legislation in 
the country, the notion of ‘protective legislation’ for labour was dominant. 
This was due partly to the influence of the mainstream labour law discourse 
at the time and the growing ideology of nationalism and anti-colonialism; 
and perhaps more importantly, due also to the involvement of many labour 
unions in the struggle for the country’s independence. The labour influence 
in the legislative process continued from the 1950s to the mid-1960s. Over 
this period, several labour laws, which were arguably in favour of workers, 
were enacted.
3 See, e.g., van Peijpe, 1998 [comparing protective labour legislation in Sweden, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands]; Edwards and Lustig, 1997 [discussing the Latin American con-
texts]; ILO, 1975 [one of the early accounts of the development of labour law in Develop-
ing Countries], and ILO, 1986 [for a later account focusing on the impact of protective 
labour laws in the ASEAN countries].
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However, after the emergence of the New Order in the mid-1960s, with its 
emphasis on economic stability and stable political conditions, the labour 
law regime severely restricted independent trade unions. This was not an 
abrupt effort – in fact, the Indonesian government, with the support of the 
military and business, systematically and effectively planned a new labour 
law regime over many years. Rather than developing this new regime as 
a means of achieving fair distributive goals, and embodying the notions of 
industrial justice, under the New Order the labour laws were used as a tool 
to promote the economic interests of the elite. Despite the fact that protective 
labour legislation existed formally, a big gap was evident between ‘law in 
the books’ and ‘law in practice’ (see, e.g., Fehring and Lindsey, 1995; Lindsey 
and Masduki, 2002).
Confident with his power, President Soeharto did not consider it neces-
sary to change the labour laws; indeed, he used the law as another tool to 
enhance his control over society within the state’s corporatist structure.4 
Thus, although the New Order’s labour law was generally supportive of 
labour vis-à-vis industry, the law was often not applied, and the institutions 
in place were manipulated in such ways that they could not overcome the 
reluctance of the government to actually enforce the regulations. Meanwhile 
‘labour law’, (hukum perburuhan), as a distinct field of legal research, was 
in hibernation for over three decades. This can be seen clearly by consider-
ing the mainstream labour law books published during the New Order era 
(Orde Baru): these books were trapped in merely technical explanations of 
the laws (in the forms of commentaries), with minimal attention directed to 
the context surrounding the written laws, nor any discussion of the imple-
mentation of the laws in practice.5
Soeharto’s fall in 1998 brought some changes to the ruling elites’ strategies 
towards labour. The ‘labour law reform programme’, which started in 1998 
as a follow-up to the Direct Contact Mission of the ILO Geneva, resulted 
in the enactment of a new labour regime consisting of a package of three 
major laws. Together these replaced Indonesia’s entire labour law system, as 
developed from the 1945 proclamation of independence until the mid-1960s. 
4 As further discussed later, the national ideology, Pancasila, or ‘Five Principles’, played an 
important role on this regard (Hadiz, 1997).
5 See, for example, Budiono, 1995; Djumadi, 1992; Djumialdji, 1987; Halim, 1987; and Kar-
tasapoetra, 1986. Interestingly, all were published by the time labour repression reached 
its peak during the New Order, culminating in the murder of Marsinah, a labour activist 
in Surabaya, 1993 (for an historical record, particularly on the role of the military in the 
murder, see Supartono, 1999). Several earlier opposing efforts were also made, however, 
(see Masduki et al., 1999), and this opposition continued strongly over the last few years 
after the Reformasi, including through the efforts of a small number of Indonesian labour 
lawyers and activists (see, e.g., Tjandra and Suryomenggolo, 2005, Samsa, 2005, Tjandra, 
2004).
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Despite early criticisms of their enactment from labour activists,6 in reality 
there has been some adoption of the protective notion within the laws inher-
ited from the previous laws (see in particular Caraway, 2009).7 As we shall 
see, such a situation, combined with the weakening of the state, has opened 
the door to democratization; which has given labour the chance to regain its 
influence in the political arena.
2 The political economy of law and the approach of this study
The foregoing discussion shows that labour law and development are, 
indeed, ‘competing conceptions’. The process of making laws involves con-
tending groups in society, which compete with each other to influence the 
formulation of a particular law to meet their particular interests. Further, 
the enforcement of those laws depends on the political and economic situa-
tion, as well as on the interactions between different actors at different levels, 
from the workplace level to the level of the national economy (Wever and 
Turner, 1995: 2; Bacungan and Ofreneo, 2002: 91-92; also Hepple, 2002). For 
the purposes of this study, in addition to the standard legal approach (which 
this study follows predominantly), this necessitates the adoption of a politi-
cal economy (of law) approach, in order to better understand such dynam-
ics. This additional approach involves analysing the development of law 
within the so-called ‘critical legal theory’ tradition. As critical legal schol-
ars have argued, law is basically a manifestation of the economic, political 
and ideological conflicts in a society (see, e.g., Kennedy, 1997). This certainly 
applies to the field of labour law (Edie et al., 1992). It is apparent that labour 
law reflects not only the obvious economic balance of power, but also the 
political and ideological balance; in particular between the working class 
and the other classes in society. These other classes include not only employ-
ers and the business community, but any proponents of conservative, anti-
egalitarian ideologies and supporters of the interests of the so-called ‘higher’ 
classes, – the ‘neo-liberals,’ to use the current term.
6 For example the Komite Anti-Penindasan Buruh (KAPB – Anti-Repression of Labour Com-
mittee), a group established in 2000 and comprising more than 40 labour organizations 
and NGOs, criticised the new laws as a form of ‘labour repression’ by law, due to the 
absence of any notions of protection. The provision of the laws contained many prob-
lems (see Kolben, 2002; Uwiyono, 2004), and they mainly served the interests of liberal-
ising the labour market, rather than developing a sound and fair labour relations frame-
work in Indonesia, as they claimed to intend to do.
7 According to the OECD Indicators of Employment Protection, Indonesia has always 
been considered one of the most protective countries towards workers in its legislation, 
together with China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Latvia, and some OECD members such as 
Turkey and Germany, based on its legislative protection of regular workers against indi-
vidual and collective dismissal and regulation of temporary contracts (see http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPL_R accessed in October 2013).
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In this regard, labour law is, like ‘economic development’, a contested con-
cept. As noted by Frederic Deyo (1997: 205), in a discussion on the relationship 
between labour and economic development in the Southeast Asian context:
[E]conomic development is typically a contested process, one in which shifting and 
emergent groups and coalitions contend for favourable economic positions in a chang-
ing and uncertain social order and in which the very nature and extent of development 
is an outcome of social and class contention.
Deyo also noted that such a political economy view is useful, in order to 
understand the role that organised labour has played during the rapid 
industrialisation in the region. As he further writes:
Of particular importance here are changes in the ‘labour systems’ through which labour 
is socially reproduced, mobilised for economic ends, utilised in production, and con-
trolled and motivated in support of economic goals. These changes are joint products of 
the economically driven labour strategies of government and business elites, of global 
political and economic pressures and constraints, of the process of industrialisation 
itself, and in some cases of the individual and collective responses of workers to elite 
strategies and industrial pressures (1997: 205).
Such approaches to exploring labour and other laws and economic develop-
ment, and their inter-relationship, lead to the theoretical position that law 
making is seldom a neutral process, based on rational and objective consid-
erations. In many cases it is rather a contest between competing interests 
within society, and these interests are often not evenly matched. This posi-
tion accords with the study of political economy which stresses the distribu-
tion and use of power in society in analysing the policy-making processes. 
As noted by Robison et al. (1997: 14-15):
[S]tate policy cannot be neutral, nor can it be the outcome of a process of professional 
decision making based on an analysis of interest group inputs. Policy is a reflection of 
the nature of domination in society. The issue is not to identify ‘good’ and ‘bad’ policy 
choices, but to understand why it is that particular policy agendas emerge and hold 
sway under particular political and economic regimes.
Although the present study agrees with some of the above approach – par-
ticularly the importance of the ‘why’ question, in order to understand the 
nature of competing interests behind policy-making processes – it also takes 
the view that it makes sense to look at right or wrong policies, if we want 
to reach the goal of legal certainty and predictability. This study considers 
that the position stated above may be too simple, given the complexities in 
policy-making processes. From this standpoint, in order to understand the 
complexity of the evolution of labour law in Indonesia and its relationship 
with economic development, it is important to understand the situation and 
problems with Indonesia’s labour law in the context of the changing eco-
nomic strategies of the Indonesian government. For this reason the politi-
cal economy of law approach may be useful to further our understanding 
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about the role of law in this specific context; namely, the role of labour law in 
a developing country. It is, moreover, beneficial to examine the contents of 
the labour policies, in order to best envisage particular regulatory solutions 
for particular problems. This approach is in line with the efforts of some 
noted law and development scholars, including Yash Ghai, Robin Luck-
ham and Francis Snyder in their edited book The Political Economy of Law: 
A Third World Reader (1987). The main questions raised in the book are: ‘to 
what extent may law be used as an instrument of state policy to promote 
social change?’, and ‘what roles, either intended or unintended, does law 
play in social processes such as the development of capitalism, the reproduc-
tion of established social relations or radical social transformation?’ (Ghai et 
al., 1987: xi).
Taking a Marxian perspective,8 the editors of the aforementioned book 
emphasise the role which law plays in relations between rich and poor 
nations in the world economy, and the functions of law within developing 
countries (p.xi). They perceive the legal situation in developing countries 
as a complex combination of legal systems; and their theoretical perspec-
tive begins with an analysis of the impacts of global capitalism and the 
legal forms which it requires. Their approach is, therefore, general rather 
than specific. The book also does not pay close attention to micro-political 
arrangements and the impact of changing government policies on these 
arrangements, or on people’s lives. It is more concerned with the macro pro-
cesses that structure micro and/or local problems, rather than the influence 
of micro and/or local struggle in structuring the extent of domination of the 
national legal system.
The approach of this study is a combination of these two perspectives of 
macro and micro. Although it starts with a broad general analysis of labour 
law and development in Indonesia, historically and politically, it also rec-
ognises the need to look closely at specific issues. For this reason the study 
focuses partly on the historical records of the political development of labour 
law in Indonesia, using the political economy of law approach; and partly on 
particular, specific issues and cases (namely trade union legislation, mini-
mum wage setting and labour dispute settlement mechanism), using more 
of a labour law and comparative labour law approach.
8 This approach has been developed mainly since the mid-1970s, based on the theories 
of dependency and under-development, as critiques the early law and development on 
studies which, according to Ghai et al. (1987: xi), had been ‘based on ethnocentric, ahis-
torical assumptions’. For discussions on the changing paradigms in law and develop-
ment studies, see Newton, 2004; also Trubek, 2003. The latter scholar once proclaimed 
the ‘crisis’ and even the ‘death’ of the law and development movement in the USA (see 
Trubek and Galanter, 1974; Trubek, 1990), which led to many changes in law and devel-
opment discourses. For a recent account on the debate, see Trubek and Santos (2006).
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3 Focus and framework of the study
The focus of this study is the development of Indonesia’s labour law, par-
ticularly during the period from 1998 to 2006 during the so-called Reforma-
si (reform) era, marked by the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998. This 
study also considers that an appreciation of the historical development of 
Indonesia’s labour law system is essential, in order to understand the legal 
system’s current form and content. The research therefore also includes the 
historic development of Indonesia’s labour laws, from independence in 1945 
and the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, through the Parliamentary Democ-
racy period (1949-1955) and the so-called ‘Guided Democracy’ era (1955-
1965). Most of Indonesia’s labour legislation was enacted and framed during 
these periods. The ‘New Order’ era under President Soeharto gets special 
attention, due to its dominance in the history of modern Indonesia since the 
country’s proclamation of independence in 1945. In power for more than 
three decades, the New Order presided over almost all of Indonesia’s cur-
rent predicaments. Even in the current ‘transitional’ era under the Reformasi, 
the New Order legacy remains dominant. Indeed, it has been argued that 
rather than reforming, the New Order’s players have simply been ‘reorgan-
ising’ power; in a form more fitting to the current political situation (Robison 
and Hadiz, 2004).
The focus and approaches chosen for this study are particularly relevant 
because of the lack of publications on the political and economic history of 
the development of labour law in Indonesia, especially since the 1960s. Even 
more importantly in a country with a large population (Indonesia has over 
245 million people), most of whom need to work to survive, labour law is 
an important tool for evaluating the way in which a government in a devel-
oping country treats its workers. Such an approach has been used in some 
other developing countries, such as South Africa (DuToit, 1979), the Phil-
ippines (Villegas, 1988; Bacungan and Ofreneo, 2002), and Chile (Ietswaart, 
1978); however in Indonesia this approach has been rare. There is currently a 
single book on the issue: Iskandar Tedjasukmana’s The Development of Labor 
Policy and Legislation in the Republic of Indonesia (1961), which is primarily a 
description and historical documentation of the development of Indonesia’s 
labour law and labour policy between 1949-1959.9 Since then, there has been 
no systematic work published on the issue.
This study will address the need for the systematic documentation and anal-
ysis of the evolution of labour law and policy in Indonesia, particularly dur-
ing the New Order era and its aftermath; as well as the need for an analysis 
9 The book has been translated into Indonesian, with the title Menelisik Hukum Perburuhan 
di Indonesia: Analisa Gerakan Ekonomi Politik 1950-1960 (Tjandra (Ed.), 2012), published 
jointly by Yayasan Pembangunan dan Pendidikan Dr Iskandar Tedjasukmana and the Trade 
Union Rights Centre.
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of the potential future role of labour law in the context of Indonesia and the 
globalisation of its market economy. Moreover, an important question with-
in law and development studies is whether law can function as a stabiliser in 
society; and labour law is difficult to deal with, and rarely investigated. This 
study will contribute to addressing that question also. With regard to the aim 
of the study – to examine the relationship between labour law and economic 
development in a developing country – labour law is a field of research that 
involves direct economic influence; with the interests of the parties involved 
usually being in direct competition with each other. These parties include 
not only workers and their unions, but also political elites and business 
people at national and regional levels; not only national actors but also glob-
al players, buttressed by the globalisation of the economy.
4 Theoretical and comparative considerations
How can we understand Indonesia’s labour law and its development within 
the wider systems of labour law in the world today? This is the main ques-
tion that this dissertation would like to explore. The next section in particu-
lar will focus on the theories and debates that are helpful in explaining the 
genesis and implementation of the current labour law regime in Indonesia. 
It starts with an examination of the character (the form and content) and 
impact (the capacity to influence outcome) of labour law, using the theories 
developed by Sean Cooney et al. (2002), which focus on the East Asian coun-
tries’ contexts. It then continues with a discussion of the structural limita-
tions of labour law reform in the country. The chapter ends with an explora-
tion of the origins of the concept of labour law, as we know it.
4.1 The character of labour law in East Asia
In its original version, labour law has been designed – and thus inter-
preted – in light of its goal, which is to protect employees. According to 
this traditional view of labour law, employees were in need of protection 
because they suffered from inequality of bargaining power vis-à-vis their 
employers.10 The idea is derived from the writings of German jurists pub-
lished mainly in the early decades of the twentieth century. One of the most 
prominent figures was Hugo Sinzheimer, the ‘father’ of German labour 
law. As noted by his student, Kahn-Freund (1981: 14), Sinzheimer saw the 
employment relationship as a power relationship characterised by domina-
tion and subordination, by which labour law came into its own as a new 
discipline as it rejected the liberal assumption that the contract of employ-
ment is a product of the parties’ autonomous choices. Sinzheimer, follow-
10 For a classic account, see Davies and Freedland (1983), chapter 1, and more recently see 
Davidov and Langille (2009).
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ing Karl Renner (1949),11 adopted the Marxian idea that the subordination 
of the worker resulted from the capitalist ownership of the enterprise (or 
‘means of production’ in Karl Marx’s words). According to Renner, the 
assumed contractual equality between the legal persons of employer and 
employee was in fact a fiction, which then reinforced the employer’s domi-
nation and the employee’s subordination. Sinzheimer wanted to defeat this 
mystification of the worker’s actual state of dependency, by contrasting the 
‘contract of employment’ – in which human beings exchange themselves, 
– with ‘ordinary contracts,’ in which the transfer of things or their uses or 
services are promised.12 According to Sinzheimer, by explicitly recognising 
these contracts in statute law, this legal mystification could be destroyed. At 
this point, labour law became the law of ‘dependent’ labour, and became 
an attempt to moderate the employer’s power to command through the 
infusion of legal elements (see Clark 1993: 83, also Kahn-Freund 1981: 79).13
The concepts of ‘subordination,’ ‘dependency,’ freedom of association, and 
the right to collective bargaining together predominantly framed the devel-
opment of labour law during the industrial revolution in Europe, which was 
the formative period of labour law (Hepple, 1986). Several general princi-
ples, with ‘labour is not a commodity’14 as the most important one provid-
ed a moral basis on which the relationship between employer and worker 
should stand, based on equality. The main expression of this principle was 
the struggle for contractual equality between the dependent or subordinat-
ed worker and the employer. This was realized in all European countries 
before the Second World War by protective legislation; notably for children, 
young persons and women (Hepple, 1986: 6-12). The legislation has been 
described by van der Heijden (1994: 135-36, also cited in Hepple and Vene-
ziani, 2009: 5) as ‘inequality compensation’, whereby ‘the legislator has con-
sidered it useful and necessary to compensate the economic inequality exist-
ing between employer and employee through law.’ In a practical sense, the 
11 The English version of Karl Renner’s classic book, The Institution of Private Law and Their 
Social Function (1949), was edited and introduced by Otto Kahn-Freund.
12 Sinzheimer, as well as Kahn-Freund, used to exemplify this by quoting Marx’s sentence 
in Wage-Labour and Capital (1847-9): ‘Labour has no other container but human fl esh and 
blood’ (see Kahn-Freund 1981: 77-8).
13 This is the essence of what Kahn-Freund has called Sinzheimer’s ‘anthropology’; that 
is: ‘[T]he belief that the true objective of labour legislation was to advance the freedom, 
dignity and personality of the individual worker and workers as a whole, to assist in 
the emancipation of the human being as distinct from the fi ctional “legal person”. The 
ultimate practical purpose of academic labour law was to promote legislative reforms to 
that end.’ (in Lewis and Clark 1981: 39).
14 The term was coined by an Irish economist, Dr. John Kells Ingram, at the British Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) meeting in Dublin in 1880 (see O’Higgins, 1997: 53-54), which 
echoed Karl Marx’s insight that capitalism has turned labour power into a commodity. 
Later it was adopted as the fi rst principle of the Declaration of Philadelphia 1944, which 
embodied the work of the ILO (International Labour Organization), and was refl ected in 
the ‘Workers’ Chapter’ of Pope Leo XIII Encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891). 
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main focus of labour law is the problems emerging from the employment 
relationship between the employer and employee, and the relative power of 
the two parties, normatively ordered by the nature of the contract and condi-
tions of employment; statutory conditions of employment; state systems for 
the settlement of industrial disputes; and the right to collective organization 
and industrial action.
In an edited compilation of articles on labour law in a number of East Asian 
states, including Indonesia, Cooney et al. (2002)15 have argued that labour 
law in East Asia had been characterised by combining a more ‘traditional’ 
focus on the protection of employees in the employment relationship, and 
a focus on the broader labour market dimensions of state policy-making 
and regulations. Thus, apart from addressing the problems emerging from 
the employment relationship and the inherent inequality of power between 
the employer and employee, labour law has also paid attention to broad-
er employment issues such as human resources planning, job training and 
replacement, and social welfare.16 Cooney et al. (2002: 5-9) identify three 
important and interlinked influences that shape the contents of labour laws 
in many East Asian countries: (1) ‘legal transplants’ or borrowing from West-
ern states and from international institutions; (2) economic development 
policies; and (3) strategies of political control. As they note: ‘most of the 
developed or developing East Asian states have adopted, in broad outline 
at least (and some more recently than others), systems of labour law that 
reflect the form and content of the systems of Western countries’ (Cooney 
et al., 2002: 3). This has been a legacy of colonial powers, and more recently 
the efforts of the ILO, both through standard-setting and through technical 
cooperation. Such borrowings from external sources, in particular the West-
ern systems, have continued even after the countries gained independence.17
Concerning the influence of economic development policy on the form of 
labour law in East Asian countries, Cooney et al. refer to the work of Sarosh 
Kuruvilla (1996, 1995), who argues that a country’s industrialisation strategy 
largely determines its industrial relations and human resources policies, or 
at least, that they are ‘closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing’ (Kuru-
villa 1996: 635). Summarising his findings by comparing Singapore, Malay-
sia, the Philippines and India, Kuruvilla writes:
15 In this regard and in the discussion about Cooney et al. (2002), the chapter has ben-
efi ted from an article by Fenwick and Kalula (2005) which discusses labour law in East 
Asian and South African countries from a comparative perspective, using Cooney et 
al.’s (2002) approach.
16 As we shall discuss later in the chapter, the Manpower Law No. 13/2003 refl ects this in 
its contents.
17 Cooney et al. (2002: 4) describe a number of reasons why this continued borrowing hap-
pens: including the need of the state (or, often, a particular political party) to secure 
political legitimacy or self-assessment as a ‘modernizing’ state; pressures from other 
states, in particular the US and European Union; and pressures from NGOs.
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The author finds that import substitution industrialization was associated with Indus-
trial Relations/Human Resources policy goals of pluralism and stability, while a low-
cost export-oriented industrialization strategy was associated with Industrial Rela-
tions/Human Resources policy goals of cost containment and union suppression. In 
countries that moved from a low-cost export-oriented strategy to a higher value added 
export-oriented strategy, the focus of Industrial Relations/Human Resources policy 
goals shifted from cost containment to work force flexibility and skills development.
(Kuruvilla 1996: 365)
Another ‘domestic contribution’ to labour law in East Asian contexts, 
according to Cooney et al., is political control. Cooney et al. refer to this as 
the ‘regime stability’ strategy common to all East Asian countries that have 
been ruled by authoritarian regimes after World War II. As they note: ‘These 
regimes have implemented labour laws which, to varying degrees, have 
been aimed at repressing and/or co-opting labour, and sometimes capital, 
in order to prevent challenges to their rule or to the implementation of their 
policies’ (Cooney et al. 2002: 7). To support their argument about the use of 
labour law for political control in East Asian states, Cooney et al. refer to 
two theoretical contributions provided by Kanishka Jayasuriya and Frederic 
Deyo. Jayasuriya (1999), whose concerns are with the nature of state-based 
law in East Asia, argues that the rule of law in East Asia, different from the 
liberal notion of the rule of law in the Western countries, has reflected the 
corporatist structure of East Asian societies. It is enforced not only by spe-
cific laws but by the whole architecture of the legal system, which, he argues, 
has recreated the political rule established by the colonial state; particularly 
with respect to the ideological notions of ‘security and order’ (Jayasuriya, 
1999: 147-173).18
In an earlier article, Jayasuriya (1996) has termed this ‘rule through law’, 
or ‘rule by law’, in his discussion on the relationship between the develop-
ment of the rule of law in East Asia and the rise of capitalism. With respect to 
labour law, ‘rule by labour law’ took place in the sense that labour law – as 
with all laws under authoritarian regimes – became an ‘instrument to pursue 
the objectives of the state’ (Jayasuriya, 1999: 2-3). Jayasuriya’s argument is in 
line with Deyo’s explanation on the corporatist attidude towards labour in 
the East Asian states (Deyo, 1989).19 Deyo’s main concerns are to identify the 
relationship between economic and social structure, and the weakness and 
18 In this regard, Jayasuriya refers to Daniel Lev’s important article in 1978 about the Indo-
nesian Rechtsstaat or negara hukum. In another article, Lev argues that the Indonesian 
political system, under the New Order in particular, ‘shared much with that of the colo-
ny, but was even rawer in its lack of institutional controls and abuse of power’ (1999: 92; 
also cited in Lindsey and Masduki. 2002: 38).
19 Deyo focuses his study on four countries: Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singa-
pore. By corporatism he means ‘authoritarian’ or ‘state’ corporatism, as opposed to the 
more voluntarist ‘societal’ corporatism characteristic of many Western European nations, 
notably Germany (Deyo, 1989: 107).
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subordination of organised labour in the region. He argues that East Asian 
states have employed either repressive or corporatist methods of control-
ling labour. As he notes, repressive controls aim at ‘containing, demobilising 
and restricting’ workers, while corporatist controls endeavour to ‘organise, 
channel and encourage certain types of individual or collective behaviour on 
behalf of elite-determined economic or political objectives’ (Deyo, 1989: 107).
Legislative measures play an important role in the mechanism of controls as 
discussed by Deyo. In the words of Cooney et al. (2002: 8):
Repressive provisions include those prohibiting the formation of unions in key indus-
try sectors; rendering strikes effectively illegal; imposing compulsory arbitration of dis-
putes; banning union involvement in politics, and conferring extensive discretionary 
powers on state bureaucrats in relation to union registration and deregistration proce-
dures; collective bargaining; and the appointment of union officials. Corporatist provi-
sions, more common in the later phase of industrialisation, include those establishing 
welfare funds; conferring privileges on state-endorsed union federations; and atomis-
ing or decentralising unions to further enterprise and state paternalism.
Deyo’s analysis in his 1989 work was convincing, but it has become less 
relevant in the 1990s (see also Frenkel, 1993: 12) as it has not placed much 
attention on the democratization processes that have been underway in the 
regions since the 1990s (Jayasuriya, 1999, Cooney, 1999; Cooney et al., 2002: 
8-9).20 Democratization has weakened the authoritarian corporatism, which 
further destabilised the structure of labour law and thus its effectiveness. We 
shall discuss this further in the next section.
4.2 The impact of labour law in East Asia
Cooney et al. (2002) want to explain the so-called ‘gap’ between law and 
practice, which they argue is an obvious phenomenon in many East Asian 
countries. Although extensive labour laws exist in East Asian countries (see 
also Cooney and Mitchell, 2002: 246-274), there remains in all cases a large 
gap between law and practice. According to Cooney et al. (2002: 9), labour 
law regimes in East Asia have not been ‘invoked in the same ways or utilized 
to the same ends as in the West during the comparable period of economic 
development’. The law/practice gap in East Asia, they argue, is different not 
only in degree but also in nature from the law/practice gap that is the focus 
of socio-legal scholarship in developed countries. Several examples provide 
evidence for this claim: for example, despite the fact that democratization 
20 Wang and Cooney (2002; see also Cooney 1996) argue in the context of Taiwan, when 
authoritarian corporatism of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government weakened the 
structure of labour law has been increasingly unable to respond to the more democratic 
context of labour relations. This is particularly true in the context of collective labour 
relations, and workers enjoy greater freedom to organise themselves through unions, 
while strikes and other industrial actions become legal, at least in principle. 
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has allowed labour movements to increase their ability to challenge the state, 
this capacity remains well below that of their Western counterparts; and 
despite growing numbers of trade unions, the levels of collective bargaining 
remain relatively low, as does the frequency of industrial action under legal 
procedures.
Referring to the rhetorical question in Donald Clarke’s article on China: 
‘What’s Law Got to Do with It?’ (Clarke, 1991), Cooney and Mitchell point 
out: ‘[It] is not that law doesn’t exist but that it has little capacity to signifi-
cantly influence other social systems, such as the state or the market.’ How-
ever, they also note that labour laws are not uniform or consistent in effect; 
similar laws have different effects in different countries and over time. Dif-
ferent areas of labour law are associated with different gaps: for example 
the adjudication of ‘interest’ disputes (disputes over entitlements of future 
working conditions during collective bargaining) is utilised in different 
ways in Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan (Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 
247-248). Similarly, laws on the formation of trade unions have influenced 
the shape and activity of workers’ organizations to different extents in dif-
ferent countries: for example, laws limiting trade union formation in South 
Korea and Taiwan became ineffective, because most unions were actually 
formed outside the parameters provided by law, while in China, employ-
ment contract laws had a marked influence, radically altering that country’s 
employment practices.
In explaining how such a gap occurs between law and practice, the work of 
Otto Kahn-Freund (1974) is particularly important in Cooney et al.’s (2002) 
analysis. Cooney et al. (2002) critically examine Kahn-Freund’s notion of 
‘legal transplantation’ as a tool in examining whether or not it is possible for 
laws developed in one jurisdiction to function effectively in another (Kahn-
Freund, 1974: 1). Kahn-Freund argued that political factors, in particular the 
power structure of the state, have the biggest impact on whether or not a 
transplant will succeed (Kahn-Freund 1974: 11-13).21 For Kahn-Freund, it was 
‘how closely [the transplanted law] is linked’ with the power structure of the 
original system that would determine its success or failure (Kahn-Freund, 
1974: 13). He considers success in legal transplants to be a process of ‘natu-
ralisation’ of the foreign laws into the domestic legal system (Kahn-Freund, 
1974: 18), or ‘uniformity,’ which other comparative legal scholars see as the 
main indicator of success of legal transplants (see Smits, 2002). Kahn-Freund 
21 Here he referred to the three most important political differences: (1) differences between 
political systems (communist and non-communist, democracy and dictatorship in cap-
italist world); (2) differences in democratic themes and distributions of power in the 
government’s branches (e.g., presidential type in the US, parliamentary type in the UK, 
and a mixture of both in France and Germany); and (3) differences in the roles played by 
‘organised interests’ (economic and cultural) ‘in the making and in the maintenance of 
legal institutions’  (Kahn-Freund, 1974: 12).
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also discusses the ‘degrees of transferability’; that is, the degree to which a 
particular law is subject to ‘rejection’ by the new legal system (Kahn-Freund 
1974: 5-6). In the case of labour law (see also Whelan, 1982), Kahn-Freund 
argues that individual labour law is much easier to transplant than collec-
tive labour law (Kahn-Freund 1974: 21). This he argues, is because collective 
labour law in any country is ‘organised under the influence of strong political 
traditions’ (Kahn-Freund 1974: 20). Moreover, decisions in particular cases in 
this area of law are often more political than those in other areas; so the allo-
cation of decision-making power under the constitution (i.e. whether power 
is allocated to courts or the government) is particularly significant (Kahn-
Freund, 1974: 20; also Fenwick and Kalula 2005: 198).
Cooney et al. (2002) criticise Kahn-Freund’s claims that politics and the 
state’s power structures are the determining factors in the success of legal 
transplantation. They base their criticisms on two arguments. Firstly, Kahn-
Freund’s dichotomy of collective/individual labour law has become too 
simplified, now that labour law scholarship is increasingly encompassing 
labour market regulation. Second, they contend that the reasons any par-
ticular transplant succeeds or fails should not be presumed, but should be 
examined empirically. As they note, (2002: 10):
Kahn-Freund offered no supporting evidence for his contention about the relative 
importance of particular influences. It is true, of course, that the close interrelationship 
of a political power structure in a society and its laws makes such a position as that tak-
en by Kahn-Freund intuitively plausible. Nevertheless there is no reason for supposing 
a priori that political power structure is always the dominating variable in accounting 
for difference. The relative influence of factors can only be addressed and resolved – if 
indeed it is possible to resolve such a problem – by empirical observation.
Further, drawing on Teubner (1998) and the idea of social systems,22 Cooney 
and Mitchell (2002) suggest that in order to explain the law/practice gap in 
East Asia, there are two important applications of the law: the effectiveness 
of the law; and the consequences of transferring a legal concept from one 
system to another. The first application implies that if law is coupled loose-
ly with a relevant social system, as is the case with labour law and labour 
22 Gunther Teubner (1998) develops a more complex account of the relationship between 
law and its context. Teubner agrees with Kahn-Freund’s notion of ‘degrees of trans-
ferability’, and thus law is no longer tightly bound in its entirety to its social context. 
However, for Teubner the different parts of the legal system vary in the intensity of 
their connection not only with a society’s political systems, but also with its economic, 
technological and cultural systems (Teubner, 1998: 17–27). A central element of Teub-
ner’s approach is the concept of law as an ‘autopoietic’, self-distinguishing, social sys-
tem (Teubner, 1993). Teubner builds his argument based on the social systems theory 
formulated by Niklas Luhmann (see Luhmann, 1995, which focuses on ‘social system’; 
also Luhmann, 2004, which focuses on the ‘law as social system’), by viewing the social 
world as consisting of systems of communication such as law, the market, politics, the 
various sciences and so on (see also Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 249). 
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markets in East Asia, its effectiveness, in the sense of ‘capacity to “interfere 
with”, or influence, them productively’ will have a limited impact. The result 
would be ‘mutual indifference’ (Teubner, 1987), ‘as if law speaks (“this is ille-
gal!”) and no one listens (because “this is efficient” or “this is good policy” 
or “this is moral”).’ (Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 250). The second application 
is particularly important, due to the fact that most East Asian labour law 
systems are transplanted from Western countries. This may lead to the pre-
sumption that they will operate very differently from how they did in their 
Western place of origin (Cooney and Mitchell, 2002: 251). Thus, this analysis 
of social systems suggests that a law/practice gap is inevitable; which opens 
up space for a more empirical investigation of the issue.
One important factor in East Asia which distinguishes it from Western states 
is the range of deficiencies in the internal structure of the legal systems 
(Cooney and Mitchell, 2002: 252-254), which lessens the law’s ability to have 
an impact on other social systems:
The weaknesses internal to the structure of labour law in East Asian states – unclear dif-
ferentiation from policy, conceptual lacunae and low capacity to generate new norms –
 diminish labour law’s capacity to operate as a self-sustaining system. It becomes rel-
atively dependent on norms produced by other social systems. … These weaknesses 
suggest that law may have diminished regulatory capacity.
(Cooney and Mitchell, 2002: 254, also cited in Fenwick and Kalula, 2005: 202)
In relation to this, Cooney and Mitchell examine three broad kinds of rela-
tionships between law and other social systems: law and politics and politi-
cal structure; law and ‘culture’; and law and economic structure. Of the 
three sets of relationships, according to Cooney and Mitchell, the relation-
ship between law and culture is the most inconclusive,23 while the relation-
ship between law and politics and economic structure is the clearest. Most 
of the countries studied by Cooney et al. have been ruled by authoritarian 
regimes. The main goal of the state is to maintain regime ‘stability’, through 
policies controlling organised labour and policies of economic development 
and modernisation for legitimacy. Both have obviously characterised labour 
law in East Asia. In the most explicit cases, law ‘simply translates political 
objectives into legal terminology: that which is contrary to the interests of 
the state is illegal’ (Cooney and Mitchell, 2002: 256). But the law-politics rela-
tionship is more complex; in most cases it is a matter of accommodation. This 
includes cases involving state ignorance of the law (for example Taiwan, 
South Korea and particularly Malaysia); cases in which laws are expressed 
23 While there is literature on China (eg. Zhu, 2002, also Peerenboom, 1993) and Vietnam 
(Nicholson, 2002) which suggest that indigenous legal cultures might have an impact to 
the functioning of Asian legal systems transplanted from Western models, analyses of 
Indonesia (Lindsey and Masduki, 2002), Malaysia (Sharifah, 2002) and Taiwan (Wang 
and Cooney, 2002) suggest the contrary. 
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in ways that allow the state to interpret and apply them as it wishes (the 
Philippines); and cases in which laws are reserved through administrative 
measures, with little or no opportunity for judicial review or other means to 
challenge the law (Vietnam, and Indonesia before 200324). In these cases, law 
is not separated from politics to the same extent, or by the same means, as it 
is separated in the legal systems and countries from which it was adapted.
These variations in the relationship between law and politics have been 
examined in the context of the wave of democratization that has occured in 
the region, particularly in Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan. There may be 
expectations that such development would have a positive effect on society. 
Cooney and Mitchell, however, observe that the impact is actually unpredict-
able and sometimes paradoxical. While democratic change has undermined 
the corporatist nature of the state and the exercise of political power in gen-
eral, it may have had less impact on other social systems, such as industrial 
relations. In South Korea and Taiwan, although the law’s capacity to influence 
state action has increased, and the unwillingness of labour law to accommo-
date state policies has been growing, in both countries collective labour law 
remains widely ignored. As pointed out by Cooney and Mitchell (2002: 257):
One of the reasons for this may be that the relevant legislation is still closely linked to the 
superseded political form, and retains authoritarian elements incompatible with current 
political arrangements. The state is no longer prepared to back the law up with coercive 
force. Accordingly, in the world of industrial relations, they can safely be ignored.
As noted by Fenwick and Kalula (2005), one important finding from East 
Asia research is that labour law has been noticeably absent in the construc-
tion and functioning of labour markets. In Vietnam, it has been reported that 
around 80 per cent of workers in the country are not covered by relevant 
legal provisions, because they work in enterprises which employ fewer than 
the minimum number required for application of the law (Nicholson 2002: 
133). In the Philippines and Indonesia, large portions of the workforce are in 
the informal sector,25 and working in the informal sector means that workers 
are not protected by any laws (Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 259). As Cooney 
24 On 15 October 2003 the Constitutional Court started to operate in Indonesia (based on 
Law No. 23/2003 on the Constitutional Court), providing access to Indonesian citizens 
to challenge the laws through judicial review. 
25 As noted by Breman (1980: 4), the term ‘informal sector’ was fi rst coined by anthropolo-
gist Keith Hart (1971) in his description of the part of the urban labour force which falls 
outside the organised labour market in Kenya (see Jolly et al. check footnotes for italics a 
required 1973). The term has since been greeted as a useful concept, and has been further 
refi ned by the International Labour Offi ce (ILO) during a study of the employment situ-
ation in Kenya within the framework of the World Employment Programme (ILO, 1972). 
Indeed, in a recent publication, the ILO (2002) has stressed the importance of ‘decent 
work’ for workers in the ‘informal economy’, as a response to the proliferation of new 
forms of work relations that fall outside the defi nition of ‘employee’, which continues to 
be the basis for most labour protection legislation. 
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and Mitchell (2002: 258) note, it is almost to none that state-based law applies 
in a large portion of transactions in the labour market. A related finding is 
the important role played by non-state based ‘informal’ regulatory systems, 
as is the case in Indonesia and perhaps other countries, which have labour 
markets with large informal sectors (Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 263).26
Such findings require further empirical investigation in specific contexts, 
especially given the common criticism of labour law from neo-liberal econ-
omists that labour law has caused distortions in the labour market. Thus, 
legislation on minimum wages, in particular, would inhibit the effective 
functioning of labour markets, by, for example, raising wages higher than 
market rates, which may then create unemployment. The finding is signifi-
cant because it directly addresses the relationship between state-based law 
and East Asian markets, and also contributes to a critical debate in socio-
legal studies about the law’s role in economic development (see, e.g., Gins-
burg, 2000).27
According to Cooney et al. (2002), there are also other reasons why labour 
law has not been influential in labour markets in East Asia. One reason 
that they propose is ignorance: companies (and often employees) are often 
simply unaware of the relevant legal provisions. A second common rea-
son is economic necessity: legal penalties may be too high for companies 
to bear, with the cost of compliance exceeding a company’s capabilities, as 
is in early-1950s South Korea, and in Indonesia after the 1997-1998 crisis 
(Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 259). A third proposed reason is a lack of effec-
tive enforcement, with companies simply refusing to comply regardless of 
having the means to do so, if they know that there will be no sanctions any-
26 As indicated by Breman (1980: 4-5), the origin of the concept is linked to Julius Boeke’s 
‘dual economy’ (1953), as a classical explanation of the phenomenon of economic dual-
ism, and of the reasons behind sustained underdevelopment in Indonesia. The concept 
refers on the one hand to an urban market economy, usually of a capitalist nature, and 
on the other hand to a rural subsistence economy characterised mainly by a static agri-
cultural system of production. Such a position, which originated from the colonial situ-
ation, has long been dismissed as invalid, because it is based on the assumption of a 
particular socio-economic duality of different stages of development, and a contrast 
between modern and traditional, capitalistic versus non-capitalistic, industrial-urban 
versus agrarian-rural modes of production. As Breman (1980: 5) puts it: ‘The urban dual-
ism that is nowadays apparent in many developing countries is not due to any gradually 
disappearing contrast between a modern-dynamic growth pole and a traditional-static 
sector which has tenaciously survived in an urban environment, but rather to structural 
disturbances within the entire economy and society.’
27 Pistor and Wellons (1999), based on extensive studies in six countries in Asia between 
the years 1960-1995, conclude that there is generally a relationship between the develop-
ment of legal and economic systems, although not necessarily between all parts of legal 
and economic systems. Jayasuriya (1999), however, argues that ‘the East Asian example 
suggests that high levels of economic performance bear little or no relation to the devel-
opment of a credible legal system’ (Jayasuriya 1999: 7).
20 Introduction
way, or if they know that there are insufficient labour inspection officials 
available, or that officials can be bribed (Cooney and Mitchell 2002: 260).
The option of private enforcement – such as through civil litigation proce-
dures – as a way of curtailing opportunistic employers is perceived by aver-
age workers to be out of reach. The complexity of the law, the difficulty of 
undertaking legal procedures, and the high financial costs of the litigation 
process all hamper the opportunities for workers to use this option. Writing 
of the Philippines, Bacungan and Ofreneo (2002: 114) note:
The legal complexity underlying the labour relations process … strongly favour[s] the 
powerful and informed who are in a position to take advantage of and manipulate the 
dense and detailed [regulations]. In such cases, of course, in the very large sectors of the 
economy in which employees are unrepresented by labour organizations, there is very 
little chance of employees being aware of their legal rights or having the ability to have 
access to them.
Cooney and Mitchell (2002) also observe that not only can law influence 
aspects of the economic system, such as labour markets; the economic sys-
tem can also influence aspects of the law, such as the changing of the labour 
market structure. Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan have all expanded 
their regulatory scope of labour law to respond to the fact that their labour 
markets are net importers of labour; while the Philippines, and recently 
Indonesia, have responded to their status as labour exporters (Cooney and 
Mitchell 2002: 267). In the concluding remarks for their book, Cooney and 
Mitchell (2002: 267) point out:
[W]hen regulators use the medium of state-based law they will, whatever their sub-
stantive objectives, encounter in East Asia configurations of relationships between law, 
politics, economics and other social systems which are alien to Western experience.
The findings of Cooney et al. (2002) are salient, especially when one recalls 
that a key function of labour law today is to contribute to the correction of 
market failures: on the one hand to protect fundamental social and economic 
rights of the workers; and on the other hand to promote economic efficiency. 
It is the intention of this dissertation to find out to what extent these findings 
are relevant to and help explain Indonesia’s development since the Reformasi 
in 1998.
5 Labour law reform and its limits
The increasing exposure of countries to global free markets, in the globaliza-
tion of the economy, has put national governments under pressure to relax 
restrictions on internal markets in order to become more competitive. The 
buzzword is ‘deregulation’, to get rid of restrictions on free market activity 
and lower barriers to the movement of goods and services across country 
Introduction 21
boundaries. Some prominent changes have included the removal or mini-
misation of tariff barriers (such as customs duties and taxes on manufac-
turing); free mobility of capital; rationalisation in the movement of com-
modities and manufacturers; and, particularly within the World Trade 
Organization framework, recognition of intellectual property rights. In the 
context of labour, market reforms mean labour market reform (Mehmet et 
al., 1999, Brassard and Acharya 2006), which aims at making labour markets 
more flexible and less expensive. The view that businesses should not have 
to carry the costs of labour when that labour is not fully utilised in the pro-
cess of value-adding, has led to changes such as regulations to make it easier 
to ‘hire and fire’ workers (Standing, 1999; also Cook, 1998); abolishment of 
rigidities in wages fixing; and even the possibility of dropping wages (Bras-
sard and Acharya, 2006). Geographical mobility of labour, however, has not 
been directly mentioned. There appears to be an implicit understanding, 
especially among the OECD economies, that free movement of labour exists, 
but this opportunity largely benefits highly skilled workers; which would 
result in developing countries being greatly disadvantaged compared to 
developed countries.
One risk of labour market reforms is that they may move in a direction other 
than that which society, workers in particular, have hoped for and expected. 
Reforms can threaten the livelihoods and economic security of workers, by 
shifting the costs of social reproduction and market risk from employers and 
states to families and communities. Various forms of labour market deregula-
tion in developing countries have further weakened the already weak sources 
of income of millions of urban people in those countries (Deyo and Agartan 
2003). As explained by Deyo and Agartan (2003: 57-58), there are two types of 
labour market deregulation: policy-based deregulation and structural dereg-
ulation. The first type, policy-based deregulation, refers to direct state action 
through regulation of labour markets and employment practices, as well 
as companies’ efforts to casualise their ‘in-house’ work by outsourcing and 
informalising production and services previously conducted ‘in-house’. The 
second type, structural deregulation, refers to deregulation which takes place 
indirectly; for example when privatisation of state-owned enterprises forces 
workers out of the regulated workforce into the relatively unregulated sphere 
of private employment; or when increasing mobile capital undermines the 
power of trade unions and governments’ regulatory power in particular 
issues such as work rules and pay standards, employment benefit and sev-
erance pay; or when the expansion of export processing zones enlarges the 
extent of ‘formal sector unprotected labour’ in those zones.
Labour law plays an important role in this process, because labour law 
establishes the framework within which industrial relations and labour mar-
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kets operate.28 Legal change is generally by a new framework of labour law 
introduced in developing countries, as can be seen by the large number of 
laws regulating labour relations (Cooney et al., 2002). In this way, changes 
in labour law can indicate the nature of change in industrial relations sys-
tems in particular regions (Cook, 1998, Cordova, 1996). Since the early 1980s 
in East Asia (Cooney et al., 2002) and Latin America (Amedeo et al., 1995), 
and since the late 1990s in South East Asia (Deyo, 2006), labour law reform 
has occurred in conjunction with the countries undergoing a transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy, along with a shift in economic development 
strategies away from import-substitution industrialisation toward the adop-
tion of neo-liberal economic policies oriented toward exports. Indeed, as 
noted by Cook (1998: 312), democracy and neo-liberalism are the ‘twin pres-
sures’ that act on the industrial relations systems. Behind labour law reform 
is labour market deregulation, the primary goal of which is to enhance 
labour market efficiency and flexibility for the sake of economic growth. 
The primary aim is to free labour markets, labour-protection measures, and 
the labour process29 itself from the institutional rigidities imposed by gov-
ernment interference, trade unions and social obligations (Deyo and Agar-
tan, 2003). In other words, the main goal of the reform is to replace exist-
ing labour market institutions with new ones, which are more efficient, and 
growth promoting, and which are based on market rationality free of the 
limitations and interventions imposed by the state and other social institu-
tions.
28 ‘Industrial relations’ refers to a concept originally developed by John Dunlop (1958, 
1993), describing a system which comprises three actors and their interactions with each 
other: management organizations; workers and their organizations; and government 
agencies. ‘Labour markets’ refers to the commodifi cation of labour within the market 
function, through the interaction of workers and employers. As discussed earlier, in the 
last decade there have been efforts from some labour law scholars towards the ‘refor-
mulation’ and ‘reorientation’ of labour law, to shift the focus from employment rela-
tionships towards broader labour market issues, and to see the law become ‘the law of 
labour market regulation’ (see Mitchell and Arup 2006; also Deakin and Wilkinson 2005, 
D’Antona 2002). It has been suggested that labour law should shift its focus from, for 
example, ‘employees’ to the broader inclusive term of ‘workers’; and from ‘workplace’ 
to the ‘world of work’. 
29 ‘Labour process’ theory is associated with Michael Burawoy’s The Politics of Production 
(1996), which provides a thorough understanding of the transformation of labour, but 
highlights processes of control and expropriation in the production itself (see Burawoy, 
1996, particularly Chapter 1). Deyo and Agartan (2003: 56, 75) have further suggested 
‘labour system’ theory as an advanced interpretation of the labour process concept, 
that is: ‘the institutionalised social processes through which particular types of labour 
are socially reproduced, protected, mobilised and allocated via markets or other social 
arrangements into productive activities, managed and motivated at sites of production, 
and valorised into profi t or surplus’. The authors claim that this, ‘offers a more balanced 
account of the full range of labour transforming processes including but extending 
beyond the site of production itself’.
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Closely connected to the argument of institutional reform is the discussion 
about the inter-relationships between institutions, institutional change, and 
economic performance. These relationships have been analysed in the works 
of the economic historian Douglass North (1990; 1989; 1981), whose argu-
ments strongly influenced development agencies during the so-called ‘sec-
ond wave’ of law and development projects in the 1990s globally (Ginsburg, 
2000: 833; Trubek and Santos, 2006).30 In North’s words, institutions are 
defined as: ‘humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’. 
They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, and constitutions), 
informal constraints (e.g. norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed 
codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics: ‘Together they 
define the incentive structure of society and specifically economies’ (North, 
1994: 360, see also Rosser, 1999: 96). Since this dissertation focuses on chang-
es in particular laws, it is the first type of institution (i.e., formal constraints) 
that is of primary concern here.
There is evidence that the process of instituting a free market economy has 
negative impacts on workers’ livelihoods and economic security, in particu-
lar by ‘shifting the costs of social reproduction and market risk from employ-
ers and states to families and communities’ (Deyo and Agartan, 2003: 58). 
This process often leads to increasing institutional tensions and generates 
political opposition within the society (Polanyi, 1944; Everling, 1997). Other 
commentators have observed that the World Bank’s and the IMF’s debt-
restructuring projects in developing countries, which have reduced state 
subsidies and social services, have undermined the social wage31 of urban 
populations (see, for example, Everling, 1997; McMichael, 2000; Stiglitz, 
2002).32 It is also evident that in many developing countries, labour market 
deregulation – particularly in the form of policy-based deregulation – has 
30 The ‘fi rst wave’ of law and development, in the 1960s, refers to ‘[a] group of sociologi-
cally sophisticated, progressive academic lawyers’ who wanted to help the states in 
developing economies to improve their legal systems, in order to help people moder-
nise themselves (see Otto 2006: 161, referring to Newton 2004).  The ‘second wave’ in 
the 1980s refers to the renewed interests of development aid agencies about law in the 
relationship with development, infl uenced by neo-liberal ideology focusing primarily 
on economic growth and private property (see also Trubek and Santos, 2006). Later, Tru-
bek et al. (2006) argue that a new development wave has emerged (they prefer to use 
‘Moment’ as a more specifi c term to defi ne the moment that law and development ‘doc-
trine’ crystallises into ‘orthodoxy’), which includes ‘changes within the fi eld of develop-
ment economics, reactions to the failures of the neo-liberal Moment, changing policies 
and practice of the World Bank and other development agencies, development within 
legal theory in the centre, and the spread of a new legal consciousness to the periphery’ 
(Trubek and Santos, 2006: 3).
31 Social wage refers to social benefi ts available to all individuals, determined by the 
basis of citizenship rather than employment, and funded wholly or partly by the state 
through taxation and received free or at subsidised cost.
32 Such criticisms come not only from outside (Everling uses a Marxist approach, and 
McMichael a non-Marxist approach), but also from inside; represented by Stiglitz, who 
was a senior adviser to  the World Bank itself.
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diminished the legal obligations of employers in areas such as workers’ pay, 
benefits, job security, and pensions (Deyo and Agartan, 2003: 58).33 This has 
happened through giving more power to employers to hire and fire work-
ers, and to hire larger numbers of temporary workers rather than permanent 
staff. This development has had a direct impact on labour law, as it chal-
lenges the notion of labour law which held sway in industrialised market 
economies during the twentieth century (particularly between 1945 and the 
late 1970s), which was characterised by collectivisation and increasing pro-
tection for workers. Since the late seventies however, new developments in 
labour law have generally been taking a different course. In labour law lit-
erature, this change is described as including trends towards deregulation 
and increased flexibility for employers, which undermine the traditional col-
lective-interest representation of workers, and threaten the content of labour 
law, as we have known it.
As Davies (2004: xv-xvi) has shown, two main perspectives are adopted to 
examine the subject of labour law today: the human rights perspective, and 
the economic perspective. These two perspectives offer different (and often 
contradictory) insights, yet together they can be useful to help understand 
the effects of labour law in practice. As noted by Dhanani et al. (2009), the 
key point of the debate is whether, and to what extent, labour can be treated 
as a commodity which can be freely traded (as with other commodities) in 
the market; and whether labour markets need to be regulated. In the words 
of Paul Krugman (1998: 15, cited in Dhanani et al. 2009: 150): ‘while almost 
everybody concedes that, like it or not, most jobs must be supplied by pri-
vate, self-interested initiatives, there is still much confusion about what this 
concession involves. Part of the problem is that many people are still unwill-
ing to accept the idea that the labour market will not function well unless it 
is allowed to behave more or less like other markets.’
Thus, there are two different and contradictory positions regarding the 
need for labour market regulation: one for regulation, and one against (see 
also Manning and Roesad, 2007: 60-61, also Dhanani et al., 2009: 150-1). In 
the case of Indonesia, this debate has intensified since the economic crisis 
of 1997-1998. The IMF and other providers of foreign capital placed condi-
tions on their financial injections during the crisis, putting significant pres-
sure on the state to reform its economic and industrial policies; in particular 
its industrial relations system. This move towards neo-liberalism and global 
competition took the economy towards de-centralisation and de-institution-
alisation, as state policy shifted to encourage labour market flexibility.
33 See also International Industrial Relations Association Congress reports, various years, 
which have discussed such trends for several years.
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The situation faced by Indonesia right after the 1997-1998 Asian economic 
crisis was comparable to that of other developing economies in Asia at the 
time (Benson and Zhu, 2009)34: a situation characterised by declining union 
memberships, and the weakening of social and institutional support for 
workers. In an extensive volume on trade unions in Asia, Benson and Zhu 
(2008) examined union characteristics and related actions and strategies, 
in twelve economies in Asia that were facing increasing competition from 
globalisation and neo-liberalism during the period of their research. Using 
the historical-institutionalist perspective developed by Gospel (2005), Zhu 
and Benson (2008) identified different trajectories of institutionalisation and 
de-institutionalisation among these economies. They found that the ways 
in which different states responded to such pressures, through particular 
regulations and policy priorities, and the responses from trade unions varied 
markedly between countries (see also Frenkel and Kuruvilla, 2002).
There is, however, a converging trend; which is that trade union movements 
throughout Asia have generally adopted a market-orientated approach, as 
described in Hyman’s (2001) typology. According to Hyman, who analysed 
the development of trade unionism in Europe, there are three models of 
unions, differentiated by their orientation: market unionism, class unionism, 
and social unionism (see also Gospel, 2008). Market-orientated unions see 
unions as economic actors pursuing economic goals (‘business unionism’) 
such as the welfare of members, especially through collective bargaining 
within the labour market. Class-orientated unions see unions as vehicles of 
class struggle, and their role is to promote working class interests and the 
transformation of society in a revolution direction. Society-orientated unions 
see unions as social actors and social partners, with labour pursuing con-
structive roles in society, such as by strengthening the voices of workers in 
society and acting as a force for social, moral and political integration. In 
practice, unions tend not to be wholly one of these three ideal models, but 
rather a mixture; although combining all three models would be extreme-
ly challenging within any one organization. As noted by Gospel (2008: 15), 
Hyman’s (2001) triangulation between market, class, and social unionism is 
useful in mapping the trajectory of unions over time.35
34 In their analysis, Benson and Zhu (2008) identify two categories of Asian economies: the 
‘developed Asian economies’ – the more advanced economies in Asia, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia – and the ‘developing Asian econo-
mies’ – the less advanced economies in the region, including Indonesia together with 
China, Vietnam, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
35 Some unions (such as in the UK, the US and Australia) started out with a strong market 
orientation, before moving in a more class-focused direction through the early twentieth 
century. Then, over the last quarter-century, some have shifted towards greater social 
partnership between society and the market or back towards market-focused goals. 
France, which had an early tradition of class-based unionism, still today provides exam-
ples of many different types of unions (market, society oriented, and class-focused), 
existing side by side. In Germany after the Second World War, unions moved from class 
to market and social orientations. 
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Drawing from Hyman’s models, Zhu and Benson (2008: 261) argue that 
trade unions in East Asian developing economies ‘have shifted from a 
political-oriented [meaning class-oriented – ST] union approach to a mar-
ket-oriented form, with little society focus’. Given this shift, it may appear 
that Asian developing economies – including Indonesia – are following the 
Asian developed economies, which experienced market liberalisation earlier 
in the 1980s. However, Zhu and Benson (2008) warn that this apparent simi-
larity may disguise major differences between the two sets of economies. 
As Zhu and Benson point out:
[T]he developed [East Asian] economies enjoy a certain level of industrial and institu-
tional maturity with relatively sound social, economic and industrial infrastructures in 
place. They exhibit strong social networks to support the basic needs of working men 
and women. In contrast, the developing economies have not built the necessary basic 
social and legal protections for vulnerable workers. The adoption of a neo-liberal policy 
framework so quickly, along with the abandonment of the move towards institutionali-
sation and social protection has meant that sustainable well-being for both society and 
individual citizens is less likely in the developing economies.
(Zhu and Benson 2008: 261)
Here lie the limits of neo-liberal labour law reform, in which ‘the framework 
of decollectivized, deregulated, and deinstitutionalized neo-liberal labour 
law is here to stay because it matches the basic needs of a globalized capi-
talist market economy and of liberal democracy’ (Hepple 1996: 626). In the 
case of developing economies such as Indonesia, undertaking decentrali-
sation and de-institutionalisation before ensuring that both industrial and 
institutional stability have been achieved will be more likely to put the long-
term sustainable development of the society under threat. Nor is this threat 
one-directional: development and change will, in turn, face challenges from 
society. As noted by Hepple (1996: 626), ‘at the very moment of its appar-
ent triumph, individualized market labour law faces political, industrial and 
judicial challenges.’ It is the intention of this dissertation to examine these 
challenges in the Indonesian context, particularly from the perspective of 
those groups generally considered ‘the weak and vulnerable groups’ in soci-
ety – the workers and their unions.
Laws to regulate the exchange of personal services or other services for mone-
tary remuneration, have no social and cultural basis in early Indonesian soci-
ety. Paid labour as a means of subsistence does not fit with patterns of early 
Indonesian social relationships (Wertheim, 1959: 236). Labour was either a 
contribution to the collective, or a service to a traditional authority. As noted 
by Furnivall (1944: 184), the first experiment with paid labour, under Dutch 
colonial rule, only occurred in 1849, in association with harbour and defence 
work in Surabaya, East Java. This was considered by the government to be 
quite successful, and in 1851 the government ordered that all state buildings 
should be constructed with paid labour. In 1854 a Public Works Department 
was established, followed in 1857 by a policy that all government works, 
‘in the absence of express orders to the contrary’, should use paid labour.
This first foray into paid labour was, however, a short-lived phenomenon. 
The intensive exploitation of colonial assets demanded more labour, which 
‘could most readily be met by using the available Javanese farmers for 
unpaid compulsory services under the traditional feudal system’ (Wertheim, 
1959: 242). For a long time afterwards, the Dutch colonial government relied 
upon and maintained the society’s existing traditional and feudal labour 
relations systems1 as the main source of labour. Despite the fact that the gov-
ernment had initiated the banning of public slaves in 1854, and had made 
first provisions for the gradual abolition of slavery in 1860, the government’s 
economic interests appeared to remain dominant throughout the 18th and 
19th centuries, until almost the end of the colonial era. Most labour legis-
lation during this time was intended primarily to control labour, either in 
domestic service or industrial production, particularly on plantations such 
as those established on the eastern coast of Sumatra, which relied on import-
ed labour from Java.
1 In the Indonesian (Javanese) traditional feudal system this was called pancen, which 
basically meant a natural tax system in the form of labour (derived from the word panic, 
meaning ‘part’ or partial responsibility, see Wignjosoebroto, 1995: 95-6), and comprising 
obligatory house and garden works for the feudal chiefs. Other types of compulsory 
labour were heerendiensten for public works (Onghokham, 2003: 29), and desadiensten for 
the village (Furnivall, 1939: 182). Despite attempts to abolish this system in 1912, and its 
formal abolishment in 1917 (replaced by a head tax system), these compulsory services 
were retained informally by government agencies for many years later, particularly for 
public utility works such as work on roads, bridges and aquaducts; as well as work on 
private estates surrounding Batavia (Wertheim, 1959: 245).
1 Historical background: 
evolution of Indonesia's labour law
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That this early development of labour policy was directed towards the provi-
sion of labour can be seen in the provisions of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wet-
boek), which regulated employment contracts among the Europeans and, lat-
er, among all groups in society. By the early 20th century, heated debate about 
the Coolie Ordinances and the use and misuse of the penal sanction (poenale 
sanctie) forced the government to consider reforming its regulations, and 
according to Furnivall (1939: 354), this marked the start of the Netherlands 
Indies’ evolution of labour policy towards protection of labour. However, the 
Coolie Ordinances, the poenale sanctie and the actual practice of using coo-
lies were all only abolished near the end of the colonial era.
Meanwhile, trade union activities were also growing, particularly in the 
more modern fields of work such as mining, railways and harbours. The 
growing significance of trade unions within society, and most importantly 
their involvement in the struggle for the country’s independence, put trade 
unions in a special position once Indonesia gained independence. This was 
reflected in the early legislation established by the new country, which was 
characterised by the notion of protection for labour. This legislative focus 
continued through the 1950s and 1960s, until the rise of the ‘New Order’ in 
the mid-1960s.
1 The colonial era – the law of the lords
During the Dutch colonial era, two different types of legislation regulated 
the labour-employer relationship. The first comprised an employment con-
tract provision under the Netherlands Indies’ Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), 
in particular three simple paragraphs ‘on the hire of servants and workers’ 
(the articles are known as ‘1601-1603 old’ and were amended in 1926). The 
second was the Coolie Ordinance (Koeli Ordonnantie), which was designed 
to manage the contract coolie labour (kuli kontrak), and to reinforce the posi-
tions of European managers and assistants on large estates.
a The Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek)
The three paragraphs of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) on the hire of 
servants and workers were originally only applied to Europeans (Staatsblad 
1847 No. 23). From 1855 they were extended to include Foreign Orientals, 
and from 1879 natives were also included (Staatsblad 1879, No. 256; Hooker, 
1978: 194).2 The primary intention was to ensure the security of the Euro-
pean employers of native workers. However, the relevant sections of the 
2 According to Article 131 Indische Staatsregeling (Staatsblad 1925, No. 415), all persons in the 
Netherlands East Indies were classifi ed into one of three groups: Europeans, Natives and 
Foreign Orientals (Chinese, Arab and Indian inhabitants), with each group having their 
own law.
Historical background: evolution of Indonesia's labour law 29
Code were generic enough to be applicable to labour contracts between non-
Europeans as well – although initially this did not lead to implementation, 
as non-Europeans remained excluded from the system (Schiller, 1946: 176).
Using the Netherlands law of 1907 as their foundation, the colonial gov-
ernment in 1926 added a further 80 articles under the title ‘7A of the Civil 
Code’. Together these provided a comprehensive compilation of the law 
governing labour contracts, adapted to the Netherlands Indies conditions 
(articles 1600-1603z of the Civil Code). A provision was made for the future 
enactment of special legislation regarding labour contracts in agricultural 
or industrial enterprises, in rail, trams, general transport and other services 
(Schiller, 1946: 177). In addition, special provisions were also enacted later 
for maritime personnel and workers in industrial enterprises (up until 1941); 
however the new law did not modify the delegation of authority to enact 
special laws on plantation managers and assistants.
The new labour law contained several articles which stated that if a labour 
contract existed between an employer who fell within the scope of 7A of the 
Civil Code (on contract) and an employee who did not fall within the scope 
of 7A, then regardless of the intention of the two parties, that labour contract 
was nevertheless controlled by the provisions of 7A ‘if the work is such as 
is usually performed by workers falling within the scope of the title’ (i.e., 
Europeans) (Schiller, 1946: 177). Further, if an employer was not within the 
terms of 7A, and their employee was within the terms, their labour contract 
was always governed by the provisions of 7A (Schiller, 1946: 177). These pro-
visions gave rise to extensive litigation, and the courts had difficulties dif-
ferentiating work that was normally performed by Europeans from work 
that was not. The new labour law did, however, include clear rules for man-
aging interracial labour contracts; and there were provisions for both par-
ties to submit voluntarily to 7A even if the work was not of a kind usually 
performed by Europeans (Schiller, 1946: 177). Thus, although the new law 
was intended to apply to Europeans, in practice it could also cover labour 
contracts between and among natives and foreign orientals.3
3 Nonetheless, Schiller (1946: 177-178) also noted the complexity of the status of labour 
contracts when both parties were non-Europeans; for example when non-European 
employees for a European employer performed non-European work, which racially 
divided law might still apply to the oriental and native workers. As he summarised it: 
‘Race, nationality, the place where the work is performed, the type of work done, the 
person of the employer, the land of the employer, and recently the amount of wages 
paid, have all been decisive of the law to be applied.’ (Schiller, 1946: 179).
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b The Coolie Ordinances (Koeli-Ordonnanties)
Other important regulations were the Coolie Ordinances, which were 
designed to manage contract coolie labour (koeli kontrak) and to reinforce 
the European managers and assistants’ positions on large estates. The first 
Coolie Ordinance was promulgated in 1880 (Staatsblad 1880 No. 133) to regu-
late labour relations, particularly on the plantations in East Sumatra.4 This 
ordinance was later expanded to cover other regions of the Outer Islands, 
including mining operations on Bangka, Belitung (Billiton) and Singkep 
islands. Further ordinances in 1884 and 1893 gave employers more effective 
legal control over their indentured workers, who were brought particularly 
from Java.
The Coolie Ordinance was stricter than the normal regulations on employ-
ment contracts. It introduced contractual work based on ‘free contract’ and 
‘free labour’ systems, and importantly it introduced the use of penal sanc-
tions (poenale sanctie), and other types of punishment as ways to regulate 
labour in the Netherlands Indies (Wertheim, 1959: 250-1; see also Breman, 
1989, Stoler, 1985, Erman, 1995). Plantation managers used these systems 
(see Middendorp, 1924),5 as a means to keep their labourers; given the short-
age of workers in the Outer Islands. If a coolie violated his contract, he was 
liable for punishment, so that, ‘[a] labourer running away from his planta-
tion could be arrested by the police and, after undergoing a prison sentence, 
be forced to fulfil his contract to the end’ (Wertheim, 1959: 251).
In order to prevent labourers from returning to their homelands at the end of 
their contracts, plantation managements employed various means of induc-
ing the coolies to stay: ‘By encouraging gambling on pay-day, saving on the 
4 The Netherlands Indies’ so-called ‘plantation economy’ developed mainly in the sparse-
ly-populated Outer Islands (particularly Sumatra) between 1870 and 1942 (Thee, 1977). 
Due to the nature of the work, plantations required extensive labour; and this became a 
major problem for the industry. The shortage of labour was solved by recruiting contract 
labourers (coolies) from China, and later, from Java (see Breman, 1989: 14-74).
5 The poenale sanctie system itself had been in the colony for some time. In 1829 the Police 
Regulation for Surabaya (Soerabajasch Politiereglement) was declared, giving more legal 
power to people over their servants ‘by imposing a penalty on the non-observance of 
agreements’ (Furnivall, 1939: 181). In 1851 this poenale sanctie system was extended over 
most of Java and part of the Outer Islands (Thompson, 1947: 151). Later, the system 
was replaced by the Police Penal Regulation (Algemeen Politiereglement voor Inlanders) 
of 1872, with a clause penalising the breach of an agreement to work. Due to protests in 
the States-General, this poenale sanctie was repealed in 1879 (by Staatsblad 1879 No. 203), 
and a new article (article 328a) was added to the Penal Code (Wetboek van Straftrecht) (see 
Paulus et al., 1917: 360-365). However, new labour control problems emerged as interest 
shifted from domestic service to industrial production with imported labour, especially 
in the tobacco plantations of East Sumatra (Furnivall, 1939: 181-182). In 1880 this led to 
the promulgation of the Coolie Ordinance, and similar ordinances for other regions in 
the Outer Islands.
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part of the workers was hampered. The mandur [supervisor] saw to it that 
the labourer, when his contract was expired, was so deep in debt that he had 
no choice but to sign a new contract’ (Wertheim, 1959: 251). Other scholars 
reported similar conditions (see, e.g. Breman, 1989; Stoler, 1995; Erman, 1995; 
Somes-Heidheus, 1992).6 Plantation managers, to prevent workers from 
building solidarity, also used the existing racial tensions among the coolies: 
‘Foremen were played off against the common coolies, Javanese against 
Chinese, the indigenous Bataks and Malays against both groups. [Also] the 
penal sanction made strikes impossible and thus impeded the development 
of a trade union movement’ (Wertheim, 1959: 252).
Various forms of severe punishment were used to respond to and prevent 
resistance by the coolies. These included actions which today would be con-
sidered torture; as noted by Breman (1989: 218), they included:
[I]ncarceration without food and water, running the gauntlet, tying up in various posi-
tions (standing, sitting, laying on belly or back, crouching, hanging), standing in the 
sun for a fortnight (didjemoer, ‘airing’), binding them hand and foot, water immersion, 
bastinado in crucified position, dragging them behind a horse with the hands tied, beat-
ing them with leaves that caused itching and then drenching them with water so that 
the body swelled, having slivers of bamboo driven under the fingernails, rubbing fine-
ly-ground pepper onto female sexual organs, hanging Chinese coolies by the pigtail so 
that the victim could barely touch the ground with his toes, and clubbing them to death.
The combination of feudalistic and paternalistic attitudes within the indig-
enous agrarian sphere, compounded by colonial coercion, led to severe 
exploitation of workers. It was apparent that coolies in plantations experi-
enced conditions that in practice were often tantamount to slavery. The situ-
ation was well articulated by Tan Malaka, an Indonesian revolutionary, in 
his famous memoirs Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara (From Prison to Prison), dur-
ing his visit to Deli (December 1919 – June 1921):
Inilah klas jang membanting tulang dari dini hari sampai malam, klas jang mendapat upah tju-
ma tjukup buat pengisi perut dan penutup punggung, klas jang tinggal dibangsal seperti kamb-
ing dalam kandangnya, jang sewaktu-waktu di-godverdom-i atau dipukul, klas jang sewaktu-
waktu bisa kehilangan isteri atau anak gadisnja djika dikehendaki oleh ‘ndoro-tuan… adalah 
klasnja bangsa Indonesia, terkenal sebagai kuli-kontrak.7
6 The works of Breman (1989) and Stoler (1985) were important on this regard. These 
authors were among the early researchers to analyse the brutal colonial labour practices 
towards koeli kontrak in the Deli plantation on the east coast of Sumatra. Erman (1995) 
and Somers-Heidheus (1992) provide analyses of the cases of Belitung and Bangka 
respectively. 
7 Malaka, 1939: 49-50; translated and cited by Harry Poeze (1976: 76): ‘De klasse die zwoegt 
van vroeg tot laat; de klasse die loon krijgt juist genoeg om de maag te vullen; de klasse 
die woont in een schuur zoals geiten in hun stal; die ieder ogenblik geslagen of een “god-
verdomme” naar het hoofd geslingerd wordt; de klasse die ieder ogenblik hun vrouw of 
dochter kan verliezen als de blanke man haar begeert… dat is de klasse van Indonesiërs, 
bekend als contract-koelis.’
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[The class that toils from early until late; the class that gets wages just enough to fill the 
stomach and cover the back; the class that lives in a barn like goats in their stable; with 
frequent beating and ‘goddamns’ hurled at their head; the class that can lose at any 
time their wife or daughter if the white man desires her ... that is the class of Indone-
sians known as contract koelis.]
In 1902, Johannes van den Brand, a practicing lawyer, published his famous 
pamphlet De Millioenen uit Deli (the Millions from Deli), condemning the 
Coolie Ordinance and the practices it encouraged, on moral grounds (see 
Breman, 1987). As a response, in 1903, the Dutch colonial government 
ordered Public Prosecutor J.L.T. Rhemrev, a member of the Council of Justice 
in Batavia, to investigate the allegations. The Rhemrev Report revealed the 
extreme cruelty of many plantations practices. This report became ‘lost’ in 
the archives, and there has been speculation that it was deliberately hidden 
by the Minister of Colonies, to keep it from public scrutiny (justified on the 
grounds that there was no opportunity for the accused to defend themselves 
against the charges, and the government should focus not on the past but on 
the future (see Breman, 1989). It was not until the late 1980s that the report 
was first made public (Breman, 1989: 7).8
Due to growing concerns about the existing law, and particularly the prac-
tices described in the Rhemrev report, there were in fact some attempts by 
Dutch politicians to improve the legislation. In 1909, the penal clause was 
weakened (Staatsblad 1909 No. 526); and in 1911 ‘free’ wage labour (hiring 
on a contract without penal sanction) was included in the ordinance (Staats-
blad 1911 No. 540; Staatsblad 1916 No. 616) (Heijting, 1925: 21-2; Touwen, 2001: 
115).9 Rhemrev himself was appointed as a temporary Labour Inspector in 
East Sumatra in 1904. In 1908 the government also established the Labour 
Inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie) for the whole Netherlands Indies (Staatsblad 
8 Jan Breman, a Dutch scholar, made the report public for the fi rst time with his mono-
graph in 1987 (see Breman, 1987, Dutch version). Breman’s chief criticism was that the 
report was deliberately never made public. However, Breman’s claim has been ques-
tioned on several grounds. As noted by Touwen (2001: 113), some references to the 
report do exist in the earlier literature (e.g. Langeveld, 1978: 298; also Pelzer, 1978: 138-
9), and Breman’s criticism has also been challenged for failing to consider the temporal 
and geographical context. We will return to this issue later.
9 This resulted in coolies falling into one of three categories: either contract coolies; ‘free’ 
coolies (vrije arbeiders) or casual workers (losse arbeiders). As noted by Houben (1999: 17): 
‘[a] contract coolie was a person who had concluded [obtained] a contract on the basis 
of [the] Coolie Ordinance, i.e. a contract including the penal clause. “Free” coolies were 
labourers from outside the region who had concluded a contract without a penal clause 
on [the] basis of the amendments to the Ordinance […] Casual workers were coolies 
from the region itself who worked for an unspecifi ed period of time at an enterprise but 
did not fall under any kind of Coolie Ordinance … [whose] position was regulated by 
the Civil Code and adat [customary] law’. Houben also noted that the word ‘free’ was in 
fact a misnomer, ‘since it does not mean that a ”free” coolie was one without a written 
contract at all but rather one working under a different type of contract’.
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1908 No. 400) (Heijting, 1925: 79). This inspectorate operated as a branch of the 
Department of Justice, and was intended to provide protection for workers.
In 1921 a Labour Office (Kantoor van Arbeid) was created within the Depart-
ment of Justice (based on Staatsblad 1921 No. 813) in Batavia, consisting of 
three divisions: labour legislation and statistics (in Java); the Labour Inspec-
torate, which was effectively included from 1923 (by Staatsblad 1923 No. 336); 
and labour unions. This Office was responsible for all matters concerning 
government involvement with labour issues (Houben, 1999: 16; Heijting, 
1925: 79-82). However, the powers of the Office were restricted. As noted by 
Houben (1999: 16), the Labour Inspectorate was tasked: ‘to make an official 
report of any irregularities which came to its notice and to initiate a criminal 
investigation’, yet ‘its function was largely preventive since the punishment 
of offences was left to the judiciary’. This means that the inspectorate could 
not impose administrative sanctions on violators, unlike their contempo-
rary counterpart in the Netherlands. Breman (1989: xiv) also criticised the 
effectiveness of the Labour Inspectorate, which, in his opinion, had actually 
become ‘an instrument with which the coolies were conditioned in accor-
dance with the wishes and needs of their employers’. Moreover, following 
heavy pressure and lobbying from planters and employers, the coercive and 
penal conditions included in the Coolie Ordinance remained in force until 
almost the end of colonial rule (Breman, 1989: 273; also Stoler, 1985).
2 Labour disputes, emergence of unions, and their laws
During this time there were some other developments towards a measure of 
freedom for workers in Indonesia, particularly in the more recently-estab-
lished industries such as mining, industry and transport. Under the con-
siderable influence of left-wing Dutch political groups, Indonesian railway 
workers started the modern trade union movement with the establishment 
of the first labour union in Java in 1905; the State Railway Workers Union 
(Staatsspoor Bond) in Bandung, West Java.10 European workers dominated 
this union though, with few members who were native Indonesians,11 yet an 
‘embryonic class consciousness’ was growing in the colony (Ingleson, 1981: 
10 The organization’s status as a ‘legal person’ (rechtspersoon) was already recognised in 
1905 with Governor General Decision (Besluit) No. 25 of 19 October 1905; and they were 
able to get the organization’s statute recognised in 1910, with Governor General Deci-
sion (Besluit) No. 28 of 14 June 1910 (see Soewara S.S. Bond, 8 July 1910).
11 The union’s early offi cials, who were mainly European, were aware of this situation, and 
campaigned to persuade the indigenous workers to join the union. The offi cial publica-
tion Soewara S.S. Bond was published in the Malay language, with the clear intention of 
encouraging indigenous workers to join the union (see e.g. Soewara S.S. Bond, 8 April 
1910, which discusses the meaning of the word ‘bond’ [union]).
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485; 499).12 Labour unions grew significantly in the 1910s and 1920s, in sup-
port of groups of workers including teachers, railway workers, chauffeurs, 
dockworkers and domestic servants. The efforts of these unions to improve 
not only wages but also working and living conditions for their members 
were often successful.
The emergence of labour unions was not an entirely peaceful process. 
Well before the formation of labour unions, it was reported that hundreds 
of labour disputes had broken out spontaneously in Java – although these 
disputes were referred to by the Operations Manager of the Semarang-Joa-
na Stoomtram Maatschappij as ‘a storm in a tea cup’. It was also noted that 
between 1901 and 1905, the average number of strikes in the colony was 
120.6 per year, rising to 137 per year in the five years from 1906 to 1910. It 
was further estimated that 11,882 people went on strike each year between 
1901 and 1906, with an average of 7,841 people per year over the next five 
years (Ingleson, 1986: 62-3; see also Locomotief, 4 January 1913).
As Ingleson (1986: 63) has further described:
Given the smallness of the urban workforce and the probability that the Bureau of Sta-
tistics received information from larger employers only, these figures represent a sig-
nificant level of direct action by Indonesian workers. As far as can be ascertained, they 
were all short-lived spontaneous protests by small group of workers whose dissatisfac-
tion with their lot was brought to the surface by some minor immediate grievance. In 
many cases aggrieved workers sought redress from their foremen or from European 
supervisors, often directly confronting European managers as a group, sometimes with 
their foremen as spokesmen. While successful negotiations have gone unrecorded, pre-
sumably workers were often able to resolve their grievances this way. However, when 
employers rejected or ignored workers’ petitions, they often responded by simply 
walking off the job. Few of these strikes lasted beyond two or three days; many were 
resolved in a matter of hours.
Labour disputes during this time were marked by a lack of communication 
between European managers and their workers; with a lack of any concept 
of industrial relations. The usual response by European managers to pro-
test actions by the workers was to inform the local Assistant Regent (called 
patih or wedana), who would then visit the workplace and talk to the work-
ers: ‘Usually these officials sternly lectured strikers on the serious conse-
quences of not returning to work immediately, but as well they often acted 
12 Ingleson, however, also noted that this ‘embryonic class consciousness’ never developed 
into a fully fl edged class consciousness’ since ‘it all too easily slid into the alternative of 
race consciousness’ (Ingleson, 1986). Compared to China and India, for instance, in Indo-
nesia there was no signifi cant indigenous capitalist class. Most of the modern sectors of 
the economy were predominantly in the hands of European managers or supervisors, 
in the service of the European capitalist class. The remainder of the economy was con-
trolled by the Chinese (particularly the batik [traditional clothes] industry), or for some 
industries, by Arab immigrants. For Indonesian workers, the Chinese and Arab manag-
ers and supervisors were as alien as the Europeans (Ingleson, 1986: 7).
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as mediators, convincing managers of the genuineness of workers’ griev-
ances and the need for them to be redressed’ (Ingleson, 1986: 63). With the 
strikers’ leadership mainly comprising older workers or foremen, and with 
no involvement by outsiders, these early strikes had many similarities to 
the peasant protest movements and uprisings. Referring to Ravanjiv Kumar 
(1971), Ingleson (1986: 63-4) has argued that: ‘Like peasants protests, early 
urban strikes occurred spontaneously, were sudden outbursts of pent-up 
frustrations and longstanding grievances, and lacked class-consciousness, 
class organization or even formal leadership. Their goals were limited to 
redressing immediate and local grievances, with no sense of being part of a 
wider social movement’.13
The situation started to change after the establishment of the nationalist 
organizations Boedi Oetomo in 1908 and Sarekat Islam in 1912. Indonesians 
employed in private undertakings, as well as agricultural and factory work-
ers, started to form similar organizations (Thompson, 1947: 158). Although 
Sarekat Islam did not begin to organise urban workers directly until 1917, 
the communists’ growing influence within Sarekat Islam led to an increasing 
sense among workers that they had support. As noted by Ingleson (1986: 64): 
‘Sarekat Islam offered a sense of comradeship and purpose. Urban workers, 
especially the skilled and the literate, flocked to the Sarekat Islam branches 
where they discussed social and economic issues, including, of course, those 
issues which affected them directly – wages and conditions in the workplaces.’
The local Sarekat Islam leaders began to involve themselves in labour dis-
putes, ‘initially as advisers and mediators, but very quickly as providers of 
the outside leadership which urban workers had hitherto lacked’ (Ingleson, 
1986: 64). Eventually, the difficult economic situation in the Netherlands 
Indies during and after World War I, along with the growing influence of 
13 The ineffectiveness of the labour movement, according to Virginia Thompson (1947), 
was one of the two major ‘labour problems’ (the other one was labour supply) in Indo-
nesia and Southeast Asia in general during the colonial era. Wilfrid Benson, in the pref-
ace of Thompson’s book, summarised the situation: ‘In Java, the maximum number 
of organised workers appears to have been reached in 1941 when the membership of 
trade unions was estimated at 123,500. […] There was little unity or continuity among 
the unions which existed. The Western government feared the political interests of the 
labour movements. The seasonal character of much of the employment, labour migra-
tion and, in some cases, the racial diversity of the labour force, were other factors mak-
ing trade union organization diffi cult.’ Something that arguably still is the main charac-
teristic of the Indonesian labour movement today.
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the communists, drove Sarekat Islam in a more radical direction.14 The Sarekat 
Islam’s growing influence in urban areas was demonstrated by its success-
ful initiatives, such as persuading employers to allow workers time off on 
Fridays for Muslim prayers; and persuading workers to stay at home for 
one day of the year (the group demanded that the prophet Muhammad’s 
birthday in late February 1913 should be a rest day).15 This influence at times 
aroused tension and panic among the Europeans in Java, as illustrated by 
the widespread rumours, in early August 1913, of a plan by native people to 
undertake mass murder of Europeans on 24 and 25 August.16
These tensions, and the belief that the Sarekat Islam was behind plans to 
organise a strike in 1913 by workers at the East Java Steamtram Company 
(Oost Java Stoomtram Maatschappij; the OJS), led to the company’s Head of 
Operations, along with the Chief Representative (Hoofdvertegenwoordiger) 
of Samarang-Joana Stoomtram Maatschappij (the SJS; of which the OJS was an 
operating company), to contact the Commandant of Java’s Second Military 
Division on 26 June 1913 and 5 July 1913, to discuss the possibility of mili-
tary assistance in the event of a strike.17 This may be the first recorded for-
mal communication between a company and military authorities concerning 
labour issues; and the first clear invitation of military intervention in labour 
disputes. Meanwhile, government concerns were also growing regard-
ing the possibility of a general strike in the railway industry; an industry 
that was crucial to the transport of export crops from the hinterland of Java, 
and on which the finances and the prosperity of Dutch economic interests 
depended.
14 The initial programme of Sarekat Islam itself was very moderate politically. The the main 
purpose of the organization was to further the interests of Islam in Indonesia and to 
work for the social and economic advancement of the people in co-operation with the 
colonial government’s Ethical welfare programme. As Tjokroaminoto, the founder of 
the organization, once stressed in his speech at its congress in 1916: ‘Our objective is the 
unifi cation of the Indies and the Netherlands, to become citizens of the self-governing 
“State of the Indies”. We do not want to cry out: “Down with the government!” On the 
contrary, our motto is: “Together with the government and in support of the govern-
ment to go in the right direction…’ (in Penders, 1977: 257). 
15 Its well-known publication, Oetoesan Hindia, became a useful tool for spreading the 
organization’s propaganda to the members.
16 The Java Bode, a Dutch language newspaper, even felt it necessary to inform its readers 
that: ‘[t]he feelings of the natives, fi red by religious frenzy, will burst out in the mass 
murder of Europeans. The rabble, taking advantage of the fanaticism of their fellow men 
and hiding behind Sarekat Islam, will send murder parties to their targets’ (cited in Ingle-
son, 1986: 70).
17 See Chief Representative (Hoofdvertegenwoordiger) of Samarang-Joana Stoomtram Maat-
schappij to the Directors (Directie), 5 July 1913, Nederlandsch-Indische Spoorwegmaatschappij 
en Tramwegmaatschappij NV Gemeenschappelijk Archief, 1880-1975, Dossier 745b, ‘Maatrege-
len bij Werkstakingen, 1913-1925’. See also Ingleson, 1986: 70. As we will see in Chapter 
3, this became one of the main characteristics of the New Order labour practice.
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According to Ingleson, this led to the issuance of an Ordinance in September 
1914, which allowed ‘the use of military on civil functions for the preser-
vation of public order or the maintenance of essential services in the pub-
lic or private sectors’ (1986: 71).18 Although the initial intention was merely 
to keep the railways functioning in the event of a strike, the new law was 
equally useful as a means of preventing strikes in any industry in the colony. 
‘This was the first major change in the colony’s laws specifically designed to 
control urban workers’, concluded Ingleson19:
Strikes were neither prohibited nor restricted, and beyond bureaucratic registration 
rules there was nothing to stop combination [unionisation] by workers in individual 
industries or on a colony wide basis. The control of urban labour was primarily through 
administrative measures and the wide provisions of the Penal Code under which swift 
action could be taken against anything deemed a threat to ‘tranquillity and order’. 
In such cases, Residents, local officials and the police had wide powers of arrest and 
detention. Moreover, controls over Indonesian press and ordinances controlling pub-
lic speaking ensured that any Indonesian, or for that matter any European, could be 
arrested and hauled before the Courts for an inflammatory speech or article. … Many 
hundreds of journalists, editors and political activists were jailed or fined under these 
provisions.
Without providing details, Ingleson pointed out that between 1921 and 
1926, a series of repressive laws was enacted which made it difficult for even 
the most moderate labour unions to remain active. As noted by Thompson 
(1947: 160-161), the colonial government did not favour joint negotiations 
by employers and employees regarding the regulation of working condi-
tions, and regarded collective agreements as matters merely for the parties 
concerned. On 11 May 1923, the Penal Code of the Netherlands Indies was 
amended with article 161 bis, by which inciting others to strike was a crime 
18 As we will see in later Chapters, the term ‘essential services’ was used repeatedly in the 
history of Indonesian labour regulations, as a means of legitimising the need to avoid 
strikes..
19 Ingleson referred to the ‘Ordinance of 14 September 1914’ or ‘Staatsblad 1914 No. 614’, 
which seems an error as that particular Ordinance does not refer to the use of the mili-
tary on civil activities as Ingleson describes. A check of the original archives (accessed 
at the National Archive in Den Haag, the Netherlands) shows that he may have quoted 
from a letter from the Chief Representative (Hoofdvertegenwoordiger) of Samarang-Joana 
Stoomtram Maatschappij to the Directors (Directie), dated 13 October 1914, which errone-
ously mentioned ‘614’ when the number was instead meant to be ‘612’, as can be seen 
in its appendix. The staatsblad discussed was actually Staatsblad 1914 No. 612 concern-
ing ‘Regeling van de verhouding en de samenwerking tusschen de burgerlijke en mili-
taire autoriteiten’ [Regulation of the relationship and cooperation between the civil and 
military authorities], which amended Staatsblad 1907 No. 261 with article 8a. See also 
Nederlandsch-Indische Spoorwegmaatschappij en Tramwegmaatschappij NV Gemeenschappelijk 
Archief, 1880-1975, Dossier 745b, ‘Maatregelen bij Werkstakingen, 1913-1925’.
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with a maximum sentence of 5 years in prison.20 Through this formal adop-
tion of provisions limiting the right to strike, any agitation which disturbed 
‘public order’ or contravened the labour contract was liable to be penalised. 
This new provision, together with other penalty initiatives in some regions, 
effectively halted the organization of strikes. In one case study, J.E. Jasper, 
the Resident of Pekalongan, released a technical briefing to his staff on 12 
May 1923 regarding the handling of security by the military, field and dessa 
police in the event of a strike in Pekalongan. Jasper was responding to the 
promulgation of Staatsblad 1923 No. 227 the day before, which declared that 
article 8a of Staatsblad 1919 No. 562 (jo. Staatsblad 1919 No. 27) be applied 
throughout Pekalongan, with public gatherings prohibited unless with prior 
notice.21
In a clear example of the lack of recognition of collective negotiations 
between management and employees, there was no reference to strikes 
in the Netherlands Indies’ early labour laws. Nor were any public institu-
tions tasked to deal with disputes between management and labour. Before 
1926, the law covered only individual contracts with no provisions made 
for collective agreements, other than those falling within the competence of 
the Coolie Ordinances. Further, agreements between native employers and 
employees were governed by their customary laws, which in fact were not 
part of the central government’s realm. When the Civil Code was amended 
in 1926, the validity of collective bargaining was finally recognised, but it 
was only applicable to Europeans. The official statistics below indicate how 
effective the provisions were: in the 1930s, strikes were few, affecting only a 
small number of companies and, on average, involving only a quarter of the 
company’s workers (see table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Number of NEI Workers on Strike, 1936 – 40






strikers to total 
workers
Days of work lost
1936 6 872 33.7 4
1937 22 1,357 15.0 100
1938 15 741 20.8 40
1939 18 1,628 13.8 36
1940 42 2,115 22.6 32
Source: Thompson, 1947: 160
20 The article was later annulled by the independent Indonesia’s transitional government, 
through Penal Code Act No. 1 of 1946 (see article 8). The act also repealed all the penal 
laws implemented by the highest military command of the Netherlands Indies or ‘Veror-
deningen van het Militair Gezag’ (see article 2 of the Act No. 1 year 1946).
21 Nederlandsch-Indische Spoorwegmaatschappij en Tramwegmaatschappij NV Gemeenschappelijk 
Archief, 1880-1975, Dossier 745I, ‘Werkstakingen, 1923’. 
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It is important to note that until the last phase of the Dutch colonial era, 
there was no official machinery set up for the settlement of labour disputes. 
The only way workers could settle their grievances was through the regular 
courts, whose decisions were final. Conciliation procedures were first estab-
lished in 1926; specifically, for disputes in the railway industry in Java and 
Madura. This so-called ‘tripartite’ labour dispute settlement mechanism, 
comprising representatives from unions, employers, and the government, 
was introduced by Government Regulation No. 3x of 1926 (Staatsblad 1926 
No. 224, 12 June 1926), slightly revised in 1929 by Government Regulation 
No. 1x of 1929 (Staatsblad 1929 No. 456, 16 November 1929).22 In November 
1937 the regulation was expanded to cover the whole of the Netherlands 
Indies (Staatsblad 1937 No. 624), and in July 1939, it was expanded to include 
other industries.
The 1937 law provided mechanisms for government intervention in dis-
putes, and also for voluntary settlement before cases progressed to courts. 
This was considered particularly important for cases involving the public 
interest’ (see also Thompson, 1947: 161). In such cases, a committee compris-
ing representatives from each group was established, which would attempt 
to arrive at a voluntary settlement, and was required to report its findings to 
government. From 1939, a committee comprised of officials chosen by the 
Director of the Justice Department, and tasked to attempt to reach voluntary 
settlement and to report on its actions could investigate all disputes.23
Following the banning of the Perserikatan Komunis Hindia Belanda (Nether-
lands Indies Communist Party)24 after their unsuccessful uprising in Novem-
ber 1926 and January 1927, unions were also banned by the Dutch colonial 
administration in 1927 (Ingleson, 1981: 501). Despite this ban, labour unions 
continued to play an important role (albeit without legal protection) in 
22 Nederlandsch-Indische Spoorwegmaatschappij en Tramwegmaatschappij NV Gemeenschappelijk 
Archief, 1880-1975, Dossier 745c, ‘Regeling Verzoeningsraad, 1920-1927’; also Dossier 745d, 
‘Maatregelen tot voorkoming van arbeidsgeschillen (Verzoeningsraad), 1920-1925’.
23 As noted by Thompson (1947: 161), in the last phase of colonial rule, the Netherlands 
Indies government responded to the outbreak of war in Europe by enacting a labour 
relations law on 16 Dec 1940, which was founded on an arbitral system. Through this 
law, the government was entitled to involve itself in labour disputes arising out of war-
time conditions, including the dismissal of workers, changes in working conditions, 
pension payments, and allowances. A Commission of Labour Affairs was established 
to hear and decide cases, and to advise the Governor General on labour matters. Firms 
whose output was connected with the war effort and which had more than twenty 
employees were obliged to obtain approval from this commission before making any 
changes to working conditions; and in enterprises with fewer than twenty persons, 
workers had the right to appeal to the commission in regard to changes in working con-
ditions. When the disputing parties were not able to reach agreement, the Director of 
Justice had the fi nal authority.
24 The Netherlands Indies Communist Party was founded in 1920, and later became the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI).
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increasing workers’ wages; representing their grievances to employers and 
forcing the colonial government to pressure employers to improve wages 
and conditions (Ingleson, 2001). Indeed, as political parties at the time func-
tioned relatively ineffectively, labour unions became central to the develop-
ment of political consciousness, by providing places for organizational skills 
to develop, and by becoming involved in the emerging nationalist indepen-
dence movement. As noted by Trimurti (1980), following the proclamation 
of independence, the so-called ‘lasykar buruh’ (labour brigade) was directly 
involved in defending workplaces against the Dutch forces, and also seized 
foreign-owned production facilities in the nationalist cause. Ingleson (2001: 
100) concluded:
In 1941, on the eve of the Japanese occupation, labour unions were among the strongest 
Indonesian organizations in the colonial towns and cities. In the aftermath of indepen-
dence in August 1945 labour unions were quickly re-formed and, freed from many of 
the restrictions of the colonial state, recruited large numbers of urban workers. The suc-
cesses and failures of the colonial labour movement were part of the collective memory 
of many leaders and members, influencing the direction of post-independence activi-
ties.
Although Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, there 
were four more years of armed struggle before the Indonesian government 
officially took over sovereignty from the Dutch in December 1949. The 
labour movement participated actively in this struggle, including through 
revolutionary fighting, and their contribution to the gaining of indepen-
dence ensured their place in post-colonial Indonesia (Hadiz, 1997).
3 The early independence – protective legislation (1945-1949)
Given the influence and prestige of its role in the independence struggle, 
Indonesia’s labour movement was in a strong position to influence the new 
nation’s labour laws, particularly the policies related to the improvement of 
wages and salaries. It is not surprising that in early independent Indonesia 
there were several new labour laws that could be considered ‘progressive’, 
in the sense that they were based on the notion of protection for workers. 
As we will see, many provisions were actually transplanted from abroad, as 
early political leaders became inspired by international policies while for-
mulating new systems for their new nation. The concept of labour protec-
tion by law had been promoted in the colony since 1920, with the establish-
ment of PPKB (Persatuan Pergerakan Kaum Buruh, United Labour Movement) 
by union leaders, including several (such as PPKB’s chair Semaoen, vice 
chair Surjopranoto, secretary Agus Salim and assistant Alimin) who were 
to become well-known figures in the labour and independence movement 
(Trimurti (2007: 143-4). PPKB fought, among other issues, for minimum 
wages, maximum working hours (8 hours during the day, 6 hours at night), 
annual holidays of 14 days, formal recognition of labour unions in the work-
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place, and the establishment of a tripartite council for labour dispute settle-
ment, pensions and social security schemes. Although the PPKB itself did 
not survive long, with differences among the leadership causing its dissolu-
tion in 1921, its chair Semaoen and other leftists including Tan Malaka and 
Bergsma immediately formed a new federation, RV (Revolutionaire Vakcen-
trale, Union Federation), and by 1922 they had re-joined other ex-PPKB lead-
ers to form PVH (Persatuan Vakbond Hindies, Indies United Unions). In 1927 
PVH became a victim of the failed coup by the Netherlands Indies Commu-
nist Party, however, with some of its leading figures gaoled.
In the early years after Indonesia’s proclamation of independence, the Min-
istry of Social Affairs handled labour issues. Then, on 3 July 1947, under 
the provisional government of Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin,25 a special 
Ministry of Labour was established, whose main functions were to handle 
labour issues in general, including protection of workers and job opportuni-
ties, social security, labour disputes, workers’ organizations and representa-
tives, and unemployment (based on Government Regulation No. 3/1947 on 
25 July 1947). The first Minister of Labour appointed was Soerastri Karma 
Trimurti (known as S.K. Trimurti).26 As noted by Nasution (1996: 33), many 
of these early leaders were committed strongly to the popular aspirations of 
the new Republic and its people, while also realizing the importance of mak-
ing a good impression internationally, to gain support for the new country. 
Their commitment was reflected in the enactment of laws, which were con-
sidered ‘pro-people’, and with respect to labour laws, Trimurti and in par-
ticular Soetomo Martopradoto (head of the legal drafting department within 
the Ministry) played important roles in ensuring the enactment of protective 
labour legislation during this time.
25 Amir Sjarifuddin was a socialist and a leading fi gure in the new Republic. Born into 
Sumatran aristocracy in the city of Medan, he was educated in Haarlem and Leiden in 
the Netherlands before gaining a law degree in Batavia (now Jakarta) (Vickers, 2005). 
In the Netherlands he studied Eastern and Western philosophy. He succeeded Sjahrir’s 
parliamentary cabinet after the proclamation of independence. He was later executed 
in 1948 by Indonesian Republican offi cers following his involvement in a Communist 
revolt, the so-called ‘Madiun Affair,’ in Madiun, Central Java. 
26 S.K. Trimurti was a well-known journalist, leader of the Labour Party and war heroine 
in the struggle for independence since the 1930s. She had been arrested by the Dutch 
colonial government in 1936 due to her political activism, and later became a journalist 
and closely involved in the struggle for independence. Although she was a founder of 
‘Gerwis’ (later ‘Gerwani’; a women’s organization associated with the PKI or Indonesian 
Communist Party) – she survived the 1965 atrocities with the killings and arrests of the 
PKI supporters because she had left Gerwis just before. She later became a strong critic 
of the authoritarian New Order government, by joining the ‘Petisi 50’ (‘Petition 50’), 
which comprised 50 leading political fi gures including Abdurrachman Wahid and Ali 
Sadikin. She died in 2008 at the age of 96 and was buried at the Heroes Cemetery in 
Jakarta (see Henky et al., 2007; also Blackburn, 2004: 176).
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On 18 October 1947, just two years after the proclamation of independence, 
the Safety at Workplace Law was promulated (Law No. 33/1947).27 This law 
signalled a significant shift in the labour policy of the new country. Previous-
ly the regulations concerning relationships between employers and employ-
ees were ruled by Articles 1601-1603 of the colonial Civil Code, which was 
more concerned with ‘private’ contracts between parties, including the lib-
eral notion of ‘no work no pay’. The new focus on workers’ rights continued 
in 1948 with two further Laws: the Workers’ Protection Law (No. 12)28 and 
the Labour Inspectorate Law (No. 23). Law No. 12 covered many aspects of 
labour issues including the prohibition of discrimination at work; 40-hour 
and six-day working weeks29; employers’ obligations to provide housing for 
workers, and an article prohibiting the employment of children under the 
age of fourteen. It also guaranteed women the right to take menstruation 
leave (two days per month) and three months’ maternity leave, as well as 
a strict restriction of night work for women. Law No. 12/1948 became the 
prime labour law of the time, setting the tone for labour regulations and pro-
tection in the new nation.
As noted by Iskandar Tedjasukmana (1961), this protective notion of labour 
originated from abroad. As he pointed out (1961: 10):
To a great extent – especially with regard to the rights of workers, labour protection, 
social security, and workers’ participation in management – the elements of Indonesian 
public labour policy were derived from the ideas, experiences, and achievements in 
Western countries, or from international sources, either directly, or through the interme-
diary of Indonesian social movements of which are mentioned here the pre-war nation-
alist movement, and the Republican labour movement and political parties.
These international sources were acknowledged by Soetomo Martopradoto,30 
the head of the Ministry of Labour’s legal drafting department in 1946-47 
under Minister Trimurti, who initiated and drafted the Law. Martopra-
doto explained that his law combined various policies from other coun-
tries, as well as a number of existing protective provisions from the Dutch 
colonial period. The menstruation leave for women workers provision,
27 Declared applicable throughout Indonesia through Law No. 2/1951.
28 Declared applicable throughout Indonesia through Law No. 1/1951.
29 Or it may also be a fi ve-day, eight-hour working week. According to Manning (1998: 
202), the 40-hour working week was shorter than the common prescription in many 
countries in the region at that time, which was either 44 or 48 hours.
30 For this information, the author is indebted to Dr. Kosuke Mizuno of the University of 
Kyoto, Japan, who shared his interview with Soetomo Martopradoto on 12 November 
2001. Martopradoto was not affi liated with any political party, however he had strong 
leanings towards labour. Later he became Minister of Labour under President Soekarno 
(1964-66). When Soekarno was ousted by the military under the leadership of General 
Soeharto, Martopradoto was imprisoned for his alleged close ties to the PKI.
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for example, was adopted from the regulations in plantations.31 Provisions 
concerning working hours were originally set at 44 hours per week, but were 
amended by parliament to eight hours per day and 40 hours per week. The 
intention was that if the parties involved – employers and unions – wanted 
to adjust these hours to meet individual company requirements, they could 
make these adjustments through collective bargaining agreements. Thus, 
while protecting labour through the law, there was also a clear intention 
to empower unions, which were believed by Martopradoto and others to 
be an important institution to balance the power of the employers and to 
develop sound industrial relations in the new country.32 Although there are 
no records of enforcement levels of these laws during the Revolution (1945-
1949), and although fighting against the Dutch may have made these ambi-
tious new laws almost impossible to implement during that time, these laws 
have become the foundation of Indonesia’s labour law, eliminating the old 
colonial labour laws and policies and providing the legal basis for labour 
protection in modern Indonesia.
4 Parliamentarian democracy and ‘guided democracy’ – 
the beginning of a conflict (1949-1965)
After the official take-over from the Dutch in 1949, Indonesia’s labour unions 
continued to grow. By the mid-1950s the union movement was significant, 
with an estimated membership of around 2 million in 13 different federa-
tions, predominantly in the formal employment sector. Union density (the 
proportion of employees in unions) reached around 20 percent, which was 
high for developing countries’ standards (Manning, 1998: 203). The unions 
also maintained close links with political parties, assisted by the prevailing 
political climate in which the emerging political parties were built generally 
on mass support; with labour unions able to act as effective tools to gain this 
support.33 The largest union federation was SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh 
31 He referred to Staatsblad 1911 No. 540 of the Coolie Ordinance, the latest revision of the 
original Coolie Ordinance of 1889 (Staatsblad 1889 No. 138), which abolished the penal 
sanction provisions from the ordinance.
32 Martopradoto explained that when he visited workers, he always encouraged them to 
form unions whenever possible. These views were shared by a large number of staff 
within the Ministry, many of whom had been labour activists before joining the Minis-
try.
33 The Indonesian political system at that time (1949 – 1957) is considered to have been 
democratic in the real sense, with strong respect for the constitution (‘constitutional 
democracy’). During this time (in 1955), Indonesia held its fi rst general elections follow-
ing independence, which it stated were ‘fair, free and secret’. Four major political parties 
emerged: the PNI (Partai National Indonesia, Indonesian National Party); the Masjumi 
(Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Modernist Muslim Party); the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, 
Islamic Scholar Party); and the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist 
Party). See Feith, 1962: 434-5.
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Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Central Labour Organization),34 a left-wing 
union with close ties to the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Com-
munist Party), which claimed half the country’s formal-sector workers as its 
members (Manning, 1998: 203).
Although raising tensions in some areas of government and business, the 
emergence of strong labour unions was so closely tied to the enactment 
of labour laws during this time that the government had no choice but to 
accept the unions. These new laws included the regulation of industrial 
accident compensation procedures, labour inspections, and annual leave. 
Industrial conflict was regulated through the Collective Bargaining Law No. 
21, which was promulgated in 1954 and gave labour unions a stronger legal 
position when dealing with employers. This law provided for direct negotia-
tion between unions and employers, and also included restrictions on the 
rights of employers to dismiss workers without prior approval from the gov-
ernment. Two years later, in 1956, the Indonesia government ratified ILO 
(International Labour Organization) Convention No. 98 on the right to orga-
nise; which gave trade unions an even stronger legal status.
In 1957, the government enacted Law No. 22/1957 on Labour Dispute Settle-
ment, which replaced Emergency Law No. 16/1951 on the same subject, and 
introduced a compulsory arbitration system through the tripartite mechanism 
managed by either the Regional or Central Labour Dispute Settlement Com-
mittee (Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan).35 Law No. 12/1964 on 
Termination of Employment in Private Undertakings complemented this Law. 
In 1969 Law No. 14/1969 on Basic Labour was enacted, reaffirming Law No. 
12/1948 which guaranteed the rights of workers to join unions, as well as bring-
ing about collective agreements and achieving basic labour standards in both 
health and safety and workers’ compensation. These laws remained the pil-
lars of the legislative protection for Indonesian workers, even during the New 
Order period (although then usually without implementation in practice).
During this time, although collective bargaining had been legally recognised 
since at least 1956 as a means of determining wages and working condi-
tions, in practice its application was limited. According to Richardson (1958: 
68) this may have been due to the unions’ legacy before independence, in 
that most labour union activists were ‘agitators’ who regarded strikes and 
threats of strike – rather than negotiations and agreements – as the way to 
achieve their goals. This approach led to labour unrest, reflected in large-
34 Founded in 1946, SOBSI became the largest union in the new country by taking a mili-
tant approach in organising and campaigning for the interests of working people. This 
approach attracted many workers to join, especially from the plantations (see SOBSI, 1962).
35 Law No. 22 of 1957, however, incorporated many of the features of the 1951 Emergency 
Law; the main differences were on the tripartite structures of the Committees, which 
consisted of government offi cials and unions’ and employers’ representatives.
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scale strikes, particularly on plantations; and it raised the tension between 
the labour movement and the early Indonesian governments, contributing 
eventually to the changing policy of labour relations in Indonesia in general.
The government found it difficult to reconcile union freedoms and indus-
trial disputes with the goals of economic stability and growth. Strike activ-
ity was frequent in the post-independent period. The number of strikes has 
been estimated at 400 during 1951 to 1956, involving 5 per cent of all wage 
employees and close to 20 per cent of regular employees, and targeting for-
eign companies (mainly Dutch) as well as some state-owned enterprises 
(Richardson, 1958: 67-9; Manning, 1998: 204). In 1956 alone it was reported 
that 144 strikes were registered, involving more than 3 million workers and 
over one million days of lost work (Hess, 1997: 40-1). As noted by Hess (1997: 
41), this labour unrest represented ‘cries for help’ from a workforce seeking 
their government’s attention to redress grievances, rather than a ‘full-scale 
assault’ on employers or state authority. The government, however, saw the 
unrest as a threat to economic stability and the economic outlook of the new 
country. This view drove the government to establish stricter anti-worker 
regulations for industrial conflict.
The growing anxiety within government and some parts of society (notably 
the urban middle-class) regarding labour unrest led to strong support for 
the government to prevent or end strikes as soon as possible (Richardson, 
1958: 69). The government achieved this primarily through the arbitration 
committees provided by the 1957 Labour Dispute Settlement Law. Richardson 
(1958: 72) notes that these committees were largely effective – many dis-
putes brought to them could be settled by mediation and arbitration with-
out strikes. As Richardson notes ‘In this, the government has had consider-
able success, though often by awarding the workers many of their demands. 
Often the arbitration committees have awarded substantial increases in 
money wages to offset the consequences of inflation’ (1958: 69). The law 
indeed gave power for the government to intervene in labour disputes; nev-
ertheless, soon after the enactment of the law, the military authority issued 
an additional regulation, reintroducing anti-strike measures for ‘essential’ 
industries (1958: 72).
This intervention by the military was probably driven by its interest in estab-
lishing peaceful industrial relations, given that so many military personnel 
had assumed senior management positions in the former Dutch industries 
after nationalisation (Hadiz, 1997: Chapter 4). It was also likely influenced 
by their conflict with the union SOBSI,36 which was campaigning strongly 
36 As we will see, this confl ict between the military and the SOBSI became a confl ict between 
the military and the PKI, with roots in the so-called ‘Madiun affair’ of 1948, when military 
forces loyal to Soekarno–Hatta (the country’s fi rst President and Vice President) annihi-
lated the PKI, whose leader, Musso, had challenged their authority (Hadiz, 1997).
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in the late 1950s for the nationalisation of foreign enterprises such as oil and 
plantation companies (which were likely considered essential industries 
by the military). The initial idea was that these companies would be run 
by worker-led councils; however, they became military-run enterprises, at 
which point the military became a large employer in its own right, with a 
vested interest of peaceful industrial relations.
The situation changed again as Soekarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ came into 
effect in July 1959. Arguing that Western liberalism during the ‘Parliamen-
tary Democracy’ (1955 – 1959) had been ‘not satisfying Indonesian society’ 
(cited in Nasution, 1996: 39), Soekarno, with support from the military, urged 
a form of corporatism to unify the major political forces at the time – nation-
alists, religious groups and communists – into a central, cooperative deci-
sion-making process. Though never directly stated, Soekarno based his idea 
on the ideology of an organic state, as developed by the Javanese nationalist 
aristocrat intellectual Soepomo; the notion of the organic, ‘integralist’ state 
became a way to legitimatize Soekarno’s authoritarianism.37
While the Soekarno government sought greater control over Indonesian 
society, the political and economic situation became increasingly worse. 
Conflict between the army and the PKI escalated. Although Soekarno’s pow-
er enabled him to manage the conflicting interests between the two major 
forces and prevent open conflict, both the PKI and the military continued 
to consolidate themselves behind the scenes.38 The Indonesian people also 
realised that their domestic economy was deteriorating. By the mid-1960s, 
foreign investment was fleeing Indonesia and domestic income and taxes 
were declining, at the same time as the government was facing increasing 
deficits to cover its foreign military expenditures (with Malaysia), and infla-
tion was soaring to over 600 per cent per year (Budiman, 1991: 47). Soekarno 
himself called 1965 ‘a year of living dangerously’ (vivere pericoloso), a premo-
nition perhaps of his loss of power only a few months later.
37 After reinstating the 1945 Constitution, which gave more power to the President than 
the 1950 Constitution had provided, Soekarno dissolved the national parliament in 1960 
and formed a new parliament whose members were appointed by him. Under this new 
system, political power was confi ned to Soekarno and the military, and political par-
ties (which had been the dominant players during the ‘parliamentary democracy’) were 
ousted and scapegoated as the causes of the national economic problems (Vatikiotis, 
1993: 105; Nasution, 1996: 46-8).
38 As noted by Budiman (1991: 34-40), the PKI consolidated itself through mobilisation and 
radicalisation of marginalized people such as peasants and workers, mainly through its 
BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants Front) and SOBSI; whereas the military 
developed links with the Islamic groups who had been involved in confl ict with the 
PKI/BTI due to their campaigns on land-reforms, and with the ousted ‘parliamentary 
democracy’ politicians who were disadvantaged by Guided Democracy.
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These problems generated high levels of dissatisfaction within Indonesian 
society, and eventually brought an end to Soekarno’s Guided Democracy 
and his rule. On 30 September 1965, some factions in the military, (particular-
ly Tjakrabirawa, the President’s guards), reportedly kidnapped and killed six 
leading generals accused of conspiring against Soekarno, while some sup-
porters of the military claimed that the PKI was behind the kidnappings (see 
Notosusanto and Saleh, 1989). The military, under the leadership of Major 
General Soeharto – a US-trained Chief Commander of the KOSTRAD (Kom-
ando Strategis Angkatan Darat, the Army Strategic Reserve Command) – then 
took charge. In a few hours, he assumed control of the army and crushed the 
‘coup’.39 He declared a state of emergency and immediately banned the PKI 
and its affiliates, including the SOBSI and all other leftist groups, whether or 
not they were related to the PKI. Their leaders were killed or gaoled without 
trial. In the purges that followed, estimates of the number of people killed 
range from 100,000 to 1 million.40 General Soeharto took full power on 11 
March 1966, forcing Soekarno to sign the Supersemar Decree (Surat Perintah 
Sebelas Maret, Letter of Instruction of 11 March), by which Soekarno trans-
ferred full presidential authority for the restoration of security and govern-
ment control to General Soeharto.
The forces that supported General Soeharto (predominantly from the Islam-
ic/religious groups and urban mercantile capitalists) then established the so-
called ‘New Order’ regime, with the army as the dominant player.41 During 
the New Order, the previously quite active and political labour movement 
was heavily curtailed. The bloodbath which accompanied the establishment 
of the New Order made it possible for state planners to be insulated from the 
demands of organised labour, when charting development strategies (Hadiz,
1997).42 We will discuss this further in subsequent chapters.
39 Whether there was in fact a coup is highly debatable, with questions in particular sur-
rounding the role and whereabouts of General Soeharto himself during the hours when 
the Tjakrabirawa kidnapped and killed the generals (e.g. Crouch, 1988; Anderson and 
McVey, 1971; see also Roosa, 2006 for a recent account).
40 Cribb (1990) estimated that half a million people were killed in the fi rst six months after 
30 September 1965.
41 Indeed, the term ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) came from an army seminar in 1966, which 
referred to the new regime by this label to distinguish it from the ‘Old Order’ (Orde Lama) 
of Soekarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ era (1959–1965).
42 In a comparison between Latin American and East Asian countries, Deyo (1987) sug-
gests that in Latin America, states pursued import substitution industries that fostered 
broad populist coalitions – including organised labour – because the states confronted 
strong labour movements that could not be easily repressed. In contrast, the East Asian 
developmentalist states – Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan – were insulated from the 
need to accommodate worker demands, because organised labour was already effec-
tively subordinated and repressed before these countries embarked on export-led devel-
opment strategies based on low-wage manufacturers. This was apparently also the case 
with Indonesia under the New Order (see also Hadiz 1997, Beeson and Hadiz 1998).
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5 Summary
The setting of labour standards through legislation has been the main mech-
anism by which the Indonesian government has sought to safeguard the 
welfare of paid labour. From the early evolution of Indonesia’s labour leg-
islation during the Dutch colonial era, to the periods after independence in 
1945 and through to the rise of the New Order regime in the mid-1960s, this 
approach has been dominant. Such an approach does not fit with the pattern 
of early Indonesian social relationships; and as described above, for many 
years the Dutch colonial government continued to rely upon and maintain 
the existing traditional and feudal system of labour relations in Indonesian 
society. The colonial government’s labour legislation during the 18th and 
19th centuries also reflected its principal economic interests, with legislation 
intended primarily to control labour in both domestic service and industrial 
production on plantations. The shift towards labour policy aimed at protec-
tion of labour began in the early 20th century, triggered by debates over the 
use and misuse of the penal sanction (poenale sanctie) under the Coolie Ordi-
nances, forcing government to make some effort to reform those regulations. 
However, the poenale sanctie – and the coolie practice in general – continued 
until almost the end of the colonial era.
Gradually the more modern industries and fields of work, including mining, 
railways and harbours, became fertile grounds for the development of trade 
unions as important social groups. Their later involvement with the strug-
gle for the country’s independence put trade unions in a special position in 
the newly-independent Indonesia, as reflected in the country’s early labour 
legislation, which was characterised strongly by the notion of protection for 
labour. Inspired and then transplanted into domestic legislation by leading 
figures in the independence movement, strong protection through legisla-
tion became the main feature of Indonesian labour laws. However, grow-
ing labour unrest in the 1950s, mainly on the plantations, raised tensions 
between the labour movement and early Indonesian governments, which 
found it difficult to reconcile union freedoms and industrial disputes with 
the desire to achieve economic stability and growth.
These concerns contributed eventually to the changing policy of labour 
relations in Indonesia in general; most importantly with the introduction 
of compulsory arbitration through the Labour Dispute Settlement Commit-
tee. The military also acquired a direct interest in labour policy, after senior 
military personnel assumed key management positions in the former Dutch 
industries following nationalisation; positioning the military in direct con-
flict with the largest trade union of the time, SOBSI, an affiliate to the Indo-
nesian Communist Party. This led, during the early New Order period, to 
the destruction of what had been an active and political labour movement; 
and the purge accompanying the early New Order days made it possible to 
insulate industrial relations policies from the demands of organised labour. 
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This situation became the root of labour law and labour relations during the 
New Order, as we will discuss further in the next chapter.

Most developing countries have identified industrialisation as the most 
important step towards economic development after their independence 
from colonial rule. For this reason, in many cases, the state has played an 
important role in fashioning major industrialisation programmes to improve 
the economy (Jilberto & Mommen, 1996). The state’s intervention in indus-
trialisation inevitably leads to its involvement in the industrial relations 
system. Thus, in the Third World the government’s control over the indus-
trial relations system is closely related to the interests of economic develop-
ment of the country (Siddique, 1989: 386). This chapter examines the ways in 
which the changing economic strategies of the New Order state were reflect-
ed in corresponding labour policies, and the responses of workers to those 
policies. It will be shown that the authoritarian New Order state played an 
influential political and economic role during its rule, by providing the con-
ditions for the development of industrial capitalism and the disciplining 
of low-wage labour; and that the Indonesian labour movement appears to 
have been unable to challenge these strategies effectively. Since this chap-
ter is based on the argument that the authoritarianism of the New Order 
regime was closely related to its choice of economic and industrial strategies, 
the chapter will look at this important link between industrialisation and 
authoritarianism, particularly in the late industrialising countries, in order 
to help understand the case of Indonesia during the New Order era.
1 The political economy of labour and development: 1965 – 1998
Post-independence, the economic history of Indonesia has been character-
ised by the strong role, which the state has played in economic life. Since the 
early days of the Republic, in the absence of a significant domestic bourgeoi-
sie capable of replacing the former Dutch entrepeneurs or forming a new 
industrialisation system after the take-over in 1949, the Indonesian state has 
been deeply involved in economic activities (Robison, 1986: Chapter 2). The 
nationalisation of former Dutch firms in 1957 added to the state’s influence 
over economic life. Although the initial efforts to support these firms were 
from the labour movement, most of these companies eventually became mil-
itary-run companies. The ‘Guided Economy’ of President Soekarno, intro-
duced in 1960, further entrenched the centralisation of economic planning 
in the state’s hands. At that point the political and economic power of the 
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) had 
2 The New Order era: 
‘rule by (labour) law’ (1965 – 1998)
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also increased considerably (Crouch, 1988: 47). From then on, the army, as an 
integral part of the New Order state, dominated modern Indonesian politi-
cal and economic life.
1.1 Industrialisation and the authoritarian state
It has been argued that there is a relationship between the timing of a coun-
try’s industrialisation and the emergence of a strong state. The later a coun-
try has industrialised (relative to the industrial revolution in England) the 
more likely it is that a strong state will have emerged. Gerschenkron (1962), 
for example, in his study of six major countries in Europe, argued that the 
state achieved greater dominance in the ‘late industrialiser’ countries than 
in those that industrialised earlier. Hirschman (1968) extended this theory to 
Latin American countries, which he called ‘the late-late industrialisers’, and 
reported a similar pattern (see Kurth, 1979: 321-6; also Robison et al., 1993: 25).
Gerschenkron observed that for the ‘late industrialisers’, the state’s greater 
involvement was required to direct the industrialisation, due to the more 
complex technologies used in later industrialisation, and thus the need for 
more capital to industrialize. Moreover, as noted by Kurth (1979: 325): ‘Of 
the three sources of entrepreneurs and capital – private domestic corpora-
tions, state corporations, and multinational corporations – the late-late 
industrialisers have depended heavily upon the second and the third’. When 
multinational corporations have invested their capital, it has usually been on 
the condition that the state is strong enough to settle problems such as politi-
cal unrests, which could threaten the corporation’s assets. In other words, a 
strong state has been considered a necessity to the development of a capital-
ist state in late industrialising countries.
At this point some will refer to the ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian state’ model 
developed by O’Donnell (1979; see also Budiman, 1991). O’Donnell argued 
that the bureaucratic-authoritarian state emerges during times of economic cri-
sis, particularly during a country’s transition from import-substituting indus-
trialisation (ISI) to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). In the ISI strategy, the 
state works together with domestic entrepreneurs, using domestic capital to 
develop the domestic market. Although there is foreign capital, this is not 
significant. The ‘popular sector’ (lo popular), specifically ‘the urban and rural 
lower class and lower middle class’ (Collier, 1979: 401) benefit since they can 
earn sufficient income through the government’s income distribution pro-
grammes (for example, minimum wages) to enable them to spend money to 
buy domestic products; which further supports the national industries.
The ISI strategy, however, according to the model often reaches a limit. The 
domestic market becomes surfeited, while industry needs to continue to 
expand, to avoid stagnating the economy. The country’s way out of this chal-
lenge is to export. Thus, the government needs to change its strategy from 
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ISI to EOI, and industrial production is expanded beyond consumer goods 
to include the intermediate and capital goods used in the production process 
(O’Donnell called this: ‘the deepening of industrialisation’; see also Collier, 
1979: 400). For this, foreign capital is a must, and foreign investors will only 
come in if a state can guarantee political stability. One of the most signifi-
cant effects of such changes to the world economy has been an increase in 
the ‘structural’ power of capital (Strange, 1988). The enhanced mobility of 
productive and financial capital has greatly increased its power, relative to 
predominantly immobile labour forces and national governments. As noted 
by Beeson and Hadiz (1998: 292): ‘Not only does footloose capital have the 
opportunity to play off one state against another, but it has the potential to 
demand “favourable investment climates,” which in many cases has meant 
disciplining or placing restrictions on the activities of labour.’
In the case of developing countries such as Indonesia, there is another chal-
lenge: the chronic over-supply of labour, which makes it difficult to develop 
an effective labour movement. Indeed, the attractiveness of many develop-
ing countries to transnational capitalists lies in their cheap labour and rela-
tively unorganised labour forces; any changes to these conditions could 
simply result in the capitalists’ relocation to another country. This further 
highlights the importance of timing in the industrialisation process, particu-
larly in the context of developing countries such as Indonesia:
While industrialization unfolded in the North [of the world], most of the rest of the 
world either was excluded or took part as colonized suppliers of raw materials or con-
sumers of imported goods. This arrangement not only fueled the wealth of the North 
but also permitted labour to struggle against capital over the surplus from production 
(not to mention reshaping the broader political-legal milieu) without having to contend 
with direct competition from an almost endless supply of workers in the colonies who 
were far poorer and had no hope of gaining wider political leverage. Colonies and colo-
nizers were deeply intertwined and yet in important respects were quite insulated from 
each other. The great strides northern labourers made both economically and politically 
were promoted by this insulation.
(Winters 1996: 218-9, also cited in Beeson and Hadiz 1998: 293)
Such a situation, faced by the labour sector and other popular sectors, has 
led to political and social exclusion, amounting to ‘consistent governmental 
refusal to meet the political demands made by the leaders of [the popular] 
sector… [and denial] to this sector and its leaders [of] access to positions of 
political power from where they can have direct influence on national policy 
decisions’ (cited in Collier, 1979: 401; see also Budiman, 1991: 7). Arguably, 
this is what happened during the authoritarian New Order.
Based on the above discussion, we may propose at least three theoretical 
consequences. First, the change in economic strategies, notably from ISI to 
EOI, is usually characterised by the emergence of a bureaucratic authori-
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tarian state, in which the state strengthens its power to refute the political 
and social demands of the people, especially the labour sector. Second, for-
eign investors are in a position to encourage local governments to impose 
wage and union controls as a condition for further investment. And third, 
the legitimacy of the regime is based largely on its capacity to deliver eco-
nomic growth and development; if this evaporates, so does the legitimacy of 
the regime. Such considerations are useful to keep in mind when examining 
the relationship between labour and development in Indonesia during the 
authoritarian New Order regime.
1.2 Economic agenda of the early New Order1
Coming to power in 1965, Soeharto’s New Order regime faced the difficult 
task of rebuilding a rapidly decaying economy. Inflation was as high as 600-
1000 percent, foreign exchange reserves were at an all-time low, and the 
agricultural/rural sector was collapsing leading to food shortages among 
other major economic issues (Budiman, 1991: 47-8). The crisis presented a 
serious problem for the New Order regime, but it also offered an opportu-
nity to establish its legitimacy. In fact, by resolving the immediate problems, 
the new regime sought to compare favourably with the previous govern-
ment (Crouch, 1988). Soeharto was not formally installed as the second pres-
ident of Indonesia until 1968; nevertheless, during 1965-1967 he introduced 
reforms to address domestic and international political issues. He declared 
martial law and outlawed the PKI and Marxist-Leninist teachings, and thus 
removed the main obstacle to a private propertied class, capitalist markets 
and foreign investment (Robison, 1986). He then took rapid steps to rein-
tegrate the Indonesian economy with the West. He cut diplomatic ties with 
China and the Soviet Union, while strengthening the country’s ties with the 
US and other Western nations.
Following the advice of a group of Indonesian technocrats trained in Amer-
ica, known as the ‘Berkeley Mafia’ (from the University of California), Indo-
nesia rejoined the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund).2 
Moreover, the Foreign Capital Investment Law was enacted in January 1967, 
1 The works of Robison (1986; 1997) have been particularly useful for this section and the 
subsequent ones. See also MacIntyre, 1990, Hill, 1996, and Schwarz, 1994.
2 Soekarno had announced Indonesia’s withdrawal from the IMF and World Bank in 
August 1964 and declared that the coming year would be ‘a year of self-reliance’. As 
a gesture to such liberalisation steps, Soeharto granted $174 million in ad hoc funds to 
tide Indonesia over the crisis, and arranged for rescheduling of debts through the ‘Paris 
Club’ members (US, UK, Japan, Australia, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
World Bank, OECD and IMF). Another source of aid was the IGGI (Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia), which was formed in 1967, favoured by the US to persuade capi-
talist nations to share the aid burden, which would be calculated proportionately to the 
benefi ts in investment and trade that these countries would derive from the host coun-
try Indonesia (see Lobo, 2004: 123-161; also Posthumus, 1971).
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and one of its main provisions was ‘a guarantee that there is no intention 
to nationalise foreign assets and a guarantee of compensation payments if 
nationalisation does occur’ (Balassa, 1991: 125). The government also pro-
vided foreign firms with an exemption from import duties, and free transfer 
of profits. Indonesia became the founder of the Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, diffusing the long-running tensions with 
Malaysia. One of the main tasks of the New Order in its early years was to 
reverse the economic deterioration and stagnancy prevalent during Soek-
arno’s Guided Democracy. Indeed, Soeharto’s government based its legiti-
macy on its promise of future economic development. Understandably, as 
noted by Dwight King (1986), the labour policies of the New Order were 
driven strongly by its economic goals:
The economic stabilisation program launched in 1966 required wage restraint and the 
contraction of credit, which inhibited the expansion of domestic business, and curtailed 
the creation of new employment. In addition, the government policy of rationalisation 
of the bureaucracy, which called for steady across the board salary increase for civil 
servants, assumed smaller increments in the private sector, which caused wage ‘pres-
sures’ there. Finally, the door had been reopened to foreign investors further adding 
to the potential for labour unrest. No doubt each of these factors contributed to the 
government’s sense that a controlled labour force was more important than ever (cited 
in Hadiz, 1996: 4).
Job creation became one of the objectives of the government’s economic 
policies, based on import-substituting industrialisation, by encouraging 
private enterprise from both domestic and foreign investors. This emphasis 
on economic stability required tighter labour control. Moreover, since the 
army had earlier assumed managerial functions over state enterprises, it 
had developed a vested interest in the maintenance of industrial peace. At 
the same time, the unions were effectively tamed; since the biggest union 
prior to the New Order, SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, 
All-Indonesia Central Labour Organization) – a union close to the Indone-
sian Communist Party (PKI) – was caught up in the destruction of the PKI in 
1965-66. The control of Indonesia’s labour movement became an important 
objective of the New Order government, to ensure its economic develop-
ment could continue as planned. In 1973, the remaining labour organiza-
tions were goaded into establishing the FBSI (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indo-
nesia, All-Indonesia Labour Federation) as the sole, state-sanctioned labour 
organization, to replace the MPBI (Majelis Permusyawaratan Buruh Indonesia, 
Indonesian Labour Consultative Council) – the non-communist unions’ alli-
ance. Meanwhile, government employees were contained within the KOR-
PRI (Indonesian Government’s Employees Corps), which was a ‘functional 
group’ rather than a union. These new organizations were directed towards 
more ‘socio and economic’ realms, instead of politics (Hadiz, 1996: 7-8).
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The bipartite and tripartite3 dispute resolution systems under the 1957 
Labour Dispute Settlement Law, inherited from the Soekarno era, were fur-
ther institutionalised and used to draw unions closer to government policy 
objectives. In 1974, the Pancasila [the Five Principles] Industrial Relations sys-
tem was introduced, as a further effort to contain the labour movement under 
state corporatism. The government’s efforts seemed quite successful. Inter-
estingly, as reported by Hadiz (1997: 35), some labour leaders were even opti-
mistic that a relatively independent labour movement could be developed 
within the New Order framework. A belief that was later proved wrong.
The state’s strengthening of its industrial powers and corresponding labour 
policies continued until the end of the 1970s, facilitated by the country’s 
strengthening economy, in association with the boom in world oil prices. 
Also apparent was the growing integration of the political interests of the 
New Order’s bureaucrats (so called ‘politico-bureaucrats’) with the coun-
try’s economic policies (Robison, 1986: 164-9; Crouch, 1988). Although there 
was a brief crisis in the mid-1970s, stemming from the failure of the state-
owned oil company Pertamina to meet certain foreign obligations and its 
embroilment in a corruption scandal, the government resolved the crisis 
rapidly by dismissing the Director of Pertamina, General Ibnu Sutowo, an 
old ally of Soeharto (Liddle, 1991: 420). The country’s economic situation 
changed dramatically, however, in the early 1980s, in association with the 
collapse of world oil prices.
1.3 Collapse of oil-prices and export-oriented industrialisation
During the first two decades of the New Order, sustained economic growth 
was established, and tens of millions of Indonesian were lifted out of at least 
the worst extremes of poverty, without international aid (Henley, 2008: 2-3). 
The most important economic changes were those in the agricultural sec-
tor. These changes, known as Indonesia’s ‘green revolution’, involved small 
farmers and the mediation of trade using market mechanisms and strong 
private sector involvement, with the state setting the economic goals and 
providing the agricultural technologies and investments to reach those 
goals. In total, government spending was more than 30 times higher in real 
terms than it had been during the late colonial period (van der Eng, 1996: 
160). Such strategies were made possible not through rural taxation, which 
remained low, but through revenues from oil and, to some extent, aid, 
whereby oil and gas provided about half of all government revenues and 
foreign aid around 20 percent (van der Eng, 1996: 162, Henley, 2008: 4).
Thus, the 1970s’ surging oil-prices and consequent boom in state revenues 
had enabled the state to finance ambitious programmes of industrialisation, 
3 Bipartite refers to union and employer (association) cooperation; tripartite refers to gov-
ernment, employer and union cooperation.
The New Order era: ‘rule by (labour) law’ (1965 – 1998) 57
and to further integrate its political, ideological and economic goals (Robi-
son, 1986). In 1982, however, oil prices plunged from about $35 a barrel to 
a low of $12 (in 1986), resulting in a fall in export earnings from oil and gas 
by almost 70 percent from 1981 to 1985 (MacIntyre, 1990: 57). In response, 
Soeharto again called on the technocrats for advice. The government then 
began a wide-ranging programme of reform and deregulation, including tax 
reform to increase revenue and trade, and financial market liberalisation to 
attract foreign investors to replace state investment as the engine of econom-
ic growth. The industrialisation strategy was also switched from import-
substituting industrialisation (ISI) to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). 
The purpose of these changes was to substitute oil as a source of state reve-
nue, with a focus on maintaining previous levels of development rather than 
alleviating poverty (Henley, 2008: 4-5). The government also opened the way 
for foreign investment in areas long regarded as strategically sensitive, such 
as power generation, telecommunication, ports and roads (Robison, 1997: 
34). This shift toward a less protected national economy integrated Indo-
nesia more closely into the world market. The implementation of the EOI 
strategy attracted more foreign investments, particularly in low-wage export 
production, as well as some mega-projects in large upstream industrial proj-
ects (Robison, 1997). Indonesia thus entrenched itself more deeply in the 
position adopted by many Third World countries, within the neo-liberal and 
the ‘new international division of labour’ frameworks (Fröbel et al., 1980).
These structural adjustments by the New Order government led to even 
more severe policies toward labour issues, including greater involvement 
by the military. Military interventions in labour matters during the 1980s 
and 1990s can be explained by the military’s efforts to maintain its political 
influence and economic benefits from government structures, which seemed 
threatened by the collapse of oil prices. Between 1979-1984, less than half the 
annual government revenue from oil and gas was used to finance develop-
ment projects (MacIntyre, 1990). The larger portion of revenue, especially 
that which came from state-owned oil and gas enterprise Pertamina, was 
allocated to the military and its individual generals. It was reported that the 
official military budget was only one-third or one-half of its actual spend-
ing; the rest of its cash came mainly from this oil revenue. As noted by Irwan 
(1989: 406): ‘The reason for this was the necessity of giving the impression 
that the government’s priority was economic development, not the military’. 
After the collapse of Pertamina, the government and the army saw a need 
to remain in control and exercise greater influence over possible sources of 
opposition, especially labour.
In this context, the Political Party Law was promulgated in 1983, requiring 
all political parties (there were actually only three, including one state-party: 
the GOLKAR) to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis (known as 
‘asas tunggal’ or ‘one foundation’ doctrine). Additional legislation was enact-
ed in 1985, in which the asas tunggal principle was extended to all non-gov-
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ernmental organizations, including trade unions, under the term of ‘organisa-
si kemasyarakatan’ or community organizations (Lubis, 1993: 166-72). Further, 
with regard to labour unions, in 1985 the government-controlled union FBSI 
was restructured into an even more centralised, hierarchical and therefore 
easily controlled organization, the SPSI (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, 
All-Indonesia Workers’ Union) (Hadiz, 1997). The Pancasila Industrial Rela-
tions concept was also brought into effect by a newly-appointed hard-line 
Minister of Manpower, Admiral Sudomo,4 who released several ministerial 
regulations legitimising military involvement in labour disputes. Military 
intervention reached a peak in 1993 with the murder of Marsinah, a woman 
labour activist who was raped and killed while involved in a workers’ strike 
in her factory in East Java, with the reported intervention of the military in 
the dispute and involvement in her murder (YLBHI, 1994). Repressive legis-
lation and ministerial-level regulations passed during this time resulted in a 
decline in strike actions, which remained low for the rest of the 1980s (Man-
ning, 1998: 212).
During this time, the Indonesian government followed governments of oth-
er developing countries in establishing economic processing zones (EPZs), 
as a ‘way out’ to survive in the free and tough competition of the world mar-
ket, by using their only benefit of ‘comparative advantage’ of low wages for 
their labour in the ‘global production sharing’.5 They believed that EPZs 
would give them benefits through increasing manufactured exports, foreign 
exchange earnings and employments.6 Until the late 1980s, Indonesia had 
4 The heads of the Ministry of Manpower during the New Order tended to have back-
grounds either in the military or as technocrats, and were therefore concerned princi-
pally with security problems or the economic reconstruction of the country (Hadiz, 1996: 
7). Sudomo himself was a general in the navy. He used to be the Head of Kopkamtib 
(Komando Operasional Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the 
Restoration of Order and Stability), and later became the Coordinating Minister of Poli-
tics and Security.
5 Developed by David Ricardo, the theory of comparative advantage focuses on differ-
ences among nations owing to climate or technology. However, as examined by Krueger 
(1995), ‘Ricardo could as easily have ascribed the productive differences to differing 
“social climates” as to physical or technological climates.’ Taking all ‘climatic’ differenc-
es as given, the theory of comparative advantage argues that free trade among nations 
will maximize global welfare. This has become the prescription developed by interna-
tional fi nancial institutions such as World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
when assisting developing countries to escape from economic crisis.
6 There are many names for EPZs, depending on the countries where the EPZs are set 
up. In China they are called ‘special economic zones’; in Indonesia, ‘bonded zones’; in 
Mexico, ‘maquiladoras’; in Korea, ‘free export zones’; and many more such as: ‘bonded 
warehouse’, ‘technology and science parks’, ‘fi nancial services zones’, ‘free ports’, etc. 
Despite the wide variety of the zone formats, one of the universal features of EPZs is 
that there is almost complete absence of either taxation or regulation of imports of inter-
mediate goods into the zones (Warr, 1990). These privileges are subject to the condition 
that almost all of the output produced is exported and that all imported intermediate 
goods are utilised fully within the zones or re-exported
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only one EPZ, known as a ‘bonded zone’, established in Jakarta in 1972 (Ariff 
& Hill, 1985: 22). In 1979, a second bonded zone was established in Batam, an 
island near Singapore, which expanded to become a ‘bonded island’ in 1986. 
The establishment of bonded zones continued in other regions throughout 
the country, including Bekasi, Karawang, Purwakarta, and other industrial 
satellites of Jakarta.7 Indonesia’s low-wages policy also helped to promote 
the entire country as a low-cost labour market.
1.4 Structural adjustments and ‘Soeharto Inc.’
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Indonesian government continued with 
the structural adjustments to reform its macro-economic policy. In 1982, the 
current account deficit had grown to $7.2 billion, and in the mid-1980s, on 
the advice of the World Bank, the Indonesian government undertook steps 
to control this deficit through monetary and fiscal policy adjustments. On 
the monetary side, capital markets were deregulated, interest rates controls 
and sectorial credit ceilings were removed, and subsidized credit was done 
away with. On the fiscal side, government expenditure was curtailed, tariff 
rates were lowered, and foreign investment was encouraged (Prawiro, 1998). 
These policies were directed at increasing production and lowering infla-
tion. In 1986, the government promulgated a series of deregulation pack-
ages to further liberalize the Indonesian market for foreign capital. In trade, 
reforms were driven by the requirement that Indonesia develop internation-
al competitiveness in a range of non-oil sectors, particularly manufacture.
Ironically, this deregulation process did not result in the creation of a gen-
eralized system of open markets and free competition. On the contrary, it 
reinforced rather than undermined the importance of state power in deter-
mining markets and the concentration of corporate power (Robison, 1997). 
This paradox is explained by the relations between the New Order bureau-
crats and military officials and the business sector (‘politico-business’), man-
ifested in the so-called ‘Soeharto Inc.’ (Time, 24 May 1999), known in Indo-
nesia as ‘KKN’ or ‘korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme’ (corruption, collusion and 
nepotism).8 Soeharto-related companies dominated the privatization of the 
former state monopoly sectors, such as ports, roads and airports. Similarly, 
the operation and management contracts for state-owned companies, such 
as satellites and the clove trade, were held mainly by Soeharto’s children 
(Robison, 1997: 45-7). In particular, Soeharto’s family members acquired sub-
stantial fortunes from their roles as intermediaries. A firm seeking to invest 
in Indonesia would seek out members of the family to be shareholders in 
7 As we will see later, Bekasi and other industrial satellites surrounding Jakarta have 
become hotspots for the labour movement in Indonesia today.
8 Soeharto came to power by promising to end corruption, yet tackling corruption proved 
not to be one of the priorities of the regime; under his rule KKN thrived while protesting 
voices were silenced (see Robertson-Snape, 1999).
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a project, in order to obtain protection and, more importantly, information 
(Schwarz, 1994). It was reported that most important business deals in Indo-
nesia would not be successful without bringing in ‘at least one of the chil-
dren’ (Schwarz, 1992: 34). In 1999, Time magazine (24 May 1999) estimated 
that the family wealth had reached at least US$ 15 billion, and identified 
Indonesia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
As noted by Robison (1997: 40-44), investors either adjusted to these new 
conditions (as in the case of the Japanese, British, US, Australian and Euro-
pean companies mainly involved in ‘mega-projects’ such as chemicals, pulp, 
metal goods, power generation and construction), or cleverly exploited the 
politico-business networks within Indonesia (as in the case of Taiwanese 
and Korean investors, in low-wage export production including textiles and 
garments, footwear, plastic products and sporting goods). Despite the lack 
of transparency in macro-economic policy, a substantial flow of state bank 
credit was provided to leading conglomerates and politico-business fami-
lies – even though some of them had been listed in banks’ bad or doubtful 
loan categories (Robison, 1997: 40). The mega-projects raised the demand 
for borrowing from state banks and international institutions, which led to 
uncontrolled foreign debt that reached US$ 100 million in 1995 (Robison, 
1997: 43). Together these problems led to Indonesia facing major challenges 
at the macro-economic level, which contributed eventually to the fall of the 
New Order after the economic crisis in 1997-98.
Meanwhile, the 1990s saw a resurgence in labour activism in Indonesia. 
Workers, often in conjunction with labour-based NGOs, began to establish 
new unions to challenge the government-backed SPSI’s monopoly. In 1990, 
the SBM Setiakawan (Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setiakawan, Solidarity Indepen-
dent Labour Union) was founded by several human rights NGO activists9; 
followed in 1992 by the founding of the SBSI (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indone-
sia, Indonesian Prosperity Labour Union)10; and in 1994 by the PPBI (Pusat 
9 Many of these unions were initiated, and indeed led, by NGO activists rather than work-
ers, as the lack of trade union roles under the authoritarian regime made it very dif-
fi cult for workers to undertake those tasks. For an extensive analysis on the relationship 
between workers and NGOs in Indonesia, before and after the Reformasi, see Ford, 2009.
10 SBSI was established on 25 April 1992, as a result of the Pertemuan Buruh Nasional 
(PBN, National Labour Meeting) on 24-25 April 1992 in Bogor, West Java, attended by 
more than 100 pro-democracy activists including several leading fi gures such as Abdur-
rahman Wahid (who became the fourth President of Indonesia in 1999), Sabam Sirait 
and Asmara Nababan. Mochtar Pakpahan, a lawyer from North Sumatera, was elected 
as its fi rst chairperson (SBSI, 1992; also Pakpahan, 1997). He was a critical opponent of 
the New Order regime, and in 1996 he was arrested for his involvement with the Majelis 
Rakyat Indonesia (MARI, Indonesian People’s Assembly), and was convicted along with 
several PRD leaders for subversive actions against the government. 
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Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, Central of Indonesian Labour Struggle)11 and 
the AJI (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, Alliance of Independent Journalists)12 
These unions could not operate effectively, however, due to the ongoing 
strict government policies and repression (see Hadiz, 1997). After 1994, no 
further new unions were established, and the number of collective labour 
agreements remained low. This situation continued for the remainder of the 
decade, without significant challenges from labour organizations, until the 
economic crisis hit Indonesia in July 1998 and led to the ‘Reformasi’ (reform) 
era.
Due to the New Order’s increasing repression of the labour movement in 
the early 1990s, Indonesia’s labour practices became the focus of strong 
criticism, both domestically and internationally. The most important official 
criticism was the petition sent to the United States Government in 1992 by 
Asia Watch and the International Labour Rights Education and Research 
Fund, concerning workers’ rights and the (non-)existence of independent 
trade unions in Indonesia. Because of these concerns, Indonesia was placed 
under review by the US Trade Representative for its facilities for tariff con-
cessions on some of its exports to the US under the GSP (generalised system 
of preferences) (see Fehring & Lindsey, 1995: 7; Human Rights Watch/Asia, 
1994: 22-7).13 Threatened by the possible loss, the Indonesian government 
increased the minimum wages for workers – but maintained its repressive 
labour policies (Tjandra, 2002; see also Chapter 5).
To summarise this section: the authoritarian New Order state served sev-
eral important political and economic functions, by providing the conditions 
for the development of industrial capitalism while disciplining low-wage 
11 Several student activists founded PPBI in November 1994. The fi rst chairperson was 
Dita Indah Sari, a former student of the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia. Dita 
Indah Sari was arrested in July 1996 due to the labour demonstration she led in Sura-
baya, East Java, which was considered to be the largest labour demonstration held dur-
ing the New Order era, attended by 15,000 workers from 10 factories (see also Balowski, 
1997). Later in 1999, the PPBI changed its name to FNPBI, the Front Nasional Perjuangan 
Buruh Indonesia (National Front for Indonesian Labour Struggle).
12 AJI was founded by journalists following the 1994 ban of Tempo magazine by the New 
Order government (see Utami, 1994).  It intended to challenge the monopoly of the gov-
ernment-backed journalists’ association PWI (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, Indonesian 
United Journalists) and to become the independent organization for young journalists 
in the country. Offi cially, AJI was a union, as it was affi liated with the IFJ (International 
Federation of Journalists), a member of the GUF (Global Union Federations); although 
in practice it struggled to fully accept itself as a union as opposed to a ‘professional orga-
nization’. In response to this internal confl ict, in 2011 some AJI activists established the 
FSPMI (Federasi Serikat Pekerja Media Indonesia, Indonesian Media Union Federation), as 
the ‘union wing’ of the AJI (personal communication with Abdul Manan, General Secre-
tary of AJI, June 2012).
13 The GSP is an autonomous, country-specifi c policy that permits tariff reductions or pos-
sibly duty-free entry of certain imports from designated developing countries. For more 
discussion see Ujiie, 2006.
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labour. Indonesia’s labour organizations were unable to challenge these 
strategies effectively. The weakness of the labour movement was due largely 
to its political exclusion, as established and maintained by the authoritarian 
New Order regime; rooted initially in the imperatives of the regime’s sur-
vival, and subsequently in the requirements of its economic strategies. Part 
2 of this chapter will explore in more detail the arguments developed in this 
first section, by examining the practice of labour law and industrial relations 
in New Order Indonesia.
2 Labour law and industrial relations in practice
This section examines labour law and industrial relations practice during 
the New Order era. It first discusses the notion of state corporatism in labour 
relations as developed in Indonesia, particularly the Pancasila Industrial 
Relations doctrine and how this doctrine has influenced industrial relations 
practice in the country. It then considers three of the most important fields in 
labour law – trade unions, minimum wages, and labour disputes settlement 
mechanisms – and their practices under the New Order. As Hess (1986: 225) 
has argued, there may be problems with the emphasis on formal machin-
ery, since it has ‘obscured the basis of the actual social relations active in 
the work environment’. Yet in the Indonesian context, the reverse may also 
apply (Ford, 1999). Labour repression under the New Order was legitimised, 
based on this formal machinery. The discussion in this following section is 
based mainly upon the formal machinery that was established under the 
New Order industrial relations system, and also examines particular labour 
laws and regulations that had direct effects on working conditions in par-
ticular fields of work.
2.1 State corporatism and Pancasila Industrial Relations
As mentioned earlier, the New Order state adopted the concept and struc-
tures of corporatism in order to control Indonesian workers. This had its 
roots in Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, which was based on the notion of 
the organic or integralist state as developed by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro and 
Soepomo, two prominent Javanese political thinkers. Soekarno, however, 
never linked his Guided Democracy concept to this theory; whereas Soehar-
to’s New Order explicitly acknowledged Soepomo’s theory and its applica-
tion, to help legitimise the state’s authoritarianism (Nasution, 1996: 47). The 
government policies towards labour that were developed during the New 
Order period were based heavily on this theory, particularly the concept of 
the Pancasila Industrial Relations.
Schmitter (1974: 96) defines corporatism as: ‘a system of interest represen-
tation, in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number 
of singular, compulsory, non-competitive hierarchically ordered, and func-
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tionally differentiated categories recognised or licensed (if not created) by 
the state, and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories, in exchange for observing certain controls on their 
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.’ As noted by 
Robison (1993: 42), the main features of corporatist state theory are ‘its func-
tional concepts of social structure and organization’ and ‘its view of the state 
as transcending particular vested interests within society but embodying its 
common interests’. Rather than addressing the needs of the interest group 
concerned, the single, state-sanctioned body of interest representation aims 
to prevent social conflict and maintain government power. This is the antith-
esis of bourgeoisie liberalism, which has also become an ideal legitimation, 
for many national ruling elites, of their authoritarianism; with the denial of 
legitimate political activities outside structures defined by the state. In Indo-
nesia under the New Order, the state ideology of Pancasila played an impor-
tant role in this process.
Pancasila, literally meaning ‘five pillars’, consists of five ideals: Belief in One 
God; Humanitarianism; Indonesian Unity; Popular Government by Con-
sultation and Representation; and Social Justice. Developed by Soekarno, it 
is part of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Its proponents argue that 
it is rooted in the Indonesian people’s philosophy and way of life; namely, 
the ‘prinsip kekeluargaan’ (family principles). According to this concept, the 
relationship between the state and the people should be considered as a rela-
tionship between ‘father and sons’, in which the state is the ‘wise father’; 
therefore the relationship between state and people should be always in 
‘harmony,’ and the two elements should trust each other. With such a broad 
and bland generalisation, Pancasila is open to a wide range of interpretations, 
but only through and by the state. As noted by Robison (1993), it may not be 
the blandness of the ideals that makes Pancasila important, but because it 
gives legitimacy to authoritarianism as a mechanism, which ‘achieves the 
common will of society through consensus under the tutelage of a state in 
the possession of its own officials’ (1993: 44). In Indonesia daily life under 
the New Order, Pancasila was frequently used to cover and to repress con-
flicts. Any attempts to establish legitimate political organization outside the 
framework defined by the state were considered ‘anti-Pancasila’, and there-
fore against the people’s will. The promulgations of the Political Party Law 
in 1983 and the Community Organizations Law in 1985 were examples of 
the state’s efforts to contain alternative political activities outside the state’s 
framework by using Pancasila (Lubis, 1993: 166-72).
As mentioned earlier, in the context of Indonesian labour policy, state corpo-
ratism was developed primarily through the concept of Pancasila Industrial 
Relations. Introduced in 1974 by General Ali Moertopo of the Special Oper-
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ation Office (OPSUS),14 the Pancasila Industrial Relations was formulated as 
a manifestation of values consistent with Pancasila ideology, and rooted in 
the cultural life of the Indonesian people. It is said that within Pancasila, the 
role of bipartite and tripartite dispute resolution mechanisms in negotiating 
the differences between the interests of labour and capital should be sup-
ported by the ‘family principle’ and the ‘traditional’ values of ‘mutual help’ 
and ‘deliberation to reach consensus’ (Djulmiati & Soedjono, 1982). There 
were no exact regulations concerning this doctrine; nevertheless, it was an 
effective tool to contain labour within the government framework.
Due to the decline in oil prices, and the government’s increasing need to 
redirect its economic policy toward manufacturing and export-oriented 
industrialisation, the government intensified its labour controls in the 1980s 
and the Pancasila Industrial Relations gained momentum. The original Pan-
casila Industrial Relations system came into real effect in the early 1980s, 
when Admiral Sudomo was in charge as the Minister of Manpower. Sudomo 
gave the concept a more precise formulation, and set up the structures that 
made it more practical. He concluded that the system should be conduct-
ed in the contexts of ‘partnership’ in production, profit and responsibility, 
towards ‘God the almighty, nation and state, the community, fellow employ-
ees and family’ (cited in Fehring & Lindsey, 1995: 3). This formulation may 
seem obscure and insipid. Nevertheless, it became an ideological – and to a 
certain extent a practical – framework to enable both tight industrial control 
and military involvement in labour disputes, based on the notion of ‘indus-
trial security’ and the subordination of labour to state policy. As noted by 
Fehring and Lindsey (1995: 3):
[the Pancasila Industrial Relations] operates at all levels of industrial relations within 
Indonesia and it is more than an over-riding ideological formulation. HIP’s applica-
tion to individuals and families means that its practical ramifications reach down 
from cabinet level to day-to-day aspects of employer/employee relationships. At the 
national level […] there is the Departemen Tenaga Kerja [Department of Manpower], the 
SPSI [Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Workers’ Union – the government 
backed trade union] and the Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan Pusat (P4P) 
[Central Labour Dispute Resolution Committee] and various national employer bodies. 
[…] [R]eproduced at the regional levels […] [it] involve[s] the walikota, or mayor, as well 
as the military forces represented by Kodim [Komando Daerah Militer, District Military 
Command] and Polres [Kepolisian Resort, local police]
14 General Ali Moertopo, a Soeharto intimate, was the Chief of the Special Operation Offi ce 
(OPSUS) and was known as the architect of the New Order. Through the OPSUS, Moer-
topo implemented numerous initiatives to assure the continuity of the new regime. He 
was in charge of taming the political parties with the so-called ‘fl oating mass’ doctrine, 
by which political parties lost their ties to the masses; he was also deeply involved with 
the creation of GOLKAR, a state political party used to contest elections and to take par-
liamentary seats on behalf of the state; and he was also responsible for the establishment 
of a sole, state-sanctioned labour union, the FBSI, in 1973 (Hadiz, 1997: 90-104).
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These organizations were coordinated by Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Ban-
tuan Pemantapan Keamanan dan Stabilitas Nasional, the Coordinating Body 
for National Stability and Security), which also involved Koramil (Komando 
Rayon Militer, Regional Military Command) and Polsek (Kepolisian Sektor, the 
sub-district police). Such policies and structures led to repressive, and quite 
often agressive, government approaches towards labour during the 1980s to 
1990s, which reached their peak in the aforementioned murder of the labour 
activist Marsinah. The situation was relaxed slightly in the early 1990s, due 
to growing international pressure on the Indonesia government to address 
its repressive labour practices. Nevertheless, from the time of the abolition of 
the relatively active and political labour movement of the 1960s, the labour 
movement in Indonesia has been kept tame and weak through restrictive 
labour laws at both the enterprise and national levels. The next section of 
this chapter will further the discussion by examining Indonesian labour law 
in its practical application during the authoritarian New Order regime, in 
three important fields of labour law: trade unions; minimum wages; and 
labour dispute settlement.
2.2 Labour law in practice
2.2.1. Trade unions
After the abolition of the SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, 
All-Indonesia Central Labour Organization) in 1965, all labour unions were 
depoliticised and rendered powerless. The unions could not continue their 
activities and existence as unions, because the military would repress any 
attempts at active labour organizations and representation. With the estab-
lishment of the government-backed union FBSI, the traditional link between 
trade unions and political parties was also severed, and redirected toward 
more socio-economic realms (Hadiz, 1996: 7-8). The FBSI was further restruc-
tured in 1985, into an even more centralised, hierarchical and therefore easily 
controlled organization, the SPSI. Despite another restructuring and renam-
ing in 1995, to become the FSPSI (Federasi SPSI, All-Indonesia Workers’ 
Union Federation), the organization remained the same weak, government-
controlled union (Hadiz, 1997). Indeed, it is evident that particularly during 
the 1980s, the organization was involved with assisting the security appara-
tus to identify and address any potentially state-destabilising developments 
in the labour area (Tanter, 1990; also Hadiz, 1997).
Although trade union rights were formally recognised by legislation in 
Indonesia,15 in practice, this legislation was ignored – the only labour-based 
regulations with any influence were the anti-labour regulations issued at 
the ministerial level, through the Minister of Manpower. During the 1980s, 
15 By that time, Indonesia had ratifi ed ILO Convention No. 98, on the Right to Organize 
and Bargain Collectively in 1956, while the Basic Law No. 14 of 1969 explicitly con-
fi rmed ‘the right to set up and to become a member of a trade union’.
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after the collapse in oil prices, several Minister of Manpower regulations 
were released which together severely restricted trade union rights. Minis-
ter of Manpower Decree No. 5/1987, for instance, required that for a union 
to obtain recognition it must have representation in at least 20 provinces, 
100 district level organizations, and 1000 workplaces. Such provisions were 
almost impossible to satisfy in a very strict labour environment, and further 
buttressed the existence of SPSI against any competitors. Due to the increas-
ing criticism of the government’s practices in labour matters in the early 
1990s, registration requirements were relaxed marginally via Minister of 
Manpower Regulation No. 3 of 1993, and Minister of Manpower Regulation 
No. 1/1994. Despite these, the conditions for unions to obtain recognition 
were still restrictive.
The restrictive conditions ensured that through the 1990s unions were not 
recognized formally unless they had representation in 100 workplaces, 25 
regions and 5 provinces. Although workers were able to establish plant-level 
unions in companies with more than 25 workers, this was permitted only 
if no unions had already been established (one union per company), and 
only after obtaining the approval of more than 50 percent of the workers. 
Further, staff in management positions were forbidden from joining these 
plant-level unions. Other ministerial-level articles advised that the corporate 
unions could ‘establish cooperation with or be affiliated to the All-Indonesia 
Workers’ Union’ (SPSI)’, and more explicitly, that they were ‘recommended 
to join the All-Indonesia Workers’ Union of relevant business sectors’ within 
12 months of their establishment’ – raising strong questions about the inde-
pendence of these unions and their ability to genuinely represent workers. 
Such provisions still clearly favoured the government-backed SPSI.
Although the slight relaxation in government policy in 1990 allowed a few 
new unions to establish themselves, the government’s ongoing strict policies 
and repression prevented these from operating effectively. After 1994, prac-
tically no new unions were established; and collective labour agreements 
remained few. This situation continued for the rest of the decade. We will 
return to this situation in the next chapter, as part of the analysis of trade 
union legislation.
2.2.2 Minimum wages
Although minimum wage regulations were introduced in Indonesia in the 
early 1970s as part of a socially-oriented wage policy (Manning, 1998: 207), 
the minimum wage figure remained under government control, without sig-
nificant consultation with either businesses or unions and workers’ organi-
zations. During the New Order era, the rate was based on a scale known as 
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Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum (KFM, Minimum Physical Needs)’16 which varied 
between regions, as determined by the Dewan Penelitian Pengupahan Daerah 
(DPPD, Local Wage Research Council). According to Minister of Manpower 
Regulation No. 131/1971, the DPPD was to comprise ten public servants, 
three trade union members and three company representatives. The trade 
union representatives were only to be drawn from the SPSI, and the pub-
lic servant representatives were drawn from a range of government agen-
cies. DPPD meetings were conducted in secret, and submissions were not 
allowed. Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 20/1971 further specified 
that the minutes of DPPD meetings would only be made available to its 
members.
This situation, as noted by Fehring and Lindsey (1995: 6), led to ‘the extraor-
dinary situation where perhaps the most important condition of employ-
ment for workers is decided without public scrutiny or public knowledge 
of either the factors that have led to the decision or how such decisions are 
reached’. And it further ‘reflects [the New Order government’s] consistent 
policy of restraining industrial reforms so that economic development can 
proceed on the government’s terms’. In labour relations literature, such a 
policy is known as ‘wage repression’ (to distinguish from ‘labour repres-
sion’); and represents a government’s efforts to repress wages and labour 
costs to boost economic gains, through tight controls over trade unions and 
the absence of proper minimum wage legislation (Deyo, 1989: Chapter 2). 
While some have argued that there is little evidence of wage repression in 
newly industrializing countries (Fields, 1994), including Indonesia (Man-
ning, 1998: 212), it would appear that wage policy was an effective tool to 
enable the New Order government to control labour. The New Order gov-
ernment, with or without pressure from international financial institutions 
and human rights organizations, was likely keen to either repress or increase 
wages and labour costs, depending on the situation and if considered neces-
sary to promote economic development – as was evident in the 1990s.
Following the growing international criticism of Indonesia’s labour prac-
tice in the early 1990s, the New Order government responded with highly 
publicized efforts to improve labour standards by boosting minimum wag-
es. Minimum wages in all provinces were raised significantly – by about 
one-third in 1994, and by a further 21 percent in 1995 (Manning, 1998: 212). 
Real minimum wages rose by approximately 15 percent in real terms and 
by 10-20 percent in most provinces during 1988-94, including a 25 percent 
real increase over the next six years in the rapidly industrializing districts 
of West Java surrounding Jakarta and Bandung. As a result, the wage dis-
16 In 1997, Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum was replaced by Kebutuhan Hidup Minimum (KHM, 
Minimum Subsistence Needs) by Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 3/1997, and 
in 2003 the enactment of Manpower Law No. 13/2003 linked minimum wages to the 
notion of ‘decent wage’. We will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 5.
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parity between the highest and lowest wages also increased. According to a 
1996 World Bank study (Rama, 1996), minimum wages in Indonesia tripled 
in nominal terms and doubled in real terms during the first half of the 1990s, 
leading to an overall 10 percent increase in average earnings and a 2 percent 
decrease in wage employment, with only a 5 percent decrease in investment. 
The study found that the unemployment effect was particularly marked in 
small firms, while employment may have increased in large firms.
This was a great step forward for Indonesian workers, who had been listed 
by the World Bank in 1994 as being at the extreme end of the international 
ranking for differences between lowest and highest wages for paid work-
ers, with a differential of 1:50 (World Bank, 1994: 52-4). However, in 1996 
the World Bank downplayed the significance of these wage changes, argu-
ing in an influential report that the rapid rise in regional minimum wag-
es, particularly since 1989, was ‘beginning to have a negative effect on the 
creation of employment, especially of women and young workers’ (World 
Bank, 1996: 81). The report went on to warn that ‘caution must be exercised 
in raising them [wages] further for fear of eroding competitiveness, lower-
ing employment growth and paradoxically of increasing poverty and labour 
unrest’ (cited in Islam & Nazara, 2000: 4). This study was influential because, 
as noted by Islam and Nazara (2000), it provoked the Indonesian govern-
ment to reconsider its policy on minimum wages. Bappenas (the National 
Planning Development Agency), for instance, in its White Paper outlining 
the medium-term outlook for the Indonesian economy (Bappenas, 1999), 
remarked that minimum wages had distorted the relative pay structure and 
inhibited labour market flexibility in Indonesia. Moreover, in July 1999, an 
ILO-supported tripartite working group had heeded the warning issued in 
the aforementioned World Bank study. The working group put forward a 
recommendation to replace the minimum wage setting process with a new 
one, which would enable a clearer description of the criteria for specifying 
minimum wages and strengthen the government’s implementation capaci-
ties. Neither group, however, offered strong evidence to support the validity 
of their proposals. Indeed, as noted by Islam and Nazara (2000: 25): ‘There is 
no evidence to suggest that minimum wage induced increases in domestic 
labour costs erode business profitability in large and medium-scale manu-
facturing’.
Hence, no matter what the controversies among scholars as to whether there 
was indeed wage repression in Indonesia during the 1990s, it seems appar-
ent that wages – and minimum wages policy in particular – were one set of 
tools used by the Indonesian New Order government to maintain its control 
over labour, in the perceived interests of economic development. During the 
import-substituting industrialization phase in the 1980s, low-waged labour 
had given a ‘comparative advantage’ in the context of international competi-
tion; and in the 1990s, minimum wages became the new tool for the govern-
ment to counter international pressures. The roles of employers and unions 
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in the setting of minimum wages were minimal; while the government dom-
inated almost all of the process.
2.2.3 Labour dispute settlement
As noted earlier, labour dispute settlement mechanisms were provided for 
during the New Order by at least two laws, which remained on the books 
throughout the New Order period: the Labour Dispute Settlement Law of 
1957 (No. 22) and the Procedures for Dismissal of Workers in Private Under-
takings Law of 1964 (No. 12). The 1957 law was enacted predominantly as 
a response to the escalating labour unrest in the mid-1950s. Its main pur-
pose was to limit strikes and lockouts, by providing a ‘compulsory arbitra-
tion’ mechanism in labour disputes. Nonetheless, both laws also provided 
protection for workers in labour relations, by emphasizing job security. The 
most important provision was the provision which stated that in all cases of 
retrenchment, the decision must be discussed with the worker and his or her 
union first; and that the employer must obtain permission for retrenchment 
from the regional Ministry of Manpower office, otherwise the retrenchment 
would be considered ‘null and void’. The Laws provided a system for the 
settlement of disputes at various stages, including via corporate or bipartite 
level settlement; via mediation by an official appointed by the Minister of 
Manpower; and via settlement by the tripartite Regional Committee (P4D) 
and Central Committee (P4P). Although the Laws acknowledged the right to 
strike, legal strikes were only permitted if conciliation efforts had failed, or 
if employers refused to negotiate. Workers were required to follow a set of 
procedures before they could strike, including notifying their employer, and 
notifying the Mediator in the Regional Ministry of Manpower office, who 
would then visit the location and attempt to negotiate with the parties first.
There were several problems with this system in the context of New Order 
Indonesia. First, in order to function effectively, such a system will depend 
heavily on the abilities of all parties (employers, unions and government) 
to legitimately represent their interests (Hess, 1997: 41) – which was not 
possible during the New Order, as trade unions had been weakened and 
kept weak since the late 1960s. Second, the labour disputes settlement pro-
cess has been criticized as ineffective due to its long and complicated pro-
cedures, combined with a high frequency of corrupt officials with a strong 
biased towards employers (Gallagher, 1994). As Manning noted (1998: 215), 
the increase in labor unrest during the late seventies and early eighties was 
caused at least partly by the ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution mecha-
nisms, alongside a lack of confidence in the SPSI. Finally, the close involve-
ment of the military in labour disputes raised further problems, which 
undermined the credibility and effectiveness of the system.
In the early 1980s, as the New Order government sought even more con-
trol over labour, it released the Minister of Manpower Decree No. 342/1986, 
concerning General Guidelines on Labour Dispute Settlement. This regula-
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tion stated that the Ministry of Manpower office must co-ordinate with the 
Regional Government, Police Resort or Military District to overcome pos-
sible physical violence in the case of a strike.17 This regulation was widely 
relied upon by the military to justify its involvement in labour disputes. Min-
ister of Manpower Regulation No. 4/1986, which permitted an employer to 
dismiss workers if they were absent for six consecutive days, was another 
example of the increasing attack on labour rights; and was used to justify the 
dismissal of striking workers.
3 Concluding remarks
This chapter has discussed the economic strategies of the New Order state, 
and its corresponding policies toward labour. It has shown that the authori-
tarian New Order state served important political and economic functions, 
by providing the conditions for the development of industrial capitalism, 
while also disciplining labour. Indonesian labour organizations were unable 
to challenge the strategies effectively. This labour weakness related largely 
to the political exclusion of labour groups by the New Order government, 
rooted initially in the imperatives of the regime’s survival, and subsequent-
ly driven by the perceived requirements of the economic strategies. These 
issues were reflected in the changing labour policies, which followed the 
changing economic strategies. This chapter’s analysis of the practices of 
labour law in New Order Indonesia, specifically in three key fields in labour 
law – trade unions, minimum wages, and industrial dispute settlement 
mechanisms – supports these observations. In New Order Indonesia, labour 
law, rather than becoming a tool to restrain public and private power over 
workers, was used to legitimise labour repression through formal machiner-
ies. The protective legislation inherited at the country’s independence, and 
which prevailed until the mid-1960s, was simply not applied in practice – 
as this option was dependent on the government’s willingness to apply the 
laws, and such willingness was clearly lacking.
The situation discussed in this chapter continued throughout the 1990s with-
out significant challenges from labour organizations; only changing dramat-
ically when the economic crisis hit Indonesia in 1997-98, as will be discussed 
later. Interestingly, prior to the economic crisis, the World Bank’s 1996 evalu-
ation of Indonesian labour law already advised that ‘[Indonesian] workers 
are overly protected’, but that ‘the government should stay out of industrial 
dispute[s]’ (The Jakarta Post, 4 April 1996). This statement was released in 
an effort by the World Bank to create ‘industrial harmony between workers 
17 Other provisions were provided in Minister of Manpower Regulation Nos. 1108/1986 
and 120/1988. In January 1994, in response to the threat of losing GSP facilities from 
the US. All these regulations were repealed and replaced by a new decree, Ministerial 
Decree No. 15A /1994.
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and employers,’ due to the rise in labour unrest in the country, which in the 
World Bank’s opinion was not favourable to business and investments.18 The 
New Order government, by this stage under financial pressure, responded 
to the World Bank’s comments by introducing a new bill, the Manpower Bill, 
which was designed to replace all previous labour laws and regulations. The 
new Bill came under strong criticism from many labour groups and NGOs, 
who saw it as an anti-worker law in every sense (YLBHI, 1997).19 Nonethe-
less, the Bill was eventually enacted as the Manpower Law No. 25/1997 
on 3 October 1997. Although it had to some extent adopted the workers’ 
demands, labour protests became widespread around the country.20
Meanwhile, the currency crisis in Thailand had become an economic crisis 
throughout Asia, including Indonesia, and the Indonesian economy was 
severely damaged. By May 1998, the country’s economic growth had fall-
en to minus 7%; unemployment hit 12%; interest rates climbed to 75%; and 
the country’s currency, the Rupiah, slumped from 6,000 to the US dollar, to a 
catastrophic 18,000 (Godement, 1999: 12). The ILO (1999) reported that the 
Asian financial crisis had added 10 million new unemployed in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines; while numbers of people living on 
18 This was consistent with the Bank’s general diagnoses and prescriptions regarding how 
developing countries should commence business, as seen in the series of ‘Developing 
Business’ reports which it publishes yearly. In ‘Doing Business 2005: Removing Obstacles 
to Growth’ (World Bank 2004), which ‘benchmarks regulatory performance and reforms 
in 145 nations’. Legislation regarding the hiring and fi ring of workers was considered 
one of heavier regulatory burdens on business in developing countries (compared to 
developed countries); along with access to credit, enforcing contracts, registering prop-
erty, and protecting investors (see Engel, 2010). Such an approach is challenged by the 
work of Ha-Joon Chang (2002: 116-7), who considers the historical role of institutions 
in the now-developed countries. His analysis suggested that the institutions of today’s 
developing countries are, in general, far ahead of where those same institutions were in 
the now-developed countries, when the latter were at similar levels of development. He 
also points out that good institutions take time to develop, and must be affordable for the 
country and socio-politically acceptable. He argues (2002: 135) that international stan-
dard property rights and corporate governance are the two areas that are most problem-
atic for developing countries, as they require large investments (for example accountants 
and lawyers) for limited returns; and, as a result, reduce the availability of funding for 
education or essential infrastructure. 
19 One major criticism was related to the right to form a labour union. Under the new Bill, 
labour unions could only be formed by a decision of the ‘majority’ of workers in the 
fi rm, which could be interpreted as 50 percent plus one, which made it harder to form a 
union except in very small fi rms. Moreover, the Bill had been drafted and approved dur-
ing secret meetings, without suffi cient consultation with unions and individual workers. 
These secret discussions were held in a fi ve-star hotel in Jakarta, in order to avoid the 
massive labour demonstrations in front of the parliament building protesting against the 
new draft. (Radio Nederland, 24 November 1997).
20 After being postponed several times, and under pressure from labour demonstrations in 
front of the Parliament Building in Jakarta, the Plenary Meeting of the Indonesian Parlia-
ment on 23 September 2002 agreed to annul Manpower Law No. 25/1997, and replace it 
with two new Bills – one on industrial relations dispute settlement, and one on guidance 
and protection for workers (Tempo Interaktif, 23 September 2002).
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less than a dollar a day were estimated to have risen from 40 million in 1997, 
to 100 million in 2000. In Indonesia, the poverty rate tripled from 22.5 mil-
lion in 1996, to 79.1 million in June 1998 – almost 40% of the total popula-
tion (Kontan, 7 December 1998). Economic growth of 7% per year since the 
1970s was wiped out within days. The crisis fractured the legitimacy of the 
New Order, leading to growing unrest throughout the country. Student and 
middle-class protests, united by the word reformasi (reform), had given way 
to rioting and looting in the capital, which eventually forced President Soe-
harto to resign on 21 May 1998. Soeharto then appointed his deputy and 
intimate, Habibie, as the new president, and ended his 32 years in power. 
The post-Soeharto era, known as the Reformasi, marked a new phase in the 
country’s history. This will be the topic of the next chapter.
Labour law plays an important role in labour reform, since it establishes the 
framework within which industrial relations and labour market operate. 
Changes in labour law may indicate the nature of change in industrial rela-
tions systems in general. Such changes often occur in parallel with a nation’s 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, and tend to be accompa-
nied by a shift in economic development strategies away from import-sub-
stitution industrialisation to neo-liberal economic policies oriented toward 
exports. Indeed, these two pressures – democracy and neo-liberalism – are 
the ‘twin pressures’ for change that work on a country’s economic system 
(Cook, 1998). This chapter describes and analyses the changes in labour laws 
during the Reformasi era, after the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998,1 
with particular attention to the enactment of the package of three new labour 
laws: the Manpower Law No. 13/2003, the Trade Union Law No. 21/2000, 
and the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Law No. 2/2004.2 The aim 
is to explain how and why such changes in labour law in Indonesia have 
occurred, and what have been the implications for labour. To this end, the 
chapter will investigate the context that structured the changes, i.e. democ-
ratization and neo-liberal economic reform, as well as the contents of the 
package of the three new labour laws, including comparing them with pre-
vious laws and analysing their impact on labour3 and the responses to these 
changes.
1 The Reformasi era is associated with the post-Soeharto era, following Soeharto’s resigna-
tion on 21 May 1998. Since that time, Indonesia has had fi ve Presidents, three of whom 
were each in power for fewer than four years: President Habibie (May 1998 – 2000), Presi-
dent Abdurrahman Wahid (2000 – 2001), and President Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001 –
2004), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY (2004 – 20014). In 2014 Joko Widodo was 
elected president.
2 In total there were fi ve new labour laws enacted; the other two were Law No. 40/2004 
on the National Social Security System, and Law No. 39/2004 on the Instalment and 
Protection of Indonesian Workers Abroad. These latter two laws will be referred to when 
needed in this discussion, but they will not be the focus of the dissertation.
3 Here labour refers to individual labour and/or organised labour, it is used interchange-
ably with the terms ‘labour unions’ and ‘trade unions’.
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1 Democratization and neo-liberal economic reform
In common with many labour law reforms in developing countries, par-
ticularly since the emergence of the so-called ‘globalisation’ of the world’s 
economy, labour law reform in Indonesia has been neo-liberal in character, 
with ‘flexibilisation’ (or ‘deregulation’, which is seen by many countries as 
a requirement for economic and occupational growth, by increasing the so-
called ‘atypical’ or ‘non-standard’ forms of employment while leaving the 
regulation of existing employment relations largely unchanged) as the thrust 
of the reform (Bronstein, 1997; Cook, 1998). Given the extensive regulations 
on labour in most developing countries, and their protective nature, it is typ-
ically the state and its labour laws, which are the main targets for the reform. 
In this way, labour law reform is seen predominantly as a tool for promot-
ing economic efficiency and encouraging exports; while at the same time the 
countries undergo economic liberalisation and transition from authoritarian 
rule to democracy. The twin pressures of democratization and neo-liberal 
economic reform act on industrial relations systems not only in develop-
ing countries but also, to some extent, in developed countries (Cook, 1998; 
see also Kuruvilla, 1996 and Kochan et al., 1994).4 Under these pressures, 
governments may either implement legislative reform, or facilitate de facto 
flexibility of the labour market through non-enforcement of existing labour 
legislation and other practices. In the case of Indonesia, due to the wave of 
democratization following the economic crisis in 1997-8, the weakened Indo-
nesian government could not ignore labour law as it had done before (as this 
requires a strong state); so it began to implement reforms by adopting flexi-
bilisation, while alo facilitating democratization by providing more space 
for organised labour. The result was a combination of neo-liberal labour law, 
with the intrusion of flexible labour markets and labour relations (for exam-
ple through the adoption of fixed-term contracts and outsourcing of work), 
while maintaining protective views towards labour (such as through mini-
mum wages regulations) and the government’s role in industrial relations. 
Although the government’s involvement in labour dispute settlement was 
reduced through the establishment of the Industrial Relations Court, its role 
in industrial relations continued via compulsory arbitration, in which the 
government acted as mediator.
4 Cook discusses the Latin America contexts. In Southeast Asia, Kuruvilla (1996) shows 
that the shifts in states’ economic strategies have driven most of the changes in industri-
al relations arenas. In contrast, in the United States, as Kochan et al. (1994) have shown, 
it is employers rather than the state which are the driving forces of change in industrial 
relations structures.
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After the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesia’s third President, 
Habibie, initiated limited reform aimed at changing the image of Indonesia 
as an authoritarian regime (Bourchier, 2000). Some examples of these unex-
pected ‘Habibie’s interregnum’ reforms5 included the immediate release of 
political prisoners held captive under the Soeharto era on charges of subver-
sive activities – many of whom had been in prison for decades – the annul-
ment of the press and publication license to make press freedom possible; 
and the revision of the five key political laws (on elections, parliament, polit-
ical parties, social organizations, and referenda), making it possible to set up 
political parties and participate in elections.6
With regard to labour policy, in June 1998 – one month after his appointment –
Habibie used his executive discretion to ratify ILO Convention No. 87 con-
cerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise with 
a ‘Presidential Decree’ (Law No. 83/1998). This was an extraordinary initia-
tive, as it bypassed the normal procedures through Parliament. The ratifica-
tion complemented the ILO Convention No. 98 concerning the Application 
of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, which 
had been ratified since 1956 (Law No. 18/1956), although without impli-
cations in practice during the New Order era. Prior to this, the Minister of 
Manpower of Habibie’s cabinet, Fahmi Idris, released a Ministerial Regula-
tion concerning Trade Union Registration, giving more freedom to workers 
to establish unions. This was followed by the government’s orders to release 
key union activists from prison, including Muchtar Pakpahan of the SBSI, 
the leading figure of the alternative (non-government) union movement 
during the New Order government’s time, and Dita Indah Sari of the PPBI; 
who were released on 25 May 1998 and 4 July 1999 respectively. Due to the 
relaxation of laws on the establishment of unions, the number of national 
5 Habibie was Soeharto’s former Vice President, and had been a close ally and long-
serving minister in Soeharto’s cabinets. It is widely considered that Habibie made these 
initial reforms in order to survive the political transition process, and to keep him in 
power (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). He was facing a diffi cult situation: while he had to 
demonstrate an ability to protect the interests nurtured under the New Order in order 
to guarantee his own political survival, this was not possible without democratizing 
the political arena, which opened the door to new actors and forces. Indeed, as Malley 
(2000) has observed, democratization did not end at this point, but was replaced by a 
‘protracted transition,’ in which authoritarian enclaves remained in place and compet-
ing elites struggled over the main state institutions and the direction of reform. A rather 
different view is provided by Lanti (2010), who argues that Habibie’s actions were not 
entirely for his own political survival, but were also infl uenced by his political views as 
a modernist Muslim and representative of an outer island (seberang), which arguably 
favours a democratic political system.
6 In less than a year, between May 1998 and February 1999, 160 political parties were 
established; far more than the three offi cial parties which had been allowed to compete 
in elections since 1973. In June 1999, the fi rst election of the Reformasi era was held. This 
election saw 48 political parties participating, and was praised by many as the fi rst free 
and fair election since 1955 (Feith 1971, see also Castles 1999).
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trade unions registered and recognised by the government rose from one 
in early 1998, to almost 50 two years later, and continued growing until it 
peaked at around 100 in 2009. Some of these unions were new, but most were 
offshoots from the New Order-supported SPSI union (Mizuno et al., 2007).
It appeared that Habibie was trying to change the prevailing image of labour 
practices in Indonesia during the New Order, in the hope of impressing the 
international community and in particular the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). By this time, Indonesia was already tied to the IMF’s prescriptions 
for economic recovery; as the first Letter of Intent with the IMF had been 
signed on 31 October 1997. On 15 January 1998, President Soeharto signed 
a deal with the IMF for another bailout package (Godement, 1999: 69). As 
part of this deal, the IMF required the immediate closing of sixteen banks, 
the dismantling of the monopoly on cloves, and the withdrawal of govern-
mental support for both the national aircraft industry and the Timor national 
car projects; all of which businesses involved people very close to President 
Soeharto (see Soesastro et al. 2010; also Letter of Intent, 31 October 19977). 
The IMF-supported programs for Indonesia extended over a six-year period, 
under four different Reformasi governments, with the last program terminat-
ing in December 2003.
The Reformasi governments continued the efforts which the New Order gov-
ernment had begun in 1996, just before the economic crisis, to change the 
country’s labour law system, making it less protective, more flexible and 
market-friendly. What is important here, however, is that although the IMF 
apparently supported labour market flexibility, at the same time it could 
not say no to the policies which supported freedom of association for trade 
unions, which were adopted as part of the new system. This is an inherent 
tension, even if only indirectly, in neo-liberal policies. The early involvement 
of the ILO in the labour law reforms may have played a part in the adoption 
of these seemingly contradictory new policies.
In August 1998, the government welcomed the ILO’s ‘Direct Contact Mis-
sion’, the purpose of which was to evaluate Indonesian labour law and draft 
a programme for labour law reform (ILO Jakarta, Press Release, 25 August 
7 Accessed at the IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/103197.htm).
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1998).8 According to one ILO Report, this labour law reform program sought 
to reformulate Indonesian labour laws ‘with a view to modernising and 
making them more relevant to and in step with the changing times and 
requirements of a free market economy’ (1999: 19). This is confirmed by ear-
lier comments by an ILO official in Jakarta:
The ILO stands ready to provide technical assistance requested by the Government in 
redrafting its labour legislation… We will provide whatever support we can to help cre-
ate a sound labour relations framework that will promote economic development while 
giving effect to ILO Conventions ratified by Indonesia.
(ILO Jakarta, Press Release, 28 August 1998)
On 23 December 1998, the ILO Jakarta Director, Iftikhar Ahmed, and the 
Minister of Manpower, Fahmi Idris, signed a Letter of Intent that was wit-
nessed by President Habibie, regarding the Indonesian government’s com-
mitment to ratifying the remaining three core ILO Conventions. This com-
mitment would make Indonesia the first country in the Asia-Pacific to ratify 
all eight of the ILO’s core conventions, and included the provision of tech-
nical assistance from the ILO to the Indonesian government to conduct the 
reforms; and the establishment of ‘the Tripartite Indonesian Task Force’ as a 
follow-up to the agreement (ILO Jakarta, Press Release, 23 December 1998). 
As noted by Iftikhar Ahmed ‘the immediate ILO technical assistance will 
focus on national legislation on labour law reform, awareness raising on the 
fundamental human rights conventions of the ILO and their compliance in 
practice’.
It is noteworthy in this regard that when the Asian financial crisis hit Indone-
sia in 1997-8, the state’s role changed dramatically, as the crisis fractured the 
very foundations of the New Order state. Following the crisis, the changes 
in labour law were part of a broader push to liberalize Indonesian economic 
and political life. Although Indonesia’s economy had begun taking small 
8 The Mission was conducted due to an invitation from the Indonesian Minister of Man-
power, Fahmi Idris, earlier in June 1998, following Idris’ attendance at the ILO Confer-
ence in Geneva. This conference was chaired by Professor Paul van der Heijden of the 
University of Amsterdam, a member of the Expert Committee and later the Chair of 
the Committee of Freedom of Association of the ILO. During the Mission’s subsequent 
six-day visit in Indonesia, ILO offi cials met with representatives of various Indonesian 
groups, including from government; employers; unions; military leaders; the World 
Bank; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They also visited Dita Indah Sari, 
who was still in prison at that time. According to Paul van der Heijden (interview 14 
March 2005), the two most important issues discussed were the new Manpower law, 
and the issue of military interference in labour disputes. The aim was to assess how the 
ILO could help the Indonesian government bring the new laws in line with ILO stan-
dards, and halt military interference as soon as possible; including through repealing the 
restrictions imposed on free collective bargaining and urging the government to ensure 
full protection of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination, and protection of 
workers organizations from interference.
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steps towards a market-based economy in the early 1980s, it had other wise 
remained relatively untouched for more than three decades, so the changes in 
the first years following the start of Reformasi were significant, with the trans-
formation from a corporatist model backed by a strong and powerful state, 
to one based mainly on market principles (Feridhanusetyawan and Pangestu 
2003; Lee 2003). During this time, the developmentalist state weakened sig-
nificantly, and the economy shifted from guided or state-led development to 
market-oriented reform and external liberalization (see Rosser 2002).
In an article in 2004, Teri Caraway has argued that during the Reformasi’s 
labour reform process, Indonesia’s unions were able to successfully defend 
their rights – unlike the experiences of unions in many other countries during 
labour reforms (Caraway, 2004). According to Caraway, what made the Indo-
nesian case different was the ‘protective repression’ character of the labour 
relations system inherited from the New Order period,9 which was a ‘bless-
ing in disguise’ for Indonesian workers. Caraway contended that although 
the reforms challenged and corrected the repressive aspects of the previous 
law, they maintained its protective elements, which ‘created a favorable start-
ing point and a strategic edge for unions [in Indonesia] in the ensuing battles 
over labour reform’ (Caraway, 2004: 32). In Caraway’s view, this protective 
legacy, combined with international pressure and institutional design, pro-
vided an ‘unexpected source of strength for weak labour unions’.
Caraway’s argument is based on the view that important ‘protective aspects’ 
of the labour legislation were preserved under the reform process. This chap-
ter challenges Caraway’s conclusion, arguing that even though some protec-
tive aspects of the old legal system were preserved indeed, in fact there had 
been a high degree of de facto flexibility10 in labour law practice in Indonesia 
during the New Order, due to lack of enforcement. Moreover, since de jure 
flexibility had also been built into the new laws, this limited both the scope 
of protection available, and the capacity to implement what protection was 
mandated in the new framework. An analysis of the development of the new 
labour law regime – a product of the labour law reform program from 1998 
to 200611 – shows that it dismantled many of the protective aspects of the 
previous labour legislation. This increase in flexibility has limited the ability 
of unions and workers to maintain their rights as previously contained in the 
9 As Caraway explained, ‘the repressive aspects of the law [were those which] violated 
international labor standards and were seen as a legacy of the brutal Suharto regime… 
[while] the protective aspects of the law were a product of Suharto’s predecessor, Sukar-
no ... [which] did not violate international labour standards’ (Caraway, 2004: 32). 
10 For a thorough discussion on ‘fl exibility’ and how it has been applied in various coun-
tries, see Gouliquer (2000); who argues that this notion has often been misused.
11 In this dissertation the author defi nes Indonesia’s labour law reform program as begin-
ning with the signing of the Letter of Intent on 23 December 1998, and ending with the 
offi cial operation of the newly-established Industrial Relations Court on 14 January 
2006.
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law; and this chapter argues that this has become the main challenge for the 
development of genuine, strong unionism in Indonesia.
Since the birth of democracy in Indonesia coincided with an economic crisis, 
there was little financial gain available for workers anyway; which contrib-
uted to the generally weak position of organised labour. As similarly noted 
by Cook (1998: 315) for Latin America:
In many cases, however, the return to democracy occurred in the context of economic 
crises — especially high inflation, indebtedness, and wage decline — so that restored 
political rights for labour did not always translate into the ability to advance in material 
gains. In addition, these fragile political transitions often required union restraint in 
voicing pent-up demands. Despite the obvious benefits of democracy, unions in many 
countries entered this new political period from a position of significant weakness.
Such a situation, combined with the destruction of the militant section of 
organized labour at the start of the New Order (see Hadiz, 1997), and the leg-
acy of systematic and often brutal disorganization and demobilization dur-
ing Soeharto’s rule which unions still struggled to overcome (Hadiz, 2000), 
ensured the continuing relative weakness of the union movement, despite 
the new freedoms of the Reformasi era. In this context, reforms that facili-
tated freer union formation did not strengthen unions, but instead increased 
union fragmentation; while the initial labour law reforms that followed the 
neo-liberal economic reforms did not contemplate the need to strengthen 
labour law enforcement mechanisms that had been left unclear in the law. 
Thus, the fall of the authoritarian New Order, and the democratization of 
the country, have in general been marked by an absence of one of the most 
important organizations representing the interests of lower classes – labour 
unions – which have remained practically excluded from political decision-
making processes.
However, as we will see further in later Chapters, this broad general situ-
ation can include many individual variations. An analysis of specific cases 
shows that the dynamics of labour reform are often more nuanced than the 
simple explanations above. Although it is true that there has been generally 
an inability of the union movement to transform their democratic freedoms 
into power in the political decision-making arena, in certain cases unions 
have arguably played a role not only in defending the rights of their mem-
bers, for example in setting minimum wages, but also in asisting society in 
general; for example their efforts to ensure the enactment of the social secu-
rity law in 2011. This will be explored in detail in later Chapters.
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2 Labour law changes
On 23 December 1998, the ‘Labour Law Reform Program’ became the formal 
working agenda of the Department of Manpower, marked by the signing 
of the Letter of Intent between the Department of Manpower and the ILO, 
with the ILO committing to provide technical assistance to support the pro-
gram (ILO Jakarta, Press Release, 23 December 1998). The reform process was 
funded by the US Department of Labour through the ‘ILO/USA Declaration 
Project,’ with a budget of over US$ 1 million (ILO, 2007: 58), a starting date 
of 2001, and a completion time in August 2006 (www.usembassyjakarta.org, 
n.d.), which was later extended for two years, to 2008. Under the reform 
program, the Indonesian government drafted three new labour bills: the 
Trade Union Bill (later the Trade Union Law No. 21/2000), the Guidance and 
Protection for Workers Bill (later the Manpower Law No. 13/2003), and the 
Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Bill (later the Industrial Relations 
Dispute Settlement Law No. 2/2004).12 Apart from facilitating the formula-
tion of the new bills, the ILO/USA Declaration Project also facilitated several 
other activities, including the publication of an information booklet which 
compiled the new laws into a single book, as well as support for several of 
Indonesia’s trade union confederations to undertake training in collective 
labour agreements, negotiations and leadership (Sinaga, 2005).
The aim of Indonesia’s labour law reforms, as outlined in the Letter of Intent 
with the ILO, was to change the existing labour law system substantially, 
to create more flexible labour regulations which support business interests, 
while also meeting basic universal labour rights as written in the ILO con-
ventions. As noted by Indonesia’s National Development Planning Body 
Bappenas, one crucial problem for the Indonesian economy was the high 
rate of unemployment. To tackle this, Bappenas argued, there should be a 
‘trade off between job security and job opportunities’. To this end, one par-
ticular document, Labour Market Analysis: Employment Friendly Labour Policy 
(2003) (also known as the ‘White Book’ in Indonesian government circles), 
became an important guide for the government in their development of 
policies concerning labour market regulations (see also Widianto, 2003). 
The resulting policies offered a combination of some protection for work-
ers, alongside pro-employer flexibility in labour relations. For employers 
and some factions of the government, particularly Bappenas, the new labour 
laws were considered less flexible than intended, as they still had provi-
sions of high severance payments; while labour groups and their supporters 
saw them as too flexible. In effect, the new labour laws did maintain several 
protective aspects, such as the requirement for permission for workers’ dis-
missal, and new legislation regarding the functions of trade unions; while 
12 For a more detailed story about the dynamics behind the enactment of these three laws 
see Suryomenggolo (1994, 2008).
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also adopting several broad provisions to facilitate flexible work practices 
for employers, through legalisation which facilitated outsourcing of work.
As we have seen earlier, the labour movement played a key role in Indo-
nesia’s labour law reform process from the beginning. However, this influ-
ence stemmed predominantly from small sections of the labour movement, 
including PPBI, KAPB, and several other small, relatively militant labour 
unions and individual activists, whose activities were supported by labour-
focused NGOs (in particular the LBH Jakarta). The larger union force, 
including the SPSI, which had the largest membership in the formal union 
sector, remained practically silent. This was because the SPSI, and particular-
ly its leader Jacob Nuwa Wea, was already incorporated into the labour law 
reform process. Formerly a Member of Parliament from the PDI-P (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Strug-
gle) of the Commission VII of the Parliament (responsible for labour issues), 
Nuwa Wea was later appointed Minister of Manpower by President Mega-
wati, and was in charge of formulating the new labour bills; in particular the 
Guidance and Protection for Workers Bill and the Industrial Relations Dis-
pute Settlement Bill. Employers were initially concerned about this appoint-
ment and about whether a union leader could maintain impartiality towards 
employers and unions (Kompas, 11 August 2001); while several union lead-
ers were suspicious that his appointment was intended to tame the rising 
labour movement. Under Nuwa Wea’s influence, several union leaders were 
selected to involve in the formal decision-making process, through the estab-
lishment of the ‘Tim Kecil’ (Small Team), facilitated by his colleague at Com-
mission VII, Rekso Ageng Herman. Herman was also successful at bring-
ing representatives from employers associations and a number of academics 
onto the Tim Kecil. Despite efforts by the union representatives on the Tim 
Kecil to insert stronger pro-labour content into the draft laws, in general this 
was unsuccessful; the Laws that were enacted were predominantly the same 
as Parliament’s original drafts, disregarding in large part the Tim Kecil’s rec-
ommendations (see also Suryomenggolo, 2004). Nuwa Wea maintained his 
position until President Megawati lost the presidential election on 20 Octo-
ber 2004.13
13 Thus, it was under Megawati’s administration that most of the new labour laws since 
the Reformasi were enacted. These included the Manpower Law No. 13/2003 and the 
Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Law No. 2/2004. Another law that Megawati’s 
administration managed to enact, the National Social Security System Law No. 40/2004, 
was, quite extraordinarily, signed by her during a special ceremony at the Presidential 
Palace which was attended by almost all ministers of her cabinet on 19 October 2004 
– just one day before she ceded power to President-elect Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(interview with Sulastomo, the chair of the National Social Security System Team estab-
lished by President Megawati which drafted the Law, on 30 July 2010).
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As discussed elsewhere (Tjandra, 2007), several union leaders who were 
not part of the Tim Kecil used other opportunities provided by the law after 
Reformasi, to challenge the reform process. In June 2003, 37 union federations 
filed a judicial review against the Manpower Law No. 13/2003, with the 
Constitutional Court of Indonesia. Their argument was that the Law vio-
lated citizens’ basic rights as guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution, through 
the flexibilisation of labour relations; specifically, the promotion of contract-
based work and outsourcing, which undermined Indonesian workers’ liveli-
hoods by diminishing job security and protection for weaker workers. The 
hearings started in November 2003, and the Constitutional Judges reached 
a decision in October 2004 which overruled most of the unions’ demands, 
and accepted only some minor revisions to the law (see Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 012/PUU-1/2003 on 28 October 2004). Two judges from the 
panel of nine judges wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the labour law 
reform through the Manpower Law No. 13/2003 was ‘unfriendly to human-
ity and offered less protection, especially towards labour’. Nevertheless, 
most of the provisions of the law challenged by the labour movement were 
maintained.
2.1 The Trade Union Law No. 21/2000
The first labour law passed after the fall of Soeharto was the Trade Union 
Law (No. 21/2000, promulgated on 4 August 2000). Despite this law being 
the first in Indonesia’s history to establish a legal basis for the existence and 
functioning of trade unions (we shall return to this later in the following 
chapter on trade union legislation), during deliberations about the Trade 
Unions Bill in parliament it was criticized by several union and labour 
groups; particularly by the Forum Solidaritas Union (FSU, the Unions Solidar-
ity Forum), an alliance of trade unions established since the Reformasi era 
(Kompas, 6 March 2000).14 The critics argued that the Law still allowed the 
government to intervene in internal union issues; for example, it contained 
a requirement for unions to report their constitutions to the government 
or otherwise face government sanctions, including the abolishment of the 
union itself. Other criticisms related to the absence in the Law of the right 
to strike; and the provision that in order to initiate collective bargaining the 
union needed to be supported by a minimum of 50 percent of all workers 
from the company or workplace to express interest in being involved in the 
collective bargaining in question.
14 The FSU consisted of several members of the FSPSI Reformasi, which split from the 
New Order supported trade union FSPSI (interview with Indra Munaswar). The FSPSI 
Reformasi consisted of, among others, ASPEK Indonesia (Asosiasi Serikat Pekerja Indone-
sia, Indonesian Association of Trade Unions), FSP KEP Reformasi, FSP TSK Reformasi, 
Farkes Reformasi, FSPMI, etc. Later on the FSU was transformed into a new peak orga-
nization KSPI (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia, Confederation of Indonesian Trade 
Unions), which was then affi liated to the ITUC (International Trade Union Confedera-
tion).
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The critics also argued that in its provisions, the bill neglected to overturn the 
New Order’s exclusion of civil servants from being allowed to join a union 
(Kompas, 6 March 2000). In article 44 of the Law, civil servants were given 
the right to organize, but this right was restricted by a ruling which stated: 
‘civil servants shall enjoy freedom of association and that the implementa-
tion of this right shall be regulated in a separate Act’, which left the position 
and rights of civil servants unclear.15 Similarly, police and the military were 
explicitly excluded from the Law, leaving them unable to establish their own 
unions.16 Other criticisms were related to provisions in the Law concerning 
the finances and assets of trade unions (Kompas, 21 June 2000), including the 
obligation of union officials ‘to report in writing to the government agency 
responsible for manpower affairs according to prevailing laws and regula-
tions’ whenever the union received financial assistance from overseas par-
ties (now Article 31 of the Trade Union Law). This provision was problem-
atic for some unions, since many were dependent on financial support from 
overseas donors. Especially at the beginning of Reformasi, when unions had 
not yet established effective mechanisms for collecting membership dues, 
there was a strong need to develop viable union financial structures and 
15 The State Owned Enterprises (BUMN) employees, who – like the civil servants – used 
to be members of KORPRI, have now been much freer to organise though, as seen in 
the establishment of the BUMN Union in 2004. Around 92 of 164 BUMN belong to this 
union (Tempo Interaktif, 17 Juni 2004). The teachers, many of whom are civil servants 
united in the PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, the United Teachers of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia), however, still face diffi culties for their union to be recognized by the 
Department of Manpower offi ce, since the offi cials consider them as professionals and 
‘not workers’ (Pikiran Rakyat, 4 March 2005).
16 ILO Convention No. 87 guarantees the right to organise for ‘all workers whatsoever’; 
yet there is one class of employees that States may, without offending their commitment 
to the Organization, deny entirely the right to organize and bargain collectively, i.e., 
the police and military. The offi cial justifi cation for this exclusion is that unionization 
might compromise the responsibilities that police and the military have for the ‘exter-
nal and internal security of the State’ (Rubin, 2005: 126). In Indonesia, however, such a 
regulation was extended to private security guards, whose rights to form unions were 
annulled based on a ‘telegram letter’ to the Head of National Police in August 2002, 
which ruled that any violations carried sanctions, including removal and dismissal. This 
policy was protested against by a hotel union for which 20 percent of its members were 
security guards. (The Jakarta Post, 30 September 2002). In practice, however, only a few 
security guards could join unions anyway, since most of them were trained by compa-
nies whose owners include former senior offi cers in the police force and the military. 
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institutions.17 Despite the concerns, this provision was retained, although in 
practice unions have remained able to receive money from overseas donors 
without significant restrictions.
The Trade Union Law contained some improvements in comparison to the 
previous ministerial-level regulations on trade unions, which it replaced. It 
allowed any group of ten workers to form a new trade union, and it allowed 
workers from one enterprise to associate with workers from another enter-
prise or workplace in support of industrial action. A number of unions in 
different workplaces might together establish one federation, and several 
federations in different regions might become one confederation, registered 
at the national level. The law did not use the word ‘registration’ but rather 
‘recording’, to refer to the legal requirement for trade unions to inform the 
Department of Manpower and Transmigration of their existence. This is 
probably due to the fact that the word ‘registration’ was misused during the 
New Order era to prevent the operation of free trade unions. Several pro-
visions in the new law also protected trade union officials from unfair dis-
missal by employers – such dismissal was considered ‘anti-union conduct’ 
and carried a criminal sanction of between one to five years’ imprisonment 
or a heavy fine.
Following the reform and relaxation of the regulations governing union for-
mation, the number of unions in Indonesia increased from one in early 1998 
to become around 100 national federations registered in late 2009, including 
five national confederations. In 2005, the latest official data available at the 
time of writing, there were 11,464 plant-level trade unions registered, mostly 
affiliated with one of the three largest confederations (KSPSI, KSPI, and KSB-
SI). Although Indonesia had become the first country in the Asia Pacific to 
ratify all core conventions of the ILO, including Conventions No. 87 and 98 
17 The aforementioned Forum Solidaritas Union (FSU), for instance, was supported by the 
ACILS (American Center for International Labour Solidarity), an international support 
wing of the United States’ AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor- Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations), during the FSU’s earlier protests against the new labour bills. When 
later the FSU became the FSPSI Reformasi, its fi rst new offi ce was funded by the ACILS 
in Cikini district in Jakarta; and was indeed located in the same building as the ACILS. 
According to Dan La Botz (2001: 307), from 1997 onwards ACILS received around $1 
million a year from the USAID (US Agency for International Development) for its proj-
ects in Indonesia, to achieve goals such as increasing the number of freely negotiated 
collective bargaining agreements; improving shop stewarding and grievance-handling 
performance; developing union capacity in due collection; and developing effective 
alternative dispute resolution processes. There was also another goal: to integrate the 
SPSI (the state-controlled union) into the overall framework of the projects. However, 
after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, ACILS switched its support from the SPSI and 
focused instead on supporting the three major unions established after the Reformasi: 
SPSI Reformasi, SBSI, and FNPBI (the Indonesian National Front for Labour Struggle, a 
left-wing union estalished by mainly student activists) (Botz, 2001: 308).
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on the rights to associate and collective bargaining,18 the level of unioniza-
tion has remained relatively low, with only 6-7 percent union density in the 
formal sector. Official reports show that although the number of registered 
unions has increased, the number of workers belonging to unions has actu-
ally been decreasing every year. In May 2002, 45 national federations were 
registered, comprising 8,281,941 members; by mid-2005, the Ministry of 
Manpower’s verification results for union registrations showed an increase 
to around 90 unions registered, but a total of only 3,338,597 members (see 
verification results by the Ministry of Manpower, with 2005 being the lat-
est report available at the time of writing). Some scholars have, however, 
challenged these numbers as inaccurate due to problems associated with the 
union membership verification process, which relies on information pro-
vided by unions without conducting independent checks of numbers (e.g., 
Juliawan, 2009).
Although the situation cannot be compared to the three decades of unions 
suppression under the New Order, in today’s Indonesia there remain fre-
quent examples of workers who have formed unions only to be denied their 
rights to collective bargaining by the employer, leading in some cases to the 
dismissal of union leaders and intimidation of union members (see, e.g., Sap-
torini and Tjandra, 2005). Despite the enactment of the Trade Union Act No. 
21/2000 as a special law on trade unions, with provisions to protect trade 
union officials from dismissal due to anti-union conduct, such dismissals are 
still frequent. One factor in this is the generally weak bargaining position 
of unions in Indonesian society, associated with society’s low recognition of 
unions as a social organization in the workplace. The state’s recognition of 
the existence of unions, at least formally, following the Reformasi in 1998, has 
not necessarily been followed by a broader acceptance, by employers and 
society, of the role of unions in the workplace.
Nonetheless, Indonesian trade unions have at least some legal basis that 
supports their traditional objectives of improving workers’ pay and condi-
tions. In Articles 28 and 48, the Law clearly prohibits a number of specific 
anti-union behaviours, such as unfair termination of employment, demo-
tion, wage repression, intimidation, and anti-union campaigns. The Law 
considers such conduct to be a ‘grave criminal offence’, which is subject, as 
mentioned above, to criminal sanction of one to five years’ imprisonment 
and/or a fine of Rp 100 million to Rp 500 million. One rare case occurred in 
2007 in Pasuruan, East Java, with the imprisonment of a general manager 
for his misconduct against trade union officials. We will discuss this case in 
detail in the following Chapter on trade union legislation.
18 The latest one was Convention No. 185 on Seafarers’ Identity Documents.
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2.2 The Manpower Law No. 13/2003
The second labour law to be passed during Reformasi received a similarly 
mixed reception to the first, with the plan to ratify the Manpower Bill trig-
gering significant controversy. Hundreds of workers and activists, particu-
larly those affiliated with the KAPB (Komite Anti-Penindasan Buruh, Commit-
tee Against Labour Oppression), used demonstrations and media releases to 
protest againt the endorsement of the Manpower Bill by the House of Rep-
resentatives (DPR) on 25 February 2003, on the grounds that the bill was 
against workers’ interests and that it was strongly influenced by the IMF and 
the World Bank (The Jakarta Post, 26 February 2003). The endorsement only 
went followed one month after Daniel Citrin, the IMF Assistant Director for 
Asia and Pacific Department, publicly questioned its delayed promulga-
tion (The Jakarta Post, 20 January 2003). The demonstration ended in clashes 
between the police and demonstrators. Nonetheless, President Megawati 
officially signed the Manpower Law No. 13/2003 on 25 March 2003.
This new Law replaced almost all previous laws and regulations that cov-
ered the basic principles governing labour relations in Indonesia, includ-
ing the Employment Law No. 1/1951 and the Basic Principles of Man-
power Law No. 14/1969, augmented by several government regulations, 
ministerial-level regulations and circulation lettters.19 It contained a bulk of 
provisions with 18 chapters, 193 articles and around 500 clauses, covering 
a number of labour issues before, during and after the employment peri-
od.20 These issues ranged from the regulation of children who have to work 
to the regulation of manpower planning, placement and training; and from 
equal opportunity to the government’s obligation to provide employment. 
The Law included basic guidelines for industrial relations, such as collective 
labour agreement negotiations, mechanisms by which to select union rep-
resentatives for negotiations, and mechanisms to enable notification of the 
collective labour agreements once concluded.
19 Law No. 1/1951 provided details of basic protections for workers, including work-
ing hours and restrictions on employment for women and children, whereas Law No. 
14/1969 was a short document stating broad principles guiding employment, health 
and safety norms and labour protection.
20 Articles 158 and 159 were later declared null and void, based on Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 012/PUU-I/2003 on 24 October 2004.
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The Law also included the requirement to establish ‘bipartite cooperation 
institutions’ in enterprises employing 50 or more workers,21 and for ‘tri-
partite cooperation institutions’ at the national, provincial, and district 
(kabupaten/kota) level. The bipartite cooperation institution is a forum for 
‘communication, consultation and deliberation’ on ‘matters pertaining to 
industrial relations’ at the company level,22 and members of the institution 
are the employers and registered trade unions in the company. The tripartite 
cooperation institution has the same functions, but in the broader region-
al and national context; and its members comprise representatives from 
employers’ groups, trade unions and the government.23 The law also pro-
vides for the right to strike, but only as a ‘last resort’; meaning that unions 
are required to attempt to reach a consensus in a bipartite forum, and if 
this fails, a mediator is called in to settle the conflict. If these efforts remain 
unsuccessful, a ‘peaceful’ and ‘disciplined’ strike is permissible, provided 
notice of the intention to strike is communicated to the Minister of Man-
power in advance. The right to strike, however, is limited in enterprises that 
serve the ‘public interest’ and/or enterprises ‘whose types of activities [if 
curtailed] will lead to the endangerment of human lives’. Moreover, the law 
decrees that strikes shall be ‘arranged in such a way so as not to disrupt the 
public interest and/or endanger the safety of other people’. Nonetheless, in 
practice strikes have often occurred without following these provisions; by 
referring instead to a separate law on the freedom of expression in public 
(Law No. 9/1998). In such cases the notification of the intent to strike is sent 
not to the Manpower Office, as regulated by the Manpower Law, but to the 
police.
21 The idea of having some form of ‘worker-management cooperation’ was not without 
precedent in Indonesia. In 1960-1964, on the basis of Government Regulation in Lieu of 
Law No. 45/1960 on Worker-Management Councils (Dewan Perusahaan), worker-man-
agement councils were established in the state’s employment enterprises (the regulation 
only applied to state-owned operations). However, there is a huge difference between 
the ‘Worker-Management Councils’ established under Government Regulation No. 
45/1960, and the ‘Bipartite Cooperation Institutions’ described in the Manpower Law. 
Government Regulation No. 45/1960, unlike the Manpower Law, provided detailed 
mechanisms for the work of the councils: the Management was represented on these 
councils by a top executive of the enterprise, who also served as chairman of the council, 
and provided the organization with a manager who was able to make decisions without 
outside consultation. The councils had to include a representative of the union associ-
ated with the enterprise, and, if the enterprise operated in the agricultural fi eld, a repre-
sentative of the farm; or if the enterprise was not in the agricultural fi eld, another labour 
representative. This meant there were always at least two pro-labour representatives out 
of four members of the councils; a relevant ‘expert’ was also required (for more dis-
cussion about worker-management councils in Indonesia in the 1960s, see Panglaykim, 
1965).
22 Article 1 section 18 the Manpower Law No. 13/2003.
23 Article 1 section 19 the Manpower Law No. 13/2003.
88 Chapter 3 
Although there is greater recognition of the existence of different interests 
in labour in post-New Order laws than in those of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Pancasila ideology is still influential in Indonesian law; leading to the con-
tinuing perception in legal and government circles that legal conflict is ‘inap-
propriate’ and should be avoided, if not suppressed.24 The establishment of 
the ‘bipartite cooperation institution’ has tended to reduce the need for col-
lective bargaining and trade union representation. This seems similar to the 
concept of the ‘work council’ in some European countries, notably Germany, 
which has a labour system in which trade union activity in workplaces is 
relatively limited (Biagi, 2001: 495). In Indonesia, some union factions were 
concerned that the mandatory requirement for all grievances to be discussed 
initially within a ‘cooperation institution’ would reduce union power, and 
would weaken the effectiveness of collective bargaining; as happened, for 
example, in South Korea (Park, 1993).
Of all the provisions of the Manpower Law, the most highly debated in pub-
lic have been the clauses on labour protection, concerning severance pay-
ment and dismissals, fixed-term contract labour and outsourcing, and mini-
mum wages (see Manning and Roesad, 2007; Dhanani et al., 2009). These 
clauses are contained in three chapters: Chapter 9 (Employment Relations, 
articles 50-66); Chapter 10, (Protection, Wages and Welfare, articles 67-101); 
and Chapter 12 (Termination of Employment, articles 150-172); which 
together cover 73 of the Law’s articles. These chapters are the most contro-
versial because they are seen as indicative of the level of rigidity and inflex-
ibility of the Manpower Law and labour market regulations in general in 
Indonesia; which ties closely to the debate about employment creation and 
business climate.25 The controversy includes provisions concerning fixed-
term contractual work and sub-contracting (or ‘outsourcing,’ as it is more 
commonly called in industrial relations practices in Indonesia26), which is 
contained in Chapter 9 of the Manpower Law (see Manning and Roesad, 
24 The fi rst sentence in the ‘Considering’ part of Law No. 2/2004 on Industrial Relations 
Dispute Settlement is: ‘That harmonious, dynamic, and fair industrial relations need to 
be put into practice in an optimal manner in accordance with Pancasila values’.
25 See for example the annual Doing Business Reports of the IFC (International Finance 
Institution)/World Bank provide international comparative data on the diffi culties in 
doing business in various countries; based on, among other things, the rigidity of a 
country’s employment regulations. Since the fi rst report on Indonesia in 2004, the coun-
try has ranked highly with regard to its restrictive employment regulations (IFC, 2004-
2010). 
26 The term ‘outsourcing’ is not actually used in Article 64-66 of the Manpower Law No. 
13/2003, which covers such practices; which instead uses the term ‘subcontract’. How-
ever, many elements in the Law are in line with the general defi nition of ‘outsourcing’ 
as used in management theory and practice, which is: ‘an act of transferring some of a 
company’s recurring internal activities and decision rights to an outside provider, as set 
forth in a contract’, or ‘the contracting out of functions, tasks, or services by an organi-
zation for the purpose of reducing its process burden, acquiring a specialised technical 
expertise, or achieving expense reduction’ (Indrajit and Djokopranoto, 2003).
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2007; also Tjandraningsih and Nugroho, 2008). Contract work and outsourc-
ing is part of what is referred to in industrial relations literature as ‘labour 
flexibility’. Developed especially in the 1980s, the flexibility concept and its 
twin, the ‘core/periphery employees’ concept, grew in popularity as man-
agement strategies became more competitive and management became less 
inclined to employ full-time or permanent employees (Salamon, 1998: 515). 
The two concepts developed into the so-called ‘flexible firm model’, which 
became the foundation of the labour flexibility concept that subsequently 
dominated human resource management discourses, and legitimised the 
reduced protection of workers.27
27 Salomon (1998: 515-6) describes several important features of this ‘fl exible fi rm’ model, 
including the need for modern enterprises to become more responsive, adaptive, and 
competitive with respect to performance, quality, and services. To this end, companies 
need ‘numerical fl exibility’ and ‘time fl exibility’ (the ability to easily adapt labour inputs 
in facing the changes of needs); ‘functional fl exibility’ (the fl exibility to transfer workers 
between tasks); and ‘pay fl exibility’ (more individualization of work and wage differ-
entiation based on individual performance, other organization-specifi c variables, and 
labour market conditions). Implementing this fl exibility leads to the creation of different 
groups of workers. First is the core group: those workers with full time, permanent sta-
tus, who become the company’s future. This group enjoys relatively secure work, and is 
the group in which the company invests training and, development, and implemented 
functional, time and wage fl exibilities. Second is the ‘peripheral group,’ which becomes 
the companies’ supporting group. This group tends to comprise a mix of (1) full-time 
workers whose skills are obtained easily from the labour market, with limited access 
to career opportunities, little investment in training, and which tends to feature a high 
employee turn-over; and (2) workers with casual employment contracts, whose non-
permanent status fi ts short term business needs and who have very low job security. A 
third group comprises workers who are not direct employees of the company, but who 
can be considered part of its human resources; including ex-employees whom the com-
pany has made ‘self-employed’ in the same area of work as before, and those involved 
through ‘contracting out’ of non-core business activities. Numerical fl exibility is at the 
heart of this fl exible fi rm model, by creating different levels of job security and differ-
ent levels of attachment to a company, which produces the fundamental differences 
between the core and peripheral workers. A key question is the the level of freedom a 
company is given to determine the types of employment contract it offers, and to replace 
(hire and fi re) workers to meet perceived company needs. The protective labour legisla-
tion provisions concerning hiring and fi ring of workers tend to be counterproductive to 
a company’s needs for labour fl exibility, as the legislation restricts a company’s ability 
to cull its workers based on perceived need, while substantially increasing the amount 
required to be paid as compensation for dismissal. This discourages companies from 
employing permanent workers, and makes them more inclined to employ non-perma-
nent part-time workers, especially in times of market uncertainty.
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Various workers’ groups in Indonesia rejected the Manpower Law’s provi-
sions concerning contract and outsourcing work. The Komite Anti-Penindasan 
Buruh (KAPB, the Anti-Repression Workers’ Committee),28 for example, 
argued that the outsourcing practices outlined in the Law’s provisions 
would relieve employers of their responsibility to ensure fair wages and 
other allowances for workers; making workers mere commodities in trans-
actions between the employer company and the firm recruiting outsourced 
workers. The workers serving these sub-contracting firms were hired on a 
contract basis, so that there was no employment security or labour insur-
ance – a situation that KAPB described as a tendency towards ‘modern slav-
ery’. In contrast, Bappenas and its neo-liberal economist supporters argued 
that provisions were not flexible enough; and that such a rigid policy on hir-
ing and firing, and the high severance pay for dismissing workers, not only 
went against the international trend but were likely to limit job creation in 
the formal sector (Bappenas, 2003; Basri, 2008). This argument clearly influ-
enced the government, in 2006 when it attempted to revise the Manpower 
Law’s provisions, particularly the controversial articles concerning contrac-
tual and outsourcing work, and the articles concerning severance payments 
(Manning and Roesad, 2006, 2007).
In this regard it is interesting to examine the role of the Tim Kecil (‘Small 
Team’), which was established under the Special Committee of Parliament 
and comprised several union leaders brought together to obtain a pro-labour 
view on the drafts of the new bills. Of the three new bills, only two (the 
Manpower Bill and the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Bill) actu-
ally included the Tim Kecil during the draft deliberations.29 Despite concerns 
from some parts of the union movement – particularly the KAPB – that the 
Tim Kecil was ‘not democratic’ and ‘exclusive’ (Suryomenggolo, 2004, KAPB, 
2003), union representatives within the Tim Kecil were able to ensure that 
several labour interests were formulated within the Law (Mizuno 2008). We 
will discuss this further in the chapter on trade union legislation.
28 The KAPB consisted of 15 unions, incuding the Asosiasi Serikat Pekerja (ASPEK, Trade 
Union Association) Indonesia; Front National Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia (National Front 
for the Indonesian Labour Stuggle); Serikat Buruh Jabotabek (Jakarta and Surround Trade 
Union); and was formed specifi cally to gather together unions and labour NGOs which 
were critical of the labour law reform processes. Their meetings and plans of action were 
facilitated largely by the Labour Division of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakar-
ta), a Jakarta branch of the leading human rights NGO Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation 
in Jakarta (YLBHI), which became the headquarters of pro-labour activities at the time.
29 The establishment of the Tim Kecil was initiated by several members of parliament, in 
particular Rekso Ageng Herman, who was from Commission VII (from the PDI-P) and 
member of the Special Committee for the formulation of the new labour bills. Herman 
facilitated the council’s initial meeting on 6 November 2002, with the names of union 
invitees put forward by Jacob Nuwa Wea). According to Suryomenggolo (2004), invitees 
from the unions were selected specifi cally to help give the council legitimacy.
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2.3 The Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Law No. 2/2004
The main provisions of the third law, the Industrial Relations Dispute Settle-
ment Law (No. 2/2004, promulgated on 14 January 2004)30 reflected the pro-
visions of the cancelled Manpower Law of 1997 (see Article 57): namely, the 
transfer of the labour dispute settlement mechanism away from the Regional 
and Central Labour Dispute Settlement Committees (or ‘P4’, Panitia Peny-
elesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan), under the Department of Manpower, to the 
‘Industrial Relations Court,’ which is under the judical branch of the state. 
As noted by Mizuno (2008), the idea of having an industrial relations court 
was not without precedent in Indonesia. In the 1920s, the Railway and Tram 
Workers Association had argued that such an arbitration court was neces-
sary to ensure legal certainty and justice within the industrial dispute resolu-
tion processes (see also McVey, 1965). However, the government had empha-
sised mediation, rather than court action, as the most appropriate means by 
which to resolve disputes. This had been adopted by the Soekarno govern-
ment and maintained by the Soeharto government through the Labour Dis-
pute Settlement Law No. 22/1957, which introduced the tripartite compul-
sory arbitration mechanism.
The proposal to establish an industrial relations court was raised again dur-
ing deliberations on the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Bill in 2003. 
Muchtar Pakpahan, the head of the Indonesian Prosperous Labour Union 
(SBSI), brought the idea back to the table through the Union Solidarity Forum 
(FSU) Team for the Reforms of Labour Law. The team launched a campaign 
for the reform of labour laws including Law No. 22/1957, emphasizing the 
need for an effective, efficient industrial dispute mechanism to replace the 
problematic compulsory arbitration mechanisms operating under the P4 (see 
Mizuno, 1998; Suryomenggolo, 2008).31 When eventually the Industrial Rela-
tions Court was adopted by the new Law in 2004, this appeared to be a com-
promise – an earlier draft of the bill showed that the government wanted ini-
tially to abolish not only the P4 system but also the requirement (under Law 
No. 22/1957) for employers to obtain permission before dismissals; which the 
government wanted to be replaced by a stronger bipartite system between 
unions and employers, with less government involvement (Mizuno, 2008: 2).
30 This Law was supposed to be implemented on 14 January 2005, a year after its enactment. 
However, problems with staffi ng, structure and infrastructure within both the executive 
and judiciary during the Law’s planning stages led to the its postponement for a year, 
until 14 January 2006, based on Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1/2005.
31 Criticisms of the Labour Dispute Settlement Committee process included that it took 
too long to resolve (often years at the regional and national levels); and that decisions 
could then challenged before the Administrative Court, which could lead to several 
more years before a fi nal, binding decision was reached. Gallagher (1997) studied the 
Labour Dispute Settlement Committee’s performance and effectiveness between 1990-
1994, and reported that the Labour Dispute Settlement Committee suffered institutional 
weaknesses and ‘battled against itself’, as demonstrated by its inconsistent decisions on 
similar issues and by its ongoing corruption problems.
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The Tim Kecil again played a role in securing workers’ interests during the 
development of this law (Mizuno, 2008). Several of the Law’s final provi-
sions reflected lobbying by the Tim Kecil, including: (1) the provision that 
cases valued at less than Rp 150 million would not incur a charge; (2) the 
provision to allow unions and employers to represent their members during 
trial; (3) the provision to allow the appointment of ad hoc judges (associ-
ate judges) who do not hold law degree in order to give more chances for 
unions to nominate their own officials; and (4) the provision to enable courts 
to issue injunctions against employers who failed to meet their legal obliga-
tions. Despite the establishment of an industrial relations court, the govern-
ment’s direct role in labour disputes was maintained; as the Law retained 
the obligation for mediation, which would be facilitated by mediators from 
regional Manpower offices (a provision which had been omitted from earlier 
drafts of the Law).
Under the new Law, the dispute settlement process is entirely subject to the 
procedures of the civil court. With the abolition of the P4, the requirement 
that employers seek permission to dismiss workers under the Labour Dis-
pute Settlement Law of 1957 was also abolished. The new Law accommodat-
ed workers’ and employers’ organizations through the introduction of the ad 
hoc judges system representing workers’ and employers’ interests. Under the 
new law, most grievances are first handled through ‘voluntary arbitration’ 
rather than ‘compulsory arbitration’; in particular in the workplace through 
the ‘bipartite cooperation institution’ (see Article 106 of Law No. 13/2003 and 
Article 3 Law No. 2/2004). The creation of these alternative channels for indi-
viduals to redress their grievances has tended to reduce the need for trade 
union representation (see Tjandra and Suryomenggolo, 2004). Although the 
law covers disputes between unions and employers, unlike before, there is 
no clear obligation for employers to recognise or bargain with a trade union. 
In a similar situation in Hong Kong, the lack of such a legal provision dis-
couraged collective bargaining, and most agreements between workers 
and employers were negotiated under informal or ad hoc bargaining pro-
cedures (Levin & Ng, 1993). Some observers have also raised concerns that 
the introduction of an industrial relations court will lead to more problems 
than solutions, given the extent of corruption in the judiciary and the lack of 
fairness in Indonesian civil courts (Tjandra, 2003; see also Pompe, 200432). 
32 Pompe argued that the newly-established Commercial Court in fact helped increase 
unemployment in Indonesia, due to its ineffi ciency and failure to provide reliable ser-
vices, which were associated with corruption. Interestingly, Pompe was also one of the 
main drafters of the Commercial Court Law, through his job as the IMF Resident Legal 
Advisor in Jakarta, Indonesia. According to information provided by those involved 
with the formulation of Manpower Law No. 13/2003, the Commercial Court was the 
model adopted when discussing the establishment of an Industrial Relations Court (see 
Suryomenggolo, 2004).
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In addition, the tendency to use ‘pure’ civil litigation procedures in the 
Industrial Relations Court would further limit the access of workers to fair 
outcomes (Tjandra, 2007).
3 The aftermath and further efforts towards change
Although the labour law reform program succeeded to some extent in soft-
ening the notion of protection within the Indonesian labour law system, 
with the intrusion of the labour market flexibility concept, in general the 
laws were considered not flexible enough. There have therefore been ongo-
ing efforts to amend the law further, to increase its flexibility. The debates in 
which stakeholders voiced concern about provisions in the Law had started 
before the Law’s enactment33; but not until 2004/5 was the issue formally 
placed on the government’s policy agenda. As noted by Manning and Roes-
ad (2007), this was precipitated by a series of reports from the World Bank 
– in particular the ‘Doing Business’ reports, which are highly publicised in 
Indonesia – and a report by the University of Indonesia in 2006 (see also 
Bird, 2005), which highlighted the negative impacts of stringent labour leg-
islation on investment climate and employment creation. Soon after these 
reports were published, the revision of the Manpower Law was flagged by 
the government: on 27 February 2006 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
released Presidential Instruction No. 3/2006, the ‘Investment Climate Recov-
ery Policy Package’, which included a statement (in Part IV, on ‘Manpower’ 
p.16) that the government’s policy was to ‘create an industrial relations cli-
mate which will increase job opportunities’, and which involved revising 
the Manpower Law No. 13/2003. Some of the articles in the draft revision34 
proposed the recruitment of contract-based workers and outsourcing into 
core business; the restriction of severance and service payments to dismissed 
workers with monthly salaries of Rp 1.1 million (around US$110) or less; and 
the free flow of expatriates. Such proposals were clearly a direct threat to 
several of the protective provisions of the Manpower Law, which had been 
preserved during the reform process.
The attempts to again revise the Manpower Law prompted massive labour 
protests across Indonesia. These began on 1 May 2006, in conjunction with 
International Labour Day celebrations; and reached a climax two days later 
when thousands of workers from KSPSI (All-Indonesian Workers Union 
33 See, for example, debates between Dita Indah Sari – leader of left-wing union FNPBI, 
Bambang Widianto – senior offi cial of Bappenas, and Jacob Nuwa Wea – then the Minis-
ter of Manpower (Van Zorge Report, 8 October 2002).
34 It was not clear how the draft came about and was publicly distributed among union 
offi cials, but it was widely believed among union people that it was Bappenas that pre-
pared it, as it had prepared many provisions of the Manpower Law of 2003 before. Inter-
view with Sjaiful DP, the National Council of the KSPI, September 2006.
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Confederation, formerly SPSI) pushed down the metal fence at the House of 
Representatives. Some attacked police, which responded by firing tear gas 
and water cannons at the workers. Dozens of workers and security person-
nel were injured (Kompas, May 4, 2006). After the incident, President Yud-
hoyono stated that such harsh actions would only harm Indonesia’s image 
internationally (The Jakarta Post, 4 May 2006). Union leaders argued that pro-
testers were frustrated by what they considered an indifferent response from 
the legislature and government officials to their demand for a guarantee of 
no revisions to the Manpower Law. Unions continued their protests by boy-
cotting the government-initiated National Tripartite Council (LKS Tripartit); 
those that boycotted included the country’s three major trade union confed-
erations (KSPI and KSPSI), and several other large national unions includ-
ing the SPN.35 The boycotts prompted intense media debate, and the gov-
ernment cancelled the planned revisions soon after, following the findings 
of an independent report by experts from five state universities assigned to 
review the labour law, which found that major changes to the law were not 
necessary (The Jakarta Post, 2 September 2006).
The team of experts commissioned to review the law included fourteen lec-
turers from five state universities, i.e., the University of Indonesia (Depok); 
the University of North Sumatra (Medan); Hasanuddin University (Makas-
sar); Gadjah Mada University (Yogyakarta); and Padjajaran University 
(Bandung). The team was weighted heavily towards economics lecturers 
and included just four law lecturers; and only one of them, i.e., Professor 
Aloysius Uwiyono of the University of Indonesia, was actually a specialist in 
labour law. Uwiyono had also been involved in deliberations over the Man-
power Law No. 13/2003, and the Industrial Dispute Settlement Law No. 
2/2004. Professor Armida S. Alisjahbana from the University of Padjajaran 
Faculty of Economics, a well-known economist who also led the USAID/
Growth through Investment, Agriculture, and Trade (GIAT-USAID) research 
project, chaired the independent review. In 2004 she led the preparation of 
a report titled ‘Indonesia’s employment protection legislation: swimming 
against the tide?’, arguing that the protective measures within Indonesian 
labour legislation had hampered employment creation in the formal sector, 
and went against global trends toward flexibilisation of labour relations (see 
also Manning and Roesad, 2007). In October 2009, Alisjahbana was appoint-
ed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Head of Bappenas, a posi-
tion equal to a Minister.
35 This boycott also had an impact in regional areas, particularly with regard to the formu-
lation of minimum wages, which normally took place in the Regional Tripartite Coun-
cils; and this produced unrest in several regions (interview with with Bambang Wira-
hyoso, President of the KSPI, September 2006, Hafuri Yahya, FSP KEP union branch in 
Banten province).
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7 Dra. Ira Irawati, M.Si. University of 
Padjadjaran, 
Bandung
Social and Politics Member

































Social and Political 
Science
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Following the unsuccessful attempt to revise the Manpower Law in 2006, 
the Indonesian government’s plans to increase the Law’s flexibility gained 
momentum again due to concerns associated with the growing financial 
crisis in the United States in 2008. In a Joint Regulation released by four 
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ministers on 22 October 2008,36 the Government reiterated the importance 
of maintaining economic growth, particularly in anticipation of the global 
economic crisis. The government stipulated that ministers should respond to 
the crisis by addressing the risks to their individual portfolio areas. The Min-
ister of Manpower, for example, should ‘consolidate workers and employers 
elements through the National and Regional Tripartite Cooperation Institu-
tion with National and Regional Wage Councils’, particularly with regard to 
the determination of minimum wages, to try to avoid job losses associated 
with wages being too high for companies to maintain. In addition, Article 3 
of the Joint Regulation stated that ‘[the] Governor in determining minimum 
wage shall try not to reach beyond the national economic growth’.
These proposed new labour provisions provoked the anger of workers 
in major cities throughout the country. Most workers’ groups and unions 
claimed the new regulations were a manifestation of the government’s pan-
ic, and an over-reaction to the economic crisis. Unions argued that the Joint 
Regulation discriminated against workers, by victimising workers for the 
sake of economic and investors’ interests. They claimed that the proposed 
increase in regulatory flexibility, as outlined in Article 3, would leave work-
ers in a worse situation than they already faced, with lower wages, less pur-
chasing power, and poorer working conditions. While workers rejected the 
new regulations, their implementation was endorsed by the Association of 
Indonesian Employers (Apindo).37 Apindo supported the Temporary Tripar-
tite Cooperation Institution (LKS Tripnas-S)38 by participating actively in all 
meetings and supporting the institution’s agenda, to the point that Apindo 
was almost successful at persuading the institution to promote the proposed 
revision to the Law. Apindo representative Hasanudin Rachman claimed 
repeatedly that the plan to revise the Manpower Law in mid-2006 to early 
36 The four ministers were the Ministers of Manpower and Transmigration, Internal Affairs, 
Industry, and Trade.
37 Since its congress in 2003 that elected Sofjan Wanandi, a well-known business tycoon, 
the Apindo had systematically encouraged ‘real’ employers to be active in all levels of 
Apindo structures, to replace the human resources managers that previously dominated 
the structures. Wanandi, long considered as the ‘spoke-person’ of the Indonesian con-
glomerates since the Soeharto era, had led the Apindo to become rather modern and 
articulative organization of employers in Indonesia. Never in the history of Apindo, the 
organization has played a role as an advocate of employers’ interest in industrial rela-
tions as it has today, by involving, very actively, in almost all national initiatives con-
cerning industrial relations, either with the government and unions through tripartite 
institution, or with the unions through bipartite institution.
38 LKS Tripnas-S members consisted of offi cial delegates of the Government, employers 
and unions. The unions’ delegates were chosen based on the verifi cation result of the 
numbers of the members of the unions. Having legal basis from article 107 of the Man-
power Law, the LKS Tripnas-S was established by Government Regulation No. 8/2005 
dated 26 February 2007, which duty was to ‘provide considerations, recommendations 
and opinions to the government and other parties involved in policy making and prob-
lem solving concerning labour issues/problems.’
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2007 was supported by the LKS Tripnas-S (interview with Hasanudin Rah-
man in May 2007). However, this proved to be not entirely true – union lead-
ers who were members of the LKS Tripnas-S strongly refuted Rachman’s 
claim (statement by Sjaiful DP, President of FSP KEP union and member of 
the LKS Tripnas-S, on 22 June 2007).
Having failed to garner sufficient support from the LKS Tripnas-S for the 
Manpower Law revisions, Apindo instead advocated bipartism as the new 
model of industrial relations in Indonesia, to replace the existing tripar-
tite model. This proposal was initially supported by just one of the three 
union confederations, KSBSI – the third largest confederation, with around 
200,000 members.39 However, after several intensive meetings between 
Apindo’s Chairman Sofjan Wanandi, and the leaders of the three confedera-
tions – Rekson Silaban of KSBSI, Thamrin Mosii of KSPI, and Sjukur Sarto of 
KSPSI – an agreement was reached on 21 February 2008 to form a National 
Bipartite Forum, comprising Apindo and the three union confederations 
(see the National Bipartite Forum ‘Joint Statement’, 21 February 2008). In an 
unprecedented move, some of these meetings were held in the confedera-
tions’ offices; previously, the unions had always been required to come to the 
Apindo office. To accommodate the new Forum, an office was rented in the 
Jamsostek Building, four full-time staff were employed (one from each orga-
nization), and Apindo provided operational costs of Rp 10 millions/month 
to cover the rent and staff salaries. The Forum’s main task was to facilitate 
meetings among the four organizations and, importantly, to ‘synchronize’ 
or attempt to reach agreement whenever differences arose among members 
concerning the interpretation of labour law (interview with Sofyan – Vice 
General Secretary of the KSPI in June 2008). This initiative was initially ques-
tioned by the Minister of Manpower, Erman Suparno, who reportedly felt 
‘overstepped’ (sidelined) because he was not informed about the Forum 
(interview with Sjaiful DP – President of FSP KEP union in June 2008). How-
ever, the Forum was supported by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
who reportedly mentioned during a cabinet meeting that the initiative was 
a ‘smart intervention’.40 Despite the hopeful start, after several months the 
initiative lost steam and the Forum quietly disbanded, due largely to Apin-
do’s frustrations over not obtaining union support for their interpretations 
of labour law, and the fact that the unions depended so highly on Apindo’s 
facilitation to make the Forum work.
39 KSBSI and other groups initiated a meeting with the Apindo, to fi nd a solution to the 
differing views concerning the proposed Manpower Law revisions (Kompas, 9 Mei 2006). 
KSBSI also hosted the fi rst National Bipartite Meeting on 11 May 2006 at the Sahid Hotel, 
Jakarta (although this inaugural meeting was attended only by KSBSI and the Apin-
do, as the other confederations chose not to attend, .in part because they felt that the 
meeting’s agenda was being driven by the Apindo, and they had hoped the could meet 
among themselves prior to meeting with the employers’ organization (interview with 
Sahat Butar Butar – KSPI in June 2008; see also Tjandra, 2008).
40 Personal communication with Bambang Widianto of Bappenas in June 2008.
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4 Concluding remarks
Despite the freedom that unions in Indonesia have enjoyed since the Refor-
masi, in general they have remained in a relatively weak position. Indone-
sia’s democratization process was initiated while the country was dealing 
with a major economic crisis; which left little for workers to gain anyway. 
This situation, combined with the destruction of organized labour during 
the New Order era, and the inability of unions to overcome the legacy of 
systematic repression during Soeharto’s rule, ensued the continuing relative 
weakness of the union movement as a whole. In this context, the reforms 
that were intended to facilitate freer union formation did not strengthen the 
unions, but instead increased their fragmentation. The initial labour law 
reforms which followed the neo-liberal economic reforms were a reflection 
of this situation: characterized by the intrusion of flexible labour market 
concepts without sufficient appreciation of the need for enforcement mecha-
nisms to be strengthened, to ensure real implementation of the laws – which 
is arguably the real problem in the Indonesian context.
This chapter, however, has shown that despite the union movement’s gener-
al inability to transform their greater freedom into increased political power, 
a deeper examination of some actual cases, particularly at the regional lev-
el, reveals that labour has sometimes managed to play a key role in reform 
nonetheless – a rather different position from the generally accepted view. 
Some observers cite these examples as evidence of increasing union influ-
ence in Indonesia (Juliawan, 2009, Tjandra, 2007; see also Teitelbaum, 2008 
for a similar argument in India); and argue that the strength of organized 
labour has been largely misjudged, due to the lack of attention to examples 
of strong trade union dynamics. Examples of stronger union organization 
include, for instance, a reduced reliance by labour groups on their previous 
‘key sources’, such as business, political and trade union elites, and instead 
more reliance on their grassroots support. The present chapter, although 
sharing this general conclusion, has demonstrated that trade union dynam-
ics in Indonesia are even more complex and nuanced than previously sug-
gested. This observation becomes the background for our discussion in the 
second part of this dissertation, which considers cases associated with the 
three most important issues in labour law in Indonesia: trade union legisla-
tion; minimum wage setting; and the Industrial Relations Court.
With all their faults, trade unions have done more for humanity than any other orga-
nization of men that ever existed. They have done more for decency, for honesty, for 
education, for the betterment of the race, for the developing of character in man, than 
any other association of men.
Clarence Darrow (1909), The Railroad Trainman
1 Introduction
The evolution of labour regulations under the authoritarian New Order 
(1965-1998) was a reflection of the changing economic and political strat-
egies of the regime; while, the evolution of labour regulations during the 
Reformasi (from 1998 onwards) is generally considered the result of liberalis-
ing the labour market, a reflection of the government’s lack of active enforce-
ment of legislation, and employers’ disinclination to comply with labour 
laws. Such development, it is argued, is rooted in the general weakness of 
the labour movement, which prevented it from having a significant influ-
ence.1 The smaller, yet essential, chapters in the Indonesian labour and trade 
union movements history,2 however, sometimes tell a different story. Having 
benefited from the protective legislation and having survived the changes 
to labour law since the Reformasi, the Indonesian labour force and its unions 
have continued to fight. This fight has not been easy, and has been less about 
large successes than about many small achievements. Yet it demonstrates the 
efforts and willingness of organized workers in Indonesia to participate in 
the implementation and enforcement of social and labour rights, after a long 
1 Some researchers cite the legacy of the authoritarian New Order as a reason why many 
labour activists have failed to take advantage of the opportunities available post-reform. 
The high level of fragmentation within the trade union movement is also proposed as 
a weakening factor, with personal rivalries between a handful of elite unions helping 
to make unions split. Both these factors contribute to the labour movement remaining 
weak in Indonesia, despite the recent increase in freedom (see, e.g., Hadiz 2007; also 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this study).
2 The term ‘labour movement’ is used here as ‘a broad term for the development of a col-
lective organization of working people, to campaign in their own interest for better treat-
ment from their employers and governments, in particular through the implementation 
of specifi c laws governing labour relations’ (Wikipedia.org). Trade unions are ‘collective 
organization within societies, organized for the purpose of representing the interests of 
workers and the working class.’ Both terms are used in the chapter to encompass and 
explore the rights-related activities of workers and trade unions and their supporters, 
including intellectuals, NGOs and some sections of government (see Spooner, 2004 for a 
general discussion of the labour movement; and Ford, 2009 for the case in Indonesia).
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hibernation under a harsh and sometimes violent repression by the state. 
This is an achievement worth exploring and understanding.
This chapter discusses labour law in practice in Indonesia since the Reforma-
si, focusing on the legislation of trade unions, and the legal, social and politi-
cal implications of this legislation for labour. It examines the trade union as 
one of the few institutions capable of promoting some measure of equity and 
social justice in Indonesia, and the role they have played in organizing their 
collective powers and strategies in support of the country’s new democracy. 
In doing so, this chapter is divided in two parts. The first part, sub-chap-
ter 2, examines developments since the enactment of the Trade Union Law 
No. 21/2000; a law which provides a legal basis for the development and 
functioning of independent trade unions. The chapter’s second part, sub-
chapters 3, discusses recent findings concerning the unprecedented growth 
in trade union movements at both regional and national levels, as unions 
seek to use new opportunities to position themselves more strongly in the 
political and social arenas.
The Trade Union Law No. 21/2000 was the first legislation focused specifi-
cally on unions enacted in Indonesia in more than three decades, over which 
time unions had been restricted and controlled under state corporatism (see 
the previous chapters). Although this law has provided new foundations for 
the development of trade unions in the country, their position is still gener-
ally weak. The state’s recognition of the existence and rights of unions in law 
does not necessarily lead to sufficient acknowledgement by employers, there 
is a lack of enforcement of the law by government, and ignorance or deliber-
ate disregard of the law by employers. In addition, conflict and fragmenta-
tion among unions themselves remains a problem, hampering the strength-
ening of the position of unions within Indonesian society.
While the overall observation has been one of continuing trade union weak-
ness following the enactment of Law No. 21/2000 on the Trade Union, field 
research has also revealed some extraordinary developments within the 
union movement, at both regional and national levels. At the regional level, 
this has included the development of regional trade union alliances; and at 
the national level, Indonesia has seen the formation of an alliance of unions, 
the KAJS (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial – Action Committee for Social Security 
Reform). The various regional alliances have served to unite unions, and 
have filled the gaps left by weak central union organizations, which have 
struggled to function as uniting forces. The KAJS’s struggle to promote 
reforms in Indonesia’s social security system also highlights the potential 
for unions to develop greater unity at the national level, and reflects a para-
digm shift within the trade union movement, from a ‘market’ or ‘business’ 
approach towards a more ‘social’ orientation and focus (see also Chapter 1). 
These developments are timely after the decades of state suppression and 
cooptation of the trade union movement under the New Order, whose legacy
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lasted for more than a decade following the Reformasi. The new develop-
ments provide the strongest indication yet that the trade union movement 
has a strong future and an important role to play in Indonesian society.
2 The regulation of trade unions
The regulation of trade unions in Indonesia has evolved in an ad hoc, con-
fused and unstructured way. Various provisions pertaining to the regulation 
of the role of unions in labour relations have appeared over the years, in 
various pieces of legislation and government regulations, and in a number 
of ministerial decrees and regulations.3 At the level of legislation and gov-
ernment regulations, changes to the provisions were infrequent – but at the 
ministerial level, regulatory changes occurred often, with provisions replac-
ing one another in quick succession, as a reflection of changing government 
strategies and the social and political situation at the time. During the New 
Order era in particular, ministerial level regulations determined almost 
every aspect of labour relations in the country; changes at this level were 
considered more effective by the regime, given that such changes could be 
made at the discretion of the minister, without the need to consult Parlia-
ment. The New Order government’s heavy hand also ensured that new reg-
ulations were enforced with little resistance. Since the reforms of 1998, how-
ever, the tendency to use ministerial level regulations has subsided, as they 
are no longer backed by such a controlling state, and there is strong encour-
agement for workplace regulations to be negotiated directly by the parties 
involved – the employers and trade unions. This section of the chapter will 
examine the evolution of trade union regulations in Indonesia, and the cor-
responding situations for trade unions; in particular the situation since the 
enactment of Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions, one of the most important 
outcomes of the labour law reforms between 1998 and 2006.
2.1 Trade unions and their regulation before 1998
The first legislation to define the legal position of trade unions in Indone-
sia was Law No. 21/1954 on Labour Agreement between Trade Unions 
and Employers. This law was based on articles 36 and 89 of the Provisional 
Constitution of 1950,4 and established the first rules of agreement regard-
ing the terms of labour between trade unions and employers. The law was 
3 Here the term ‘decree’ correlates with the Indonesian term ‘keputusan’, and ‘regulation’ 
correlates with the Indonesian ‘peraturan’. 
4 The Provisional Constitution of United Indonesia in 1950, which replaced the Constitu-
tion of Federal Indonesia in 1949, is considered the most democratic constitution that 
Indonesian has had, and contained many chapters on human rights and the welfare of 
Indonesia’s people. President Soekarno later abrogated it in 1959, under pressure from 
the military (see Ricklefs 2001: 285).
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considered democratic, and reflected the situation in Indonesia of the time: a 
time in which multi-unionism existed and ideological contestations among 
unions were very much alive. The two implementing regulations of the 
Law were Government Regulation No. 49/1954 on guidance for making 
and managing labour agreements; and Minister of Labour Regulation No. 
90/1955 on labour union registration. The latter was important, as it stipu-
lated that any trade union or combination of trade unions could be regis-
tered, with few formal or material requirements that could hinder the free-
dom of workers to form and register their unions. To be registered, a union 
simply needed to provide its constitution, its leadership structure and a list 
of members’ names; there were no minimum requirements associated with 
numbers of members, coverage of regions, or organizational structure (see 
also Rajagukguk, 2002: 44).5
This early positive approach to trade unions did not last. By the time Soe-
harto took power in 1965-6, and with the formal establishment of the New 
Order government in 1968, the government’s policy towards the trade union 
movement was to remove it from politics, and force unions to focus only on 
small-scale social and economic issues. The government sponsored several 
national seminars on ‘the renewal of labour movement paradigms and the 
labour relations system in Indonesia’, which resulted in a number of plans 
for the future of the trade union movement (Cahyono, 2003). These included 
that the labour movement should be united in one independent structure, 
free from the influence of political parties; and that the personal political 
interests of union officials should not be brought into the unions, but should 
be channeled through political parties (Soegiri, 2003). Further, the labour 
movement should be financially independent, rather than dependent on 
other sources of finance, especially from abroad.6 With regard to this last 
point, it was stated that union members’ fees would be collected through a 
check-off system (COS), which would facilitate unions’ financial security7 
and free the labour movement to determine and implement the organiza-
tions’ policies (see Sofyan, 2009). However, as argued by Herlina (2001: 75), 
the COS system was not in fact intended to support unions, but to give more 
5 According to Kertonegoro (1999: 12-15), this regulation was also infl uenced by the fact 
that the country’s fi rst general election was approaching (in 1955), and political parties 
were looking for support from labour groups, including forming labour unions as their 
onderbouw (substructure) in order to recruit members which could deliver votes.
6 In 1969, Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 1/1969 concerning Foreign Assistance 
for Labourer/Worker/ Employee Organization in Indonesia was released, which set 
new rules to control and restrict foreign assistance to trade unions.
7 A ‘check-off system’ is defi ned as: ‘a system whereby an employer regularly deducts a 
portion of an employee’s wages to pay union dues or initiation fees’ (www.legal-diction-
ary.com). Invented in the early nineteenth century by anthracite mine operators in the 
US (Córdova, 1969), the COS is attractive to unions, as the collection of dues can be cost-
ly and time-consuming. It prescribes the manner in which dues are paid by deductions 
in earnings rather than through individual cheques sent directly to the union. Unions 
are thereby assured of the regular receipt of their dues.
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power to employers by allowing employers to manage unions’ sources of 
income and further entrench the government’s grip on the unions.
Following these new proposals for unions, the MPBI (Majelis Permusy-
awaratan Buruh Indonesia, Indonesian Labour Consultative Council) was 
established on 1 November 1969, supported by 21 sector unions. This coun-
cil was the first attempt to unite different federations under a single national 
leadership. Two years later, on 21-28 October 1971 in Tugu, Yogyakarta, a 
seminar which aimed to establish a single national labour organization was 
organised by the MPBI, with the support of the Indonesian Manpower Foun-
dation (YTKI – Yayasan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia) and the Friedrich Ebert Stif-
tung, a German foundation. The seminar provided the opportunity for the 
MPBI to be transformed into the FSBI (Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, the 
All-Indonesian Labour Federation), the first united union federation since 
the New Order, which was established on 20 February 1973.8 Agus Sudo-
no and Soewarto were elected as the first President and General Secretary 
respectively,9 with a term of office between 1973-1980. On 11 March 1974, the 
FBSI was confirmed as a single union by the Director General of Manpower 
Protection and Maintenance of the Ministry of Manpower (Cahyono, 2003: 
36).
The government’s efforts to unify trade unions had remained gradual to this 
point. In particular, the laws and regulations established during the 1950s 
and 1960s, which supported a multi-union system and were in essence pro-
labour and pro-union, still existed. To address this, in 1975 the government 
released a new regulation to revoke Minister of Labour Regulation No. 
90/1955. This new regulation, the Minister of Manpower, Transmigration 
and Cooperatives Regulation No. PER-01/Men/1975 on the Registration of 
Labour Organizations, stated that union federations were only permitted to 
organize collective agreements if the federation included at least 20 provinc-
es and at least 15 trade unions. The corporatist ideology of ‘Pancasila Labour 
Relations’ (Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila) was, moreover, introduced in 
the form of a regulation for the first time – although the concept had been 
dominant since the beginning of the New Order in the mid-1960s.10 The next 
regulation, Minister of Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperatives Regu-
8 Presidential Decree No. 9/1991 stated that 20 February was to be ‘Indonesian Work-
ers Day’, and that this ‘represents a milestone of the united workers in Indonesia,’ and 
would replace International Labour Day (1 May), which was associated with the leftist 
labour movement.
9 Agus Sudono was the former President of Gasbiindo, a Moslem union; Soewarto was an 
ex-offi cial for the Opsus OPSUS (or ‘Operasi Khusus’ - Special Operations) (see Cahy-
ono 2003: 35-36). The inclusion of former security personnel in the unions was aimed 
at identifying and dealing with any potential destabilizing developments in the labour 
movement, and became a common feature of the New Order’s treatment of unions (see 
Tanter, 1990).
10 See also Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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lation No. PER-2/MEN/1978 concerning company regulations and nego-
tiations on the drafting of collective labour agreements, stipulated that only 
registered trade unions could undertake collective bargaining. These two 
regulations together did much to support the government’s plan to reduce 
the number of registered unions.
During this time, public servants were in most cases prevented from join-
ing unions, and Presidential Decree No. 82/1971 further stipulated that 
there was to be one single organization for civil servants, the KORPRI (Korps 
Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia, the Republic of Indonesia Public Servant 
Corps).11 Three years later, Government Regulation No. 6/1974 further 
stipulated that the definition of ‘public servants’ had been expanded to 
include all state employees at both national and regional levels, as well as all 
employees working in enterprises owned wholly or partly by the State. This 
definition was expanded again, by Presidential Decree No. 3/1984 on the 
approval of KORPRI’s constitution and KORPRI’s rules and statutes, which 
stated that public servants also included all persons working in private com-
panies in which the Government owned a share. This resulted in public ser-
vants having no opportunity to organize themselves into unions, and as the 
situation extended to workers in state-owned enterprises, it led to situations 
in which organizations such as the PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia 
– Teachers United of the Republic of Indonesia) – the only organization to 
which public and private school teachers were able to belong – had no rights 
to negotiate terms and conditions of employment.12
International influences
The international community saw Indonesia’s new policies towards collec-
tive bargaining as a violation of the international standards to which Indone-
sia was a signatory.13 In December 1987, the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) officially complained to the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) about the violations, arguing that the policies were ‘in 
conflict with obligations placed on the Government under the provisions of 
Article 4 of Convention No. 98, namely to encourage and promote collec-
11 This regulation has never been repealed, and is still valid at the time of writing.
12 The PGRI had been one of the founders of the MPBI and the FSBI, but the PGRI’s 12th 
congress in Jakarta in 1973 ruled to forbid PGRI members from joining unions, and the 
PGRI became merely a professional, rather than a workers’, organization. From that 
point, the PGRI’s national leadership was guided in its duties by an advisory council, 
consisting of the Minister of Education and Culture, the Minister of the Interior, and the 
Ministry of Religion (accessed at http://www.scribd.com/doc/10758374/Kesimpulan-
Kongres-PGRI).
13 At this time, Indonesia has not ratifi ed the Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); but it had ratifi ed the Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
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tive bargaining.’14 The complaint forced the Indonesian government to reply 
at the next ILO conference, at which it claimed that Indonesia had its own 
system, ‘Pancasila Industrial Relations’, which was based upon ‘globally 
acceptable principles adapted to meet the national ideals, cultural heritage 
and overall policies of the Republic and its indigenous population,’ whereby 
‘a mutual working agreement or collective agreement should be developed 
as the means of implementation for all rules and regulations.’ The govern-
ment further stated that in the context of trade union mandates for public 
servants, collective agreements were not applicable because ‘the conditions 
of employment, including wage structures, for public sector workers are reg-
ulated by special laws and regulations.’15
The ILO’s committee of experts generally accepted these claims, but recom-
mended that ‘all workers, without distinction whatsoever, should enjoy the 
right to establish organizations to further and defend their interests’. The 
ILO also requested the Indonesian government ‘to supply more informa-
tion on the activities of the KORPRI, the PGRI and any other associations 
set up for public and para-public servants to protect their interests, e.g., in 
collective bargaining, grievance procedures’ and ‘to review the legislative 
monopoly situation establishing KORPRI as the sole association for civ-
il servants so as to permit civil servants to join organizations of their own 
choosing.’16 This international pressure forced the Indonesian government 
to address the issues, at least on paper. In 1990, the Minister of Manpower, 
Cosmas Batubara, on behalf of the Indonesian government, asked the PGRI 
and KORPRI to register as the ‘teachers’ union’ and ‘public servants union’, 
to free the Indonesian government from the ILO’s pressure and demonstrate 
that democracy was supported in Indonesia (Ramadhona, 2009). However, 
14 See ‘Complaint Against the Government of Indonesia Presented by the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU),’ Report No. 259, Case No. 1431.
15 All quotations in this and the following paragraph with regard to the Indonesian gov-
ernment’s responses to the ILO are from the ‘Complaint Against the Government of 
Indonesia Presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Union (ICFTU),’ 
Report No. 259, Case No. 1431.
16 According to Presidential Decree No. 82/1971 on KORPRI, KORPRI ‘is the only place 
to gather and develop all government employees outside their offi cial duties’ and its 
goal was to ‘maintain and strengthen the political stability and social dynamics in the 
country.’ In practice, however, under the Soeharto government, KORPRI became a polit-
ical tool to support the regime. In Law No. 3/1975 on Political Parties and Functional 
Groups, and Government Regulation No. 20/1976 on the Membership of Public Ser-
vants to Political Parties, KORPRI was forced to become the main supporter of the gov-
ernment’s political party, Golkar (Golongan Karya – translated as Functional Groups), 
with the introduction of the ‘mono-loyalty’ concept of civil servants to GOLKAR. Later, 
after the 1988 reforms, Government Regulation No. 5/1999 forbade the participation of 
public servants in political parties, and in its congress in 2003 the KORPRI took a neutral 
political position (www.korpri.or.id).
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this is generally considered to have been merely an attempt to deflect inter-
national pressure.17
In 1980, the first FBSI congress led to the establishment of a more definitive 
structure for the organization over the next five years. Agus Sudono was 
re-elected as President. In the second FBSI congress in 1985, several radi-
cal structural changes occurred (Sofyan, 2009), the objectives of which were 
to turn the unions into a single, hierarchical organization that could control 
the grassroots workers. The term ‘buruh’ (labourer), which was considered 
too ‘radical’, was changed to the more neutral term of ‘pekerja’ (worker). 
The name FBSI was also changed, to ‘SPSI’ (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indone-
sia – All-Indonesian Workers Union), and the structure was transformed 
from federated to unitary, with a single central command established at 
the DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat – Central Leadership Council); while the 
leadership of the 21 sector unions within the federation was transformed 
into nine departments. Between the nine departments and the various sub-
departments (bureaus and sections) of the national leadership, there was no 
effective coordination or links to the councils at the provincial level or to 
those at the district level, let alone any links to the plant level unions. More-
over, the authority of the sector unions to run their own administration was 
abolished; while at the plant level, the unions were transformed to become 
a ‘work unit’ (unit kerja) under the command of the council at the district 
level.18 In 1985, Agus Sudono, who had led the FBSI since 1973, was replaced 
by Imam Soedarwo,19 a businessman who obtained the position with the 
support of Minister of Manpower, Sudomo (Tempo, 7 December 1985). These 
changes were resisted by the sector unions who established the ‘Joint Sec-
retariat’ (Sekretariat Bersama) of the SBLP (Serikat Buruh Lapangan Pekerjaan 
– Industrial Field Labour Union), to which we will return later.
The government’s efforts to control unions through regulations continued 
throughout the 1980s. Minister of Manpower Regulation No. Per-05/Men/
1984, for example, gave employers the right to collect union members’ dues 
17 In fact, it was not until the 1998 reforms that the PGRI dared to declare itself again as 
teachers’ union (www.pgri.or.id). In 2003, the PGRI was involved in the establishment 
of the KSPI (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia – Confederation of Indonesian Trade 
Unions). KORPRI, in contrast, has continued not to declare itself as a union, and govern-
ment employees have remained unable to join unions, with the exception that workers 
of the BUMN (Badan Usaha Milik Negara – state owned enterprises) – also by defi nition 
members of KORPRI – are generally able to join unions.
18 These changes made it easier for the government to control union leadership from top 
to bottom, reducing the potential for unions to organize strikes. Prior to the changes, the 
government could only effectively control the national leadership, which allowed the 
sector unions some autonomy in administering their activities.
19 Imam Soedarwo was a member of parliament for Golkar, the New Order political party, 
as well as the Director of PT Karwell Indonesia, a garment factory established in 1979 
and operated in the Bonded Warehouses Indonesia (BWI), Tanjung Priok, Jakarta. He 
also chaired the Indonesian Textile Association (Tempo, 7 December 1985).
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via the check-off system, enabling employers to control unions by adminis-
tering unions’ sources of income from dues. Minister of Manpower Decree 
No. Kep-1109/Men/1986 limited the establishment of unions at the plant 
level, forcing discussions about union formation to be conducted through 
‘counseling’ sessions; to be held with government officials, the SPSI branch, 
and the employers association Apindo. Moreover, Minister of Manpower 
Regulation No. Per-05/Men/1987 further increased the difficulty of register-
ing unions and bargaining collectively, by requiring labour organizations to 
have at least 20 provincial level structures, 100 district level structures, and 
1,000 plant level unions before they could be registered. Together these regu-
lations entrenched the position of the government-sanctioned union SPSI as 
the dominant union, and made it almost impossible for alternative unions to 
compete, or even exist.
In 1986 the government’s control to labour union activities was expanded 
further, through the implementation of new labour dispute settlement mech-
anisms.20 Minister of Manpower Decree No. 342/Men/1986 on the Guide-
lines/General Instructions for Conciliation of Industrial Relations Dispute, 
explicitly permitted government mediators from the Regional Manpower 
Office to collaborate with the Regional Government and Police Resort or 
Military District, to deal with any physical violence in the case of a strike 
(this approach was also confirmed by a military regulation, the Command-
er of Bakorstanas Decree No. 02/Satnas/XII/1990 on the Guidelines for 
Countermeasuring Industrial Relations Cases21). Two further decrees were 
Minister of Manpower Decree No. Kep.1108/Men/1986, which required all 
disputes to go through a dispute resolution procedure, overseen by the Man-
power Office and Minister of Manpower Decree No. Kep.120/Men/1988, 
which established a ‘code of conduct’ for workers which forced striking 
workers to go back to work or face sanctions and police or military interven-
tions. Together they greatly restricted the right to strike and entrenched the 
20 The procedure for resolving disputes during collective bargaining was outlined in Law 
No. 22/1957 on Labour Disputes Settlement. This law was promulgated to limit strikes 
and lockouts, and in effect also established compulsory arbitration. As noted earlier, 
Law No. 22/1957 was replaced by Law No. 2/2004, which introduced the Industrial 
Relations Court – which will be examined in detail in Chapter 6.
21 The Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional – the National 
Stability Establishment Aid Coordinating Body) was established by President Soeharto 
through President Decree No. 29/1988. The organization’s tasks were ‘to coordinate the 
efforts of government’s departments and agencies in the recovery, maintenance, and 
establishment of national security, in response to any obstacles, challenges, threats and 
harassment (article 2 (1)). The organization was headed by the Chief of the Army, with 
a secretariat consisted of representatives from the Coordinating Ministry of Security 
and Defense, the Army, the Police, the Attorney General Offi ce, and the National Intelli-
gence Agency (article 4(2)). Its broad powers ensured that the Bakorstanas could become 
involved in any issue that it considered to relate to ‘national stability’, including labour 
issues. After the Reformasi, President Abdurrahman Wahid, through Presidential Decree 
No. 38/2000, dissolved the Bakorstanas in 2000.
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military’s intervention in labour affairs, and further undermining the capaci-
ty of workers to organize and act collectively (see Caraway, 2004, also Nayar, 
1993). Arguably the most shocking outcome of these policies was the mur-
der, reportedly by the military, of a female worker and activist from Marsi-
nah in 1993; an event which led to global protests (see previous chapters).
Indonesia’s policy of military intervention in labour disputes generated 
strong criticism from both the local and international community. The Indo-
nesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) conducted an investigation into 
the Marsinah murder, and filed a judicial review against Decree No. 342/
Men/1986 to the Supreme Court. Internationally, Asia Watch and the Inter-
national Labour Rights Education and Research Fund sent a petition to 
the United States Government in 1992 citing Indonesia’s gross violation of 
workers’ rights and concerns about the non-existence of independent trade 
unions in the country. This petition led to Indonesia being placed under 
review by the US Trade Representative through the US’s Generalised System 
of Preferences (GSP) program.22 Facing the threat of a possible loss of tariff 
concessions on some of its exports to the US under the GSP, the Indonesian 
government responded by increasing the minimum wage for workers, but 
maintained its other repressive labour policies (Tjandra, 2002). The above 
ministerial decrees were later repealed and replaced by Minister of Man-
power Decree No. Kep.15A/Men/1994, concerning the Industrial Relations 
Dispute and Dismissal at the Plant Level and the Minister of Manpower 
Mediation Procedures, which abolished direct intervention by the military 
in labour disputes.
However, the Indonesian government persisted with its single-union policy 
into the early 1990s, retaining its efforts to ensure that the SPSI was the only 
legal union in the country. Minister of Manpower Regulation No Per-03/
Men/1993 on Registration of Workers’ Organization reinforced this, particu-
larly with Article 2 of the regulation, which stated that unions and combined 
unions could only register if they comprised at least 100 plant level unions, 
spread across at least 25 districts and at least 5 provinces. For more localized 
or area-restricted industries and types of work, such as mining, unions need-
ed required at least 10,000 members prior to registration. Article 1a of the 
regulation also stated that a union must be set up only ‘by and for workers’, 
which was intended to deny recognition to groups which included mem-
bers or organizers who were considered by the Ministry of Manpower to be 
non-workers, in particular lawyers or human rights activists who may have 
22 See Fehring & Lindsey, 1995: 7; also Human Rights Watch/Asia, 1994: 22-7. For further 
discussion of the GSP process, see Glasius, 1999.
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been supporting the group.23 In addition, as stipulated in Minister of Man-
power Decree No. Kep-438/Men/1992, for workers to form a trade union at 
the company level they were required to obtain written permission from an 
existing workers’ organization at the branch level – which in effect meant the 
SPSI, given there was no other ‘existing trade union’; and the SPSI would be 
unlikely to grant permission. In yet another constraint on unions, the enact-
ment of Law No. 8/1985 on Social Organization meant that in order to be 
recognized as a union, a workers’ organization was required to register as 
a ‘social organization’ with the Department of Home Affairs – and all social 
organizations in Indonesia were required to adhere to the Government’s 
official ideology of Pancasila.24
Nevertheless, provisions in Regulation No. Per-03/Men/1993 and Decree 
No. Kep-438/Men/1992 did offer the possibility of changes to the SPSI’s 
structure. In September 1993, the SPSI claimed to be initiating a transfor-
mation from a unitary (centralized) structure to a federated (decentralized) 
structure (although in fact changes had started with the SPSI’s 3rd Congress 
in November 1990, when its nine departments were altered to become 13 
sectoral unions, each including a chairman and a general secretary who were 
elected during the congress). The SPSI’s further changes in 1993, however, 
were not significant; the union’s structure remained effectively centralised. 
In October 1993, the union reported that 12 of its 13 industrial sectors were 
registered as independent unions. In response, in 1994 the US Department of 
State’s review on Indonesia’s human rights situation during 1993 observed: 
‘However, [for registration of unions] to become final, the SPSI’s constitu-
tion must be altered. This can only be done at a SPSI congress; the next one 
is scheduled for 1995, or a special congress could be convened before then.’ 
Apparently responding to this US report, the SPSI’s Leadership Meeting on 
3-8 October 1994 committed to reform and restructure the SPSI, from a uni-
tary structure back to a federation. The name SPSI was changed to FSPSI 
(Federation of SPSI), and the 13 sectors within the union were developed 
into 13 industrial field workers’ unions. The union’s transformation was 
confirmed officially through the amendment of its constitution, during the 
4th Congress on 14-19 November 1995, to acknowledge the new FSPSI and 
its 13 Member Unions (DPP SPSI, 1995).
23 This was no doubt related to the fact that NGO labour activists had played a large part 
in establishing the two other unions of the time, Serikat Buruh Setia Kawan (the Solidar-
ity Labour Union, also known as Serikat Buruh Merdeka or the Free Trade Union); and 
Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI, Indonesian Workers Welfare Union). Although 
both unions were well established unoffi cially, government regulations prevented their 
registration and they were therefore illegal.
24 The Law gave the government the power to disband any organization it believed to be 
acting against Pancasila, and forbade any organization from accepting funds from for-
eign donors without prior government approval – a regulation that greatly hindered the 
work of many local humanitarian organizations.
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Both Regulation No. Per-03/Men/1993 and Decree No. Kep-438/Men/1992 
had been strongly criticized by various countries and international institu-
tions. In June 1993, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) filed an official complaint against the Indonesian Government, 
to the ILO. The ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association, which had 
already sent a direct contact mission to Indonesia on 21-27 November 199325 
to examine these issues, noted in its 1994 Committee of Expert on Freedom 
of Association’s report that ‘there was an absence of specific and detailed 
legislative provisions to protect workers against acts of anti-union discrimi-
nation at the time of recruitment and during the employment relationship, as 
well as acts of interference by employers to their organizations.’ (ILO, 1994: 
268). The report concluded: ‘Legislative measures should be taken to repeal 
the provisions, and in particular article 2 of [Minister of Manpower] Regula-
tion Per-03/Men/1993, which prevent workers from engaging voluntarily in 
collective bargaining and concluding collective labour agreements through 
freely chosen representatives.’ (ILO 1994: 268). The Indonesian government 
responded to this suggestion by issuing Minister of Manpower Regula-
tion No. Per-01/Men/1994 concerning the Establishment of Trade Unions 
at the Enterprise Level. This regulation appeared on the surface to provide 
a concession, by allowing company level unions to be established outside 
the structure of SPSI – but any concession was immediately negated by the 
regulation’s requirement for such unions to affiliate with the SPSI within 
12 months. The single-union regulations were therefore retained, until the 
wave of reforms hit Indonesia in 1998.
Despite such government resistance, the 1990s also saw a resurgence of 
labour activism in Indonesia. Several labour-based NGOs and activists 
established new unions in the early 1990s, to challenge the government-
backed SPSI’s monopoly,26 despite these unions being unable to operate 
properly under the government’s strict policies and repression (Hadiz, 
1997). After 1994, no new unions were established, but Indonesia saw a 
rise in related groups and activities, including labour-oriented NGOs, pro-
labour students and community groups in industrial areas; and awareness-
raising about labour issues through education, cooperatives, and training 
and discussion groups for workers (Ford, 2001). The establishment of work-
25 The direct contact mission was initiated as part of the Indonesian government’s efforts 
to calm international pressures, especially those associated with the GSP. Its task was ‘to 
advise on better implementation of the Convention [No. 98, which Indonesia had rati-
fi ed].’ 
26 Unions established in the 1990s include the SBM Setiakawan (Serikat Buruh Merdeka 
Setiakawan, Solidarity Independent Labour Union), founded in 1990; the SBSI (Serikat 
Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, Indonesian Prosperity Labour Union), in 1993; and the PPBI 
(Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, Central of Indonesian Working Class Struggle) and 
AJI (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, Independent Journalists’ Alliance), in 1994. For an exten-
sive analysis on the relationship between workers and NGOs in Indonesia, before and 
after the Reformasi, see Ford, 2009. We will return to this topic later.
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ers’ groups and their activities helped to enhance workers’ ‘class’ identity, 
and gave them at least some sense of unity and purpose, which sometimes 
manifested in organized strikes (Hadiz, 1997: 137-8). This was only possible 
for groups at the local and community level, where the New Order govern-
ment had much less control; and this became the only organizing vehicle 
available for workers under the authoritarian regime. Following the 1998 
reforms, these informal workers’ groups retired from their roles as substi-
tute unions, and some of them transformed into unions at the enterprise and 
regional levels (Ford, 2001: 111-12). These unions gave workers the chance to 
become more independent, including from the NGOs, which had helped to 
organise them before.
2.2 Trade unions and their regulation after 1998
The fall of President Soeharto on 20 May 1998 led to many progressive 
changes in Indonesia, including changes to the government’s policies 
towards unions. On 27 May 1998, one week after Soeharto’s fall, The Min-
ister of Manpower of the transitional government released Regulation No. 
Per-05/MEN/1998 on the Registration of Workers’ Organizations, which 
repealed and replaced the previous regulations on the same subject, and 
provided a foundation for any workers’ organization to register. According 
to this regulation, even the SPSI had to register within a period of 90 days 
from the issuance of the regulation. The regulation initiated Indonesia’s for-
mal ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Associa-
tion and Protection of the Right to Organise, with ratification of the conven-
tion occurring on June 5, 1998, in conjunction with Presidential Decree No. 
83/1998. Previously, in 1956 Indonesia had ratified ILO Convention No. 98 
concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and 
to Bargain Collectively by Indonesia. These two conventions were the most 
important conventions for the right of workers to form unions and bargain 
collectively.
On August 4, 2000, Indonesia enacted Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions.27 
Despite criticism from labour unions and NGOs during its formulation 
(see Chapter 3), the Law incorporated many of the requirements stipulated 
in ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. Under the new law, Indonesian trade 
unions were given a legal basis that supported their traditional objectives 
of improving pay and conditions for workers in a ‘free, open, independent, 
27 The offi cial name of the Law is ‘Workers Unions/Labour Unions’ (Serikat Pekerja/Serikat 
Buruh). As noted by Quinn (2003: 17), the name is an attempt to acknowledge the differ-
ences among workers’ organizations as to the appropriate terminology. The New Order 
discouraged the use of ‘serikat buruh’ (labour union), which it considered to have a left-
ist/radical connotation. In the post-1998 era, the term began to be used again, especially 
by small new unions, while the more larger and more established unions tended to use 
the term ‘serikat pekerja’ (workers’ union).
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democratic, and responsible’ environment.28 The new law provided for two 
kinds of workers’ organizations: trade unions within and trade unions out-
side enterprises. The law also provided for three levels of union organiza-
tion: trade unions; federations of unions; and confederations of unions. The 
law permitted workers the right to form and become members of a trade 
union, and required only 10 workers to establish a union; membership of 
which must be open to all workers.29 The law also protected union members 
from being discriminated against by employers, and made it easier to form 
a union; facilitating competition with SPSI. According to the law the func-
tions of unions included the development of collective labour agreements; 
settlement of industrial disputes; representation of workers on councils and 
institutes dealing with labour issues; and defence of the rights and interests 
of their members.30 According to Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower, only reg-
istered unions can conduct collective bargaining, and for these unions to act 
as the sole bargaining agent, they must represent 50 percent or more of the 
workers at the enterprise.31
Despite the early concerns about the new Law, its problems turned out to be 
far fewer than feared (see Quinn, 2003: 19). The requirement for the Region-
al Manpower Office to notify unions as part of the registration process, for 
example, had led to claims of bias and concerns that the office would refuse 
to register new unions; but in practice the office issued notifications smooth-
ly once unions had fulfilled their formal requirements. One union, the PGRI, 
was reportedly refused registration as a teachers’ union on the grounds that 
its members were ‘not workers’, since many of them were civil servants who 
were also members of KORPRI and therefore could not become union mem-
bers (Pikiran Rakyat, 4 March 2005); but in general such reports were few 
(Quinn, 2003: 18). The PGRI, in fact, could have joined the KSPI confedera-
tion; and could also have become the only Indonesian member of Education 
International (the international union federation for teachers, which is also 
a member of the Global Union Federation). Under the new law it remained 
true, however, that workers in state owned enterprises, who were also mem-
bers of KORPRI, were freer than civil servants to organize into unions.32 
Another early concern about Law No. 21/2000, regarding the provision to 
allow any group of 10 workers to form a union, which it was feared would 
lead to the problem of union multiplicity within a workplace, also turned 
out to be unfounded (Quinn, 2003: 19). The Law also ensured that once 
unions obtained their legal status from the government, which in practice 
28 ‘Introductory part’ of Law No. 21/2000.
29 Article 5 Law No. 21/2000. 
30 Article 1(1) Law No. 21/2000.
31 Article 119 Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower.
32 When the BUMN Union was established offi cially in 2004, their members already 
included 92 of the 164 state owned enterprises (BUMN) in Indonesia (Tempo Interaktif, 17 
June 2004).
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was relatively easy, they remained legal and valid entities and could not be 
dissolved by anyone but themselves – or, in the exceptional case where they 
were found to breach ‘the interests of the State and the general public’, by a 
court decision.33
Although both the Trade Union Law and the Manpower Law were formu-
lated with the involvement of trade unions and employers’ organizations 
(Suryomenggolo, 2009), for different reasons both unions and employers 
experienced some disappointment with the laws, particularly in relation to 
outsourcing, contract workers, and severance payment and dismissal pro-
cedures (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 2008: 242). The unions and their supporters 
argued that even though some protective aspects of the old legal system 
were preserved under the labour law reform program, the high degree of 
flexibility which was built into the new laws has limited both the scope of 
protection available and the capacity to implement what protection is man-
dated in the new framework (Tjandra, 2009). Employers and their support-
ers, on the other hand, complained that the Law granted workers a high sev-
erance payment, which made it more expensive for employers to dismiss 
their workers, and reduced labour flexibility (Manning and Roesad, 2006).
2.2.1 Legacy unions
Under at least some level of ongoing pressure from both employers and 
unions, and certainly from the international community, post-reform Indo-
nesian governments have adopted a range of different and sometimes 
ambiguous positions to workers and their organizations; applying poli-
cies and approaches which vary depending on who holds the position of 
Minister of Manpower at the time. Under the presidencies of Abdurrahman 
Wahid and Megawati (1999-2004), although the government prioritized the 
need for economic recovery through such practices as reforming labour 
markets to increase flexibility, both governments tended to be relatively pro-
labour in nature; with the Minister of Manpower playing an important role. 
Wahid’s first Minister of Manpower, Bomer Pasaribu,34 for example, was the 
Minister who released the controversial Decree No. Kep-150/Men/2000; 
while Megawati’s Minister of Manpower, Jacob Nuwa Wea,35 was the mas-
33 See Article 37 Law No. 21/2000. In one interesting case,  a union was established with-
in a workplace and then most of the union’s founders were dismissed by the employ-
er, leaving a single member (who was also the union leader). Despite this, the union 
remained legal and could not be dissolved; and later the union acquired new members 
and became active again (personal communication with Jejen Kaschev, referring to a 
case at PT Indonesia Monti in West Java).
34 Bomer Pasaribu was one of the SPSI leaders after the centralisation of the SPSI in 1985. 
In 1995 he became Chairman of the SPSI and was also a member of the national leader-
ship of GOLKAR.
35 Jacob Nuwa Wea was the Chairman of SPSI who replaced Bomer Pasaribu in 2000. He 
was also a member of the national leadership of President Megawati’s PDI Perjuangan 
political party.
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termind behind the successful incorporation of several protective provisions 
within the new Manpower Law and the Industrial Relations Disputes Settle-
ment Law (see Suryomenggolo, 2009; also Mizuno, 2005). In contrast, during 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency (2004-2014), the Ministers of Man-
power36 were not so influential in determining government policy towards 
labour; instead, they generally exemplified the power sharing approach of 
Yudhoyono’s so-called ‘rainbow cabinet’.
Despite the many differences between Wahid’s and Megawati’s Ministers 
of Manpower, Bomer Pasaribu and Jacob Nuwa Wea, both were Chairman 
of the KSPSI (Conferation of SPSI),37 a position which they retained during 
their respective terms as Ministers. Both men also managed to ensure the 
survival and continuing dominance of the KSPSI, their ‘legacy union’, which 
they led under the new democracy (Caraway, 2008). As an example of Nuwa 
Wea’s efforts to maintain the SPSI’s dominance, in early 2002 he insisted on 
government verification of the number of national unions, and exact num-
bers of members. This led to a report in May 2002 which stated that there 
were 45 national unions registered in Indonesia, with a total membership 
of 8,281,941 workers, more than half of which (4,576,440 workers) belonged 
to the KSPSI. The report was unofficial, and did not clarify how the data 
had been collected. Despite this, its contents were circulated widely among 
national union leaders, and used by the government to allocate union repre-
sentation on the tripartite national institutions – with, of course, the KSPSI 
gaining the most.38 It was not until 2005 that the Department of Manpower, 
under Minister Fahmi Idris, undertook to verify the numbers, based on an 
investigation by the Manpower Office in the regions.39 This official research 
showed that there were only 80 national unions, with a much lower total 
membership of 3,338,597 workers. The largest proportion still belonged to 
the KSPSI (1,657,244 workers), followed by the other two pre-reform unions, 
the KSPI with 793,847 workers, and the KSBSI with 227,806 workers.
It has been argued that it is important to understand the role of these ‘legacy 
unions’ in new democracies, in order to assess the extent to which indepen-
dent trade union movements have developed since democratic reforms. 
As noted by Caraway (2008: 1372), the legacy unions are the ‘state-backed 
unions inherited from the previous non-democratic regimes’. They normal-
ly maintain their non-democratic aspects and they can also be part of the 
reason why labour movements remain weak after democratic reform. As 
36 There have been three Ministers of Manpower during this period: Fahmi Idris (2004-
2005); Erman Suparno (2005-2009); and Muhaimin Iskandar (2009-2014).
37 As a way to accord with Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions, the FSPSI Federation of 
SPSI (FSPSI, Federation of SPSI) was transformed into the KSPSI (Confederation of SPSI, 
KSPSI). Similarly, the FSBSI (Federation of SBSI) became KSBSI (Confederation of SBSI).
38 Personal communication from Sahat Butar Butar, KSPI, 10 May 2006.
39 See Minister of Manpower Regulation No. Per.06/Men/IV/2005; this was the fi rst regu-
lation ever on this subject in Indonesia.
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Caraway (2008: 1393) pointed out: ‘Their dominant position in many new 
democracies provides part of the explanation for why labour movements are 
so weak. By crowding out new organizations and holding members captive, 
they limit the promise that democratization holds for unions to vigorously 
pursue improved working conditions and workers’ welfare.’ In Indonesia, 
several of the new unions established since 1998 attempted to challenge the 
SPSI’s dominance, but as with previous efforts since 1992, these attempts 
were unsuccessful. Even when the KSPSI split in 2007, their dominance sur-
vived, having benefited from the well-structured organization from nation-
al to regional level that was developed during the New Order, as well as 
the established access to government officials, and access to funds from the 
check-off system and other sources; particularly from Jamsostek Ltd.40 We 
shall discuss this further in the following section.
2.2.2 NGO supported unions
It is interesting to consider, at this point, the relationship between labour 
NGOs and the unions they facilitated prior to the Reformasi era; particularly 
given their later split due to the changing situation after the reforms. In some 
cases, the split was a relatively smooth process, such as in the case of the 
union GSBM (Gabungan Serikat Buruh Mandiri – Independent Labour Union 
Alliance) and its NGO organizer, the LPBH FAS (a labour advocacy NGO 
based in Jakarta). In other cases, the split caused direct conflict between 
the NGO leaders and the workers in the new unions, who were demand-
ing more authority over their organization. The best known example was 
probably the disagreement between the SISBIKUM, a labour NGO based in 
Jakarta, and the GSBI (Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesia – Indonesian Labour 
Union Alliance), a union established from workers’ groups in 1999 and pre-
viously organized by the SISBIKUM.41 The workers, inspired by the reform 
movement, demanded more freedom in conducting their activities. Led by 
several former workers, they declared the establishment of a new union 
40 Jamsostek Ltd. is a state owned company established under Law No. 3/1992 on Work-
ers Social Security, and tasked to administer the compulsory social security scheme for 
Indonesia’s formal workers, in which dues are collected from workers and employers. 
In 2010 the scheme’s membership was around 9 million of the 30 million workers in the 
formal sector in Indonesia, with assets valued at more than Rp 100 trillion. With such 
huge assets and practically no government contributions, Jamsostek Ltd. has become a 
‘cash cow’for political groups, including some trade unions, which obtain fi nancial sup-
port through so-called ‘KSO’ (kerja sama operasional – operational cooperation) between 
the company and unions. As reported by Joko Hariyono of the SPN union – one of the 
KSO’s benefi ciaries – a union could get Rp 1,500 per year for each member; meaning that 
the SPN, with around 400,000 members as verifi ed by the Ministry of Manpower, could 
receive around Rp 600 million/year, sent to the national leadership. The money is used 
primarily for the union central operations (offi ce rent and salaries for full-time staff) and 
for activities organised by the national centre; with some funds distributed to the union’s 
branches around Indonesia. According to one SPN branch level leader in Jakarta, SPN 
has received around Rp 2 million/month from this scheme, or Rp 12 million/year.
41 Interview with Emilia Yanti from the GSBI union, Jakarta, June 2010.
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called GSBI, supported by 27 workers’ groups formerly organized by the 
SISBIKUM. They demanded the new union’s independence from the NGO, 
or at least an equal partnership between the two, which involved sharing 
responsibility for the training and education of workers, as well as the orga-
nizing of work. According to workers, these demands followed after SISBI-
KUM’s Director, Aris Merdeka Sirait, became involved with a political party: 
the Labour Party established by Muchtar Pakpahan for the 1999 election. 
The workers did not want to be ‘used’ by the NGO for political reasons. Aris 
Merdeka Sirait responded by threatening to stop supporting the union if it 
persisted with its demands. Following Sirait’s threat, only 5 workers’ groups 
from the original 27 chose to continue with the new union, given that it 
would face severe financial problems after splitting from the NGO.
Despite the potential financial problems, the new union GSBI managed to 
continue to work through the networks it had established. GSBI also ben-
efited from its links with international NGOs, including close ties with con-
sumer groups in Europe such as the Netherlands’ Clean Clothes Campaign, 
which was working with workers to campaign against labour rights vio-
lations by Adidas, Nike and other famous brands in the shoe and garment 
factories in Indonesia (see also Sluiter, 2009). The GSBI survived by using 
these networks, which also enabled them to keep their members focused 
on several strategic enterprises, such as protesting against Panarub Ltd. in 
Tangerang, a producer of Adidas; and indeed expanding their membership 
into other sectors as well. In the context of international campaigns, despite 
their relatively small membership (a self-reported 12,000 members in 2010), 
the GSBI managed to compete well with the larger unions, such as SPN (Seri-
kat Pekerja Nasional – National Workers Union), which had a membership of 
400,000 and represented a similar sector to the GSBI. International NGOs 
considered the latter as an alternative organization, and preferable to work 
with; given that it combined the legitimacy of a workers’ organization with 
the manoeuverable flexibility of an NGO, due to its relative small member-
ship and simple organizational structure.42
But such survival stories are rare. More often, workers’ groups established 
by labour NGOs disappeared if their NGOs ceased being able to continue 
their activities due to loss of donor support.43 An example is the case of the 
SBK (Serikat Buruh Kerakyatan – People Labour Union) in Surabaya, which 
disappeared following the insolvency of the Yayasan Arek (Arek Founda-
42 Emilia Yanti, the General Secretary of the GSBI, is a well-known fi gure in international 
labour activism; she is often invited to international meetings of women activists, due 
to her role in campaigning for garment women workers’ rights in factories producing 
international brands in Indonesia.
43 Since the 1998 reforms, fewer donor organizations have continued to support labour 
NGOs in Indonesia. Instead, funds tend to be directed to international unions that can 
actually work directly in Indonesia with their Indonesian affi liations
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tion), which had supported the union. Similarly, the SBSU (Serikat Buruh 
Sumatera Utara – North Sumatera Labour Union) in Medan, North Sumatera, 
disappeared once its supporter, the KPS (a labour NGO based in Medan), 
shifted its focus from industrial workers to plantation workers. Some other 
unions managed to survive after losing their NGO support. These included 
the FSBKU (a union in Tangerang, formerly supported by the Institute Sosial 
Jakarta – Jakarta Social Institute, an NGO dealing with urban issues includ-
ing labour); the GSBM (a union in Jakarta, formerly supported by LPBH 
FAS); and FSBI and SBJ (unions in Jakarta, formerly supported by Yakoma 
PGI, a labour NGO in Jakarta with close links to the Protestant Church). In 
2002, some of these unions that had started with NGO support formed the 
KASBI (see also Ford, 2009). Althouth the GSBI was initially involved with 
the formation of the KASBI, in 2003 it withdrew its KASBI membership, cit-
ing concerns about the KASBI’s growing alliance with a political party, the 
PRP (Persatuan Rakyat Pekerja – United Working People; later Partai Raky-
at Pekerja – Working People’s Party). It is interesting to note that of all the 
unions in the KASBI, which had previously been supported by NGOs, only 
the GSBI was able to survive independently; and as KASBI has developed, 
most of its member federations have declined.
2.3 Challenging the SPSI dominance
The SPSI’s dominance among unions had been challenged several times 
since its peak in the early 1990s, both from within the labour movement and 
from without; but most challenges have ended with the SPSI’s victory. As 
mentioned earlier, the first challenge to the SPSI occurred in 1985, with the 
establishment of the Joint Secretariat (Sekretariat Bersama – Sekber) of the 
SBLP (Serikat Buruh Lapangan Pekerjaan – Industrial Sector Labour Union) by 
union leaders whose unions had been forced to merge with the more cen-
tralized SPSI. The Sekber SBLP was led by Adolf Rahman, chairman of the 
SBE (Serikat Buruh Elektronik – Electronics Labour Union) and former Vice 
General Secretary of the FBSI (1980-1985); who was also a member of the 
board of the WCL (World Confederation of Labour). The Sekber SBLP con-
ducted various union-related activities; but according to Komarudin (2009) 
they obtained particular success by campaigning abroad about how the SPSI 
had destroyed independent unions, which put international pressure on the 
SPSI and led eventually to reforms to the SPSI in the early 1990s. The Sek-
ber SBLP’s activities ended at that point, as many of its leaders re-entered 
the new SPSI leadership, following the third SPSI congress and associated 
reforms in 1990.
NGO activists and some sectors of the student movement led other chal-
lenges to the SPSI’s dominance. In 1990, for example, the rival union SBMSK 
(Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setia Kawan – Solidarity and Freedom Labour Union) 
was established by several NGO leaders, including HJC Princen (the direc-
tor of a human rights NGO in Jakarta) and Saut Aritonang (a former activist 
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of Sekber SBLP). SBMSK positioned itself as a competitor for SPSI’s domi-
nance. Two year’s later, in 1992, several leading NGO figures including 
Abdurrahman Wahid44 and Asmara Nababan45 agreed to establish another 
rival union, the SBSI (Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia – Indonesian Prosper-
ous Labour Union),46 and Muchtar Pakpahan was appointed as its first Pres-
ident. Further, in 1994, several groups of leftist students, led by Dita Indah 
Sari, formed the PPBI (Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia – Centre for Indone-
sian Labour Struggle),47 which similarly tried to to challenge the SPSI. But 
these three groups, SBMSK, SBSI and PPBI, were unable to pose a significant 
threat to the SPSI, since the strict government pressure imposed upon them 
restricted their activities. Indeed, both Muchtar Pakpahan and Dita Indah 
Sari were later jailed for several years because of their union activities.
After the 1998 reforms, several leaders from the industrial sector unions 
challenged the SPSI again. This challenge was significant because the chal-
lengers came from within the national structures of the SPSI itself, and they 
had strong support from international labour NGOs who were keen to pro-
mote the development of independent unions in Indonesia after the Refor-
masi (Caraway, 2008; La Botz, 2001). In a trade union workshop organized 
by the International Labour Organization on 21-23 August 1998, factions 
within 11 of 13 member unions affiliated with the FSPSI48 declared that they 
and their entire plant level union membership would break away from the 
FSPSI and form a new federation, called the ‘FSPSI Reformasi’. The leaders 
of the FSPSI responded by sending a warning letter to all unions that sup-
ported the withdrawal, threatening that they would be dismissed and could 
44 At the time, Wahid was the leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization 
in the country.
45 Asmara Nababan was a well-known human rights activist and member as well as Sec-
retary General of Komnas HAM (National Commission on Human Rights) from 1993-
2002. 
46 In 2000, the SBSI became the KSBSI (Confederation of SBSI), in accordance with the new 
Trade Union Law.
47 After the 1998 reforms, the PPBI was changed to the FNPBI (Front Nasional Perjuangan 
Buruh Indonesia – National Front for Indonesian Labour Struggle), and became part of 
the PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik – Democratic People’s Party). For more discussion 
about PPBI, FNPBI and its chairperson Dita Indah Sari, see La Botz (2001: 229-251).
48 The eleven unions which supported the reforms were: The KPI (Indonesian Seafarers 
Union); the SP LEM (Metal, Electronics and Machinery Workers Union); the SPTI (Indo-
nesia Transport Workers Union); the SP RTMM (Cigarettes, Tobacco, Food and Bever-
age Workers Union); the FSP PP (Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union); the FSP 
KEP (Chemical, Energy and Mining Workers Union); the FSP TSK (Textile, Clothing and 
Leather Workers Union); SP KAHUT (Timber and Forestry Workers Union); SP PAR 
(Tourism Workers Union); SP FARKES (Pharmacy and Health Workers Union); and SP 
PP (Printing and Publication Workers Union). The two unions that rejected the reform 
initiatives were the SP NIBA (Commercial, Bank and Insurance Workers Union) chaired 
by Bomer Pasaribu; and the SP BPU (Building and Public Works Union) chaired by Sju-
kur Sarto. These latter two Chairs became the Chairman and General Secretary, respec-
tively, of the old FSPSI in 2000.
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not use any facilities belonging to the FSPSI for that purpose. The threat 
worked: supporters of the FSPSI Reformasi realized that being independent 
would mean financial problems, as the government would cease to support 
them. For the mid-level officials of the FSPSI Reformasi – many of who were 
retired Golkar or military officials – such a situation was not preferable. As a 
result, of the original 11 unions that had supported the FSPSI Reformasi, five 
returned to the FSPSI,49 and only six continued to support the proposed new 
union50 (Sofyan, 2009). As noted by La Botz (2001: 174), the support from the 
ACILS (American Center for International Labor Solidarity) was particular-
ly vital at this time for the survival of FSPSI Reformasi. The ACILS provided 
funds to run the organization and an office, which was located in the same 
building as the ACILS office, in the Cik’s Building, Cikini, Jakarta.
The FSPSI Reformasi was established officially at a congress in Cipanas, 
West Java, on 3-6 October 1998. Describing the new union’s first congress 
outside the SPSI structure, La Botz (2001: 175) wrote:
In a dramatic break with the past practice, about half of the delegates were plant level 
union representatives, rather than just middle- and top-level union staffers. Several 
international labour representatives also attended the founding congress, including Bill 
Jordan of the ICFTU’s Brussels office, Takashi Izumi of the ICFTU-APRO office, several 
International Trade Secretariat representatives, and the Indonesia Director of the Ger-
man Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Japanese, German, and US labour federations gave 
their blessings to the new independent SPSI Reformasi.
The congress elected Hartono of the SP PP (Plantation Workers Union) as 
the President, and Muhammad Rodja from the SP TSK (Textile Garment 
and Leather Workers Union) as the General Secretary; and a new constitu-
tion was adopted, to confirm the breakaway from the SPSI. Nevertheless, 
the success of the founding congress was followed by the reality of internal 
problems within the FSPSI Reformasi leadership. Despite the appointment 
of some lower level workers to the leadership of the new union, many of 
its leaders were former leaders of the previous government-backed union, 
bringing along with them the culture and tradition of bureaucratic and cor-
poratist views of trade unionism (La Botz, 2001: 176). Many of them also 
faced issues of corruption and internal transparency from their time in the 
SPSI (Ford, 2006; Caraway, 2008: 1381). These problems led to rumours in 
1999 about the possibility of amalgamating the larger union federations of 
49 These fi ve unions were: KPI (Indonesian Seafarers Union); SP LEM (Metal, Electronics 
and Machinery Workers Union); SPTI (Indonesia Transport Workers Union); SP RTMM 
(Cigarettes, Tobacco, Food and Beverage Workers Union; and SP PP (Agricultural and 
Plantation Workers Union).
50 These were: SP KEP (Chemical, Energy and Mining Workers Union); SP TSK (Textile, 
Clothing and Leather Workers Union); SP KAHUT (Timber and Forestry Workers 
Union); SP PAR (Tourism Workers Union); SP FARKES (Pharmacy and Health Workers 
Union); and SP PP (Printing and Publication Workers Union).
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the FSPSI Reformasi into a new confederation, which was encouraged by 
the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), especially the 
Asia Pacific Regional Office, controlled largely by the Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation (Ford, 2000: 8).
FSPSI Reformasi’s rumoured need to amalgamate became reality, as one 
by one its supporters fell away. Two years later, on February 2, 2002, at a 
National Convention in Bogor, West Java, seven of the unions which had 
originally supported the FSPSI Reformasi, together with five other unions 
– PGRI (Teachers’ Union); SP BUMN (State Owned Enterprises Workers 
Union); ASPEK (Indonesian Workers Union); SP ISI (Cement Industry Work-
ers Union); and GASBIINDO (Amalgamated Indonesian Muslim Union) 
– declared the establishment of the new KSPI (Kongres Serikat Pekerja Indo-
nesia – Congress of Indonesian Trade Unions), which was presented as the 
new national alternative to the SPSI. Rustam Aksam, the President of the SP 
TSK (textile, garment, leather) union, was elected the first President of KSPI. 
The SP BUMN and GASBIINDO later withdrew from the KSPI, and became 
independent federations without national affiliations. At the KSPI’s second 
congress in February 2007, the union changed its name from ‘Congress’ to 
‘Confederation’, following its formal acceptance as an affiliate of the ICFTU 
(later the ITUC or International Trade Union Confederation), in Indonesia. 
The KSBSI is also an affiliate of the ITUC, and its president normally sits as 
the Indonesian union representative at the Governing Body of the ILO.51
Despite the establishment of new unions and associated changes, none of 
the new confederations has become a champion of labour rights. The FSPSI 
Reformasi continues to exist, although it has not developed significantly 
since the split; while the KSPI is also stagnant, due to weak national leader-
ship since its formation in 2002. The other confederation, the KSBSI, appears 
similarly inert. Despite relatively generous support from international 
unions and labour NGOs,52 including support for the KSPI from the Japan 
Trade Union Confederation, and support for the KSBSI from the Belgium 
Christian Confederation of Trade Unions (ACV-CSV) and Dutch Christian 
51 The ITUC is a merger of the ICFTU and the WCL (World Confederation of Labour), 
declared on 1 November 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Despite the amalgamation, in prac-
tice each confederation has still maintained its established structure and resources. For 
example, for union representatives in the Governing Body of the ILO from the Asia 
Pacifi c region, the WCL could have one union representative from the Asia Pacifi c coun-
tries that are part of the WCL. Since the KSBSI in Indonesia was the only WCL affi liate 
in the Asia Pacifi c region, the President of the KSBSI was normally also a member of the 
ILO’s Governing Body for the region – despite the KSBSI’s membership being smaller 
than the membership of KSPI, another affi liate of the ICFTU (personal communication 
with Shigeru Wada, the International Transport Workers Federation; see also Traub-
Merz and Eckl, 2007).
52 See the Draft Concept Trade Union Support Solidarity Organizations – Global Union 
Federation Coordination Meeting Indonesia, Jakarta, April 27-28th, 2010.
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Confederation of Trade Unions (CNV),53 the unions have not played an 
important role as national centres.54 Instead, their activities have remained 
limited, and have not had a significant influence on national policies or 
society. Part of the explanation may be that most of the unions’ activities 
appear designed to follow agendas dictated by the government, or the agen-
das of donors – most of which come from outside Indonesia.55 Even when 
the unions run activities focused on domestic labour issues, these activities 
usually stem from initiatives of either the Indonesian government or the 
ILO Office in Indonesia, which defines most of the unions’ issues and agen-
das. This is due to the failure to collect membership dues from each union’s 
member federations, so the national centres presently obtain funds from 
other sources, such as overseas donors. The lack of sufficient membership 
fees to support union activities is now becoming a problem, as many inter-
national donors, particularly from Europe and Japan, have started to reduce 
their financial support to the Indonesian confederations, due to economic 
crises in their own countries.56
When considering the relationships that the KSPI and KSBSI have with their 
member federations, it is clear that the two confederations are very different. 
In the case of the KSPI, its national centre has very little grip on its member 
federations, which seem more empowered than their central organization. 
One explanation for this may be that most of the KSPI’s member federations 
are derived from industrial sector unions, which have direct member work-
ers and therefore member dues to help pay for activities; while the national 
53 The KSBSI has been a long-time partner of various Christian unions in Europe, particu-
larly those from Belgium and the Netherlands. This is probably related to the fact that 
the union was founded by NGO activists who were also active in the Protestant church-
es in Indonesia, in particular the PGI (Indonesian Churches United). Many of the activ-
ists were from a Christian Batak background. There is an unwritten convention in the 
KSBSI that if the President of the union is from a Christian background, then the General 
Secretary, the second level of leadership, should be a Muslim, and vice versa.
54 Here I refer to the statement by Isaac and Sitalaksmi (2008: 249): ‘The main function 
of the confederation or peak level is to formulate union policy and strategy, and to 
engage in political dialogue with the government, singly or in conjunction with other 
confederations. Discussions on legislation, the minimum wage and other matters affect-
ing industrial relations take place at this level.’ Confederations are tasked to do this 
because: ‘[They] are better equipped to handle national issues, using international links 
for advice and assistance. In some cases, where major sector-specifi c issues are in dis-
pute with employers, the confederation may step in to provide stronger leadership than 
might be available at the regional level in resolving a dispute, often using government 
leverage and protests marches of workers in the process.’
55 One union activist from the KSPI, for example, questioned the direct benefi t of a series 
of workshops about HIV-AIDS in relation to Indonesian migrant workers, given that the 
KSPI has no members who are migrant workers. Apparently the ILO funded the work-
shops, and the KSPI’s involvement was due to a request from the ILO. Similar examples 
have been reported for other confederations, including the KSBSI.
56 The KSPI, for example, has had no offi ce space since 2010, because the national leader-
ship has not had suffi cient funds to pay the rent. 
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centre does not. In addition, many of these member federations have their 
own financial support from international donors, especially through affilia-
tions with the GUF (Global Union Federation).57 In two of many examples of 
KSPI member federations which receive strong support, the FSPMI receives 
support from the International Metal Workers Federation and the FNV Mon-
diaal58; and the Kahutindo receives support from the International Build-
ing and Wood Workers Union and LO Finland (the Confederation of Trade 
Unions of Finland). Since member federations are generally able to work by 
themselves, the need for a national centre is also reduced. In the case of the 
KSPI, this has resulted in the same union having two categories of activists – 
those who are mostly active in the member federations, and those most active 
in the confederation – often without strong coordination between them.
In contrast to the KSPI, the KSBSI’s national centre has more authority over 
its member federations, because in the case of the KSBSI, it is the national 
centre rather than the federations, which is the body with the authority to 
deal with international donors. This has led to the KSBSI having relatively 
weak member federations, relative to the KSPI; which influences their per-
formance.59 The KSBSI’s national centre is at risk if international donors pull 
their support, as this would leave the national centre with the burden of 
running the entire organization given that the member federations are not 
sufficiently empowered.60 The differences between the two confederations 
57 The GUF Global Union Federation – GUF (see www.global-unions.org) is an internation-
al federation of national and regional trade unions, organized into specifi c industry sec-
tors, and previously known as the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). This generous 
level of international support is only bestowed upon federations that are GUF affi liates. 
Funds normally go through the GUF, particularly the regional offi ces, which then orga-
nize activities in collaboration with their national affi liates in each country. Few national 
unions are able to collaborate directly with donors, as the GUF encourages donors inter-
ested in supporting union activities in a particular country to work through the GUF, and 
discourages direct collaboration between donors and the unions in that country.
58 FNV Mondiaal is an international NGO belonging to the Dutch Confederation of Trade 
Unions (FNV).
59 For example, the Lomenik of KSBSI is much less infl uential than the FSPMI of KSPI, 
although both are with the same affi liates with the International Metal Worker Federa-
tion. Likewise the Kahut of KSBSI is much less empowered that the KAHUTINDO of 
KSPI, although both are members of Building and Woodworker International.
60 In 2010 and later, despite Europe’s fi nancial troubles, the KSBSI has continued to receive 
strong and exclusive support from the Christian confederations from Europe, particular-
ly the Belgium ACV-CSV and the Dutch CNV. In the case of the Dutch CNV, this support 
may have derived from its competition with the other major Netherlands confederation, 
the Dutch FNV, which had long-standing contacts and networks with Indonesian labour 
activists, facilitated by well-known fi gures Tom Etty on the Dutch and Fauzi Abdullah 
on the Indonesian side. These fi gures were very active in campaigning against Indo-
nesian labour rights violations during the 1980s and 1990s (see for example Etty 1990, 
1994). The Dutch CNV’s support of KSBSI may also be related to concerns that reducing 
support for Indonesian unions would mean that the European Christian unions have 
fewer contacts and less infl uence in a country with one of the world’s largest Muslim 
populations. 
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discussed above demonstrate that there are also internal challenges within 
the confederations, which need to be addressed to enable them to reach their 
potential as functional national centres.
The existing weaknesses of the national centres and the fragmentation of the 
trade union movement since the reform, along with the new unions’ inabil-
ity to challenge the legacy unions of the SPSI, have contributed to the gen-
erally weak labour movement in post-reform Indonesia, despite the poten-
tial presented by the new system. Violations to labour rights have remained 
widespread (see Caraway et al., 2011 for the most recent report); and unions 
have generally struggled to challenge them. Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower, 
for example, limits contract-based employment to a period of no longer than 
two years, with an extension for no longer than one year. With regards to 
outsourcing work, the law provides ‘minimum requirements’ that this work 
must be separate from the core business – it must be limited to supporting 
operations. The law also stipulates that when such requirements are not ful-
filled, the worker must become a permanent employee. In practice, however, 
there are massive violations of this law by employers (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 
2008: 247). Since the regional autonomy policy devolved responsibility for 
labour issues from the national to the district levels, the problems of weak 
labour inspection has also been exacerbated, and unions are not in a position 
to demand that the law’s conditions be fulfilled (Hanggrahani and Tjandra, 
2007; also Ford and Tjandra, 2008).
The current situation presents the need for a careful way forward. The 
weakness of the national centres currently limits the potential for labour 
groups to influence national labour policy-making, since it is the national 
centres, which usually have the legitimacy to represent Indonesian workers 
at national and international forums, such as the ILO conference. However, 
empowering member federations without also empowering the national 
centres could easily result in a similarly overall weak situation by further 
increasing the fragmentation of the union movement outside the SPSI, with 
each group focusing on its own issues at the expense of the whole. This 
would further weaken the national centres, with flow-on effects for the 
member federations and Indonesian workers in general. A solution may 
lie not within formal mainstream union structures, but somewhere outside 
those structures; while still retaining a connection to the formal structures, to 
enable internal reforms while at the same time being sustained. The follow-
ing two case studies illustrate the trade unions’ efforts to resolve Indonesia’s 
problem of a weak trade union movement. The case studies highlight the 
complexities of the post-1998 Indonesian trade union movement, and their 
efforts to increase both their bargaining power with employers and govern-
ment, and their influence in society. The first case study focuses on the grow-
ing trade union movement at the regional level, and presents some contrasts 
with the situation at the national level. The second case study focuses on the 
struggles of several national unions, united in the KAJS (Komite Aksi Jami-
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nan Sosial – Action Committee for Social Security), to demand social security 
reforms for all Indonesian citizens. Before continuing with the case studies, 
it is useful to summarise the key features of trade unions following 1998, to 
enable data from the case studies to be put into context.
2.4 Post-1998 trade unions in Indonesia: key features
According to the figures available at the time of writing of this research, 
published by the Ministry of Manpower in 2007, there were 69 national fed-
erations and three confederations registered in Indonesia. The total mem-
bership of the three confederations together was 2,397,393. The KSPSI held 
the biggest membership, with 1,601,378 workers; followed by the KSPI with 
458,345 workers; and the KSBSI with 337,670 workers. When combined with 
a number of national federations that were not affiliated with any confed-
erations (with a total of 920,318 workers), and plant level unions that were 
not affiliated with federations (with 97,924 workers), the overall total num-
ber of Indonesian workers belonging to trade unions was 3,415,635 in 2007. 
In a more recent 2010 report, the number of national federations registered 
increased from 69 to 90, and the total union membership declined minimally, 
from 3,415,635 to 3,414,455 workers.6162
Table 4.1: Membership statistics for Indonesian trade unions (2007)








1 KSPSI62 16 6,779 1,601,378
2 KSPI 7 973 458,345
3 KSBSI 12 1,559 337,670
4 Trade union federations not 
affiliated with confederations
34 2,028 920,318
6 Plant-level unions not affiliated 
with federations
– 437 97,924
TOTAL 69 11,776 3,415,635
Source: Ministry of Manpower ‘Report of the Development of Workers Organizations 2007’ (signed and 
stamped but never published)
61 See ‘Worker/Labour Organizations July 2010’, www.depnaker.go.id accessed in July 
2010). This report does not provide the level of detail about confederation memberships 
that is provided in the 2007 report.
62 These fi gures represent the KSPSI as one organization. After the split in 2007, the two 
KSPSI still have similar structures and, indeed, similar names. In several sector unions 
the old KSPSI is bigger than the new KSPSI, and the other way round. It is not clear 
though, how many members each confederation actually has after the split, as the Min-
istry of Manpower has not provided such information yet.
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Total union membership in Indonesia in 2010 represented 3.18 percent of 
the total labour force of 107.41 million people, and 10.1 percent of the total 
workers working in the formal sector, which included 33.74 million people.63 
Although union membership of 10.1 percent of formal sector workers is not 
small relative to other countries, the number of workers working in the for-
mal sector is very low (the formal sector represents only 31.42 percent of the 
total labour force, while the other 68.58 percent or 73.67 million workers are 
in the informal economy) – and a much lower proportion of informal sector 
workers join unions, leading to the low overall level of union membership in 
the country. This low level of unionization may be related to the inhospita-
bility of Indonesian labour law to unions. Although the law guarantees the 
right to join unions and includes penalty for violations of these rights, the 
legal process associated with investigating alleged violations is lengthy and 
complex (as exemplified by the King Jim case concerning the imprisonment 
of an employer for trade union rights violations – see Tjandra, 2010). Low 
levels of union membership may also be related to concerns that employ-
ers sometimes treat union-member workers more harshly, and this treat-
ment often goes without sanction (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 2008). Low union 
membership is also typical of less-developed countries, which tend to have 
high unemployment (the Indonesian unemployment rate was estimated at 
6.7 percent in 2012), high levels of self-employed workers in the non-formal 
economy, and low productivity. These conditions will clearly influence the 
prospects for the development of trade unions in Indonesia.
As of 2007, the KSPI consisted of seven member federations, primarily from 
the industrial sector, six of which were affiliates of GUFs. The KSBSI had 
eleven member federations, six of which were affiliated with GUFs. The 
KSPSI had seventeen national federations, but only one of them, the KPI 
(Kesatuan Pelaut Indonesia – Indonesian Seafarers Union), was affiliated with 
the ITF (International Transport Worker Federation). International unions 
and donors have generally tended to avoid the KSPSI, out of concern that 
it is not an independent union.64 Most international unions under GUFs 
work in Indonesia through their affiliates, but in some cases they also work 
directly; and some even have their own representative offices in Indonesia, 
such as the UNI (Union Network International (UNI), with ASPEK Indo-
nesia) and the IUF (International Union of Food (IUF), with FSPM (Federasi 
Serikat Pekerja Mandiri – Federation of Independent Workers Unions). Each 
GUF member has its own policy concerning its relationship with its affili-
ates. The IUF, for instance, allows only one affiliate at the national federation 
(the FSPM), whose members range from hotel workers to plantation work-
63 See ‘Keadaan Ketenagakerjaan Indonesia, Februari 2010’ [Labour Situation in Indonesia, 
February 2010] (http://www.bps.go.id/brs_fi le/tenaker-10mei10.pdf)
64 Personal observations during the Trade Unions Support and Solidarity Organizations 
Coordination Meeting in Jakarta, 27-28 April 2010. 
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ers unions.65 In contrast, the PSI (Public Service International (PSI) has Indo-
nesian affiliates from many different sector unions at plant to national level, 
including plant-level unions SP Angkasa Pura (Airport Workers Union) and 
SP PDAM (Public Water Companies Union); and at the national level, the 
FSP Farkes (Federation for Pharmacy Workers Union). Each union is largely 
independent, and does not necessarily interact with the other affiliates of the 
PSI in Indonesia.
In 2007, the KSPSI split into two, following conflicts between the leaders of 
the organization.66 Thus, the three major confederations at the start of the 
reforms grew to four in 2008. Apart from the four major confederations, 
there is also another union, KASBI (Konfederasi Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia 
– Confederation of the Indonesian Labour Union Alliance), which claims to 
be a confederation. According to a report by the Ministry of Manpower in 
2007, this group had 1,428 member workers, in 68 plant-level unions, pri-
marily across Java.67 Although their membership is much smaller than that 
of the other four confederations, they often gain media attention due to their 
radical approach to actions and demands. The KASBI is the most political 
of the confederations, openly supporting a socialist ideology and with close 
links to the PRP (Perserikatan Rakyat Pekerja – Working People Association), 
65 The FSPM does not belong to any national confederation. It was founded following a 
series of pro-union activities organised in Indonesia by IUF offi cials Gerard Greenfi eld 
and Hemasari.
66 Sjukur Sarto, the Vice President, and several other leaders of the KSPSI wanted to 
replace Jacob Nuwa Wea, the incumbent President, before the end of his term in Febru-
ary 2008, due to his deteriorating health. Sjukur Sarto, supported by several other lead-
ers, held an ‘extraordinary congress’ on 24-26 August 2007 in Jakarta, at which he was 
elected President. Jacob and his supporters rejected the result, and insisted that Jacob 
continue in his position until the end of his term. Following the congress, there were 
clashes at the national offi ce (Secretariat) of the KSPSI in Pasar Minggu region, Jakarta, 
involving hundreds of people. Later, the offi ce was sealed by the building’s owner, Jam-
sostek Ltd. (a state-owned enterprise dealing with formal workers’ insurance), to pre-
vent its destruction by the protesting groups. After several years of lobbying, Jacob won 
use of the building, having benefi tted from his networks as a former Ministry of Man-
power. In the 2008 congress, Jacob was re-elected as President, while Sjukur continued 
as president of a separate faction, which also retained the name KSPSI. From that point 
there were two KSPSIs, with the split occurring from national to regional level, and both 
continued to use the same organizational structures, name, and logo. Informally, the two 
organizations were known as ‘KSPSI Pasar Minggu’ and ‘KSPSI Kali Bata’, referring to 
the location of their offi ces. Initially, the government was reluctant to recognise either 
of the divided organizations, but later both were recognised, and invited to return to 
the government’s national tripartite meetings. The ILO, the main partner of Indonesia’s 
confederations, followed the government’s approach. This story is an example of the 
fragility of trade unions in Indonesia, with personal confl icts among leaders potentially 
resulting in the splitting of the whole organization.
67 This number was disputed by KASBI activists, who claimed that when the KASBI was 
established there was already a requirement, by the federations that joined them, that 
KASBI needed to have at least 5,000 members (personal communication with Emilia 
Yanti, General Secretary of GSBI, one of the founders of KASBI, June 2010).
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a left-wing political organization supported predominantly by student activ-
ists affiliated with the international socialist movement. In 2011, the Indone-
sian government recognised the KASBI as a confederation, but, it remains 
relatively alienated from the activities of the government’s national tripartite 
bodies, due to its small representation – although its members sometimes 
join the regional tripartite institutions.68
In addition to the confederations, the 2007 data show that there were another 
34 national unions and federations that did not belong to any higher-level 
federations or confederations. The total membership of these groups was 
920,318. There were also 437 enterprise-level unions, with a total of 97,924 
member workers. Thus, while employers have been able to speak with a sin-
gle collective voice – through Apindo69 -, unions have remained fragmented 
in the form of tens of national unions and thousands of plant-level unions, 
often highly separated from one another (Quinn, 2003: 9). No national or 
industrial collective bargaining agreements have ever been concluded; most 
agreements continue to be made at the enterprise level. The number of col-
lective bargaining agreements is also low relative to the number of unions: 
with 10,959 cumulated collective labour agreements concluded, compared 
with 44,149 cumulated company regulations registered at the Ministry of 
Manpower in 2010 (Ministry of Manpower, 2010). Further, the minimum 
wage has not functioned as a wage floor for workers at the lowest level; and 
formal workers in general remain dependent upon legislation to raise their 
wages – highlighting the continuing weakness of unions in collective bar-
gaining for fair working conditions.
These political conditions, combined with the weakness of the unions’ peak 
organizations and their inability, to date, to strengthen their political posi-
tions against government and employers through use of government lever-
age and protests (the ‘political driving force of the trade union movement’ 
[Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 2008: 249]), have prolonged the lack of influence of 
68 In one example in East Java in 2009, a KASBI representative became a member of the 
tripartite body at the provincial level; but this was only after the KASBI had formed a 
coalition with several other small unions.
69 Although on paper any employer in Indonesia can have its own organization, there is 
only one employers’ organization actively dealing with industrial relations issues: Apin-
do (Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia - Association of  Indonesian Employers), as the indus-
trial relations wing of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (KADIN). In a biography, 
Apindo’s Chairman Sofjan Wanandi is reported to enjoy being referred to as a ‘real activ-
ist’ (‘aktivis sejati’, which is also the title of the book by Sanda et al., 2011). His activism 
included his direct involvement in the two big changes in Indonesian political history: 
the change from Soekarno to Soeharto while he was a student activist, and the change 
from Soeharto to democracy while he was a senior political activist. Never before in the 
history of Apindo has the organization played as strong a role as an advocate of employ-
ers’ interests as it does today; it is now actively involved in almost all national initiatives 
concerning industrial relations, either with the government and unions through tripar-
tite institutions, or with the unions through bipartite institutions.
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trade unions in Indonesia, despite all the potential for improvement since 
the 1998 reforms. The challenges faced by Indonesian trade unions today 
remain twofold: to develop a united movement, and to strengthen their 
political and social bargaining power in society; with the second aim depen-
dent on the first. To this end, as noted by Isaac and Sitalaksmi (2008), the 
present generation of Indonesian trade unions has several major goals that 
they want to achieve: ‘to engage in collective bargaining, to obtain favour-
able terms of employment for workers, to be able to process worker griev-
ances effectively, to secure a growing membership, and to influence the gov-
ernment to enact terms favourable to these objectives.’ (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 
2008: 247). On this basis, Isaac and Sitalaksmi conclude that since 1998, the 
Indonesian trade union movement has been predominantly ‘business’ or 
‘market’ unionism, as per Gospel’s definition (see Introduction of this dis-
sertation; also Gospel 2005, 2008; Zhu and Benson, 2008). It is in this context 
of Indonesia having had a form of ‘market unionism’ since 1998 that we will 
consider the two levels of the trade union movement, below.
3 The two levels of the trade union movement in Indonesia
There has been much debate about the reasons why organised labour in 
Indonesia has remained relatively weak, despite the opportunities present-
ed since the 1998 reforms. Some researchers point to the legacy of the New 
Order’s authoritarian atmosphere, which they suggest discourages union 
activists from taking advantage of the freedom of the existing post-reformasi 
situation (see, e.g., Hadiz, 2000), and maintains the dominance of the less 
democratic legacy unions (Caraway, 2008). Others blame the high levels of 
fragmentation within the trade union movement, exacerbated by personal 
rivalries among small numbers of union leaders that can split unions apart 
as in the case of KSPSI’s split described earlier. Both issues likely contribute 
to the labour movement’s ongoing weakness. Among activists and academ-
ics who are sympathetic to the labour movement, there is also a consensus 
that employers’ violations of trade union rights as guaranteed by law may 
be a primary reason for the decreasing levels of participation in unions by 
workers (see, e.g., Saptorini and Tjandra, 2005; also Caraway, 2011). Anti-
union actions by employers, including the (illegal) refusal to allow workers 
to form unions and negotiate collective labour agreements, along with intim-
idation and other pressure by employers on union activists, generates fear 
which discourages non-unionised workers from joining unions, and encour-
ages those who have joined to withdraw their membership. Some observers 
have expressed concerns about the future of the trade union movement in 
Indonesia, at least in the short-term: ‘[the movement] may not grow much 
beyond its present infant stage for some time to come’ (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 
2008: 253).
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However, recent observations at both the regional and national level indi-
cate the presence of unprecedented development of the trade union move-
ment, despite the challenges. At the regional level, this is exemplied by the 
development of regional trade union alliances in several regions; and at the 
national level, an important development has been the formation of an alli-
ance of unions, the KAJS (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial – Action Committee for 
Social Security Reform). These regional and national-level developments 
reveal that a new kind of trade unionism is emerging in Indonesia. At the 
regional level, unions are starting to recognize the needs to unite and form 
alliances, in order to fill the holes caused by the failure of their national-lev-
el, central organizations to function as uniting forces, and to raise the politi-
cal bargaining power of the working classes at the local level. At the national 
level, the KAJS’s efforts to reform the social security system reveal a para-
digm shift within the trade union movement – from ‘market-’ or ‘business-
based’ towards a more social orientation. These are timely developments, 
after decades of state suppression and the prolonged legacy of the New 
Order in the years since democratization. These developments, as discussed 
below, give cautious hope of a brighter future for the trade union movement 
and its role in Indonesian society.
3.1 Regional level: towards political trade unionism?
As described earlier, one factor contributing to the relative weakness of trade 
unions in Indonesia is likely the ineffectiveness of the peak organizations 
(confederations); including their inability to perform their duties as umbrel-
la organizations. This in turn has generated mistrust in the leadership, by 
those at lower levels. Although in recent history the national unions have 
struggled with various internal problems, and have not demonstrated the 
ability to build a strong labour force for advocacy, in very recent years there 
have been examples of exactly the opposite occurring at the regional level, in 
a number of regions (Tjandra, 2010). At regional and local levels, the proxim-
ity to real problems, as well as the stronger communication and trust which 
are often inherent at those levels, have likely facilitated the observed increase 
in union networks and alliances. Increasing numbers of trade unions, from 
disparate organizations and backgrounds, are now uniting in regional alli-
ances to advocate for common issues and support workers’ interests in their 
regions.70
70 The fi eld research in the regions was conducted in two provinces: East Java (the cities/
districts of Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, Mojokerto and Malang); and the Riau Islands 
(cities/districts of Batam, Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai), over a total period of 4 
weeks in May, June and July 2007, together with Dr. Michele Ford from the University 
of Sydney whose observations have been incorporated into this section. Observations 
and interviews with the trade union alliances from various regions were conducted in 
February and March 2010. I also obtained information from a series of workshops titled 
‘Trade Union Movement Workshop’, organized by the Trade Union Rights Centre on 
26-28 February and 10-13 April 2010.
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Although these alliances are not formally established organizations, and are 
largely self-financed and run without strict regulations and systems, they 
appear able to bring significant changes in their regions – unlike the branch-
es of the confederations which exist in these regions. For example, in 2009 
in Yogyakarta in Yogyakarta province, and Serang in Banten province, the 
local alliances ABY (Aliansi Buruh Yogyakarta – Yogyakarta Labour Alliance) 
and FSBS (Forum Solidaritas Serikat Buruh - Serang Labour Solidarity Forum) 
have lobbied successfully for the enactment of special regional regulations 
on employment; as implementing regulations of Law No. 13/2003 on Man-
power, adapted to their regions. In Tangerang in 2010, pressure from the 
local union alliance Aliansi Serikat Pekerja/Serikat Buruh Tangerang (Tangerang 
Trade Union Alliance) led the Regent of Tangerang to increase the minimum 
wage to bring it closer to the figure demanded by workers – even though 
the wage figure had already been set for the year. In Pasuruan in East Java 
province in 2009, a massive campaign by an alliance of workers and unions 
against PT King Jim Indonesia produced an important precedent when, for 
the first time since the enactment of Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions a 
businessman was convicted and jailed for obstructing such activities.71
Most of these regional alliances have been established to address common 
issues of workers in the particular region. Common issues include minimum 
wage fixing processes (including actual wage figures and compliance); the 
unions’ desire to jointly control their representatives on the Wages Coun-
cils72; and the implementation of minimum wages provisions. The opera-
tional financing of the alliances has mainly involved using the pre-existing 
resources from their own unions; for example, meeting locations are rotated 
between the offices of the unions involved. Alliances have also tended to 
include a wide variety of trade unions local to the area, regardless of their 
backgrounds, including independent unions which exist only at enterprise 
level; regional-level unions; and those affiliated with various confedera-
tions and national federations, including many representatives from branch 
leadership. For example, the local alliance Forum Komunikasi Serikat Pekerja/
Serikat Buruh Depok (Communication Forum of the Trade Union of Depok), 
in Depok, near Bogor, was originally formed merely to facilitate meetings 
of plant-level unions affiliated with the FSP KEP (Chemical, Energy and 
Mining Workers Union). There was already a FSP KEP branch in the Bogor 
district, but this was considered less effective than a local alliance, as its 
scope was too wide, and there was a need for more effective communication 
among board members of the plant-level unions of this federation. During 
the development of the alliance, the FSP KEP affiliates in Depok formed a 
separate branch from the Bogor branch, and the ‘Communication Forum’ 
was extended to the various trade unions in the district of Depok, including
71 I have discussed this in detail elsewhere, see also Tjandra (2010).
72 The Wage Councils are tripartite institutions at both the national and regional levels. We 
will discuss these in detail in the next Chapter.
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the FSPMI, the KSPSI and others.73 Similarly in the Pulogadung Industri-
al Area in Jakarta, the alliance ‘FOKUS’ (Forum Komunikasi Serikat Pekerja 
– Communication Forum of Trade Unions) was established by the various 
plant level unions belonging to KSPSI Pasar Minggu in the area. Despite 
concerns that some of these unions would not work together because their 
national leaders were in conflict with each other, at the regional level the 
unions recognised the importance of uniting to raise their collective bargain-
ing position. This was exemplified at the regional Forum Buruh DKI (Jakarta 
Labour Forum), where the two KSBSI and SBSI 1992, despite national-level 
conflicts, were present at the same forum.
Regardless of the variety of organizational and ideological backgrounds of 
the union supporters, most of these alliances have been established with 
a shared focus on the importance of mass action and direct participation. 
Joint action as part of an alliance is considered most beneficial, as this would 
strengthen the bargaining position of the unions collectively, especially 
when dealing with government authorities. A demonstration by a large 
number of workers from a single union is considered less influential than 
a demonstration by fewer workers but which includes representatives from 
several trade unions. In Semarang, an activist from the SPN union, which 
was part of the alliance ‘Gerbang’ (Gerakan Serikat Buruh Semarang – Sema-
rang Labour Union Movement), explained that when SPN organized a 
demonstration they always requested the alliance members from the other 
unions to attend, even in small numbers; and to carry their own union flags. 
As he explained: it is a strategy. The goal is to demonstrate the involvement 
of various unions in the actions, which appears from the variation of the 
flags carried in the actions.’74 Activists from Tangerang, Serang, Bekasi and 
Jakarta shared similar stories.
The initiative to establish the alliances has usually come from grassroots 
union members; often reformist union activists who believe that the inability 
of the central organizations to facilitate unions in the regions had led to the 
weakness at the regional level, especially against the government.75 As stat-
ed by one union activist from the KSPSI in Yogyakarta: ‘It is the failure of the 
confederations that makes us weak; instead of providing ways for different 
unions to work together in the regions, they merely focus on their own needs 
and have less attention for building unity among unions.’76 Workers who 
had occupied positions in plant-level unions or in the branch-level organiza-
73 Interview FSP KEP, Depok, in August 2011.
74 Interview Gerbang, Semarang, in August 2011.
75 As mentioned earlier, due to the weak position of the trade unions in collective bargain-
ing, many of them rely upon government protection, through the law and regulations, to 
fulfi l workers’ needs. Thus, pressure on the government is considered safer than direct 
confrontation with employers, which could end with the dismissal of union leaders.
76 Interview FPP Kahut – ABY, Yogyakarta in August 2011.
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tions also initiated many of the regional alliances; they therefore already had 
some experience interacting with other unions. The top level of the unions 
(DPP), however, seemed reluctant to support such initiatives from the grass-
roots. They saw the formation of the alliances in the regions, outside their 
own structures, as potential threats; including the risk that their members 
may move to other organizations.77 This concern was especially prominent 
in the legacy union, KSPSI78; but was also felt by the new unions established 
post-1998. One new national federation established in 1999, for example, 
found it necessary to request a ‘notice’ in advance, if any members wanted to 
invite their affiliates into the area for collaborative activities.79
Nonetheless, the growing confidence of the local leadership to challenge 
their top leadership has forced the latter to adapt to this new development in 
the regions. Instead of imposing sanctions against the alliance initiatives, the 
wiser leaders have accepted this reality, and simply request ‘better coordina-
tion’ between their affiliates in the alliance, with respect to structure. As not-
ed, most regional alliances were informal in structure, without strict systems 
of works. According to the activists, such a liquid system was considered 
more useful, because it reduced unnecessary tension between union mem-
bers of the alliance and their superior organizations; and more importantly 
it minimized potential conflicts within the alliance regarding, for example, 
who should become the leaders. Leadership was normally held collectively, 
through a ‘presidium’, and not hierarchical. Most of the ‘system’ within an 
alliance was built through personal ties between the activists themselves, 
enhanced by sharing the same regional area and holding frequent meetings, 
especially when there were issues to address, such as local minimum wage 
fixing.
One exceptional alliance structure was the structure of the FSBS (Forum Soli-
daritas Buruh Serang, Serang Union Solidarity Forum, or simply the forum), 
in Serang, Banten province, and its twin organization, the ‘Serang Trade 
Union Alliance’ (or the alliance). The alliance was considered the ‘official’ 
leaders of the affiliated unions in the region, and its members were the 
leaders of the unions, which supported it. It also represented local organi-
77 Sjaiful DP of FSP KEP, for example, complained about this alliance, accusing it of erod-
ing the central organization’s authority (personal communication with Sjaiful DP in 
August 2011).
78 It is interesting to note that of the three strategies employed by the legacy union KSP-
SI to maintain their dominance, (‘stick’, ‘carrot’, and internal reform; each of which is 
employed depending on the strength or weakness of the union’s position at a particu-
lar place and time, Caraway [2008]), the latter strategy, internal reform, is currently the 
most frequently employed – pointing to a decline in the dominance of KSPSI’s central 
organization at various level and regions.
79 Interview with TURC activists in August 2012. The TURC was very active in organising 
these alliances to meet and discuss national and regional issues, through its series of 
‘Trade Union Movement Workshops’.
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zations of workers, helping to increase their bargaining position with the 
local authorities. In contrast, the forum was a more informal organization, 
in which various union officials may be involved in researching regional 
labour issues to support the alliance, either individually or in collaboration 
with relevant NGOs.80 This strategy was deemed necessary to maintain the 
‘independence’ and ‘integrity’ of the trade union organizations.81 Of the two 
organizations, the alliance was the one which interacted with the political 
powers and authorities; while when dealing with other parties and net-
works, such as NGOs; it was the forum that appeared (see also Cahyono, 
2010).82
Although there tend to be few strict rules within the union alliances, a gener-
ally acknowledged unwritten ‘code of ethics’ includes the point that unions 
within an alliance are not allowed to recruit new members from other unions 
within the alliance. On occasions when this may occur, for example if any 
union member at the enterprise level wishes to move to another union in 
the same alliance, the leadership of the union targeted tends to refrain from 
accepting the move, as they consider that the moving of members between 
unions within an alliance could harm its stability and integrity. This infor-
mal policy against taking another union’s members is not shared by the non-
alliance unions in the same region, which frequently practice ‘fishing in the 
same pond’.83 Given this, the existence of an alliance of unions may also be 
useful for the existing union structures, to help them maintain their mem-
bership and power. The problem is that sometimes such reformists’ initia-
tives can be hijacked by the existing unions’ oligarchs, who do not genuine-
ly want reform, as noted by one labour activist.84 One alliance leader from 
Semarang and Bekasi mentioned the need of the alliance union leadership to 
take over the oligarchs’ positions through independent election within their 
unions, so that reforms can be more systematic.
80 The FSBS, for example, in 2010 had an agreement with national human rights NGO, 
Demos, to conduct a series of political education workshops for workers in Serang. For 
these activities the FSBS could obtain fi nancial support, which could be used concur-
rently to support the alliance’s activities.
81 Interview Kahar Cahyono, Secretary of the FSBS, August 2012. 
82 Cahyono (2010) provided a case study of regional alliances in Serang region, Banten 
province.
83 This term was coined by Indrasari Tjandraningsih to explain this phenomenon in the 
Indonesian trade union movement post-1998 (personal communication in August 2012).
84 A labour NGO activist from TURC mentioned this.
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Below is a list of the regional alliances established in fifteen regions of Indo-
nesia as of 2012:
Table 4.2: Regional union alliances and their member unions (2012)
No. Regional union alliance Members
1 Forum Buruh DKI Jakarta (Jakarta 
Labour Forum)
FSPMI, ASPEK Indonesia, SPN, FSP LEM 
KSPSI, FSBI, SBSI 1992, KSBSI
2 Aliansi Buruh Kawasan (Industrial Zone 
Labour Alliance), Jakarta
FSBI, SPN, FNPBI, SBSI 1992, KSBSI
3 Aliansi Serikat Pekerja/Serikat Buruh 
(Trade Union/Labour Union Alliance), 
Depok
FSP KEP, FSPMI, FSP LEM, FSP FARKES 
Reformasi, FSP RTMM SPSI, SPN
4 Aliansi Buruh Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta 
Labour Alliance), Yogyakarta
Regional federations: SPN, FSP FARKES 
Reformasi, FSP KAHUT SPSI, FSP NIBA 
SPSI, FSP LEM SPSI, FSP RTMM SPSI; Plant 
level unions: SP Inna Garuda, SP Lintas 
Media; NGOs: Sekolah Buruh Yogyakarta 
(Labour School of Yogyakarta), Serikat 
Pekerja Rumah Tangga (Domestic Workers 
Union), FPPI, Sekretariat Bersama 
Perempuan Yogyakarta (Women Solidarity)
5 Koalisi Buruh Sukabumi (Sukabumi 
Labour Coalition), Sukabumi
Regional federation: FSP RTMM SPSI, 
KSBSI; Plant level union: SP Danone Aqua
6 Aliansi Serikat Pekerja/Serikat Buruh 
Serang (Serang Trade Union/Labour 
Union Alliance) and Forum Solidaritas 
Buruh Serang (Serang Labour 
Solidarity Forum), Serang
Regional federations: FSP KEP Reformasi 
(KSPI), FSPMI, SPN, FSP TSK KSPSI, KSBSI
7 Buruh Bekasi Bergerak (Bekasi Labour 
Movement), Bekasi
FSPMI, FSP KEP, PPBI, FKI Bekasi
8 Forum Komunikasi dan Informasi (FKI – 
Communication and Information 
Forum) SPSI Bekasi
Plant level unions belonging to the FSP KEP 
SPSI in Bekasi; also supported by other 
sectors such as commerce (FSP NIBA), 
metals and electronics (FSP LEM)
9 Gerakan Buruh Semarang (Gerbang – 
Semarang Labour Movement), 
Semarang
Plant level unions belonging to SPN
10 Aliansi Buruh Menggugat (ABM – 
Labour Accused Alliance) Jawa Timur, 
Surabaya
Regional union: FSPMI, KASBI; plant level: 
SP KFC
11 Forum Komunikasi (Fokus – Union 
Communication Forum) SP Pulo 
Gadung, Jakarta
Plant level unions belonged the KSPSI in the 
Pulo Gabung Industrial Zones
12 Forum Komunikasi Buruh Bogor (Bogor 
Labour Communication Forum), Bogor
FSP TSK SPSI, SPN, FSPMI, Gaspermindo
13 Aliansi Buruh Bandung (ABB – 
Bandung Labour Alliance), Bandung
FSP KEP SPSI, FSP TSK SPSI
14 Perjuangan Rakyat Karawang (Perak – 
Karawang People Struggle), Karawang
FSP KEP KSPI, SPOI, KASBI
15 Aliansi Buruh Jember (Jember Labour 
Alliance), Jember
Sarbumusi, SP Productiva, Serbuk, SBI 
PGTebu, SPKAI IX, Sarbupage, SP Mitra 
Tani.
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With regard to advocacy, the regional unions’ alliances have usually start-
ed by limiting themselves to labour issues, such as violations of minimum 
wages or union busting. But in some regions, such as in East Java, the unions 
alliance has lobbied not only on these traditional labour issues but also on 
broader social issues, such as the rights of disabled people and the state’s 
obligation to provide health care.85 In other regions there have been efforts 
to expand the alliance’s activities for political purposes; such as in Serang, 
Banten province (Tjandra, 2010; Cahyono, 2010), where the alliance called 
for the abolition of anti-labour policies in the regions. In the case of Batam, 
several unions developed networks with political parties for the general 
election, and several union leaders became parliamentary candidates (Ford 
and Tjandra, 2008). This development is particularly interesting, as only a 
few years ago the separation between the labour movement and politics was 
still wide, and ‘wage labourers, and many trade union activists too, [did] not 
see any relations between struggles in the workplace and those over politics’ 
(Törnquist, 2004: 392; also cited in Ford, 2009: 179). Recent findings at the 
regional level, however, show that this separation has become more fluid. 
The increased regional autonomy since 2000, when authority over labour 
and various other issues was devolved from Jakarta to the district/city 
levels,86 has forced unions to face more direct political realities and contests 
at the local level, encouraging union leaders to learn to cope with the current 
situation and opportunities. Indeed, trade union strategies to raise labour 
interests have shown increasing levels of political participation, particularly 
since the 2004 general election (Ford, 2009: 179). These developments have 
likely been triggered by the growing realisation, among political parties, that 
trade unions are an increasingly important political force in the regions.
Many trade union leaders who became well known publicly and among 
workers have been approached by political parties, to be drawn into party 
cadres, either as ‘vote-gatherers’ or as genuine legislative candidates. The 
most notable trade union to be approached by a political party was the FSP-
MI (Indonesian Metal Workers Federation), which was approached by the 
PKS (Justice Welfare Party)87 in several regions, such as in Batam, Riau Island 
province.88 In 2004, in an effort to avoid being seen as a substructure of the 
political party, but interested in an affiliation, the FSPMI Batam formed the 
JAS METAL (Jaringan Simpul Pekerja Metal – Metal Workers Network), which 
85 The work of the ABM Jawa Timur (Aliansi Buruh Menggugat – East Java Labour Struggle 
Alliance) has been remarkable in this regard.
86 For further discussion on the social and political impacts of the regional autonomy poli-
cy in Indonesia, see Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken (2007).
87 The PKS gained the number four position in the 2009 election results, after the Demo-
cratic Party (President Yudhoyono’s party), Golkar (formerly the New Order party) and 
PDI Perjuangan (former President Megawati’s party).
88 Said Iqbal, the President of the FSPMI, was later a candidate for the PKS in the 2009 
election for Riau Island. Several FSPMI leaders in other regions, such as Batam, Serang, 
and Bekasi, were also running for the PKS. This was agreed through a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’ between the presidents of the FSPMI and the PKS.
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was designed as a kind of ‘political wing’ of the FSPMI Batam, to negoti-
ate agreements with political parties.89 In 2005, the JAS METAL was directly 
involved in the campaigns for the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Batam city, 
supporting Ria Saptarika and Ahmad Dahlan, who were nominated by the 
Golkar Party and the PKS, and went on to win the election. Although the 
union claimed that this result would not directly benefit its workers, the 
union’s involvement in the campaign clearly gave them more access to the 
elected Mayor and his Vice Mayor.90 In the 2007 Jakarta regional election, 
the PKS put forward Adang Dorodjatun and Dani Anwar as candidates for 
Governor and Vice Governor. During the election, the FSPMI became part 
of the so-called ‘Labour Work for Jakarta Coalition’, in collaboration with 
other unions, such as ASPEK Indonesia, SPN, SBPMI (Ports and Maritime 
Union Indonesia), SBTNI (Indonesia’s National Transport Labour Union), 
and FSP LEM KSPSI. On 16 July 2007 these organizations produced a polit-
ical contract, signed by the two candidates and the leaders of the unions, 
which included a promise by the candidates that if elected, they would set 
the provincial minimum wage in Jakarta at Rp 1-1.5 million,91 with housing 
for workers and other perquisites (Koran Perdjoeangan, July 2007). However, 
the two candidates were not elected.
It is important to note that the FSPMI’s ‘political experiment’92 in Batam in 
2005 was an initiative of the FSPMI alone, without links to other unions in 
the regions, although many activists from other local unions were also run-
ning as candidates for various political parties.93 In contrast, the involvement 
of several unions in the Jakarta elections in 2007 was primarily an initiative 
of the PKS, which gathered the unions to stand for it in the election; rather 
than an initiative of the unions to gather themselves and negotiate with the 
PKS.94 However, the increasing ability of the trade unions to make politi-
cal demands and lobby strategically against political powers in the regions 
seems to have sometimes been a liability for the union regional alliances. In 
the case of the Jember Labour Alliance, for example, the alliance was almost 
89 Interview with Ridwan Monoarfa, June 2007.
90 Interview, Nefrizal, June 2007.
91 The minimum wage in Jakarta at the time was only Rp 900,560 (USD 90).
92 This term was used by Said Iqbal, President of the FSPMI, personal communication in 
June 2007.
93 Said Iqbal of FSPMI had to compete against Eduard Hutabarat of Lomenik KSBSI, as 
both were running in the same election district but for different political parties; Huta-
barat was from the Labour Party. Neither was elected.
94 It was reported that in 2006 seven union leaders, including Bambang Wirahyoso of SPN, 
Said Iqbal of FSPMI, Khairul Anam of Kahutindo, and Harjono of FSP LEM SPSI, were 
brought to the city of Mecca using PKS funds, to take the Umrah – the minor pilgrimage. 
Some labour activists were concerned about this initiative by the PKS, which ‘however 
noble it is’ was considered a form of ‘bribery’ to the union leaders, for the party’s politi-
cal interests (personal communication with several labour activists in Jakarta). In 2007 
these union leaders were all involved in supporting the PKS candidates for Governor 
and Vice Governor of Jakarta.
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destroyed when one of the union leaders ‘sold’ the alliance for his own politi-
cal gain, by supporting a candidate for the Regent elections and claiming that 
he led an alliance of labour unions with thousands of members – meaning 
potential votes. The labour activists in Jember reacted against this event so 
strongly that they blocked future attempts to rebuild the union alliance in the 
region.95 This exemplifies the challenges that unions that become involved in 
politics may need to appreciate (see also Ford, 2009: 180).
Despite the early successes of the regional union alliances, several chal-
lenges have been clearly evident. One has been the reluctance of the cen-
tral organizations to support the development of regional alliances and their 
subsequent initiatives, which may be perceived as threats to the organiza-
tion as a whole. Regional union alliances have tended to be initiated and 
driven by local union leaders, who may be seen by their superiors in the 
central organizations as dissidents. In the absence of strong leadership in the 
regions, these concerns from central organization may be sufficient to end 
the initiatives. Another challenge has been the different approaches to strat-
egies within the alliance, which can become obstacles for further develop-
ment of the alliance, and sometime even lead to its breakdown. Within many 
alliances there is also still a high dependency on individual leadership by 
reformist union leaders, who take the initiative and act as the driving force; 
these alliances need a system to ensure they are strong irrespective of indi-
vidual players, and can be maintained over time. A final challenge is often 
the absence, within an alliance, of a clear and common goal; such a goal is 
often essential to maintain an alliance’s direction and unity, and to ensure 
it supports the wider goals of the trade union movement. On this point, it 
is interesting to note that many regional union alliances have embraced the 
issue of social security reforms, especially since the enactment of Law No. 
40/2004 on the National Social Security System and the deliberation over the 
Social Security Provider Bill in the parliament. This may therefore become a 
common issue that unites the trade union movement, and links their goals to 
those of a broader segment of Indonesian society. The presence of the KAJS 
(Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial – Action Committee for Social Security), an alli-
ance of various national trade unions specifically campaigning on this issue, 
is likely to encourage this unity and shift the orientation of the Indonesian 
trade union movement towards a new concern: social justice. We will dis-
cuss this in the next section.
3.2 National level: the battle of paradigms?
It has been argued that the trade union movement in Asia, in both developed 
and developing countries (see Introduction), has generally adopted a market 
orientation (‘business’ or ‘market’ unionism), in which unions are seen as 
95 Interview with Mashur Saifudin of Jember Labour Alliance, February 2010.
138 Chapter 4 
economic actors pursuing economic goals, such as the economic welfare of 
members, especially through collective bargaining within the labour mar-
ket; and that there has been much less focus on social welfare more broadly 
(Zhu and Benson, 2008: 261). However, unlike the situation in developed 
Asia, in developing Asia the market-focused approach has been adopted in 
the absence of basic social and legal protection for workers; and this leaves 
individual workers and society more vulnerable. Hence the importance of 
efforts by the trade union movement, particularly in developing Asia, to 
reconsider their commitment to the market-focused paradigm, and to advo-
cate more strongly for sound social policies. Such efforts would demonstrate 
the extent to which the trade union movement has positioned itself strongly 
in society. With regard to unions shifting towards a social orientation, it is 
interesting to consider the situation in Indonesia since the enactment of Law 
No. 40/2004 on the National Social Security System, and the formulation of 
its implementing legislation, the Social Security Providers Bill. This period 
corresponded with the emergence of a new kind of trade union initiative, 
the Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial (KAJS – Action Committee for Social Security), 
a national-level union alliance dedicated to pushing reforms for a compre-
hensive social security system. This new orientation within the trade unions 
movement, and the associated conflict between unions following market-
oriented versus social paradigms, is described below.
3.2.1 The SJSN Law, the BPJS bill, and the KAJS
In response to the economic crisis which eroded the New Order and high-
lighted the need for a domestic source of funds, and at the same time to dem-
onstrate their difference from the New Order, Indonesia’s post-1998 reform 
governments advocated a new, more thorough social security system for all 
citizens. This was born out of a proposal by the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung 
(Supreme Advisory Council), in the 2002 General Session of the Indonesian 
People’s Assembly, to amend the 1945 Constitution to specify the people’s 
right to social security, and the state’s obligation to provide it. Indonesia’s 
subsequent presidents – Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati – 
each played a role in ensuring the eventual enactment of Law No. 40/2004 
on the National Social Security System (the SJSN Law), which was signed by 
President Megawati on October 19, 2004, one day before the newly-elected 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) came into office.96 The enact-
ment was a considerable achievement, as the law had generated strong res-
ervations within several interest groups, most notably Jamsostek Ltd. (the 
state company responsible for the social security for formal workers), and 
96 In total it took four years (2000-2004) to draft the Bill through to enactment, including 56 
revisions between the fi rst and fi nal draft. Sulastomo, the former Head of the SJSN Team 
assigned to draft the academic paper associated with the social security law, reported 
that the signing of the new law included an unprecedented special ceremony at the Pres-
idential Palace, to which President Megawati invited everyone directly involved in the 
making of the law.
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Taspen Ltd. (the state company responsible for managing pension funds for 
public servants), which both saw the Law as a threat to their existing corpo-
rations.97
The SJSN Law was ground-breaking. It is the first law to rule that all Indone-
sians must be covered by social security, through five mandatory universal 
programs — healthcare benefits, occupational accident benefits, old-age risk 
benefits, pension benefits and death benefits.98 The Law aimed to correct the 
existing discriminatory and limiting social security schemes: for example, of 
Indonesia’s 230 million people, 139 million or 60 percent did not have access 
to healthcare schemes; and further, only public servants, the military and 
police officials were able to access pension schemes. To address these issues, 
the Law requires an implementing law and a set of government regulations. 
Although the Law regulates and specifies the basic principles of the new 
social security system to be developed, it does not specify the ways in which 
the system must be implemented and administered – it provides no informa-
tion about the kinds of public institutions to be established to facilitate the 
new system, nor how these should be run. These practical points were left to 
be resolved by the Bill on Social Security Provider (the BPJS Bill).99
The three most important features of the SJSN Law are: (1) the transforma-
tion of the existing four companies which administered social security, from 
state-owned companies to public institutions100; (2) universal healthcare for 
all Indonesian people; and (3) the establishment of a pension scheme for 
formal workers in the private sector, to complement the existing pension 
schemes for public servants. The system would be administered through a 
mechanism of social insurance, that is ‘a mechanism of collecting funds from 
compulsory contribution to be used to provide protection against social eco-
nomic risks that befall participants and/or their family members’, while the 
state would be responsible for covering the contributions of poorer people.
97 Personal communication with Hasbullah Thabrany, an academic professor and expert on 
Indonesia’s social security system, who was also one of the early drafters of the SJSN Bill.
98 See Handbook on Social Security Reform in Indonesia (Coordination Minister for People’s 
Welfare, 2006).
99 In addition to the requirements of the BPJS Bill, the SJSN Law also required the govern-
ment to issue 11 government regulations and ten presidential instructions by October 
2009, to implement fi ve mandatory universal social security programs.
100 These were: (1) Jamsostek Ltd., responsible for social security for formal workers in 
the private sector (established in 1992, based on Law No. 3/1992 on Manpower Social 
Security); (2) Taspen Ltd., responsible for managing pension funds for public servants 
(established in 1981, based on Government Regulations No. 25 and 26/1981); (3) Asabri 
Ltd., responsible for managing pensions and healthcare for military and police offi cials 
and their families (established in 1981, based on Government Regulations No. 25 and 
26/1981); and (4) Askes Ltd., responsible for healthcare for public servants and their 
families (established in 1992, based on Government Regulation No. 6/1992).
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The Law was a major progressive step, but its implementation faced chal-
lenges from President SBY’s government, which cited concerns such as the 
potential fiscal impacts of the system, and the capacity of infrastructure to 
support it.101 While such concerns were important, other reports suggest 
that the government’s reluctance to accept the Law may have been related 
largely to its impending loss of direct access to the social security funds 
administered by the existing four state social security companies; and to 
pressure from private insurance companies concerned about losing their 
markets.102 In President SBY’s first term (2004-2009), his cabinet prepared 
various scenarios and ‘road maps’ for the Law to be implemented by 19 
October 2009 at the latest. SBY’s second term cabinet (2009-2014), however, 
stalled or reversed most of these. Until just before the October 2009 dead-
line, the government had not submitted anything to the DPR. The DPR then 
initiated the submission of a draft bill on Social Security Providers (the BPJS 
Bill),103 to be discussed in the House in the 2010 legislative program. During 
101 See various statements by the Indonesian government representative during the nego-
tiations with the House of Representatives Special Committee on the BPJS Bill, espe-
cially the meeting on 9 February 2011 (transcript prepared by Andriko Otang and Surya 
Tjandra).
102 According to Sulastomo, the former Head of the SJSN Team assigned to draft the Bill, 
when the SJSN Law was drafted there had already been strong criticism of the Law, 
particularly from foreign insurance companies. Sulastomo explained that the SJSN Team 
received a letter from USAID rejecting the SJSN Bill, on the grounds that it would harm 
the operations of many American private insurance companies in Indonesia. Sulastomo 
also said that when the Law was fi nally enacted, he received a comment from a World 
Bank offi cial in Jakarta that such a law was ‘too good to be true´ for Indonesia (interview 
August 2010). See also Afi rianto (2006), arguing that there were some fl aws in the SJSN 
Law, which would worsen Indonesia’s labour market conditions, decreasing fi nancial 
sustainability and adding pressure to the state budget. In contrast, employers tended to 
adopt the position of ‘wait and see’, although they worried that the new system would 
burden them more, as healthcare premiums would rise (personal communication with 
Djimanto, Chairman of Apindo – Indonesian Employers Association in August 2010).
103 On this point, the role of Prakarsa, an NGO based in Jakarta, was crucial, as this was the 
organization which submitted the original draft of the BPJS Bill; and persuaded the PDI 
Perjuangan party faction at the House to offi cially submit the initiative Bill in 2009, to 
be deliberated in 2010. The PDI Perjuangan was persuaded partly by several members 
of parliament from the PDI Perjuangan, in particular Surya Chandra Surapaty; who was 
previously both Chairman of the Special Committee on the SJSN Bill (1999-2004) and 
Vice Chairman of Commission IX of the Parliament, responsible for welfare, manpower, 
and health issues. Surapaty was therefore personally interested in the issue; he also had 
substantial knowledge on the issue through holding a PhD in public health, with a focus 
on public healthcare (personal communication with MP Surya Chandra Surapaty, June 
2011). Another key factor in the PDI Perjuangan’s decision to submit the Bill was likely 
the common understanding that the SJSN Law was one of President Megawati’s most 
important legacies at the end of her administration in 2004 (personal communication 
with MP Rieke Diah Pitalokaof the PDI Perjuangan, member of the Special Committee 
on BPJS Bill in June 2011). In order to be accepted as a House initiative Bill, the Bill fi rst 
required the support of all the political parties, through the opening plenary session of 
the House of Representatives, which was scheduled on 5 April 2010. This support was 
received.
Trade unions and the law in Indonesia 141
later discussions about the issue in the House, the government continued to 
be obstructive, including by impeding negotiations with the Parliament.104 
It was in response to these delaying tactics that dozens of national labour 
unions and NGOs, as well as farmers, fishermen, student organizations and 
individuals, formed the KAJS, as a civil society organization established spe-
cifically to push the implementation of social security reforms.
The establishment of the KAJS was agreed formally at a meeting facilitated 
by the FSPMI (Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers Union) at the Hotel 
Treva, Jakarta, on 6-8 March 2010.105 This meeting was important, because 
in order to strengthen the workers’ demands, the union leaders agreed to 
merge all the groups and individuals supporting the social security reforms, 
into a single ‘action committee’. The chairmen and secretary-generals of the 
confederation and federations were to be the main supporters of the KAJS, 
with a collective leadership. It was also agreed that the KAJS would be coor-
dinated by the Presidium, which was to comprise several union and NGO 
leaders,106 including Said Iqbal (FSPMI) as the Secretary-General,107 and 
104 The debate was over whether the BPJS Bill would be ‘mengatur’ (regulating) or simply 
‘menetapkan’ (ruling). The government wanted the Bill to be merely a ‘ruling’, which 
would create a new institution without transforming the existing state companies that 
administered social security; while the House wanted it to be ‘regulating’, which would 
give the Law legitimacy to force the transformation of the existing companies. Some 
experts, however, argued that this debate was simply about semantics issues; as any 
laws would contain both ‘regulating’ and ‘ruling’ components within it; and they sug-
gested that this highlighted the government’s deeper unwillingness to support the Bill. 
See Minutes of the Meeting between the government and the House Special Committee 
on the BPJS Bill, which ended with a deadlock on 9 February 2011. 
105 This activity was supported by the German labour support NGO, Friedrich Ebert Foun-
dation Jakarta Offi ce, which had been working with various labour unions and NGOs in 
Indonesia since the early 1970s.
106 These included R. Abdullah (FSP KEP KSPSI), Joko Hariyono (SPN), Achmad Mundji 
(FSP PP KSPSI), Indra Munaswar (KOBAR), Ali Akbar (FSP PPMI KSPI), Timbul Siregar 
(OPSI), Abdullah Sani (KSBSI), Said Iqbal (FSPMI), and Surya Tjandra (TURC).
107 Said Iqbal is the most important actor in the KAJS’s involvement in pushing the social 
security reforms towards their eventual success, with the enactment of the Law on BPJS 
in 2011. He is a charismatic leader with strong public speaking skills, and was able to 
persuade people through a series of public gatherings held by his union, FSPMI, on 
behalf of the KAJS; in addition to his strong conceptual understanding of the issue. In 
acknowledgement of this, Said Iqbal and the FSPMI were awarded the 2013 FNV (The 
Dutch Confederation of Trade Union) Febe Elizabeth Velasquez Award. The award 
included a statement that he ‘mobilized a rally, during which millions of people took to 
the streets demanding higher wages, a restriction on fl exi labour as well as the introduc-
tion of statutory social security. As a result, access to health care for the very poorest 
and a pension for all working people was assured.’ (http://www.industriall-union.org/
fnv-trade-union-award-goes-to-said-iqbal). Iqbal also is one of the two central fi gures, 
together with a union leader from Colombia, in the FNV documentary ‘Working Class 
Heroes’, which premiered on 16 May 2013.
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Surya Tjandra (TURC) as the NGO representative.108 In the process there 
were some changes to the presidium membership: the representatives from 
SPN, FSP PP KSPSI and KSBSI withdrew their involvement, and Muhamad 
Rusdi from ASPEK Indonesia became a member. In addition, it was agreed 
that trade union/labour union alliances would be established in the regions 
to support the national leadership of the KAJS, and would undertake tasks 
including organizing mass actions, lobbying and preparing concepts from 
the unions perspective, conducting seminars, workshops and public meet-
ings about social security reforms, and expanding the network of the KAJS 
to other unions and workers’ organizations, to advocate for both the imple-
mentation of the SJSN Law and the enactment of the BPJS Bill.
To encourage national-level and regional governments to support the social 
security reforms, tens of thousands of workers participated in demonstra-
tions across Indonesia, accompanied by direct public campaigns in indus-
trial areas and through the media, to mobilise workers’ support. On April 5, 
2010, a national day of action in support of the reforms was held in conjunc-
tion with the opening of the House of Representatives plenary session,109 
followed by similar actions across the regions. These culminated in a dem-
onstration on International Labour Day, May 1, at the Presidential Palace in 
Jakarta, when an estimated 150,000 workers marched from Hotel Indonesia 
Square to the State Palace and office of the President in Central Jakarta, to 
demand the immediate implementation of the SJSN Law and the enactment 
of the BPJS Bill. Demonstrators called for a new national social security sys-
tem, based on the SJSN Law and the BPJS Bill, and including three key goals: 
healthcare for all Indonesian people; pensions for all Indonesian people; and 
ensuring that social security providers were public legal entities, based on a 
‘trustee’ system. These three goals would be manifested in the BPJS Bill that 
was under deliberation by the House of Representatives. Despite the dem-
onstrations, the government continued to stall, and so on June 10, 2010, the 
KAJS filed a citizens’ lawsuit at the Central Jakarta District Court against the 
Indonesian President, the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and eight 
associated ministers, for negligence and a failure to meet their obligations to 
108 Surya Tjandra, the author of this dissertation, of the TURC (Trade Union Rights Cen-
tre), was the only NGO representative in the presidium. The presence of TURC, whose 
activities focused on trade union empowerment and advocacy for legal issues, gave the 
KAJS confi dence, especially when entering into court proceedings. As an NGO, TURC 
was also able to present a different perspective from the trade unions, and was able to 
work with fl exibility and creativity without the concerns about organizational rivalry 
that often arises between unions.
109 The opening of House of Representatives plenary session on April 5, 2010 was crucial, 
as it coincided with the deadline for whether the parliament would agree to continue to 
discuss the Bill. Pressure from workers, who initiated a large demonstration in front of 
the House, combined with direct lobbying of the leaders of the House, led the plenary 
session to agree to accept the Bill. 
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implement the people’s constitutional rights to social security.110 These legal 
actions by the KAJS clearly disrupted the government, and posed challenges 
for President Yudhoyono.111 The court sessions were held weekly, and drew 
considerable media attention to the issue of social security reforms. The 
court sessions were typically attended by tens or even hundreds of workers, 
who sometimes demonstrated outside or inside the courtroom. The eventual 
victory of the plaintiffs on 13 July 2011 boosted the confidence of the unions 
and workers in general, and set a strong legal precedent for the legitimacy of 
their demands.112
After the court ruling, the special committee of the House began intense 
deliberations about the BPJS Bill, and the KAJS monitored these special com-
mittee sessions closely, placing several people daily on the balcony of the 
House meeting rooms to observe the debate.113 This monitoring frequently 
included providing direct input, including sending text messages directly 
to legislators’ mobile phones, particularly in response to comments from 
other legislators that were considered misleading or attempts to hinder the 
discussion. This strategy proved valuable; legislators were aware that they 
were being monitored, and the KAJS was able to influence directly each of 
the Special Committee members on particular issues raised during the dis-
cussion. To maximise the effectiveness of the messages to the legislators, 
110 Although Indonesian legislation does not formally recognise the so-called ‘citizen law-
suit’ – in which citizens have rights to sue the government if it fails to meet its obliga-
tions to its citizens – such lawsuits are repeatedly accepted by the courts. 
111 Personal communication with a lawyer from the government’s legal team, August 2010.
112 The KAJS citizens’ lawsuit was fi led on behalf of 120 people from a number of civil 
society organizations and professions, including trade unions, NGOs, domestic work-
ers organizations, migrant workers, lawyers, informal workers, journalists, other pro-
fessionals and students. The TURC was the lead institution supervising all activities 
related to the lawsuit; including drafting the lawsuit, attending the court hearings, and 
coordinating around 20 legal representatives from the unions’ advocacy divisions. The 
judgment, Central Jakarta District Court Judgment No. 278/PDT.G/2010/PN.JKT.PST, 
was reached over a year later, on 13 July 2011. The judgment stated: 1. Court sees the 
Defendants (President, Vice President, Spokeperson of the Parliament and eight relat-
ed Ministers) guilty and derelict in their duty to implement Law No. 40/2004 on the 
National Social Security System; 2. Court declares that the defendants have to imple-
ment the social security law by: a. implementing immediately the UU BPJS – law on 
transforming the implementing body for social security system; b. drafting the regula-
tion and presidential decree according to the UU SJSN; c. making adjustment of the four 
existing social securities companies according to the National Social Security System 
Law No. 40/2004; 3. Court declines other accusation against defendants (Rp 1 compen-
sation for the government’s negligence); and 4. Court is sanctioning defendants to pay 
the proceeding cost of 2.1 million rupiah (USD 230).
113 Among the KAJS activists they were known as the ‘fraksi balcon’ (balcony fraction), 
as an informal watchdog for the formal political processes in the House. One member 
of the KAJS presidium, Indra Munaswar, was the most active one attending almost all 
meetings held at the House and he was the one informing all KAJS leaders about any 
development during the deliberations.
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often hundreds were sent at the same time.114 KAJS instructed its observers 
on how to best send the messages, including suggested wording of texts, 
through its Facebook Group account, which was established to support the 
organization’s activities. The Facebook account was also used to consolidate 
and update KAJS’s supporters in various regions, providing them instant-
ly with any developments in the House, including the minutes of the par-
liamentary meetings, and instructions for preparing responses and action. 
The Facebook account was administered collectively by approximately 
twenty core members of the KAJS team, and with membership exceeding 
6,000 by mid-2011, the site was also an effective vehicle for debates and the 
sharing of knowledge and experiences related to social security and broad-
er labour issues. Given that many workers had regular access to the inter-
net, particularly Facebook,115 which could be accessed easily through their 
mobile phones, Facebook proved to be a highly effective tool for mobiliz-
ing workers,116 and clearly contributed to KAJS’s eventual victory, when the 
House and the government agreed to pass the BPJS Bill into law on 28 Octo-
ber 2011.
Prior to the victory, however, the government attempted some final tactics 
to oppose the Bill. Following the court verdict, the government appealed to 
the High Court of Jakarta, further prolonging the reform efforts.117 In addi-
tion, during the parliamentary sessions the government’s representatives 
rejected several key points in the SJSN Law and demanded a revision of the 
SJSN Law prior to continuing with the BPJS Bill – in direct contradiction 
to the directives in the court ruling. In particular the government strongly 
opposed the transformation of the four existing state-owned social security 
companies; arguing that this would harm the state’s economy (Media Indo-
nesia, 20 September 2010). These delaying tactics led the KAJS to increase 
114 Several legislators were complaining about this, saying that their mobile phones were 
hanged because of hundreds of text messages with the same contents pouring into them 
at the same time. ‘I am with the workers, trust me, just please don’t send me any more 
messages. I’ve got your point already,’ said one legislator overwhelmed during the 
break of the session.
115 According to digital marketing agency iCrossing, in 2011 Indonesia was the second larg-
est facebook user in the world at just over 35 million, second after the US at 150 million 
(The Guardian, 6 April 2011).
116 A similar story might be found in relation with the demonstration to support the Cor-
ruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and its open confl ict with some high-ranking 
police offi cials alleged of corruption, whereby thousands of people gathered to defend 
the KPK.
117 In the early October 2013 the High Court of Jakarta released its decision annulling 
the decision of Central Jakarta District Court based on the argument that ‘the Central 
Jakarta District Court was not authorized to examine such matter because the formation 
of the Act concerns the legislative authority and the Government’, and that ‘the BPJS 
Law was already promulgated by the legislative on 28 October 2011 and signed on 25 
November 2011.’ Although the decision would not affect the validity of the BPJS Law, 
the KAJS Lawyers Team nonetheless applied for cassation to the Supreme Court on 10 
October 2012 arguing that the Higher Court of Jakarta had ‘wrongly applied the law’.
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its own efforts, including planning the largest labour demonstration since 
the reform, which was set for October 2011 and would close several indus-
trial areas. Fifty thousand workers and people from supporting organiza-
tions were expected to participate. A second plan involved marching to and 
potentially occupying the House building and the nearby Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in Jakarta for a few days. The deadline for the DPR to finish its 
sessions was 28 October 2011, at which time a lack of resolution on the Bill 
would mean a deadlock, with further deliberation being postponed until 
after the next election. Thus, for the KAJS this was a point of no return. A 
week out from the deadline, a meeting scheduled for 21 Oct 2011 between 
the government and the special committee was cancelled due to a planned 
government cabinet reshuffle – during which time President Yughoyono 
forbade ministers from making any ‘strategic decisions’ (Republika, 12 Octo-
ber 2011) – however, this was the third recent cabinet reshuffle, and suspect-
ing delaying tactics, the KAJS decided to use all its resources to increase its 
push for reform. At this point, aware of the demonstration plans, the House 
agreed that 28 October 2011 would be the final date at which a decision 
about the passing of the BPJS Bill would be made.
After a dramatic week of internal and external lobbying between the House 
leaders, political party leaders, and the government’s representatives, and a 
parallel show of support for the Bill by thousands of workers who camped 
overnight in order to gather at the parliament building on 28 October, late 
that evening the the Indonesian parliament and government finally agreed 
to pass the BPJS Bill (Tribunenews, 28 October 2011).118 This was a historic 
moment for all Indonesian citizens and an important step towards universal 
social security coverage. The new Law on Social Security Providers (BPJS) 
No. 24/2011, which was officially signed a month later on 25 November 
2011, stipulated that there would be two social security providers running 
all social security schemes for Indonesians: the BPJS I on healthcare and the 
BPJS II on manpower. The BPJS I on healthcare would involve the transfor-
mation of the existing Askes Ltd., and would manage universal healthcare 
for Indonesian people, starting with the transfer of Askes Ltd.’s assets, mem-
bers, and currently-managed healthcare programs (including those man-
aged by Jamsostek Ltd. for formal workers; and by Asabri Ltd for military 
personnel). The Law stipulated that the BPJS I on healthcare should begin 
operation on 1 January 2014. The BPJS II on manpower would involve the 
transformation of the existing Jamsostek Ltd., and would manage occupa-
tional accidence, death, old age and pension benefits for all workers in the 
118 The day after the BPJS Bill was, it was reported that Vice President Budiono held an 
extraordinary meeting at his offi cial house in the afternoon of 29 October 2011, gathering 
together all the ministers involved in the process, including the PDI Perjuangan chair-
person, former President Megawati (Tempointeraktif, 29 October 2011). The meeting was 
to discuss the consequences of the new Law for the government, and to consolidate the 
responses needed from the government.
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formal sector; and was stipulated to begin operating on or before 1 July 2015 
(Kompas, 28 October 2011; The Jakarta Post, 28 October 2011).
3.2.2 The KAJS: union support and opposition
As an organization trying to consolidate the powers of the trade union 
movement, and with such an ambitious agenda as universal social security 
for Indonesian people, the KAJS naturally encountered people and organi-
zations with vested interests in opposing their agenda. The most significant 
opponent was the national government itself, which had enjoyed direct 
access to social security funds administered by the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) during the previous decades. Most prominent of the SOEs was Jam-
sostek Ltd., which had accumulated assets from workers’ premiums of more 
than Rp 109 trillion in 2011, providing substantial income for the govern-
ment. In 2011, it was estimated that the company’s total assets were around 
Rp 648 trillion (Detikfinance, 12 August 2011). Among the other groups to 
oppose the KAJS were a few national union federations and confederations 
which had been receiving financial support from Jamsostek Ltd. through 
the so-called ‘kerja sama operasional’ (operational cooperation).119 The most 
prominent of these union groups were SPN, KSPSI (Kali Bata) and KSBSI. In 
fact, KSPSI’s Chairman, Sjukur Sarto, and KSBSI’s President, Rekson Sila-
ban, were also commissioners of Jamsostek Ltd., appointed by the govern-
ment as ‘representatives’ of workers on the company’s Board of Commis-
sioners. These three unions were the ones most active in opposing the BPJS 
Bill, as the KSO schemes from which they benefited were not guaranteed 
under the new system, which included a more transparent monitoring sys-
tem in which the BPJS (including the one formed from Jamsostek Ltd.) could 
be scrutinized by the public with regard to administration of their public 
trust funds.
Some confederation leaders were also antagonistic towards the KAJS 
because they perceived that it had upstaged and commandeered earlier joint 
efforts to consolidate the national confederations. An important meeting had 
119 As explained by one SPN union leader, each of their members was valued at Rp 1,500 
by Jamsostek Ltd. Therefore, the national headquarters of the SPN –a union with 400,000 
members – received Rp 600 million a year, which went towards headquarters adminis-
tration costs and was also distributed to the branches. Offi cially, the money was sup-
posed to be used for the ‘socialisation’ of Jamsostek programs targeting the union’s 
members, settled through a Memorandum of Understanding between the leader of the 
union and Jamsostek Ltd. directors. Most of the larger unions received this funding from 
Jamsostek Ltd., including the mainstream legacy unions (KSPSI, KSBSI, and KSPI); one 
small leftist union (KASBI) was also a benefi ciary.
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been held on 23-25 November 2009 in Sukabumi120; the Trade Union Meet-
ing for Political Consensus (TUMPOC). Following this meeting, in Febru-
ary 2010 many unions and activists agreed to establish the Forum Rembug 
Nasional – National Assembly Forum (FreN) as a continuation of TUMPOC. 
However, one month later the KAJS was formed, and many activists and 
donors who had supported TUMPOC shifted their allegiance to KAJS, cit-
ing concerns about FreN’s leadership and sources of operational funds.121 
FReN’s proposed leadership structure had involved the leaders of the con-
federations automatically becoming the leaders of the alliance; and this 
approach was rejected by several leaders of the national federations, who 
believed that federation-level leaders wielded more power and direct influ-
ence over workers, and were therefore more appropriate as leaders of the 
alliance. This power battle between confederation and federation leaders 
may also help explain the lack of enthusiasm for the KAJS among the major-
ity of confederation leaders. As noted above, certain confederation leaders 
also had vested interests in opposing reforms to the existing social security 
system for private formal workers, such as the workers associated with Jam-
sostek Ltd; with KSPSI’s Chairmen, Rekson Silavan and Sjukur Sarto, direct-
ly appointed by government commissioners of Jamsostek Ltd. This position 
gave them bonuses of hundreds of millions of rupiahs every year, with little 
perceived benefit for workers.122
The differences between the various confederations’ responses towards the 
KAJS led, in turn, to major differences in workers’ responses towards both 
the KAJS and the struggle for social security reform. The KSPSI and its mem-
bers, especially those allied with Sjukur Sarto, remained predominantly sep-
arate from the KAJS, although a few individual leaders from the KSPSI did 
choose to join. The KSPI and its members were more evenly split between 
those who did and did not support the KAJS; the KSPI’s President, Thamrin 
Mosii, was ambivalent about supporting the initiative, but some federations 
within the KSPI, in particular the FSPMI, engaged actively with the KAJS. 
Within the third confederation, the KSBSI, only one federation chose to affili-
ate with the KAJS; the Lomenik (metal and electronics sectors). This federa-
120 This meeting was initiated by the KSBSI and organized jointly with the KSPI and the 
KSPSI. It was supported fi nancially by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), and the 
American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). Around 50 activists from 
a number of union organizations attended. The meeting aimed to build a more solid 
labour movement (Kompas, 23 November 2009), and discussed issues such as social secu-
rity reforms, labour inspection, and resistance to the existing contract and outsourcing 
system. A merger of the three confederations was also discussed (Kompas, 24 November 
2011). This meeting was the fi rst time, since the 1998 reforms, that mainstream unions 
had met to directly discuss political issues (see also Tjandra, 2009).
121 Of TUMPOC’s original two main supporter organizations, FES and ACILS, FES was 
strongly supportive of the KAJS, and provided funds for the promotion of the KAJS’s 
agenda to the regions and for national seminars in Jakarta. In contrast, ACILS remained 
uninvolved with the KAJS and associated social security issues.
122 Meeting between KAJS leaders and Jamsostek Ltd. Management, August 2010.
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tion was willing to put its name as plaintiff in the lawsuit filed by the KAJS; 
while the KSBSI’s other federations initially refused. Later, however, in early 
2011, the KSBSI’s founder and Chairman of the Advisory Council, Muchtar 
Pakpahan, managed to coerce the entire leadership of KSBSI’s federations 
(with the exception of the President – Rekson Silaban) to apply to the Con-
stitutional Court for a judicial review of Law No. 3/1992 on Workers’ Social 
Security (Jamsostek). This led to a modest shift in the KSBSI’s views towards 
social security reform, and the organization began to participate more 
actively in KAJS activities. Rekson Silaban and Sjukur Sarto, however, were 
able to persuade the KSPI’s president, Mosii, to reject the BPJS Bill, by urg-
ing him to prioritize revising the Jamsostek Law, rather than supporting the 
BPJS Bill (Rakyat Merdeka, 2 June 2010). This proposal was very similar to the 
delaying tactics by  the Government, Jamsostek Ltd. and Taspen Ltd.; and led 
to criticism of Mosii by those within the KSPI who were concerned that he 
had been influenced by Silaban and Sarto.123
Despite the inter-union politics described above, the KAJS proved able 
to consolidate the labour movement to push for social security reform. 
Their successful deployment of thousands of workers during the Labour 
Day protests of May 1, 2010, and repeated on Labour Day 2011, generated 
wide media coverage and ensured that the issue of social security reform 
went from being misunderstood and unsupported by union leaders and 
the public, to holding a central place in public debate. In the absence of a 
political party ideologically supportive of a social and political agenda like 
social security, the presence of the KAJS proved vital in the political arena, 
especially in parliament where it acted as a social watchdog. When some 
members of parliament expressed frustration at the government’s unwill-
ingness to discuss the BPJS Bill before the end of the second parliamentary 
session in early 2011, the KAJS organised a fortnight-long ‘People’s Forum 
for Social Security’, which became a means by which to consolidate and 
coordinate reform efforts in the lead up to Labour Day, and included the 
demand: ‘Implement social security now, or SBY down!’ This level of resis-
tance would not have been considered possible by the mainstream labour 
unions in earlier years; although they became KAJS’s main supporters. The 
demands were well timed politically, coinciding with the voicing of concerns 
by interfaith religious leaders that the government was deceiving the pub-
lic on poverty rates (Waspada, 13 July 2011), and the controversial Wikileaks 
report revealing the abuse of power by President SBY and his family (Sydney 
123 As explained by one KSPI leader, the rejection of the three confederations’ leaders was 
delivered at a press conference sponsored by Jamsostek Ltd. at a hotel in Jakarta (per-
sonal communication with Agus Toniman of the KSPI, June 2010).
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Morning Herald, 11 March 2011).124 In the wake of such revelations, strong 
union demands combined with the threat of industrial strikes were highly 
influential in the existing political constellation.
The KAJS also scored an important breakthrough with respect to expand-
ing Indonesian workers’ awareness, from the historic narrow focus on tra-
ditional interests such as wages and uncertain employment status, towards 
broader social issues. Unlike the action committees that had previously aris-
en in Indonesia, the KAJS was able to survive over the long term and remain 
vibrant and consistent on the same issue. With no other groups focused on 
the same issue or using the same methods, KAJS’s success inspired many 
innovative trade unionists to adopt KAJS’s struggle as their own; not 
because their superiors had directed them, but through personal choice. 
Responding to criticisms from the opponents of the SJSN Law and the BPJS 
Bill, the KAJS Secretary-General, Said Iqbal, who was then the President of 
FSPMI, said: ‘Who am I to force so many trade unions to join the KAJS, who 
themselves want to struggle for social security? Surely there is some level of 
rationality to our demands, so as to produce this massive movement at such 
a scale, involving tens of trade unions across various regions.’ The existence 
of KAJS also encouraged direct consolidation between labour activists in the 
central organizations and those at the grass roots level; and trade unions, at 
some point, managed to put common social interests above their organiza-
tional ego and interests.125 This was a particularly important development 
for the trade union movement in Indonesia.
3.2.3 Battle of paradigms?
Within a relatively short time, the KAJS cemented its influence as a social 
and political force. Its success at persuading the parliamentary plenary 
meeting to approve the BPJS Bill as a House initiative, and its ability to unite 
the labour movement from national to local levels, allowed it to act as a cata-
lyst to end the political stagnation prevalent in the House during the BPJS 
124 Indonesian Vice-President Boediono visited Canberra on 10 March 2011 for talks with 
acting Prime Minister Wayne Swan and other relevant offi cials about reforming Indo-
nesia’s corrupt bureaucracy. At the same time, secret US diplomatic cables – obtained 
by Wikileaks and later reported in the Sydney Morning Herald – implicated Indonesian 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in extensive corruption and abuse of power, 
including intervening to infl uence prosecutors and judges to protect corrupt political 
fi gures, and pressuring his adversaries while using the Indonesian intelligence service to 
spy on political rivals – including a senior minister in his own government. The reports 
also accused the President’s wife and her family of seeking to enrich themselves through 
their political connections.
125 One KAJS leader from Bekasi noted that after the organization’s success with respect to 
getting the House and government to pass the BPJS Bill, many grassroots-level unions 
approached the KAJS to ‘synchronize the perceptions’ on various labour issues, such as 
social security and wages. This leader noted: ‘Many people brought their hopes to us, 
and we hope that we can fulfi l theirs.’ (personal communication with Obon Tabroni, the 
FSPMI leader, October 2011).
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Bill deliberations. As the influence of the KAJS grew, so did the influence of 
trade unions in Indonesian society. However, not all unions appreciated the 
KAJS’s achievements. Several unions, most notably the SPN, had commit-
ted to opposing the social security reforms on the grounds they would harm 
workers’ interests.126 When the BPJS Bill was finally passed by the House, 
these groups swore publicly to continue to fight the reforms (okezone.com, 
3 November 2011), including by filing a judicial review against them. This 
continued resistence was due in part to the vested interests mentioned ear-
lier, and potentially also a reflection of the different paradigms and orienta-
tions held by different unions – whether they were class-oriented, business/
market-oriented, or more socially focused.
Information in documents produced by the unions opposed to the KAJS, as 
well as statements in newspaper articles and direct personal communica-
tion with several of their leaders,127 indicates that the resistance to the BPJS 
Bill was associated in particular with concerns about the transformation of 
Jamsostek Ltd. from a state-owned enterprise to a public institution moni-
tored by a board of trustees. Some of these unions, seemingly inspired by 
Marxist arguments, argued that social security should be covered by, and the 
sole responsibility of, the state. They argued that instead of collecting money 
from the people, all social security costs should be covered by the national 
budget, from taxes collected; and they argued that without these costs being 
covered by the national budget, ‘social insurance’ was simply a way of cam-
ouflaging the state’s denial of its obligations to the people. Thus, the unions 
argued, the only way for workers and Indonesian people in general to enjoy 
full protection was through the nationalisation of foreign assets and the 
government-take over of all natural resources to be used for the common 
good.128 Some other unions argued that such changes would harm work-
126 In addition to SPN, other unions, which opposed the social security reforms were KSPSI 
(Kali Bata); Sarbumusi; SBSI 1992; FSP BUMN (SOEs trade union); and some factions 
within the KSBSI, FNPBI, KASBI and GSBI. Several other non-union groups also opposed 
the reforms for their own ends, including the DKR (Dewan Kesehatan Rakyat – People’s 
Health Council), an NGO established by the former Minister of Health, Siti Fadilah 
Supari. The DKR had acted as a watch-dog organization for the implementation of the 
‘jamkesmas’, a free healthcare program for the poor which was established as part of 
the implementation of Health Law No. 36/2009 (article 171 subsection (1)), and which 
stipulated that fi ve percent of the annual federal budget for healthcare should go to the 
Ministry of Health. This equated to around Rp 60.1 trillion in 2011; a huge amount of 
money for a single institution. Under the proposed reforms this funding would cease, as 
the health budget would be redirected to the newly-established BPJS, as part of the new 
universal healthcare system.
127 See, for example the ‘Joint Statement of Indonesian Trade Union/Labour Union on the 
BPJS Bill’, signed by ten union leaders from eight unions on 7 October 2011. It is interest-
ing to note that this statement was read out at a press conference held jointly by unions 
and Apindo, at the Apindo’s headquarters in Jakarta – such collaboration was highly 
unusual practice at the time.
128 The unions that adopted this position were FNPBI, KASBI, and GSBI.
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ers’ interests, as the money collected would then be used for all Indonesian 
people, rather than exclusively for the benefit of workers who had paid their 
premiums. This position might best be expressed in a statement of one SPN 
regional leader: ‘Should we workers and our money at Jamsostek Ltd. also 
be used for the benefit of the poor? Shouldn’t the poor be the responsibility 
of the government? Aren’t we, the workers, actually the poor itself?’129
The KAJS adopted a different position – but this evolved markedly dur-
ing the struggle. To start with, many KAJS leaders supported a ‘business’ 
or ‘market’ orientation to unionism. Although they strongly supported 
the transformation of the existing state social security companies into pub-
lic institutions controlled by the public, their main concern was Jamsostek 
Ltd. and its responsibility for workers in the formal sector. Their original 
demands, therefore, focused on the transformation of Jamsostek Ltd. into 
BPJS ‘Jamsostek’, with the establishment of just one additional pension pro-
gram, for formal workers in the private sector. They had little interest in 
supporting pension schemes for other social groups, such as workers in the 
informal economy; nor any interest in reforming the problematic pension 
schemes for public servants. Only as the parliamentary deadline neared did 
the KAJS publicly support a new universal pension system for all citizens, 
which meant that formal workers would contribute to others; as well as the 
‘mutual cooperation’ principle in the SJSN Law. The KAJS did, however, 
always publically support the proposed universal healthcare scheme for 
Indonesian citizens, based on a belief that ‘workers have families too, and 
they are not protected by any social security programs. Thus it is our duty to 
fight for them too.’130
The range of arguments for and against the social security reforms, by both 
the KAJS and other union groups, highlights the range of orientations held 
by trade unions in Indonesia today. These vary from those that focus on 
people’s rights to social security and the state’s responsibility to provide 
those rights, for example through nationalising foreign assets in Indonesia 
(class-oriented); to those that focus on union members’ interests while keep-
ing unions separate from broader society concerns (business-oriented); to an 
increasingly-popular focus on the positive roles of workers and unions in 
broader society (social-oriented). The growing social orientation of Indone-
sia’s trade union movement is important, as it provides the foundations for 
building basic social and legal protection for vulnerable workers, with the 
129 The unions which adopted this position were: SPN; KSPSI (Kali Bata); Sarbumusi; SBSI 
1992; FSP BUMN (SOEs trade union); and some factions in the KSBSI. This quote was 
from Rachmat of SPN Tangerang (October 2011), and referred to the old age funds paid 
by workers during the employment, which could be accessed after they were dismissed 
or retired.
130 Personal communication with Said Iqbal and Indra Munaswar, Secretary-General and 
member respectively of the KAJS Presidium (July 2010).
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goal of ensuring sustainable well-being for Indonesian society and individ-
ual citizens – especially in the context of the adoption of a neo-liberal policy 
framework characterised by decollectivism and individualisation of labour 
relations (see Chapter 1).
In the lead-up to the passing of the BPJS Bill, the KAJS’s efforts, while suf-
ficient to disturb the government’s plans, were not necessarily sufficient to 
induce the government to implement the social security reforms agenda. 
The biggest challenge for the KAJS in the future – and for the Indonesian 
trade union movement in general – remains how to transform its move-
ment into a strong political force. This will require strong leadership; trust 
from member unions and individual members; and sufficient energy to sus-
tain the battle over the long term. This is not a simple task; particularly for 
a relatively informal and flexibile organization like KAJS; the battle would 
arguably be better fought by a political party, but none of Indonesia’s exist-
ing political parties has fully supported progressive social concepts such as 
social security.
Following the passing of the BPJS Bill on 28 October 2011, the KAJS immedi-
ately set up the ‘BPJS Watch’ to monitor the implementation of the law (Kom-
pas.com, 29 October 2011). The first task of BPJS Watch was to ensure that 
there was no manipulation of the formulation of the provisions, between 
when the Bill was passed on 28 October 2011 and when it was signed on 28 
November 2011 – as had occurred sometimes in the past.131 BPJS Watch was 
also tasked to monitor the implementation of the BPJS Law, in particular the 
operation of the BPJS I on healthcare in 2014, and the BPJS II on manpower 
in 2015 (Pelitaonline.com, 2 November 2011). At the same time, many activists 
in the KAJS began to question the future of the KAJS. As one member of the 
KAJS presidium queried: ‘The struggle of KAJS might continue, but what is 
really the ultimate goal of all this?’132 This was a big question, and one which 
was not answered directly by the KAJS. The answer was relatively simple, 
although not easy to achieve: the goal was to maintain and strengthen the 
unity of the labour movement, both within itself and with the popular politi-
cal and social agendas.
131 On this point, the KAJS referred in particular to an incident that occurred during the 
passing of Law No. 36/2009 on Health, in which certain references to tobacco disap-
peared from the fi nal version of the law. The originally agreed wording of the law 
included, in article (2) Section 113, the words: ‘addictive substances as referred to in 
paragraph (1) include tobacco, products that contain tobacco, solids, liquids, and gases 
that are addictive and which if used can cause harm to the user and/or the community 
around them’. The absence of this provision from the fi nal version of the law was report-
edly due to the actions of the chairperson of the House special committee on the Health 
Bill, Ribka Tjiptaning, following intense lobbying from the tobacco industry (Tribune-
news.com, 20 Juli 2011).
132 Personal communication with Indra Munaswar, November 2011. 
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The establishment of the Council of Indonesian Labour (Majelis Pekerja 
Buruh Indonesia, the MPBI) on 1 May 2012, in association with the Interna-
tional Labour Day celebrations, was originally intended to help address 
the questions about Indonesia’s labour movement’s long-term goals. Said 
Iqbal, the Secretary General of the KAJS and Chairman of both the FSPMI 
(Indonesian Metal Workers Federation) and KSPI (Confederation of the 
Indonesian Trade Unions), approached the chairs of the two other largest 
confederations, the KSPSI (Pasar Minggu) and the KSBSI,133 to develop an 
informal umbrella organization to represent Indonesia’s labour movement, 
by uniting the largest confederations and several national-level federations. 
The announcement of the formation of the MPBI and the declaration of the 
confederations’ united front occurred at the Bung Karno National Stadium, 
the largest stadium in Jakarta, in front of 80,000 workers.134 An office for the 
MPBI, with two full-time staff, was established in the most important district 
in Jakarta – Thamrin street – in the historic Sarinah Building, ‘so that labour 
could have its own pride,’ as explained by Andi Gani Nena Wea, President 
of the KSPSI.135 Since its establishement the MPBI has overseen several 
unprecedented achievements, including a successful national strike involv-
ing over two million workers from 14 industrial districts on 3 October 2012, 
and many rallies which have brought tens of thousands of workers onto the 
streets of Jakarta, to draw the public’s attention to labour issues and goals.
The MPBI’s success at mobilising massive labour demontrations has also 
strengthened labour’s position with the government. Following the dem-
onstrations, the government agreed to revise several existing regulations, 
including revising one Minister of Manpower regulation on acceptable liv-
ing standards to include 14 more components, based on market surveys136; 
and releasing another Minister of Manpower decree to limit outsourcing 
practices to only a few categories of work.137 Meetings between the MPBI 
and the Minister of Manpower became more frequent; and the MPBI also 
promoted labour issues to key international institutions in Jakarta; including 
the US Embassy, whose ambassador invited the MPBI leaders to meet with 
133 Like the KSPI, the KSBSI is also an affi liate of the ITUC (International Trade Union Con-
federation). The KSPSI is not.
134 See ‘Manifesto MPBI’, 1 May 2013.
135 Personal communication with Andi Gani Nena Wea, President of KSPSI, May 2012. Andi 
Gani Nena Wea is a son of Jakob Nuwa Wea and also an entrepreneur in the coal mining 
industry.
136 See Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 13/2012 on the Components and Implemen-
tation of the Steps to Achieve Decent Living Conditions.
137 See Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 19/2012 on the Terms for Subcontracting 
Components of Work to Other Enterprises.
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him.138 Arguably the MPBI’s most significant early achievement was when 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono invited the council, and several other 
union leaders, to the President’s Palace on 29 April 2013 to discuss labour 
issues. At this event, the President gave a ‘present’ to the delegates – in the 
form of an announcement that 1 May would become an official holiday in 
Indonesia, starting in 2014 (Kompas, 30 April 2013). This decision was for-
malised on 29 July 2013, through President Decision No. 24/2013.
Unlike the KAJS, the MPBI established a more formal leadership structure, 
with leadership controlled largely by the chairmen of the three confedera-
tions, and with leaders of the smaller unions being placed on the organising 
committee. This rigid hierarchical structure was critcized from the begin-
ning by several union leaders within the MPBI, who were concerned that 
it threatened the ‘togetherness’ and ‘collegiality’ of the alliance, given that 
most decisions were imposed from above rather than decided collegially 
like in the KAJS.139 These fears appeared validated when conflicts emerged 
between MPBI’s three leaders, especially between Said Iqbal and the other 
two, associated with different ideological perspectives concerning demands 
for higher wages,140 as well as direct personal competition.141 These conflicts 
threatened to end the MPBI, particularly as Said Iqbal and his union were 
the largest force driving the MPBI, as their ability to mobilise members was 
much greater than that of the other two confederations. Although never 
formally dissolved, after these conflicts the MPBI gradually became inactive. 
138 The increasingly strong bargaining position of the labour movement has also generated 
interest from the American Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia. Its website, under the 
title ‘Newsmaker Interviews’, has presented a series of interviews with the three Presi-
dents of the three confederations, consecutively: Mudhofi r (http://www.amcham.or.id/
nf/features/4225-newsmaker-interview-mudhofi r), Andi Gani Nena Wea (http://www.
amcham.or.id/nf/features/4208-newsmaker-interview-andi-gani-nena-wea), and Said 
Iqbal (http://www.amcham.or.id/nf/features/4256-newsmaker-interview-said-iqbal).
139 Personal communication with Indra Munaswar of SP TSK Reformasi and Timboel 
Siregar of OPSI. Both were active in the KAJS as presidium members, and in the MPBI as 
organising committee members.
140 At the time of writing, Iqbal wanted to continue to take a more ‘militant’ approach, by 
demanding a wage increase of 50 percent in 2014, while the other two wanted to take a 
softer approach, by leaving such decisions to be made at the company level. In an inter-
view with The Jakarta Post (1 May 2013), Iqbal clearly advocated ‘the militant way’ in 
order to raise labour interests under the current system, as he was quoted: ‘Labor unions 
have forcibly taken the militant way because other ways and roads to settle unresolved 
major labor issues have been closed down.’
141 Said Iqbal was recently awarded the Febe Elizabeth Velasquez (FNV) Award in com-
bination with the production of the documentary fi lm about the labour movement in 
Colombia and Indonesia. In the documentary, Iqbal was presented as the main labour 
movement fi gure for Indonesia, which increased tensions among the MPBI presidium. 
The other two members of the presidium accused Iqbal of claiming undue credit by not 
acknowledging, in the documentary, the contributions of the other two leaders to the 
union movement. Although these allegations were rejected by Iqbal, arguing that the 
fi lm was made by the FNV and he had no control over the content, the issue led to deep 
cracks in the MPBI leadership. 
Trade unions and the law in Indonesia 155
In 2013, its role as an umbrella organization was replaced by a new alliance, 
the National Labour Movement Consolidation (Konsolidasi Nasional Gerakan 
Buruh, the KNGB), again initiated by Said Iqbal and his unions. The new 
organization was officially announced on 30 September 2013, in Jakarta’s 
historic Gedung Joang (‘Struggle Building’), a monument to Indonesia’s revo-
lution for Independence.
Despite the recent progress, the future of the Indonesian labour movement 
remains uncertain. Said Iqbal has proposed the idea of establishing a ‘rumah 
rakyat’ (people’s house), as a venue and an organization for facilitating and 
consolidating advocacy between labour organizations and other civil soci-
ety organizations.142 According to Iqbal, the organization associated with 
the ‘rumah rakyat’ would be a political mass organization but not a political 
party – although it would consider the possibility of becoming one if needed. 
Iqbal also mentioned that 2014 would be an appropriate year for the rumah 
rakyat to commence. Iqbal explained his vision as: “[Unlike political parties] 
we will focus on advocacy and addressing people’s problems, rather than 
focusing on acquiring power. But we could only become such an advocate 
if the people we help support us to do so.’143 The question as to whether the 
efforts of the KAJS, the MPBI, the KNGB, and perhaps the proposed rumah 
rakyat and the labour movement supporting it, will together prove capable 
of transforming labour into a long-term social and political movement, will 
need more time to be assessed.
4 Conclusion
Labour law has long emphasized the protection of the individual, through 
trade union membership and collective bargaining. This means that while 
recognizing the importance of collective bargaining, based on the collective 
strength of unions to determine the rules applicable in their workplace or 
142 The term ‘rumah rakyat’ was inspired by the existence of a similar gathering place in 
Bekasi (an industrial city near Jakarta) which was established primarily by the local 
FSPMI members . This site, named ‘Rumah buruh’, was located on an unfi nished bridge 
which was intended to link two industrial zones, EJIP and MM 2000, but which was 
abandoned by the government and the zones management, due to ongoing confl ict over 
the land with the community surrounding the bridge. The site has been used by the 
local unions as a place for consolidation, training, planning of demonstrations and other 
activites, and has become a symbol of the labour movement in Bekasi and other regions. 
The term ‘rumah buruh’ originates from the terms ‘omah tani’ and ‘rumah tani’ (peas-
ants’ house), from Batang, Central Java – where similar peasants advocacy movements 
have occurred previously.
143 Personal communication with Said Iqbal, June 2013
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industry,144 the law also emphasizes the need for effective statutory protec-
tion, in order to protect workers and their unions from undue power from 
their employers.145 Consequently, labour law is often designed with provi-
sions to protect workers: for example, protection from unfair dismissal; a 
requirement to employ ‘good faith’ during collective bargaining; and the 
involvement of workers and union representatives in labour dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. Trade union law in particular might contain provisions 
to protect union autonomy from encroachment by employers and the state 
(Hepple, 1995), including: provisions to support collective bargaining, such 
as providing unions with legal avenues if an employer refuses to recognize 
the union for collective bargaining despite strong workplace support; provi-
sions to ensure that strike action is protected from liability in tort; and provi-
sions to ensure that regardless of strike action, union funds are safeguarded 
during any subsequent legal actions. In many countries, labour legislation 
often also includes provisions on the ‘closed shop’ system, a term used to 
describe a workplace in which all employees are required to be members of a 
particular trade union (Davis, 2004: p.11-12).146
In Indonesia, however, trade union regulations have been used to control 
labour, rather than support labour as a collective power for sound indus-
trial relations. This control occurred particularly during the three decades 
of the authoritarian New Order era, during which time, the government 
supported a single union, SPSI, which functioned as the state’s subordinate. 
The Reformasi in 1998 provided opportunities for new independent unions 
to develop alongside the legacy union SPSI; and numbers of unions mush-
roomed from the single union in early 1998, to 90 national unions registered 
in 2010. Despite this, the position and influence of the unions is considered 
to have remained weak, hindered by the ongoing dominance of the legacy 
unions and the inability of new unions to challenge them, due to internal 
structural problems, which discourage unity and coordinated action. This 
study’s recent findings, however, have highlighted recent positive develop-
ments for trade unions at both regional and national levels, offering hope 
144 This is related to the so-called ‘collective laissez faire’, coined by Kahn-Freund to explain 
the situation in Britain, where labour law played a relatively minor role in managing 
labour issues (compared to its role in other industrialized countries), and where instead 
most workplace and industry rules were left to be decided through bargaining between 
trade unions and employers.
145 These values associated with labour law are found in various publications written by 
key scholars in the fi eld, including for example Hepple (1995), with his famous article 
‘The Future of Labour Law’; Wedderburn (2000); Barnard et al. (2004); and Klare (2004).
146 These long-held values of labour law are, arguably, being challenged by the globaliza-
tion of economies, which, according to some, requires a more fl exible labour market to 
enable companies to compete globally (Conaghan et al. 2004). In many developed and 
developing countries, a more global market focus and associated claims about the need 
for fl exibility have forced recent changes to labour law systems, generally characterized 
by a decline in trade union strength, and a reduction in collective bargaining (Hepple 
1995; also Dae-oup 2006).
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for the future of the trade union movement in Indonesia. Having learned 
that the solution might not lie within the structures of the existing national 
workers federations and confederations, several unions at both regional and 
national levels have developed alternative strategies, through the formation 
of regional and national alliances. The various regional alliances are dealing 
with local labour issues, such as regional minimum wage determination, as 
well as with local politics and how political involvement can be used to ben-
efit labour. The national alliance with the KAJS extends even further beyond 
traditional workers’ issues, focusing its struggle on reforming Indonesia’s 
social security system for the benefit of all citizens. Together these alliances 
represent the recent and unprecedented development of the trade union 
movement in Indonesia, lending hope that the future includes the more 
active participation of unions in Indonesian society.
Change does not come from Jakarta, change comes to Jakarta. The presence 
of various alliances of trade unions across different regions raises optimism 
for more involvement of unions in developing regional and national-level 
policies. Change may begin in the regions, but it will never be enough if it 
is confined to the regions. Therefore the empowerment of union alliances in 
the regions should be combined with empowerment of trade union centres, 
especially at the confederation level. The confederations would be ideally 
positioned to become the voice for the union movement when negotiating 
with the state. However, for this function to be realized, the trade union 
movement requires real and genuine unity within itself, at both regional and 
national levels. To this end, the regional alliance of unions and the national 
union alliance of the KAJS and the MPBI, despite recent challenges, could 
be important starting points. One crucial agenda for the trade union move-
ment in Indonesia is to develop its social and political powers, to act as a 
countervailing force in society against the existing powers of employers and 
capital. Any changes in favour of labour and society will depend largely 
upon the effective political organization of these forces, and these changes 
may involve, as they did in Europe, a long and potentially violent process, 
including a struggle for law reform.

[M]inimum wage is not about economic models, but about how some economic models 
can be put to the service of political interests.
(Levin-Waldman, 2001: xiii)
1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the relationship between labour law and the labour 
market in Indonesia, in the context of the country’s most heatedly-debated 
labour issue: minimum wage policy.1 The concept of a minimum wage 
policy emerged soon after Indonesia’s independence in 1945, and began to 
receive serious government attention in the late 1950s. Despite this early 
interest, a policy was not adopted formally until the late 1960s; and only 
implemented in the early 1970s, during the New Order. During the follow-
ing 40 years, in particular since the 1998 reforms, minimum wage policies 
in Indonesia have been problematic – developing into a complex nexus of 
legislative texts, practices and processes which often differ not only between 
government institutions, employers and trade unions, but also from one 
region to another, influenced by a diverse range of national and regional-
level social, economic, political and ideological factors. To help workers and 
unions negotiate such complex policy issues, the regional union alliances 
(see Chapter 4) became important vehicles for workers; while Wage Coun-
cils were formed to serve as the institution tasked with researching and rec-
ommending minimum wage figures to the heads of regents and cities. Wage 
Councils are the places within which the interests of workers and employers 
are contested; and the dynamics of the struggles within these institutions 
offer a clear illustration of the challenges of minimum wage policies in prac-
tice, within the existing labour law framework in Indonesia.
1 The term ‘minimum wage(s)’ has several defi nitions. In this chapter, we follow the defi -
nition used in most frequently in ILO publications – i.e., the legally enforceable lower 
limit(s) of wages, fi xed by a process invoking the authority of the State, and excluding 
the limits that have only the force of recommendation, and the lower limits to wages 
fi xed in collective agreement (see for example Starr, 1981: vii).
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It may be argued that laws and regulations are manifestations of the eco-
nomic, political and ideological conflicts and compromises which arise 
naturally between diverse groups in the pluralistic society; and this chapter 
argues that the issue of minimum wage policies should be viewed no differ-
ently. The chapter’s argument will be informed by the political approach to 
the study of minimum wage, developed by, among others, Levin-Waldman 
(2000, 2001, 2005), who challenges the dominance of the prevailing economic 
approach in studying minimum wage. As Levin-Waldman noted (2001: xii):
The minimum wage is not about some losing their jobs so that others can receive an 
immediate increase in pay. Rather it is about what we as a political community believe 
the end product of work ought to be. Do we believe that we have an obligation to 
ensure that those who work, even in the least attractive jobs, will earn wages sufficient 
for subsistence? The minimum wage raises the question: What do we, as a community 
owe to those who work?
As explained by Levin-Waldman (2001: 2-4), this approach does not reject 
the usefulness of the economic model in analyzing minimum wage policies 
and related issues; rather, it stresses the importance of considering politics as 
part of the analysis, in combination with the dominant economic approach. 
To date, the minimum wage has been studied largely through an economic 
lens, with a focus on economic models, which have been considered respon-
sible for driving the policy process. Levin-Waldman suggests that this misses 
the political point that the minimum wage is a crucial aspect of state policy, 
designed to protect particular sectors of society; and that an understanding 
of how state policies are formed is critical to a larger understanding of mini-
mum wage issues. As Levin-Waldman (2001: 3) notes: ‘[the minimum wage] 
issue involves the interaction between economic forces and public institu-
tions, for state policy is inevitably a response to those forces and/or to a par-
ticular group of interests seeking to make an issue out of them.’
This chapter will demonstrate that one major difference between the Refor-
masi era and the earlier, authoritarian New Order era is that under Reformasi, 
unions have more opportunities to become involved in the minimum wage 
setting processes, especially through the Wage Councils established in the 
regions. However, unions have remained relatively weak, so their involve-
ment in wage setting has not necessarily resulted in a better position for 
workers in general. Lack of compliance by employers, and lack of enforce-
ment by government, have further eroded the positive impact that mini-
mum wage policies might otherwise have achieved. The existing minimum 
wage is also set too low to offer effective protection for workers. Despite 
ongoing efforts to achieve better wages in Indonesia, wages remain at a level 
at which 40-50 percent of average salaries are used to meet minimum food 
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requirements (Merk, 2009).2 The situation is worsened by the lack of a social 
security scheme in Indonesia, and the minimum wage has not been used as 
a ‘social floor’.3
This chapter analyses the history and practice of minimum wage setting in 
Indonesia, particularly the situation in regional areas since regional autono-
my has increased; and the roles and influence of organized labour on wage-
setting decisions. The evidence presented here suggests that despite the 
challenges that trade unions have faced (see Chapter 4), unions and labour 
activists have learned effective strategies for positioning themselves strong-
ly, when bargaining for better wages for workers. In situations where the 
minimum wage setting processes established in various regions have pre-
vented unions from using collective bargaining mechanisms at the compa-
ny or industry level, the Wage Councils have become the main avenue by 
which labour can participate in the wage setting process, with unions rely-
ing on a combination of legal and political activities to assist their struggle. 
The decentralization of minimum wage setting to the regions has presented 
both benefits and challenges for labour’s efforts to develop minimum wages 
as a social policy tool and as a benchmark for collective bargaining. Compe-
tition and differences in local political dynamics between regions, combined 
with the fragmentation of unions, weak central union organizations, and 
challenges associated with the existing surplus of labour in Indonesia, have 
resulted in a wide range of outcomes with respect to minimum wage set-
ting, between different regions and industry sectors. In the absence of clear 
support, at the national government level, for the existence of unions and 
their right to undertake collective bargaining; and in the absence of employ-
ers’ interest in working constructively with unions, minimum wage setting 
has remained largely an area of conflict without significant agreement. This 
chapter will explore these issues in two parts. The first part of the chapter, 
sub-chapters 2 and 3, will analyse the legal-institutional aspects of minimum 
wage setting in Indonesia, and the second part, sub-chapters 4 to 6, will pres-
ent and analyse a representative case study, in order to illustrate minimum 
wage setting in practice.
2 The defi nition of a ‘decent wage’ or ‘living wage’ is quite broad, but it is generally 
accepted that a decent wage should enable the earner and their family to meet the most 
basic costs of living, without the need for direct government fi nancial support or pover-
ty programmes. The Living Wage Action Coalition, for instance, considers a living wage 
to mean that ‘an individual can take pride in her work and enjoy the decency of a life 
beyond poverty, beyond an endless cycle of working and sleeping, beyond the ditch of 
poverty wages’ (www.livingwageaction.org). 
3 The minimum wage is used as a ‘social fl oor’ if minimum wage policy is linked to the 
social security of vulnerable groups – such as retirement benefi ts for pensioners, with 
minimum wages increasing as required to maintain the purchasing power of the very 
poorest – and/or linked to economic growth, with the aim that society as a whole will 
benefi t from the fruits of progress brought about by economic development (see Eyraud 
and Saget, 2008: 107-8). Neither of these links has been established in Indonesia.
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2 The evolution of minimum wage policies
Particularly since the end of World War II, the minimum wage has become 
an attractive policy tool for poverty reduction and social justice, in both 
developed and developing countries. As a policy, the minimum wage has 
several benefits for governments: it does not require significant direct gov-
ernment expenditure; it is a relatively simple and highly-visible way for a 
government to demonstrate its commitment to social justice, by directly tar-
geting the poorest workers; and it enables the government to remain directly 
involved in labour market operations (avoiding the neo-liberal approach of 
minimizing government involvement in market mechanisms, Starr, 1981). 
Alternative social programs, such as poverty reduction through cash trans-
fers or public works, tend to be less attractive for government as they may 
be more difficult to target and monitor; may often include high non-labour 
costs; and may create political-economic disputes about, for example, which 
groups in society should be beneficiaries, and to what extent (Cunningham, 
2007). Thus, the characteristics of the minimum wage, including self-target-
ing worker incentives and a direct labour market-focus, make it an attractive 
social protection tool for many countries.
For developing countries in particular, there are other reasons why the mini-
mum wage may be appealing, or readily accepted. The principle of mini-
mum wage regulation may have been transplanted to them, from the former 
colonial powers with which they had historical ties. In addition, more proac-
tive newly independent countries may want to align their labour legislation 
closely with the international labour standards; due either to concern for 
their citizens’ rights, or concern about international perceptions. There may 
also be more fundamental reasons, related to labour market conditions and 
the general orientation of government policies. The low living standards of 
many wage earners, and the scarcity of jobs, may intensify pressure on new 
governments to take action, and a minimum wage policy is a visible and 
simple way to provide the required protection; while also retaining direct 
government involvement in the labour market – especially in countries 
where strong industrial relations systems for unions and employers have 
not yet developed.
In Indonesia, the first attempt to develop processes for determining wage 
rates was in the mid-1950s, when the Indonesian government requested the 
ILO for technical assistance on two issues: wage policy and industrial rela-
tions (ILO, 1958). This request was in response to growing labour unrest in 
Indonesia, which was aggravating the country’s economic situation. The 
government hoped to receive the ILO’s advice on wage-fixing standards, 
and on the most appropriate methods for the social and economic condi-
tions of the time. It also hoped to receive advice about the organization and 
operation of Indonesia’s existing labour dispute settlement mechanisms, 
developed earlier as Emergency Law No. 16/1951 on labour dispute settle-
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ment (see Chapter 2). In response to this request, the ILO sent an advisor, 
W.J. Hull, to Indonesia between 1 October 1955 and 26 December 1956, who 
submitted a report to the Indonesian government in 1958. The report not 
only provided an analysis about the existing situation, but also made rec-
ommendations about an appropriate wage-fixing system and institutional 
and organizational reforms to improve the existing mechanisms for labour 
dispute settlement. Drafts of appropriate wage-related legislation were 
also included, along with comments on the then draft law for settlement of 
labour dispute.4
The report included an explicit statement of the principles behind wage set-
ting: ‘the ultimate goal of wages policy should be to ensure that all wage 
earners earn at least a living wage from their principal employment’ (ILO, 
1958: 3). The ‘living wage’ was defined in the report as ‘a wage, which will 
provide the basic essentials for supporting a man, wife and two children in 
a standard of life commonly accepted as tolerable in the society of which 
they form part’.5 This was an important and ambitious target for a country 
that had only recently developed an industrial relations system. Despite this 
report, and despite Indonesia’s strong labour movement in the 1950s, the 
government did not pass minimum wage legislation until early 1970s.
Similar to the situation in other developing countries, the wage system in 
Indonesia was initially developed not only as part of the market mechanism 
to enable the efficient allocation of resources; it was also assigned an impor-
tant social policy function, to protect the weak by relating wages to needs. 
As noted by Arndt and Sundrum (1975: 369), the wage system that evolved 
after Indonesia’s independence in 1945 was originally weighted towards 
social security objectives, and this was reflected in key features of the sys-
tem, including: the importance of a high proportion of wages in kind other 
than financial ones; the practice of linking wage levels to the ‘needs of the 
worker’ such as the number of dependants; and the protective labour legis-
lation, which limited an employer’s right to dismiss.6 One important reason 
for such a policy in Indonesia, in the early years of independence, was the 
4 The Labour Dispute Settlement Law No. 22/1957 was, however, already enacted before 
the report was offi cially submitted to the Indonesian government.
5 This principle is clearly a refl ection of the Preamble to the ILO Constitution of 1919, 
which notes that peace and harmony in the world requires ‘the provision of an adequate 
living wage’; and refl ects also the ILO Convention No. 131 on Minimum Wage Fixing, 
which was adopted in 1970 and which states that a minimum wage should consider ‘the 
needs of workers and their families’. For further discussion on the history and practice 
of the living wage concept, see Waltman (2004), also Shelburne (1999).
6 This involved particularly the provisions requiring employers to obtain the govern-
ment’s permission prior to dismissing employees, as contained in Labour Dispute Settle-
ment Law No. 22/1957 and the Dismissal at Private Undertakings Law No. 12/1964. 
The Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement Law No. 2/2004 later replaced both laws, 
and the aforementioned provisions were weakened with the establishment of the Indus-
trial Relations Court. We will discuss this further in Chapter 7.
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lack of effective alternative policy instruments (Arndt and Sundrum, 1974: 
369-70). Government resources were limited, and largely already allocated 
to other purposes; leaving social security and welfare services inadequately 
provided for, relative to the situation in more socially developed states. Fur-
ther, as we have seen, for various historical and political reasons the trade 
unions had failed to establish a strong role to participate in collective bar-
gaining and wage negotiations. Under these circumstances, ‘a wage system 
designed to reconcile the demands of economic efficiency and social security 
is a necessary compromise’ (Arndt and Sundrum, 1975: 370).7
In 1969, Indonesia established the first Dewan Penelitian Pengupahan Nasional 
(DPPN, National Wage Research Council), based on President Decree No. 
58/19698 and later regulated by Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 20/
Men/1971. This was followed two years later by the establishment of the 
Dewan Penelitian Pengupahan Daerah (DPPD, Regional Wage Research Coun-
cil), which was based on Minister of Manpower Decision No. 131/Men/1971 
(see also Djarwadi, 1996: 112 and Manning, 1998: 207). According to these 
regulations, the Council was to comprise mainly of government officials: 
of the Council’s 18 members, 16 were representatives from various govern-
ment institutions (including academics from the state university), with the 
remaining 2 members being one union representative, and a representative 
from the employers’ organization.
Although minimum wage levels which are set below or too far above exist-
ing wage levels will be ineffective, leading respectively to wage reductions 
or to employer disregard for minimum levels (or, if high minimum wages 
are enforced, to the risk of workers losing their jobs), these considerations are 
irrelevant if a country’s wage regulations are merely cosmetic. This was the 
case in Indonesia during the 1970s and 1980s, when the Indonesian govern-
ment not only avoided intervening in wage determination despite minimum 
wages being insufficient to protect workers from poverty, but also avoided 
enforcing the regulations which it had set up to protect workers from unfair 
dismissal (see Manning, 1994). In addition, during this time the government 
kept tight control of the trade union movement, by allowing only a single, 
government sanctioned union. As a result, there was little effective govern-
ment or union involvement in wage setting; and the institutional context, 
7 As noted by Arndt and Sundrum (1975), this ‘double-job’ of wage policy in Indonesia 
had a price. First, it could discourage the promotion of effi cient use of labour and other 
sources provided by the operation supply and demand of labour within the labour mar-
ket. And second, since the meaning of ‘need’ is to an extent subjective, using this crite-
rion in a policy without including a tight defi nition may lead to confusion, discrimina-
tion of workers, and may primarily benefi t those in waged employment, while the large 
numbers of ‘self-employed’ and the informal sector may be excluded regardless of the 
need for social assistance. These concerns remain real for wage policy in Indonesia even 
today.
8 Replaced 35 years later by President Decree No. 107/2004 on Wage Councils.
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which governed wage determination, involved haphazard mechanisms that 
varied depending on industry sector and activity. In a review of findings 
from other scholars, Manning (1994: 80-81) described the existence of two 
extremes in wage practices in Indonesia at this time: a very loose mechanism 
for determining wages in the semi-formal and informal sector; and a very 
rigid, strict set of rules in the public sector and for government employees:
‘At one extreme, casual wage rates are often negotiated on an individual basis in rice 
agriculture and construction, and may vary from person to person depending on the 
relationship between the employer and employee (Stoler, 1977; Tjondronegoro, 1977; 
Hart, 1986). Wage agreements for one activity in rice may involve commitments to work 
on other tasks in the agricultural cycle (as in the case of kedokan contracts). In many con-
struction activities, the exact wage paid to a particular individual is difficult to deter-
mine because it is at the discretion of the head of the labour team (the mandor) (Sjah-
rir, 1993). At the other extreme, government wages are rigidly determined according 
to educational level, years of service and position. Here, non-basic wage emoluments 
(both official and unofficial) play an important role in determining total labour incomes 
(Gray, 1979). In between, permanent and semi-permanent wage contracts in manufac-
turing may be based on rigid formulae such as those applied to civil servants, or among 
more skilled persons they may vary considerably according to skill, experience and 
relationship to the employer. Depending on the type and size of firm, unskilled workers 
have a wide range of employment contracts; these may be informal, casual arrange-
ments or formal permanent contracts drawn up in accordance with labour legislation.’
In the late 1980s, Indonesia witnessed two important developments for its 
labour market. The first was the rise in labour unrest and the establishment 
of several independent trade unions, despite government efforts to main-
tain strict control and labour repression. The second development was the 
government’s decision to attempt to enforce the implementation of mini-
mum wage regulations – the first such effort since the regulations were 
established in the early 1970s. This new effort to enforce wage policy has 
been seen by some as an attempt by the government to compensate for the 
policy’s restriction of labour rights, and to appease workers (see, e.g., Har-
rison and Scorse, 2005). Indonesia’s new approach to wages also coincided 
with growing internal and external pressure for change (Suryahadi et al., 
2003, Manning, 1994). Internal pressure came partly from domestic labour 
rights activists and NGOs, with support from international human rights 
activists; and partly from individuals within government and other policy 
makers concerned that the growing labour unrest could hamper economic 
growth. External pressure came particularly from anti-sweatshop activists in 
the United States, who demanded better conditions for workers in Indone-
sia (Harrison and Scorse, 2005: 145-148; Dhanani et al., 2009: 155-167). These 
activists lodged complaints with United States Trade Representatives, citing 
Indonesia’s systematic violation of labour standards, and recommending the 
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removal of Indonesia’s preferential trade status under the GSP (Generalised 
System of Preferences) for its exports to US markets.9
The Indonesian government, concerned about the potential loss of its GSP 
status, increased minimum wages through legislative changes, while doing 
little to improve other labour rights. In 1989, the government released Min-
ister of Manpower Regulation No. 5/Men/1989 on Minimum Wages, which 
aimed to redesign the mechanism for setting minimum wages in the regions, 
with reference to minimum physical needs, the cost of living, and labour 
market conditions.10 According to this regulation, the rate of Kebutuhan Fisik 
Minimum (KFM, Minimum Physical Needs) was determined differently 
from one region to another, by the Regional Wage Research Council estab-
lished earlier. The KFM standard was designed in 1956 under the Djuanda 
Cabinet, and included estimates of various costs for food, drink, clothing 
and shelter for the physical sustenance of workers (Djarwadi, 1996: 111). The 
basis of the KFM standard was the consumer price index of the nine basic 
foods, and the daily calorie requirement for a single male worker (2600 calo-
ries/day) with a maximum of three dependants (K-3).11
In 1995, a broader consumption bundle aimed at satisfying ‘subsistence’ 
instead of only ‘physical needs’, and known as Kebutuhan Hidup Minimum 
(KHM, Minimum Subsistence Needs), was introduced through Minister of 
Manpower Decree No. 81/Men/1995, and confirmed by Minister of Man-
power Regulation No. 3/Men/1997, to be used in the regional minimum 
wage setting. Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 3/Men/1997 was later 
replaced by Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 1/Men/1999 on Mini-
mum Wages. Both KFM and KHM are bundles of consumption items need-
ed for the subsistence of a single worker. The KHM costs 15 percent to 20 
9 As noted by Harrison and Scorse (2005: 145) there were seven issues related to labour 
rights violations: ‘obstruction of the right to organize, restrictions on civil servants, the 
right to strike, the intervention of security authorities in labor disputes, restrictions of 
workers’ access to appeal, limited sanctions against employers, and unfair restrictions 
on the right to work.’
10 Under this regulation, minimum wage was defi ned as the lowest basic salary excluding 
other fi xed benefi ts accepted by workers. In 1990, the government revised this regulation 
by releasing a new regulation, Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 01/Men/1990, in 
which minimum wage was defi ned as the lowest basic salary including fi xed benefi ts, 
based on daily payment. 
11 For example, a single male worker is targeted to receive 2600 calories/day; a worker 
with a wife (K-0) 4800 calories/day; a worker with a wife and a child (K-1) 6700 calo-
ries/day; a worker with a wife and two children (K-2) 8100 calories/day; and a worker 
with a wife and three children (K-3) 10000 calories/day. Despite this complex system 
of minimum wage calculations, the resulting purchasing power, if it delivers 2600 calo-
ries/capita/day (equal to 234 kg of rice per person annually) is too low for subsistence, 
according to the well-accepted ‘Sayogyo’s poverty line’ calculations, in which total 
energy expenditure divided by local rice prices and number of family members gives a 
minimum annual food requirement equivalent to 480 kg (rural areas) and 320 kg (urban 
areas) of rice per person (Sayogyo, 1971).
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percent more than the former KFM, and provides a broader consumption 
bundle of 43 items, ranging from food, clothing and housing to transport, 
health and recreation. It represents an increased likelihood of meeting basic 
human needs, compared with the KFM; for example the food bundle of the 
KFM was set to 2600 calories/capita/day, wheras in the KHM it is set to 3000 
calories/capita/day.12
Until 2000, at the provincial level a single minimum wage would be set, 
which would apply throughout the entire province. The only exceptions 
were the regions that included ‘special economic zones’ and ‘export process-
ing zones’ (for example Riau, South Sumatera, West Java and Bali); for which 
different minimum wages applied. A few provinces also applied different 
minimum wages for different sectors in the economy, but these wages were 
not allowed to be lower than the general minimum wages, which applied 
in the region. Until the end of 2000, these regional (provincial) minimum 
wages were established by a decree issued by the Minister of Manpower, 
following recommendations from the provinces’ Governors. Although the 
Governors were obliged by law to take advice from the tripartite provin-
cial Wage Councils, in practice the employee (and employer) representatives 
on the Councils were usually government appointees; and as most Council 
deliberations were conducted in secret, it is unlikely that any true union rep-
resentation was achieved (Masduki et al., 1998).
Since the beginning of 2001, following the adoption and implementation 
of the regional autonomy policy,13 the task of minimum wage setting was 
handed over to provincial governors.14 Although the central government 
retained the task of specifying the criteria for setting minimum wages, the 
governors were put in charge of determining the actual minimum wages to 
be set in their province. In some cases, governors then delegated this respon-
sibility to the mayors and regents in their regions. In addition to the previ-
ous, relatively simple mechanism for determining minimum wages, wages 
are now set by considering the following workers’ needs; the consumer 
index; the current performance, development potential and sustainabil-
ity record of the company; average wages in specific regions and between 
regions; labour market conditions; economic growth; and income per capita. 
In addition to minimum wages at the regional level, there are now also sec-
toral-level wages, whereby wages set by individual companies can be com-
pared against others in the same sector.
12 This legally recognized fi gure is now the highest in Asia, comparing favourably to, for 
example, India (2700 calories), Sri Lanka (1900 calories), and Bangladesh (1700 calories) 
(see Merk, 2009).
13 This policy was based on Regional Governance Administration Law No. 22/1999 and 
Fiscal Balancing Law No. 25/1999. Law No. 32/2004 later revised Law No. 22/1999. For 
a critical overview on these laws, see Bunte and Ufen, (2009: 111-2).
14 Based on Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Decree No. 226/Men/2000.
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The new regulations also add several provisions, which indicate progress 
towards the establishment of minimum wage setting mechanisms. Accord-
ing to the new regulations, the value of the minimum wage at the district 
level must be higher than the value at the provincial level; and the value of 
the sectoral provincial/district minimum wage must be at the least 5 percent 
higher than the provincial/district minimum wage. The minimum wage 
must be set at least 40 days before it is implemented, (implementation hap-
pens on January 1 every year); and must be revised every year. Following the 
enactment of Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower, the goal for minimum wages 
is to increase until they reach the Kebutuhan Hidup Layak (KHL, or ‘decent 
living needs’).15 This goal takes into account productivity (GDP; workforce 
numbers during the same period); economic growth; and marginalised 
industries.16 The ‘components of the KHL calculations’ (i.e. the list of items 
to be included in the cost calculations, such as food, rent and power), and the 
specific stages to work through to determine KHL, are regulated by Minister 
of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 17/MEN/VIII/2005. This 
regulation replaced Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Decree No. 
81/MEN/1995, with the addition of three new components (numbers 43 to 
46), as well as the establishment of a stronger legal basis for Wage Councils 
at the national and regional levels.17
In 2009, the Indonesian Government enacted the Special Economic Zones 
Law No. 39/2009. This implementing law of article 13 of Investment Law 
No. 25/2007 replaced a host of earlier laws, and applies to particular zones 
that are ‘designated to carry out an economic function, and are granted cer-
tain facilities and incentives’,18 in several regions in Indonesia. It has been 
argued, however, that such a law is a typical ‘way out’ for developing coun-
tries; allowing them to survive economically in the tough competition of the 
free world market, by using the benefit of ‘comparative advantage’ in ‘global 
production sharing’. Despite the many differences between the features of 
economic zones worldwide, one of the universal features of ‘special eco-
nomic zones’ is that there is an ‘almost complete absent of either taxation or 
regulation of imports of intermediate goods into the zones’ (Warr, 1990: 130). 
These privileges are subject to the condition that almost all of the output 
produced is exported, and that all imported intermediate goods are utilised 
fully within the zones or re-exported; these zones are therefore often also 
called ‘export processing zones’. Although, in general, labour law remains 
applicable, there are often concerns about potential ‘anti-union’ behavior 
15 See article 89 subsection (2) of Manpower Law No. 13/2003.
16 See article 88 subsection (4) of Manpower Law No. 13/2003.
17 Based on President Decree No. 107/2004 on Wage Councils.
18 See article 1 subsection 1 of the Special Economic Zone Law No. 39/2009.
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and views in such zones.19 In the case of Indonesia’s Special Economic Zones 
Law, there is a provision regarding minimum wage-setting within the zones 
which seems to overrule the minimum wage regulations described earlier.
Unions in Indonesia have raised concerns about this provision. They argue 
that it is counterproductive to the stated goal of minimum wage efforts, 
which is to gradually achieve decent living needs for all workers. In par-
ticular, these concerns have been voiced by metal workers unions, many of 
whose members work in Special Economic Zones in Bekasi, West Java, and 
in Batam, Riau Island.20 These unions refer to Article 45 of the Law, which 
states that the local governor should determine the minimum wage in the 
zones, but then includes a section that in setting the minimum wage, the gov-
ernor must consider at least three conditions: (1) minimum wage as a ‘safety 
net’; (2) the capacities of small and medium enterprises; and (3) decent living 
needs. Studies and reports about the impact of Special Economic Zones Law 
on workers have shown that they have no significant influence on reducing 
unemployment (as was officially promoted during the formulation of the 
law), and that they have the potential to reduce workers’ rights within the 
zones.21 However, since 2009, reports have shown no negative impacts of the 
Special Economic Zones Law on wages; suggesting that in practice, the law 
might not be effective, as the special economic zones are generally required 
to follow the general minimum wage setting.
In summary, there are at least four different sources of the criteria for setting 
minimum wages; as described in table 5.1 below. Each complements the oth-
er in different ways. The Manpower Law provides general provisions for the 
minimum wage and its link with decent living needs (KHL); the Minister of 
Manpower Regulation No. 1/Men/1999 gives the basic implementing rules 
about minimum wages; the Minister of Manpower Regulation and Trans-
migration No. 17/Men/VIII/2005 lists the essential components of KHL 
to be surveyed for cost (i.e. the basic items and services required for living, 
including food, housing and power), and the Special Economic Zones Law 
19 In 2001, for example, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), in 
its Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 2001, noted that ‘export-processing 
zones’ had transformed their meaning to ‘rights-free zones’ (ICFTU, 2001). In the case of 
Sri Lanka, the country’s Board of Investment is using an Employees’ Council to substi-
tute for a union; and sometimes a union is reorganized into an Employees’ Council. In 
addition, companies are giving workers the impression that if they establish a union, the 
factory will be closed, which increases negative perceptions of unions.
20 Interview with Obon Tabroni and Jamaludin of the FSPMI, June 2009.
21 In the case of Batam, Riau Island, Burmansyah’s research (2009) shows that the total pri-
vate investment in Batam in 1998 was around US$ 5,166 million, and that it rose to US$ 
5,351 million in 1999, and to US$ 6,113 million in 2000. This growing trend in private 
investment, however, was not followed by the capacity to absorb workforces. In 1998, 
the workforce absorption was 53.02 percent, but this fell to 41.76 percent in 1999, and fell 
again to 34.01 percent in 2000.
170 Chapter 5 
provides special rules for the implementation of the minimum wage system 
as it is applied in specific economic zones.
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Based on the series of regulations outlined above, and as frequently empha-
sized by the government, the primary aim of minimum wage setting is to 
to ensure that all wage earners receive decent living wages. In the words of 
Manpower Law No. 13/2003 (article 88 subsection 2), the aim of minimum 
wages is: ‘to enable the worker to earn a living that is decent from the view-
point of humanity.’ In practice, however, there are several obvious problems 
still to resolve in Indonesia. One major issue is that the prescribed minimum 
wage is only paid in the formal sector. Even in the formal sector, a consid-
erable proportion of small businesses pay less than the minimum wage, 
either due to ignorance or because they take advantage of the provisions 
available for exemption – which are generally handed out freely by the gov-
ernment (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 2008). In the informal sector, the situation is 
22 I am grateful to Obon Tabroni for providing input for the table, especially for the infor-
mation on the Special Economic Zones Law.
23 Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Decree No. 13/2012, with revision of the 
number of components of the workers’ needs and their prices to be surveyed in the mar-
ket, later replaced this.
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even worse; as the minimum wage is effectively excluded from application –
and the informal sector includes around 70 percent of the workforce (Bird & 
Suryahadi, 2002, Basri, 2008). The few minimum wages that have been set 
for the informal sector are very low, and their effectiveness is therefore con-
sidered insignificant.24 According to Saget (2006), around 30 percent of full-
time workers and 50 percent of full-time casual workers in Indonesia earn 
less than the minimum wage. Attempts by unions to secure the minimum 
wage through collective bargaining are often rejected, and such rejections 
often include threats of dismissal of workers, or even plant closure (Isaac 
and Sitalaksmi, 2008). Thus, as noted by Dhanani et al. (2009: 149), ‘mini-
mum wages and other imposed labour standards turned out to have limited 
impact, due largely to low compliance.’
This situation has been exacerbated by the weak bargaining position of 
unions, as a result of low levels of unionization, the dominance of legacy 
unions, fragmentation of new alternative unions, the lack of strong central 
organizations and other factors outlined in Chapter 4. In general, unions 
do consider the minimum wage rate to be too low, and have called for it to 
be at least equal to ‘decent living needs’ (kebutuhan hidup layak – KHL) – as 
stated by the Manpower Law (article 89). Many unions say that without this 
change, the law is meaningless. Other unions want to change the minimum 
wage setting system entirely, pointing out that it is ‘out of date’, as it is based 
on items for calculation that are no longer relevant to workers’ actual needs 
today. In either case, the unions appear at present to lack of power to push 
effectively for such changes.
However, recent observations – particularly in conjunction with the devel-
opment of regional alliances since regional autonomy – suggest that unions 
may be starting to exert their influence more strongly, and may play a 
more effective role in defending their members’ rights; in particular with 
respect to better wages. Regional Wage Councils have become a magnet for 
various unions united in regional alliances; with councils acting as a hub 
within which the unions’ legal and political concerns and strategies can be 
aired. Within the Wage Councils, unions can present their positions against 
employers and government, and work to support their interests and achieve 
24 In its Global Wage Report (2010), the ILO notes that in several countries, including Indo-
nesia, the proportion of people on low pay (i.e., those who earn less than two-thirds of 
median wages) has increased to more than two-thirds since the mid-1990s. This has con-
tributed directly to the rising of wage inequality, characterised by the ‘rapidly increas-
ing wages at the top and stagnating wages at the median and bottom of the distribu-
tion.’ (ILO 2010: 31). In this situation, the ILO (2010: 70-80) concludes: ‘In these and other 
countries with high or growing rates of low pay, there is a risk that a large number of 
people will feel left behind. This, in turn, may lead to increased social tensions, particu-
larly if certain groups of people consider that they have paid a high price during the cri-
sis while the benefi ts of the earlier expansionary period – and perhaps future recovery –
have been unevenly shared.’
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their aims. The dynamics within and surrounding the Wage Councils repre-
sent the very essence of minimum wage policies in practice, under the exist-
ing labour law in Indonesia. I will discuss this further in the second part of 
the chapter.
3 Minimum wage setting
Minimum wage setting in Indonesia has been institutionalized in the form 
of the Wage Councils, which exist at both the national and district levels. The 
National Wage Council, based in Jakarta, does not play a major role in wage 
setting, but instead focuses mainly on policy monitoring. It is in the Wage 
Councils at the district level, in cities and regencies that the real wage-setting 
work is done; in particular by undertaking wage surveys which form the 
basis for minimum wage setting for the coming year. According to recent 
data, as of January 2009 Indonesia has 497 cities and districts, in 33 provinces 
(Department of Internal Affairs Basic Data, 201025); but not all districts have 
minimum wages. In those that do not, the Governor sets a proxy ‘minimum 
wage’ at the provincial level.26 According to recent Ministry of Manpower 
data, the 33 provinces have 33 different provincial-level minimum wages; 
but there is no information available about the exact number of regional 
minimum wages in place at the district level.
3.1 Wage councils
The Wage Councils are tripartite institutions made up of (1) representatives 
from government, and academic/experts; (2) employers’ organizations; and 
(3) the trade unions, with a ratio of 2:1:1 respectively. Minister of Manpower 
and Transmigration Regulation No. 3/Men/I/2005 outlines the require-
ments for the establishment, operation and membership of the National 
Wage Council. The National Wage Council has 23 constituent members, 
including ten government representatives, five trade union representatives, 
five employer representatives, and three academics and economic experts. 
The ten government representatives are: three from the Department of Man-
power and Transmigration, and one representative each from the Coordinat-
ing Minister of Economy, the National Development Planning Agency, the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, the Department of Industry, the Department of 
Trade, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Energy and 
Mineral Resources.
25 Accessed at http://www.depdagri.go.id/basis-data/2010/01/28/daftar-provinsi 
(November 2010).
26 One example is South Sulawesi, which applies provincial-level minimum wages to all of 
its districts.
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The employers’ on the National Wage Council are represented by Apindo. 
Various registered national confederations and federations, whose pro-
portional representation on the council is based on the relative size of their 
membership, represent the trade unions. The Director General for Industrial 
Relations Development of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 
heads the National Wage Council; he or she is also counted as a Council 
member. The Council’s deputies are representatives from the Director of 
Wages, Social Security and Welfare of the Department of Manpower and 
Transmigration; and representatives from the employers’ organizations and 
trade unions. The main task of the National and Regional Wage Councils 
is to provide advice to the government, at the national and regional level 
respectively, regarding minimum wage setting.
As noted above, the National Wage Council works primarily on general 
policy monitoring, and the Regional Wage Councils, in cities and regencies, 
bear the responsibility for conducting the wage surveys, which form the 
basis for data on which the regional government set their minimum wages 
for the coming year. However, the Regional Wage Councils are currently 
missing key regulations to ensure that they are standardized. For example, 
there are no national-level regulations that specify which parts of a regional 
government should be included as members in the Regional Wage Council. 
Regional government representatives come from a variety of offices within 
regional government, dealing with labour, the economy, and social issues; 
and the Head of the Regional Manpower and Transmigration office is ex offi-
cio the chairperson of Regional Wage Councils (also doubling as a member). 
Another concern is that the existing national-level regulations do not clearly 
define how the Regional Wage Councils should operate. In the absence of 
such standard regulations, the Councils’ operation tends to be based on par-
ticular tata tertib (rules of conduct) formulated and agreed by the members 
of each individual Regional Wage Council at the start of council sessions 
every year (council sessions normally start in early August and end in early 
December).
Once a governor decides the minimum wage for the districts in his or her 
province, this minimum wage becomes a rule. Article 90 (1) of the Manpow-
er Law No. 13/2003, in conjunction with articles 13 subsections (1) and (2) of 
the Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 1/Men/1999, prohibits employ-
ers from paying wages lower than the minimum wages, including for those 
workers under probation. Violations of these provisions, based on Article 
185 of the Manpower Law No. 13/2003, may be punished by a minimum of 
one year and a maximum of four years in jail, and/or a fine of a minimum 
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of Rp 100 million and a maximum of Rp 400 million.27 However, employers 
who are ‘unable’ to pay minimum wages may be allowed to postpone pay-
ment at the official minimum-wage level.28 Applications for such postpone-
ment (including the reasons why the employer found him- or herself unable 
to pay the minimum rate; details of how the employer is overcoming this 
situation; the proposed alternative rate to be paid; and for what duration) 
must be submitted at least ten days before payment of wages is due. The 
application should be supported by the original written agreement between 
the employer and the trade unions, as registered at the Regional Manpower 
Office; or, if there are no unions in the company, the agreement of the major-
ity (>50 percent) – of the workers eligible for minimum wages, as well as the 
company’s financial report for the last two years.29 Following the submis-
sion of such an application for postponement of minimum-wage payments, 
the governor should give his or her decision within one month; although, 
if the one-month period expires and the governor has not communicated 
the decision, then the application is automatically considered to have been 
‘accepted’. During the one-month period, the employer should continue to 
27 There have been efforts by unions to bring employers who violate such provisions 
to prosecution, but these efforts almost always fail. The fi rst-ever case of a success-
ful prosecution for such violations occurred in Surabaya in 2013, with a guilty verdict 
reached against Mrs Tjioe Christina Chandra, owner of the company Terang Suara Ltd., 
Surabaya, East Java province. Chandra was accused of not paying her 53 employees 
the minimum wage (the payment they received was Rp 800,000 rather than the mini-
mum wage of Rp 948,500). She was originally acquitted by the Surabaya District Court 
in 2011, but the decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in 2012 (Decision No. 
687 K/Pid/2012), and she was sentenced to jail for one year with a fi ne of Rp 400 mil-
lion (Lensa Indonesia, 17 September 2013). The case attracted attention because Chandra 
was arrested shortly after she completed the review hearing of her case in the Surabaya 
District Court, on 17 September 2013. Member of Parliament, Rieke Diah Pitaloka had 
visited the Public Prosecutor a day before, to urge him to execute the Supreme Court 
ruling (Detik.com, 17 September 2013). According to Pitaloka, the case could be a mile-
stone in efforts to dismantle the existing impunity with which some employers oper-
ate in Indonesia, and dismantle the existing repressive and discriminatory laws against 
labour: ‘The verdict is expected to give a deterrent effect against other entrepreneurs 
who are still doing a lot of violations.’ (Detik.com, 19 September 2013). The execution of 
the case represented a long struggle for the union involved, FSPMI. FSPMI organised 
the workers who were the victims of the underpayment, and also campaigned strong-
ly during the case, including lobbying the prosecutors, the Surabaya Court and even 
the Supreme Court – reminding all parties about a similar case in Pasuruan, East Java, 
involving a Japanese subsidiary, King Jim Indonesia Ltd., whose general manager was 
jailed because he dismissed union leaders who were merely carrying out their functions 
(see Tjandra 2011, also Chapter 6 of this study).
28 Based on Article 90 (2) of the Manpower Law No. 13/2003. The explanatory note of the 
article states: ‘The postponement of the payment of minimum wages by an enterprise that 
is fi nancially not able to pay minimum wages is intended to release the enterprise from 
having to pay minimum wages for a certain period of time. If the postponement comes to 
an end, the enterprise is under an obligation to pay minimum wages that are applicable 
at the time but is not obliged to make up the difference between the wages it actually paid 
and the applicable minimum wages during the period of time of the postponement.’
29 See Minister of Manpower Decree No. 231/Men/2003.
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pay wages as normally received by the workers, and the maximum post-
ponement should not exceed 12 months.
3.2 Regional minimum wage setting
The first step in the process of determining the minimum wage for districts 
is the selection of the representatives to sit on the Regional Wage Council; 
from the nominations put forward by the employers’ organizations and 
trade unions.30 The employers’ organization representatives are always 
from Apindo, as this is the only employers’ organization registered to deal 
with labour relations issues; while the unions’ representatives are selected 
so as to achieve a proportional representation by union size, according to 
the membership verification result in the regions. When the selection is fin-
ished, the candidates are appointed, either by the governor (for member-
ship of provincial wage councils) or the mayor/regent (for membership of 
district wage councils).31 As noted above, at the first meeting for the year 
each Wage Council determines its ‘tata tertib’ (rules of conduct), and agrees 
on key issues such as: the KHL components to be cost-surveyed (the items 
and services essential for living); the number of traditional markets targeted; 
the number of surveys to be conducted; the time-table of the survey; and the 
membership of the survey teams. In the absence of specific national-level 
regulations regarding the details of ‘tata tertib’, the rules are decided based 
on consensus among the members of each of the Wage Councils. In many 
cases, this means that the ‘tata tertib’ is merely a reflection of the existing 
power balance within the Wage Councils.
After the rules of conduct are established, the council conducts the market 
survey to obtain the required KHL (decent living needs) figures.32 The sur-
veys are normally conducted in groups, divided proportionately between 
the Wage Councils’ members who do the data collection themselves, and 
conducted at traditional markets near where workers live.33 The aim is to 
30 See Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 6/Men/IV/2005, in conjunction with Direc-
tor General of Industrial Relations Decree No. 12/DPHI/IV/2005, concerning member-
ship verifi cation within the trade unions.
31 See President Decree No. 107/2004 on Minimum Wages.
32 Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 17/MEN/VIII/2005 on the 
components of calculation and the stages toward the achievement of KHL
33 The decision to choose traditional markets as survey locations has been criticised as out-
dated and misleading by some labour unions, as, they argue, most workers now shop 
predominantly at retailers; either small retailers (many of which are located nearby 
workers’ housing), or more often big retailers such as Carrefour – at which prices are 
normally signifi cantly higher than at traditional markets. Trade union representatives 
point out that to refl ect these changes in shopping behavior and ensure accuracy of data, 
surveys would need to be conducted at these retailers. Despite these arguments, to date 
the unions have failed to have the new approach included in the ‘tata tertib’; with gov-
ernment and employers representatives usually rejecting the proposal (FGD with DKI 
Labour Forum in August 2010).
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obtain the actual costs of goods that workers consume daily. The number 
of surveys to be conducted depends on the agreement reached within the 
Wage Council; usually surveys are conducted at least three times per year, 
at the same location each time, with the aim of obtaining the comparisons 
needed to calculate the KHL. Following completion of the surveys, the Wage 
Council members hold meetings to discuss the results, including clarifica-
tion on inconsistencies, classification of the survey results, and so on. Meet-
ings are then held to discuss and decide on the district minimum wage to 
be recommended for the year.34 This process involves political negotiations, 
where unions and employers, as well as the government, try to influence the 
results. In some cases unions also use ‘mass pressure’ to influence the pro-
cess, with two aims: to monitor their representatives within the Wage Coun-
cils; and to directly influence the nominal rate of KHL for the year.35
Once the KHL figure for the year is agreed, the Wage Council then submits 
this proposed figure as a recommendation to the head of the district.36 The 
heads of the districts send their recommendations to the provincial governor 
for a final ruling. Generally, the governor will accept the recommendation 
without reservation. In some cases, union leaders consider the governor’s 
influence to be more important than the district head’s; as in the case of 
Bekasi, in which the Regional Wage Council in Bekasi was still determin-
ing its KHL figures when some unions’ leaders traveled to Bandung, in an 
attempt to influence the West Java Governor.37 In other cases, governors are 
required to consider many issues before accepting their district heads’ rec-
ommendations, including any employers’ objections which have been sub-
mitted through lobbying – which often takes place at this level rather than 
at the lower district level. According to one union leader, this is a deliberate 
strategy by employers, who are aware that regional unions who are active 
in pressuring the Wage Councils at the regional level do not have the finan-
cial or human resources to travel to plead their case at the provincial level.38 
Once the new minimum wage has been decided, the Regional Wage Councils 
are often involved in efforts to ensure the community accepts the decision, 
especially in cases where the decision has been marked by controversies.
34 See Minister of Manpower Regulation No. 1/Men/1999 on minimum wage setting.
35 Union leaders from various regions confi rm this; most notably those from Jakarta and 
Bekasi, which in the last few years have launched a series of major demonstrations to 
infl uence the minimum wage setting in their Wage Councils, exterting pressure from 
outside - in addition to the representatives from their unions who are already there. We 
shall return to this later.
36 See Minister of Manpower Decree No. 226/Men/2000.
37 Personal communication with Obon Tabroni of FSPMI union, Bekasi, in August 2010. 
38 Personal communication with Abdullah of the KSPSI union, Bekasi, in August 2010.
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Table 5.2 below summarizes the process of minimum wage setting at the dis-
trict level.39
Table 5.2: Minimum wage setting processes in cities/regencies, 2010
No. Steps References Notes
1 Selection of prospective 
representatives 
nominated by the 
employers’ organization 
and the trade unions.
Minister of Manpower 
Regulation No. 6/Men/
IV/2005, in conjunction 
with Director General of 
Industrial Relations 
Decree No. 12/DPHI/
IV/2005 concerning the 
membership verification 
of the trade unions.
The employers’ organiza-
tion representatives are 
always from the Apindo 
(Indonesian Employers’ 
Association); the unions’ 
representatives are propor-
tionally from various 
unions, dependent on the 
membership verification 
data in the regions.
2 Appointment of the 
members of Regional 
Wage Councils by the 
heads of cities/regencies.
President Decree No. 
107/2004 on Minimum 
Wages.
By the governor (for 
provincial wage councils) 
and by mayors/regencies 
(for district wage councils).
3 Formulation of ‘tata tertib’ 
(rules of conduct) by the 
Wage Councils members.
Consensus. To agree on issues such as: 
the KHL components be 
cost-surveyed (i.e. items 
and services essential for 
living); number of markets 
targeted; number of 
surveys conducted; time-
table of the survey, etc.
4 Implementation of market 
survey to get the KHL 
(decent living needs) 
figure.
Minister of Manpower 
and Transmigration 
Regulation No. 17/MEN/
VIII/2005 on the 
components of calculation 
[essential items and 
services to be costed] and 
the stages toward the 
achievement of KHL.
The surveys are normally 
conducted in groups, 
divided proportionately 
between the Wage 
Councils’ members who 
do the data collection 
themselves at traditional 
markets nearby workers 
live. The aim is to get the 
actual costs of goods that 
workers consume.
5 Meetings to discuss and 
calculate KHL for the 
year.
The results of market 
surveys.
This includes classification 
of survey results, clarifica-
tion on inconsistencies, etc.
39 In Jakarta, Indonesia’s  capital, there are no district Wage Councils and thus no district-
level minimum wages; all minimum wage setting is conducted by the provincial Wage 
Council. The steps explained are, however similar; just at a different level.
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6 Meetings to discuss and 
decide on the figure for 
the district minimum 
wage to be recommended 
for the year
Minister of Manpower 
Regulation No. 1/
Men/1999 on minimum 
wage setting.
This includes political 
negotiations in which the 
unions and employers, as 
well as the government, 
try to influence the results. 
In some cases unions also 
use ‘mass pressure’ to 
influence the process.
7 Submission of 
recommendation agreed 
at the Wage Councils on 
the minimum wages 
figure in the district.
Minister of Manpower 
Decree No. 226/
Men/2000.
The recommendation is 
submitted to the head of 
the district, who sends it to 
the provincial governor to 
be decided.
8 Waiting for the decision of 
the governor on the new 
minimum wages for the 
coming year.




Generally the governor 
will accept the 
recommendation without 
reservation. In some cases 
the Regional Wage 
Councils are also involved 
in the socialization (efforts 
to encourage community 
acceptance) of the new 
minimum wage decision.
From the discussion above, we can see that beside the technical mechanisms 
of wage setting, such as price surveys, the minimum wage represents a set 
of political considerations by the district head, who provides a recommen-
dation to the governor, who will then decide the new minimum wage. In 
providing their recommendations, they often tend to put political consider-
ations ahead of the technical process and data from the Wage Councils, such 
as the price survey data. Despite this, the Wage Councils have become the 
main sites of political struggle and contest among different interest groups: 
employers, unions, and the government. The discussions in the second part 
of the this chapter, and the two case studies below about minimum wage 
setting processes in Sukabumi, West Java and Jakarta will provide more evi-
dence to support this observation.
4 Wage councils and the workers’ struggle for better wages
During the authoritarian New Order era, Wage Councils, although tasked 
with conducting market surveys based on workers’ needs and provid-
ing recommendations to the government regarding regional minimum 
wages, were in practice used as a tool for the government to restrain indus-
trial reforms, so that economic development could proceed on the govern-
ment’s terms (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation). The New Order-sanctioned 
union, SPSI, played a role as the government’s ‘rubber stamp’ – being the 
only union represented on the Wage Council (see Chapter 3). After the 1998 
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reforms however, other unions have been able to join, engage with and influ-
ence the Wage Councils at the national and particularly the regional level, 
bringing different dynamics to them.
Several regional unions’ alliances have been very active in recent years 
advocating for better wages through the Wage Councils.40 Minimum wage 
setting faces five major challenges that trade unions are working to address. 
The first challenge is that the government, as the institution primarily 
responsible for the welfare of workers, still tends to view minimum wages 
as a formality, rather than as a tool to extend social welfare to the most vul-
nerable workers. From the unions’ perspective, the government appears to 
be ambivalent on the issue of minimum wages: although the government is 
keen to retain control over the setting of minimum wages (and thus control 
over labour), it is also reluctant to place wages fully in the hands of collective 
bargaining – which would require clear protection and facilitation for the 
development of stronger trade unions as important actors in the collective 
bargaining process. The second challenge still facing minimum wage setting 
is the urgent need to reform the representation system in the Wage Councils, 
as many union representatives on the councils are considered, by the unions, 
to be either ‘too old’ (out of touch or ineffective) or ‘too close’ to employers 
and government, with the risk of perceived or real corruption. A third, relat-
ed challenge is the urgent need to equip the unions’ representatives on the 
Wage Councils with sufficient knowledge about the law and the technical 
details of minimum wage setting, to enable them to compete effectively with 
the other parties within the Wage Councils. In addition, the methods associ-
ated with designing, implementing and analysing the KHL (decent living 
needs) rate surveys, and calculating appropriate annual rates, are important 
skills for union members to master, to enable them to monitor and, if neces-
sary, argue persuasively for changes to the process.
The fourth challenge facing minimum wage setting is that unions are not 
currently effective at lobbying and negotiating on wage issues, and need to 
improve their methods, including developing strategies that combine active 
lobbying and negotiation efforts with effective mass actions and workers 
mobilization. The final challenge is that although the minimum wage system 
is important, there is a growing realisation among union leaders that mini-
mum wages should be treated as a springboard from which to develop a 
new, better wage system, to be determined by collective bargaining between 
unions and employers. Through advocating for minimum wages, unions 
want to gradually develop their bargaining position, in order to negotiate 
with employers for wages above the existing minimum wages, based on 
employers’ and/or industries’ financial capabilities. Consideration of these 
five major challenges facing trade unions in relation to minimum wage set-
40 Focus group discussion with various regional unions alliances, 27 December 2010.
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ting is particularly useful, when examining how unions have struggled to 
defend the rights of workers for better wages through minimum wage set-
ting in the regions, where the Wage Councils are the main arena.
4.1 Union involvement: influencing from within and without
Union representation on Wage Councils is usually determined by the quo-
ta dependent on the number of members in each union. As an example, in 
one case a single union member in the Wage Council represented a union 
with 15,000 members; therefore unions whose membership reached 40,000 
would be represented by two people. The same mechanism applies to deter-
mine the union representation in the tripartite cooperation institutions, as 
required by Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower, both at the national and region-
al level. One exception is found in the Jakarta Special Capital Region, which 
instead applies ‘the largest seven’ system, in which the seven unions with 
the largest memberships in Jakarta are permitted to have one representa-
tive each. This means that a union with 70,000 members, and a union with 
only 10,000 members, will each get the same number of reserved seats (one), 
and equal voting power in the Wage Council. According to one SPN union 
leader in Jakarta, this system may be problematic, as employers and govern-
ment can potentially split the union representatives by coopting the largest 
unions’ representatives: ‘With such a representation system, it is easier for 
the government and Apindo to condition the Wage Council as desired by 
them, by just holding one to three members from the biggest three unions.’41 
On the other hand, as observed by one FSPMI union leader in Jakarta, such 
a system can also make union representation more equitable, and thus give 
more control to the unions’ representatives on the Wage Council.42 As the 
union leader explained, ‘The main problem with the Jakarta Wage Council is 
that it is dominated by mostly old unions’ activists from particular unions. 
They have been there for too long, and thus have built inappropriate close-
ness with both the government officials and the employers’ representatives. 
Therefore, the first thing unions must do is replace them with new and fresh 
union representatives. This can only be done if there are opportunities for 
involvement of other unions in the Wage Council.’ Both the SPN and FSP-
MI, along with several other unions in Jakarta, formed the Forum Buruh DKI 
(Jakarta Labour Forum) to synergize the unions’ efforts to monitor the per-
formance of the Jakarta Wage Council. We shall return to this later.
In some cases, small unions without a large membership can also become 
members of the Wage Council, by forming a coalition with other small 
unions. In one case in Surabaya, the SBK (Serikat Buruh Kerakyatan – Popular 
Labour Union), a small independent union in Surabaya city affiliated with 
the left wing national union KASBI, became a member of the Surabaya Wage 
41 Interview with Ramidi of SPN Jakarta, 27 December 2010.
42 Interview with Joko Wahyudi of FSPMI Jakarta, 27 December 2010.
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Council through a coalition with several other small unions in the region. 
This coalition was achieved through an agreement that these small unions 
would share the positions they received when they had the chance to sit on 
any tripartite institution in the Surabaya region, not only the Wage Council. 
Thus, while a SBK representative became a member of the Wage Council, a 
member of one of the other unions in the coalition became the union rep-
resentative on the regional tripartite cooperation institution.43 According 
to Jamaludin, an SBK leader, his union deliberately chose to join the Wage 
Council instead of the tripartite cooperation institution because in their 
view, the former was more strategic than the regional tripartite institution. 
As he explained, ‘The Wage Council is really related to the workers’ main 
issue, that is, minimum wages; whereas the tripartite cooperation institution 
is merely ceremonial, and its activities are often not directly related to work-
ers’ interests.’ He also added that the tripartite institution was preferred by 
some of the other union leaders in the coalition, predominantly the old activ-
ists, who saw it as ‘more prestigious’ as ‘they could sit at the same table with 
the government and employers representatives’. ‘For us it is not the prestige 
we’re looking for, but whether we can actually use the available institutions 
for the workers’ benefit. And we think the Wage Council is more useful for 
now.’ Jamaludin argued that such a strategy was beneficial, as many of their 
activities there could be covered by the media, and it thus became a KASBI 
strategy to widen their influence in the East Java region.44
In another case in Malang, the SPBI, another KASBI affiliate, used a strategy 
of combining struggles from within and from outside the system, including 
by joining the Wage Council in 2005 to influence other union members on 
43 This is an institution stipulated under Article 107 of Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower. 
Its stated task is to ‘provide considerations, recommendations and opinions to the gov-
ernment and other parties involved in policy making and problem solving concerning 
labour issues/problems.’
44 Interview with Jamaludin, Surabaya, June 2009. It is interesting to note that in addition 
to being the SBK offi cial, Jamaludin was previously already active in the FBS (Forum 
Buruh Surabaya – Surabaya Labour Forum), a non-union workers’ group founded by 
Jamaludin and his co-workers at the Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet in central Surabaya. 
This group’s activities in Surabaya, and in East Java in general, were quite remarkable 
– as the group developed into a political power in Surabaya by becoming a successful 
advocacy organization for labour issues in the regions. As argued by Ford and Tjandra 
(2009), regional autonomy in Indonesia has created increasing media interest in local 
issues, including labour; thereby creating opportunities for groups like FBS – as well 
as opportunities for individuals like Jamaludin, who emerged as a worker activist with 
the instinct and skills to be a labour politician, and who used these skills to promote 
the labour movement cause. Jamaludin took various strategic public relations positions 
related to the organization of labour, while maintaining positive relations with the press 
by providing regular updates on labour issues. Through these efforts, Jamaludin was 
offered opportunities to run as legislative candidate for several political parties, and he 
became an important fi gure in the development of the trade union movement in the 
region. In 2009, he was recruited to work as an expert staff member for a Member of Par-
liament in the PDI Perjuangan party in the National Parliament, and moved to Jakarta.
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the council.45 According to one SPBI leader, the strategy was useful because 
the union could obtain direct access to information concerning the process 
of minimum wage setting in the region, which is not normally publicly 
available. ‘Even if we failed to persuade others to fight for raising the mini-
mum wages, we would let other unions that are not Wage Council members 
know the problems with the Wage Council, by disclosing anything from the 
meetings. So the pressures would come from within and from outside the 
Wage Council,’ he explained. This strategy was apparently quite effective, 
as in October 2005, the Regent of Malang proposed a minimum wage rate 
for Malang district to the East Java Governor which was even higher than 
that proposed by Surabaya, forcing the East Java Governor to reduce the 
rate of the proposal from Malang at his discretion on December 8, 2005.46 
As the SPBI leader noted, ‘We were not successful at raising the wages then, 
but we nonetheless showed that there was a possibility for independent 
unions to influence from within the Wage Council system.’ Similar stories 
can be found in other districts around industrial areas, in particularly Java, 
Sumatera, and Sulawesi, where unions from a variety of backgrounds have 
attempted to use the opportunity of Wage Council membership and influ-
ence the councils from within and without.
4.2 Union strategies: targeting the KHL, pressuring the government
As noted earlier, the main task of the Wage Council is to conduct market sur-
veys to help determine the KHL (decent living needs) rate.47 The law states 
that the KHL rate should be the basis on which the Wage Council should 
determine the minimum wage rate, which is then submitted by the coun-
cils to the heads of districts, who then recommend this rate to the provin-
cial Governor for final confirmation. Thus, according to many union leaders, 
the processes of conducting the market surveys, and the determination of 
KHL within the Wage Council, are vitally important processes which relate 
directly to the minimum wage that will be set by the Governor. This is the 
reason that many regional union alliances identify the KHL as the primary 
target and focus in their struggle to influence the Wage Councils to achieve 
fair wages. Their request is simple yet strategic: minimum wages should be 
equal to the (appropriately determined) KHL. This is already required by 
law, which gives the unions a strong position from which to present their 
case, improving the likelihood that the request will be successful. In other 
45 Interview with Andi Irfan, May 24, 2007.
46 In East Java there was an unwritten rule that the minimum wage in cities/districts in the 
so-called ‘ring one’ regions (the districts surrounding Surabaya, the provincial capital), 
might not exceed the minimum wage in Surabaya as the largest city. Such an act by the 
Governor was unprecedented, as the Governor would normally accept any minimum 
wage rates recommended by the Regents/Mayors.
47 Article 1(1) of Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 17/MEN/
VIII/2005 on the components of calculation and the stages toward the achievement of 
KHL.
The law and politics of minimum wage setting 183
words, by simply calling for legal enforcement of minimum wages, the 
unions are managing to open more space for negotiations on wages within 
the Wage Councils.
Apart from considering the KHL, the process of minimum wage set-
ting is also required to take into account ‘productivity’ and ‘economic 
development’.48 In practice, however, as explained by one union leader in 
Jakarta, ‘the dominant tendency within the Wage Council is to refer predom-
inantly to the inflation rates, consumer price index, and similar figures. In 
other words, data related to economic considerations, rather than the real 
workers’ needs, as the minimum wage is supposed to be all about.’ Observa-
tions from several regional Wage Councils confirm that council members – 
from all three membership groups – generally do not see the KHL as impor-
tant. The employers’ and government’s representatives seem to see the KHL 
as merely a formality, and focus mainly on the actual minimum wage rate, 
by simply considering the relative increase from the previous year’s mini-
mum wage rate, rather than heeding the price survey results. Interestingly, 
most union representatives appear to do likewise; supporting the previous-
ly-mentioned union concerns that union representatives on the councils 
tend to follow the process blindly, without criticism. Interviews with coun-
cil members reveal how members, particularly the employers’ representa-
tives, tend to ignore the market surveys processes partly to avoid visiting the 
‘muddy and dirty’ traditional markets to undertake the survey; or because 
they are ‘too lazy’ to follow the detailed steps required to conduct the market 
surveys.49
According to one union representative on the Jakarta Wage Council, the dis-
interest in the KHL by council representatives from employers’ groups and 
government is actually advantageous for the unions; as it offers the opportu-
nity for the unions to conduct more accurate surveys, which would greatly 
increase the fairness of the KHL calculations.50 One explanation that has 
been offered to account for council members’ disinterest in the KHL surveys 
is that they are confident that the Wage Council would be unlikely to set 
a KHL that was ‘too high’ (from the employers’ perspective), based on the 
generally ‘harmonious’ environment which exists within Wage Councils. 
This presumption may account for the shock felt by employers when the 
Forum Buruh DKI, in close strategic collaboration with their representatives 
in the Jakarta Wage Council, managed to obtain a high KHL rate for Jakarta 
48 Article 88 (4) of Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower.
49 Interview with Rusmiatun of the FSPMI union, member of the Jakarta Wage Council 
in August 2010. She also explained that she and her union representatives sometimes 
encouraged the Wage Council members from the employers’ group, who were usually 
quite old, to wander around the markets before the survey. This resulted in these repre-
sentatives tiring, and appearing to be even more disinterested in following the survey 
properly.
50 Interview with Joko Wahyudi of the FSPMI Jakarta branch in August 2010.
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in 2010 (the basis for setting the minimum wage in 2011). They achieved this 
by conducting careful and detailed market surveys, combined with close 
monitoring of Wage Council meetings and holding a series of demonstration 
and a workers’ strike on 25 November 2010 in Cakung Bonded Zone, North 
Jakara; the first major strike focused specially on the minimum wage issue 
since the 1998 reforms.
The case of Forum Buruh DKI in Jakarta provides an example of how unions 
have managed to combine both legal and political strategies, by targeting 
the KHL as well as conducting mass actions to pressure the Wage Council 
and the provincial government; resulting in higher than expected minimum 
wage rates in 2011. Similar strategies were repeated in Jakarta in 2012, in an 
attempt to improve the minimum wage for 2013. This time, the strategies 
were intertwined with the consolidation of the trade union movement at the 
national level, as well as the successful national strike on 3 October 2012 and 
the changing political landscape following the election of reformed politi-
cians as the new Governor and Vice Governor of Jakarta. We shall return to 
this in the next subsection.
5 The case of Sukabumi and the KBS
One case study of the political struggle of unions for better wages for their 
members, and for workers in general, occurred in Sukabumi and involved 
particularly the efforts of Koalisi Buruh Sukabumi (KBS, Sukabumi Labour 
Coalition), an alliance of unions in Sukabumi Regency. Despite its lack of 
resources, this coalition used every opportunity available and was success-
ful at raising the monthly minimum wages from Rp 671,500 in 2010 to Rp 
1,201,020 in 2013. This effort, representing an increase of almost double in 
just three years of campaigning, marked the biggest ever increase in West 
Java province since the implementation of the minimum wage policy. This 
case is particularly important, as it shows how even a small group of dedi-
cated union activists can play a significant role in achieving progressive 
change, simply by using all possible political opportunities effectively to 
gain better wages for their members.
5.1 The background of the case study
Sukabumi has been a well-known region of Indonesia since Dutch colo-
nial times; popular as a leisure and tourist destination with its cool climate 
and scenery, including mountains, forests and beaches. The climate is well 
suited to tea plantations and dairy farms, and Sukabumi also boasts one of 
the largest natural water reserves in Indonesia, making it a strategic destina-
tion for bottling water industries. With such a variety of assets, Sukabumi 
hosts a range of industries, both labour-intensive and capital-intensive; from 
simple industries run by unskilled workers to those with high-tech pro-
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cesses requiring skilled workers. Although Sukabumi Regency had been in 
place for centuries, in 1955 Sukabumi city was officially formed, develop-
ing quickly into a services-oriented city focused on tourism. The regency, 
the area of which was much bigger than the city (in fact, the vastest district 
in Java and Bali, with 416,404 hectares and 47 sub-districts), maintained its 
rural characteristics and industries, which were dominated by plantations, 
water bottling, and later labour-intensive garment industries which had 
relocated from other regions.
With such characteristics, the minimum wages in Sukabumi Regency tended 
to be below those of Sukabumi city, although the two regions had relatively 
similar conditions regarding their costs of living. The minimum wage rates 
in Sukabumi were considered far from ‘decent’, as they were consistently 
ranked the lowest of all the minimum wages set in West Java province. In 
2009-2010, for instance, reports showed that garment workers who had 
worked for more than 15 years in Sukabumi Regency received wages similar 
to minimum wages plus sundulan (adjustment wages);51 in total receiving 
only Rp 1,500,000 per month. Even with the addition of overtime, a worker 
would receive only around Rp 2,500,000 to Rp 3,000,000 – a very low figure. 
Similar conditions occurred in Sukabumi’s capital-intensive industries as 
well, including the dairy industry, where workers received relatively higher 
salaries compared with others in Sukabumi, but still lower than expected, 
particularly when taking into account their large production output.
5.2 The struggle
The vision and strategy of a ‘united front’, to assist their struggle for bet-
ter wages, had been discussed among Sukabumi union activists for years. 
The idea tended to be dismissed by the conservative unions that existed in 
Sukabumi at the time, characterised by the strong influence of the legacy 
unions, notably the SPSI.52 ‘They [the legacy unions] have dominated the 
Wage Council for many years, and the council always recommended low 
KHL (decent living needs) rates, which would determine the low minimum 
wages set in the regency,’ explained Dadeng Nazarudin,53 an apparently-
dissident member of the SPSI, and also a member of the Sukabumi regency 
Wage Council. Nazarudin’s main concerns were related to a particular mini-
mum wage practice, which involved a bias for some industries over others, 
with workers in more capital-intensive industries, such as the water-bottling 
company, receiving much higher salaries than those in labour-intensive 
industries, due to the much higher than normal variation between sectoral 
51 Upah sundulan are wages that have been adjusted based on the length of work in one 
company and the percentage of the adjustment is normally based on the percentage of 
increase of the minimum wages set in the year.
52 For more discussion about legacy unions and the SPSI see Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
53 Interview with Dadang Nazarudin, Sukabumi in December 2009.
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minimum wages for the different sectors in the region (see table 5.3: Mini-
mum wages and sectoral minimum wages in Sukabumi Regency – 2010).
To illustrate the magnitude of the differences between minimum wages by 
sector: there were at least 12 sectoral minimum wages in Sukabumi Regen-
cy in 2010. The unions and the employers’ representatives from each sector 
had negotiated these wages. The negotiations were held separately from the 
negotiations for the general minimum wage; in many cases without equal 
bargaining positions among the union representatives, due to the particular 
characteristics of their sectors. Some higher-level sectors, such as tobacco, 
food and beverages, might get higher sectoral minimum wages; as they were 
better represented on the Wage Council because their large employee num-
bers in Sukabumi allowed them to have more than one representative on the 
Wage Council. Several other sectors had no representatives on the council 
at all; despite the fact that some of their workforces, such as in the garment 
industry sector, had been expanding rapidly in recent years. With regard to 
the garment industry in particular, ‘It is predominantly for this sector that 
we need to reform our minimum wage setting mechanism,’ argued Dadeng 
Nazarudin. Nazarudin himself previously worked for Dua Tang Group, a 
well-known food and beverages company in Indonesia, whose workers’ 
salaries were higher that other sectors.
Table 5.3: Minimum wages and sectoral minimum wages in Sukabumi Regency (2010)
General minimum wages Rp 671,500,-
Sectoral minimum wages:
 1. Plantation and cattle breeding Rp 672,500,-
 2. Hotel and other business Rp 672,000,-
 3. Textile, Garment, shoes industry, elektronic industry Rp 675,000,-
 4. Poultry farm Rp 770,000,-
 5. Mining and digging Rp 825,000,-
 6. Transport for oil and gas Rp 950,000,-
 7. Machineries and Metal Rp 780,000,-
 8. Wood Rp 672,250,-
 9. Pharmacy and cosmetics Rp 674,500,-
10. Dairy industry, Supplement/Isotonic and Ice Cream Rp 1,015,500,-
11. Bottled water industry (‘non-makloon’) Rp 962,500,-
12. Bottled water industry (‘makloon’) Rp 842,500,-
As further explained by other KBS activists, the problem of resolving such 
disparate sectoral minimum wages was complicated by the fact that most 
workers in Sukabumi Regency were not unionized, and those who were, 
tended to have no access, in practice, to policy making decisions such as 
minimum wage setting, due to the ineffectiveness and corruption of union 
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officials. ‘It is common in Sukabumi that union officials are in fact offer-
ing to “guarantee” that their members will not demand higher salaries 
other than minimum wages, with the expectation [in return for this guar-
antee] of receiving some money from the employers,’ said Ade Rukmana, 
another KBS activist, who worked for the largest water-bottling company in 
the country, Danone-Aqua, whose main processing factory is in Sukabumi. 
When asked about the motivations behind his decision to leading the KBS 
and effect change, Nazarudin explained: ‘It may not be in our direct interest 
to struggle for better wages in Sukabumi Regency, as we are coming from 
relatively higher level industries, but if we don’t do this, who else will?’ The 
KBS was eventually established after a workshop in December 2010; we will 
return to this later.
Nazarudin also argued that Sukabumi had become one of the most popu-
lar destinations for factories relocating from other regions, particularly 
Tangerang (Banten province), where minimum wages were much higher 
compared with Sukabumi. The KBS claimed that Sukabumi’s wages policies 
were leading to significant increases in the numbers of lower level manufac-
turing industries in the region, including garment manufacturing industries 
moving from Tangerang to Sukabumi; and that these industries’ workers 
were not being protected by those supposed to protect them. ‘We could see 
with our own eyes on the streets that there have been increasing numbers of 
new factories in the regency, mostly labour-intensive industries. The prob-
lem is that their workers receive very low salaries compared to those who 
work in the city,’ said Nazarudin. ‘It is not fair, as we who work in the regen-
cy with lower wages are actually the ones who are supporting the city, as we 
always shop in the city. What we want is simply a more balanced situation.’
Table 5.4: Minimum wage in Sukabumi Regency and Sukabumi city (2009-2013)
Year Sukabumi Regency Sukabumi city Difference
2009 Rp 632.500,- Rp 770,000,- Rp 137,500,-
2010 Rp 671.500,- Rp 850,000,- Rp 178,500,-
2011 Rp 850,000,- Rp 860,000,- Rp 10,000,-
2012 Rp 885,000,- Rp 890,000,- Rp 5,000,-
2013 Rp 1,201,020,- Rp 1,050,000,- Rp 151,020,-
As explained by KBS activists, their actions to improve the situation began 
by gathering together all existing unions in Sukabumi Regency, to discuss 
the issue and obtain a commitment to take action. The first meeting was held 
on 19-21 December 2009, facilitated by the Trade Union Rights Centre (see 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation). At the meeting, all participants agreed with 
the establishment of KBS, to serve as an informal vehicle for unions in Suka-
bumi Regency to struggle for better wages. KBS activists then approached 
the regent on 24 April 2010, requesting an official declaration of the KBS’s 
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official acknowledgement as mass organization. Coincidentally, a regional 
election for the regent was looming in early 2011, and the incumbent Regent, 
Mr Sukmawijaya, aimed for re-election; which may have influenced his will-
ingness to support the workers’ demands. As explained by Nazarudin, with 
agreement from other activists: ‘We have a bargain too, as we do not get any 
money from the Regent. Our demand was simply that he would give work-
ers better salaries’.54
The KBS used this political opportunity effectively, and negotiated for the 
Regent to sign a ‘political contract’ with the KBS. This included an agree-
ment to set minimum wages at equal to the KHL from the price survey con-
ducted by the Wage Council. Although this was already required legally, in 
practice the Regent had always previously recommended minimum wages 
that were lower. The Regent’s new agreement and declaration were high 
profile events that were covered by some local media, assisting the KBS 
as it continued its struggle to raise minimum wages. ‘We could not simply 
depend on the Regent’s approval; we still had to do so many other actions 
to realize our demands,’ explained Dadeng. Their next actions were to orga-
nize a public rally on the occasion of International Labour Day, 4 May 2010, 
combined with audiences with the Regent, the Head of the Manpower Office 
of the Regentcy and members of the regional parliament. Again, the aims of 
these activities were to raise public and official awareness and focus atten-
tion on the issue of fair minimum wages. At the same time, the KBS formed 
an advocacy team on wages, whose first act was to conduct an alternative, 
independent and academically rigorous price survey, to challenge the offi-
cial price survey conducted by Wage Council members. ‘Our price survey 
was methodologically and academically valid, as we worked together with 
the Labour Law Study Centre at the University of Pasundan in Bandung, the 
capital of West Java province; and with a research NGO in Bandung as well,’ 
argued Dadeng.55 ‘As an example [of improvements to the survey – author] 
we conducted the survey four times in the middle of the month, not at the 
beginning of the month [when prices tend to be at their highest – author] or 
the end of the month [when prices tended to be lowest – author]’. Dadeng 
also explained that the traditional markets chosen for surveys were selected 
because they were known as markets where workers in Sukabumi Regen-
cy were actually going to buy goods for their daily needs: Cicurug, Ciba-
dak, Pangleserandan, and Pelabuhan Ratu. These were also markets near 
to where most industries were located. The survey results were brought to 
the Regional Parliament on 13 July 2010, with a request to carefully moni-
tor the minimum wage setting process. As explained by Nazarudin, KBS’s 
54 Focus Group Discussion with KBS activists, 19 December 2009.
55 KBS activists considered the involvement of independent academics to be very impor-
tant, as it would give objectivity and rigor to the survey they conducted. It was impor-
tant that the public saw that the survey was objective and accurate, rather than just 
being perceived as merely workers’ demands without a sound basis.
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approach to the regional parliament was also an effort to gain support from 
other political powers, in addition to the support from the Regent.
The KBS’s lobbying strategy outlined above was combined with efforts to 
influence the minimum wage setting through direct involvement with this 
Wage Council. Dadeng Nazarudin himself was already a member of the 
Wage Council. He was also Chairman of the SPSI RTMM (tobacco, food and 
beverages union), Sukabumi branch; the largest sector union in Sukabumi 
Regency. With his influence, Nazarudin initiated changes in the Wage Coun-
cil, including opening council positions to people from unions that were not 
yet members, such as from the garment sector unions. ‘So we could have 
a stronger position when negotiating within the Wage Council,’ Nazarudin 
explained. Nazarudin enabled these new union members to join the council 
through a series of careful steps. First, he withdrew himself and all other 
representatives from his union from the Wage Council. This move caused 
all negotiations within the Wage Council to deadlock, as the Wage Coun-
cil’s rules of conduct included the rule that if a quorum of members was 
not available, the meeting must be halted. In response, the government 
approached the union and requested the union to fill the abandoned seats, 
so that Wage Council negotiations could continue. Nazarudin and the KBS 
used this opportunity to suggest some changes to the Wage Council, includ-
ing that the Wage Council should include industry sectors other than those 
already represented; in particular, they recommended inclusion of represen-
tatives from the garment and textile industry. These recommendations were 
adopted, allowing several new members to join the Wage Council.
The involvement of the KBS in these Wage Council changes was immediate-
ly resisted by Apindo and also by some other labour union members of the 
Wage Council. The Apindo members on the Wage Council refused to sign 
the results of the surveys which had been conducted with close monitoring 
by the KBS from both inside and outside the Wage Council. The employ-
ers’ representatives on the Council also refused to negotiate on the sectoral 
minimum wages; an activity which usually occurrs after the minimum 
wage is set. The Wage Council negotiations became deadlocked again, with 
employers insisting that the new minimum wage for 2011 should only be 
Rp 730,000, (a 7 percent increase from the previous year), while the unions 
sought for it to be Rp 925,723,- based on the results of the KHL survey. As no 
agreement could be reached within the Wage Council, the Regent stepped in 
and recommended a rate of Rp 850.000. This recommendation was put to the 
Governor of West Java and was set as the new minimum wage for Sukabumi 
Regency in 2011. This rate, which was only Rp 10,000 lower than the rate for 
Sukabumi city, represented a wage increase of up to 26.6 percent – the high-
est rise in the country for that year – and was a long-awaited leap in wages 
for many workers.
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Employers, however, continued to resist the changes, leading to a prolong-
ing of negotiations over sectoral minimum wages. As well, the increase in 
the nominal minimum wage in Sukabumi Regency resulted in several appli-
cations by employers to postpone payment of minimum wages. By some 
reports (see Antarasumbar.com, 10 December 2010), 40 companies filed to 
postpone the implementation of the new minimum wage in their factories – 
although one Manpower Office official reported that the office actually only 
received three applications.56 This indicates that the new minimum wages 
were largely accepted. This was considered a significant victory for many 
workers in the region, and in response, the union movement relaxed its 
efforts during the subsequent year, allowing the minimum wage rate to be 
increased by only Rp 5,000 (from Rp 880,000 to Rp 885,000) in 2012; which 
widened the gap between this rate and the minimum wage in Sukabumi 
city. Nazarudin justified this relaxation of effort in the following way: ‘We 
decided to slow down a bit of our movement, as all parties should adapt 
themselves to the new arrangements concerning minimum wages, but we 
will continue to struggle in 2012 [for the minimum wage in 2013].’
As promised, the KBS did redouble their efforts in 2012. They faced some 
challenges. Membership of Wage Councils is reviewed annually, and the 
KBS lost some of their supporters from the previous years’ council, as many 
of those who had been supported by KBS were not nominated as council 
representatives by their own unions this year. Dadeng Nazarudin had also 
left his position as the branch leader of his union, losing his direct influence 
over the appointments of union representatives to the Wage Council. Naza-
rudin chose instead to work from the outside. ‘The strategy involved par-
ticularly the close monitoring of the surveys conducted by the members of 
the Wage Council.’ Nazarudin explained. ‘We joined them [Wage Council 
members] in any surveys conducted, using our own money, and recorded 
anything relevant found in the survey, particularly the actual value of the 
KHL components [essential items and services] that were surveyed.’
Based on the 2012 surveys, closely monitored by KBS activists, the Wage 
Council initially found the new KHL rate to be Rp 1,434,353,- 57 However, the 
Wage Council soon reduced this figure, recommending instead Rp 1,035,000,-
. This new amount was suspiciously similar to that obtained through the 
surveys undertaken by the Wage Council in Sukabumi city – which had not 
been independently monitored by anyone. The Sukabumi Regency Wage 
Council arrived at their new lower figure by reducing the renting room cost 
component of their calculations, and by deleting the electrical and water cost 
components entirely. Concerned about these actions, the KBS immediately 
met with the Regent, who had previously supported the KBS’s requests, and 
56 Personal communication with Aam Ammar Halim of the Manpower District Offi ce of 
Sukabumi regent, 10 December 2010.
57 Interview with Dadeng Nazarudin and KBS activists on 27 November 2012.
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explained their own findings to him. The Regent reviewed the results again, 
and initially arrived at a new figure of Rp 1,377,331,-. Soon after, the Regent 
decided to continue to refer to the Wage Council’s revised recommended 
figure, but to this he added additional figures to account for the components 
that had been reduced or excluded. He increased the renting room figure to 
Rp 320,000,- (the Wage Council had reduced this to Rp 220,000,-), and added 
back in the electrical and water components, to arrive at a new recommend-
ed minimum wage rate of Rp 1,201,020,-. This figure was accepted by the 
Governor of West Java and set as the new minimum wage for Sukabumi 
Regency for 2013 (detikfinance.com, November 2012). The new minimum 
wage of Sukabumi Regency now exceeded, quite significantly the rate in 
Sukabumi City (which was Rp 151,020,-), and represented a success for KBS 
and workers of similar magnitude to the success in 2010.
It is interesting to note that KBS’s actions in this case study did not include 
mass actions, but focused primarily on developing a close relationship with 
Regent Sukmawijaya. According to some critics, the KBS’s reliance on this 
relationship suggests that despite their success with respect to increasing 
minimum wage in the region, their real contribution to the development of 
the labour movement in the region is questionable.58 Nazarudin’s involve-
ment with the KBS, in particular, raised tensions among SPSI leaders in Suk-
abumi Regency, who accused him of aiming to popularize his own name 
among workers and use his close relationship with the Regent for his own 
personal political interests.59 Nevertheless, the Sukabumi case clearly dem-
onstrates how union activists in Indonesia have been able to use a combina-
tion of legal and political actions to achieve fairer wages for their members. 
The case highlights the capacity for a small group of union activists, operat-
ing in a small regional area, to achieve great benefits for their members. The 
case of Jakarta in the following section will provide a very different set of 
insights, as it will reveal the dynamics operating in a much larger region, 
and one which is also much closer to the central government.
6 The case of Jakarta and the national government response
The laws and regulations on minimum wage setting stipulate that the 
authority to set minimum wages is in the hands of provincial governors, 
whose duty it is to decide the minimum wages in all regencies and cities in 
58 Personal communication with Mohamad Popon, SPSI TSK Sukabumi Regency branch 
offi cial, in August 2011.
59 When Dadeng Nazarudin fi nished his term as the chairman of the SPSI RTMM branch 
in 2012, he decided also to quit from the SPSI, and to focus on his work with the KBS. 
Although the KBS has maintained its activities, more recently Dadeng has joined the 
GSBI union, and prepared himself to run for regional legislative in 2014 election. He 
failed in the effort.
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their province. In practice however, minimum wages are also a key interest 
of the national government, especially the economic ministries – in particu-
lar the Ministry of Manpower, whose main duties include providing imple-
menting regulations on minimum wages. Thus, although minimum wages 
are set in the regions, the central government sometimes needs to intervene; 
especially when extraordinary events occur, as the case of Jakarta described 
below will show.
The struggles of Jakarta workers and their representative group, (the Forum 
Buruh DKI or Jakarta Labour Forum), occurred against the backdrop of 
struggles at the national level, through the MPBI (Majelis Pekerja Buruh Indo-
nesia, the Council of the Indonesian Labour. These struggles included the 
MPBI’s organization of Indonesia’s first ever general strike, on 3 October 
2012 under the banner of ‘HOSTUM’ (hapuskan outsourcing tolak upah murah, 
abolish outsourcing and reject low wages) (see also Chapter 4). The strike 
attracted around two million workers from at least 14 industrial cities across 
Indonesia, highlighting the success of national-level efforts. This was the 
first time in Indonesia that national union confederations had successfully 
united in a single action for the interests of their members, as well as for 
workers in general in Indonesia. The national government responded reluc-
tantly to these efforts, but could not deny the urgency of reviewing all mini-
mum wages set in the past few years. There appeared to be an agreement 
among the relevant national authorities, including the Coordinating Minis-
try of the Economy, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Manpower, 
that a significant increase in wages was needed for formal workers, through 
the vehicle of minimum wage setting.
Soon after the general strike, the national government announced the release 
of a new regulation to facilitate wage increases, namely Minister of Man-
power and Transmigration Decree No. 13/2012 (back-dated to 10 July 2012). 
This new regulation kept many aspects of the old system, but revised and 
added to the list of KHL components (items and services essential for living) 
required to be considered in the calculations, specifically the components 
numbered from 46 to 60. The employers responded as expected, by threat-
ening to file a judicial review against the new regulation even before it had 
been realized. Theunions accepted the regulation, albeit with reservations 
– in particular, they pointed out that despite the increase in survey compo-
nents, in practice the total value to workers would not improve markedly. 
In their opinion, many of the newly-added components were not essential 
to most workers (they cited deodorant as an example); and they were con-
cerned that the value of some other, more essential components had been 
reduced – for example the fuel component had been changed from kerosene 
to gas. The price of gas is much lower; yet kerosene is widely relied upon by 
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Indonesian workers.60 Nonetheless, the unions recognized that this initiative 
demonstrated some level of central government effort to appease the labour 
demands for fairer wages.
On 2 November 2012, by his own initiative, the Minister of Manpower 
Muhaimin Iskandar brought together the three governors of the most indus-
trialized provinces in Indonesia: the Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo; the 
Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut Chosiyah; and the Governor of West Java, 
Ahmad Heryawan. Together they agreed on several issues in relation to 
the setting of minimum wages in their three provinces (Tribunenews.com, 2 
November 2012). The Minister of Manpower fronted a news conference in 
his Jakarta office to declare: ‘Before the setting [of minimum wage] through 
the Governors’ decrees, we will continue to do the coordination. Today is 
the first coordination, and we agree to continue to monitor the talks on the 
Wage Councils.’ The Minister also stated that the governors had agreed that 
apart from the KHL survey, they would also consider other key factors in 
minimum wage setting, and that the results of these considerations would 
be coordinated between the governors and factored into their decisions. This 
strong claim by the Minister was later revealed not to have been taken seri-
ously by the governors, who disregarded it and made their own decisions 
without coordinating with each other.
In 2013, minimum wages in Jakarta increased significantly, as did those in 
the surrounding industrial regions including Bekasi, Karawang and Cika-
rang in West Java, and Tangerang and South Tangerang in Banten. The 
newly-elected Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo, decided that the mini-
mum wage for Jakarta would increase from Rp 1,529,000 to Rp 2,200,000, 
representing a 43.87 percent increase in just one year (see table 5.6; Detik-
finance.com, 2 December 2012). Following this move, the Governor of West 
Java, Ahmad Heryawan, decided on similarly significant increases to mini-
mum wages in Bekasi, Karawang, Cikarang, Depok, Bogor and Sukabumi; 
in agreement with the recommendations submitted by the Wage Councils 
in those regions. The Governor of Banten, Ratu Atut, followed suit with a 
significant increase in minimum wages in Serang, Tangerang and Tangerang 
Selatan. It is important to note that in all these regions, the union movement 
was already relatively strong. Similar increases in minimum wages did not 
occur in other regions, where there was no strong union movement. It is also 
notable that the Wage Councils in those regions, with active union involve-
ment, had recommended each of these significant increases in minimum 
wages in 2013 and the Governors were simply abiding by the recommenda-
tions that had been discussed and decided within the Wage Councils.
60 As kerosene is no longer subsidized by the government, it has become even more expen-
sive than subsidized fuel gas.
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In response to the increase in provincial minimum wages in Jakarta, Indone-
sia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appeared to criticize Joko Wido-
do at the National Congress of Apindo (Indonesian Employers Association) 
on 8 April 2013; commenting that minimum wages should not be exploited 
for political purposes to the extent that it becomes a populist issue. One day 
later at the same forum, the Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Hatta 
Rajasa, made a similar statement. Both argued that the setting of minimum 
wages should involve a consideration of economic factors but not politics; 
with the implication that politics had influenced Widodo.
The case of Jakarta’s wage struggles is in many ways unique. The trade 
unions were strongly active in the Wage Council, as well as successfully tar-
geting the KHL. They also organised mass actions to pressure the Jakarta 
provincial government; including the successful national strike action on 3 
October 2012. In addition, it must be acknowledged that the new leadership 
duo in Jakarta at this time61 – especially the Vice-Governor Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama – played a significant role in the wage increases. The Vice-Gover-
nor appeared sympathetic to the workers’ calls for more decent wages, espe-
cially their request to ensure that minimum wages should not be less than 
the KHL. Indeed, Jakarta provided a significant breakthrough in minimum 
wage setting mechanisms, through processes that are interesting to consider. 
The Vice-Governor personally led the Jakarta Wage Council’s final meeting 
of the year in 2012, instead of the usual chair, the Head of the Department 
of Labour and ex officio Head of the Wage Council. The purpose of this final 
meeting was to determine the KHL figure that would be recommended to 
the governor. Under the direct leadership of the Vice-Governor, the Jakarta 
Wage Council implemented a new regression system to calculate the value 
of KHL, which became the basis of the new minimum wage.
The new regression system required that the KHL value during the remain-
ing months of the current year (since the last survey; in this case in October 
2012) should be taken into account when calculating the new KHL value. Fol-
lowing these calculations, a KHL value of Rp 1,979,789,- was obtained. For 
the first time ever in Jakarta, and indeed in Indonesia, projections of future 
‘decent living needs’ for the following year were also taken into account 
when recommending the next year’s minimum wages (in this case, projec-
61 Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama represent a new bind of reformist politicians 
in Indonesia today. Widodo used to be the Mayor of Surakarta in Centra Java, he is well-
known for his humble and clean reputation so that several international media called 
him ‘Jakarta’s Obama’ (BBC News, 23 January 2013). Purnama, the fi rst Indonesian of 
Chinese descent to become Vice-Governor in Indonesia ever, was the Regent of Beli-
tung Timur before he became member of parliament for Golkar, well-known because of 
his motto ‘bersih, transparan, profesional’ – from the acronym of his own name ‘BTP’, 
meaning: ‘clean, transparent, professional’. He consistently lives up to this slogan, 
among others by disclosing his salaries and other benefi ts as public offi cial to public, an 
extraordinary act in the current Indonesian political culture.
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tions of needs from January to December 2013). With the inclusion of these 
new considerations, it was determined that the minimum wage would be set 
at Rp 2,216,000,- or 112 percent of the KHL. When this recommendation was 
agreed to by the majority of council members, the representatives from the 
employers’ association, Apindo, walked out – even though they had been 
actively involved in all phases of the price surveys conducted since early 
2012. However, the Head of the Provincial Manpower Department decided 
that Apindo’s absence did not invalidate the Wage Council’s recommenda-
tion, because the council still retained a quorum.
Following this decision, Governor Joko Widodo ruled that the provincial 
minimum wage for Jakarta in 2013 would be set at Rp 2,200,000; which was 
a reduction of Rp 16,000 from the KHL recommended by the Wage Council. 
The employers in Apindo, who considered it to be too high, immediately 
questioned this figure. Workers, on the other hand, considered the increase 
of 43.87 percent from the previous year as simply a long awaited and much 
needed closing of the gap between the minimum wage and the KHL (see 
table 5.5 and table 5.6), given that minimum wages in Jakarta had always 
been significantly below the KHL figures.
In response to the new figures, the areas surrounding Jakarta set their mini-
mum wages at roughly equal rates: Rp 2,042,000 in Depok; Rp 2,002,000 
in Bekasi and Bogor; Rp 2,200,000 in Tangerang (equal to Jakarta); and 
Rp 2,202,000 in South Tangerang (slightly higher than Jakarta). The same 
did not happen, however, in Central Java. In Semarang, the capital of Cen-
tral Java province, the minimum wage was set at Rp 1,209,000; only slightly 
more than half the Jakarta minimum wage. Apindo claimed that this situa-
tion has led to the departure of 90 companies from Jakarta to Central Java 
(Liputan6.com, 18 March 2013); although unions have questioned this claim.62 
If Central Java is indeed becoming a new hub for industry, from the unions’ 
point of view this opens up a whole new arena of struggle, with the workers 
of Central Java now in need of help to raise their wages.63
Table 5.5: KHL and Minimum Wage in Jakarta (2001-2010)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
KHL 426,000 519,931 699,710 746,749 759,953 831,336 991,988 1,055,276 1,314,059 1,317,710
UMP 426,250 591,266 631,554 671,550 771,843 819,100 900,560 972,605 1,069,865 1,118,009
% UMP 
thd KHL
100.06% 113.72% 90.26% 89.93% 101.56% 98.53% 90.78% 92.17% 81.42% 84.84%
62 It was diffi cult to confi rm this claim, as at the time of writing, there was no data avail-
able. Reports from union activists based in the Cakung Bonded Zone in North Jakarta, 
where most of Jakarta’s labour intensive companies are located, did not support the 
claims; the union members stated that in fact no factories were moving from their zone.
63 Interview with Obon Tabroni, FSPMI union leader, in Bekasi in August 2012.
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Table 5.6: KHL and Minimum Wage in Jakarta (2009-2013)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
KHL 1,314,059 1,317,710 1,401,829 1,497,838 1,979,789
% KHL increase  0.28%  6.38%   6.84%  32.17%
UMP(Provincial 
minimum wage)
1,069,865 1,118,009 1.290.000 1,529,150 2,200,000
%UMP increase  4.50% 15.38%  18.53%  43.87%
%UMPtoKHL 81.42% 84.84% 92.02% 102.09% 111.12%
As discussed earlier, under Indonesia’s regional autonomy regime, the region-
al governors, on the recommendation of the district heads, set minimum wag-
es. As a result, the minimum wage will differ from district to district, often 
influenced heavily by location-specific social, economic, political and ideolog-
ical variables. As an example of this, areas with relatively strong labour move-
ments tend to have higher minimum wages; while areas with weak labour 
movements tend to have correspondingly lower minimum wages. The mini-
mum wage is often also influenced by local politics. Political maneuverings in 
the lead up to local elections can result in relatively substantial minimum wage 
increases, such as the aforementioned increase in Sukabumi in 2011. However, 
the atmosphere ahead of local elections can also have the opposite effect, as 
happened in West Java in 2012. The Governor of West Java, despite the absence 
of any high minimum wage increase in the region, chose to grant a suspen-
sion of the minimum wage to hundreds of companies prior to the elections; 
just one more example of how political the setting of minimum wages can be.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is not the intention of the 
author to entirely reject economic models as a means of analyzing and under-
standing minimum wage policy. Rather, this chapter aims to highlight the 
importance of political science research, as an analytical tool to balance the 
economic approach when looking at wage policy. Understanding the way in 
which government policy is formed is important for a better understanding of 
minimum wage issues. Government policy is nothing if not a response to the 
political dynamics of the various forces that exist in society and between its 
players. For now, workers have a bit of wind in their sails; at least, the workers 
in Jakarta and surrounding industrial areas. Change has not, however, arrived 
in all regions. The central government still has an important role to play in 
establishing a more equitable balance of wages across the country; and this 
has yet to happen.
7 Discussion
When minimum wage policies were first becoming established – largely 
in the developed world – at the beginning of the 20th century, the domi-
nant argument among scholars and policy makers was that an appropri-
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ate minimum wage would produce strong benefits for society; particularly 
with regard to efficiency gains. One prominent figure in industrial relations 
research, Sidney Webb, argued that a minimum wage would have the ben-
eficial effect of increasing overall economic activity by increasing productiv-
ity (see Webb, 1912; also Palley, 1998). Webb believed that employers would 
not want to pay higher wages unless they could be assured that they would 
achieve greater return for their new cost, and since minimum wages were 
fixed by law and imposed on all employers, they could also be protected 
from dishonest and disloyal competitors (Webb, 1912: 975-6). Similarly, 
workers would have an added incentive to become more productive, so that 
they would be in a position to command higher wage rates, by stimulat-
ing ‘the invention and adoption of new processes of manufacture’ (Webb, 
1912: 982). Only a few efficient industries and workers could profit from the 
absence of a mandatory wage floor. The idea behind such a consensus was 
related to the broader theory of the state’s social obligations to its people, to 
provide prosperity through, for example, full employment. Webb believed 
that all government policies should be directed toward this effort.
Since the 1970s, however, there has been a shift in the policies of many gov-
ernments, from full-employment policies toward anti-inflationary policies; 
particularly by pursuing a low-wage strategy. As argued by Thomas Palley 
(1998), in the case of the United States, the political dominance of business 
and the intellectual dominance of laissez-faire ideology have meant that the 
economic policy of the United States’ government has consistently favoured 
business at the expense of labour. Economists have played an important 
role in this, by convincing the government that the market should be freed 
from government intervention, and that under the economic model of com-
petitive markets, unemployment is caused in part by high and rigid wages. 
Under this ideology, since unions and minimum wage policy serve to raise 
wages, they are both seen as forces that drive up unemployment (Palley, 
1998: 19-21). With the domination of the United States in the world’s econo-
my, and its political influence on international financial institutions includ-
ing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, such policies and 
ideologies have also been brought to the many countries that are required to 
work with the United States through loans and financial assistance (Palley, 
2004).64
As a striking example of the United States’ potential influence on minimum 
wage policy in other countries, since 2003 the World Bank’s private sector 
wing – the International Finance Corporation (ICF) – has published an annu-
64 This was done particularly through the so-called ‘Washington Consensus,’ consisting of 
a set of relatively specifi c economic policy prescriptions which together constituted the 
‘standard’ reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by institu-
tions based in Washington, D.C., such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, and the US Treasury Department (see John Williamson, 1989, who coined the term). 
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al ranking of countries based on their ‘ease of doing business’ [with the Unit-
ed States]. The IFC also ranks each country for its ‘difficulty of hiring,’ by 
measuring: ‘(i) whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent 
tasks; (ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and 
(iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the 
average value added per worker.’ The score is between 1 and 0, with a score 
of 1 representing the most ‘difficult’ countries, and a score of 0 representing 
the most ‘easy’ countries with which to do business. In the explanation for 
its methodology, the IFC report says65:
[A] score of 1 is assigned if the ratio of the minimum wage to the average value added 
per worker is 0.75 or more; 0.67 for a ratio of 0.50 or more but less than 0.75; 0.33 for a 
ratio of 0.25 or more but less than 0.50; and 0 for a ratio of less than 0.25. A score of 0 
is also assigned if the minimum wage is set by a collective bargaining agreement that 
applies to less than half the manufacturing sector or does not apply to firms not party 
to it, or if the minimum wage is set by law but does not apply to workers who are in 
their apprentice period. A ratio of 0.251 (and therefore a score of 0.33) is automatically 
assigned in 4 cases: if there is no minimum wage; if the law provides a regulatory mech-
anism for the minimum wage that is not enforced in practice; if there is no minimum 
wage set by law but there is a wage amount that is customarily used as a minimum; 
or if there is no minimum wage set by law in the private sector but there is one in the 
public sector.
Under this definition, in the view of the IFC and the World Bank, the less 
a state is involved with or regulates how wages are set, the better. In fact, 
the non-existence of a minimum wage, and/or the moderation of the mini-
mum wage and its setting, are considered the ‘best’ from the IFC’s and the 
World Bank’s perspective. The best policy, according to this ranking system, 
is to leave wage setting entirely to supply and demand and, maybe, to col-
lective bargaining, without any recourse to legislation or other regulatory 
measures to establish a minimum wage. As noted by Berg and Kucera (2008: 
1): ‘The belief [of the Doing Business publication] is that onerous regulations 
concerning hiring workers on temporary contracts, paying large amounts 
of severance on dismissal, restrictive working hours and too high payroll 
taxes have hampered investment and stalled job growth, causing the poor to 
suffer more than they already do.’ The blame is placed squarely on the rigid-
ity of labour markets, and in particular on the setting of minimum wages 
by the state rather than the market; and deregulation is seen as an answer. 
This is typical of the ‘neo-liberal’ view of macro-economic policy, whereby 
the focus is primarily on engendering price stability by controlling inflation, 
while allowing market-driven ‘supply-side factors’ to determine real wages 
and employment.
65 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/employing-workers (in September 
2013).
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It has been argued that such a neo-liberal approach to policy making has had 
a negative impact on the balance of the global wage share and growth rates 
during the neo-liberal era of the post-1980s. The ILO’s Global Wage Report 
2012-2013 (2012) shows the dramatic decline in the share of wages in GDP in 
both the developed and developing world, accompanied by lower growth 
rates at the global level as well as in many individual countries. A simulta-
neous increase in the profit share by 1% point in the major developed and 
developing countries has led to a 0.36% decline in global GDP (ILO, 2012). 
In a report submitted to the International Labour Office, Onaran and Galanis 
(2012) show the vicious cycle generated by the decades long ‘race to the bot-
tom’, with the global multiplier effects of a simultaneous decline in the wage 
share leading to a decline in global growth.66 According to Onaran and Gala-
nis (2012), the main caveat of this neo-liberal view is to treat wages merely 
as a cost item, but not its impact on demand. As noted by Onaran (2013) in 
explaining their research:
We estimate the effect of a change in income distribution on aggregate demand (i.e. 
on consumption, investment, and net exports) in the G20 countries. Consumption is a 
function of wage and profit income, and is expected to decrease when the wage share 
decreases, since the marginal propensity to consume out of capital income is lower than 
that out of wage income. Investment is estimated as a function of the profit share as 
well as demand, and a higher profitability is expected to stimulate investment for a 
given level of aggregate demand. Finally, exports and imports are estimated as func-
tions of relative prices, which in turn are functions of nominal unit labour costs, which 
are by definition closely related to the wage share. The total effect of the decrease in 
the wage share on aggregate demand depends on the relative size of the reactions of 
consumption, investment and net exports. If the total effect is negative, the demand 
regime is called wage-led; otherwise the regime is profit-led. Mainstream economic 
policy assumes that economies are always profit-led, whereas in the post-Keynesian 
models the relationship between the wage share and demand is an empirical matter, 
and depends on the structural characteristics of the economy.
Mainstream, United States-led economics continue to guide policy towards 
further wage moderation, along with austerity, as one of the major responses 
to the Great Recession. This is the ‘vicious cycle’ generated by the decades-
long race to the bottom, whereby the main caveat of this common wisdom is 
to treat wages merely as a cost item (Onaran, 2013). Nonetheless, the alter-
native view maintains that, in the real world, there are indeed institutional 
rigidities, as well as social norms and conventions, which make the labour 
market different from the market for goods (see Berg and Kucera, 2008). As 
noted by Dhanani et al. (2009: 1): ‘In such an institutional context, a short-
run trade-off between inflation and unemployment is the norm rather than 
the exception. A preoccupation with controlling inflation is thus counterpro-
66 Onaran and Galanis (2012) analyze the interactions among different economies in the 
G20, and calculate the global multiplier effects of a simultaneous decline in the wage 
share in Germany, France, Italy, UK, US, Japan, Turkey, Korea, Canada, Australia, Argen-
tina, Mexico, China, India, and South Africa.
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ductive.’ Indeed, a judiciously set minimum wage can make a contribution 
to meeting social goals, without much distortion of employment patterns. 
This is described as the ‘new Keynesian’ view of macro-economic policy. 
According to this new view, wages have a dual role; affecting not just costs 
but also demands. They represent a cost of production for employers, and 
they are a primary source of income for wage employees and their families. 
In other words, wages are both a cost of production and an essential source 
of effective demand, i.e., they represent needs or desires backed with pur-
chasing power.
This discussion shows that minimum wages, including their setting and 
practices, cannot be seen merely through the single lens of neo-liberal eco-
nomic theory. Instead, minimum wages are also – if not predominantly – 
about political policy choices, based on the ideologies and interests of those 
who make the policies and regulations at particular times, and in particular 
places. As we have seen in the discussion above, in Indonesia the minimum 
wage has become a highly contentious political issue. Although Indonesia 
has adopted one of the most sophisticated systems of minimum wage set-
ting in the Asian region since the early 1970s, surviving both the authoritar-
ian New Order regime and now the Reformasi, the system still has problems; 
due to the lack of full implementation; and the system’s failures to protect 
the living standards of low wage workers. Instead of providing a floor for 
the most vulnerable workers in the informal economy, the minimum wage 
in Indonesia has become the effective wage for workers in the formal mod-
ern private sector, with much less influence in the informal sector. As well, 
the minimum wage setting processes within the Wage Councils have tended 
to become the forum for collective bargaining on wages between unions and 
the employers, facilitated by the government; which also highlights the fail-
ures of employers and organized workers to develop effective collective bar-
gaining mechanisms at workplaces.
This situation with respect to minimum wages in Indonesia is typical of what 
the theorist Saget refers to as a ‘maxi minimum wage’ situation (Saget, 2008). 
According to Saget (2008), a considerable number of countries worldwide 
set minimum wages at levels that seem to be either far too low, or far too 
high, to be considered reasonable. Using data from more than 130 countries, 
including industrialized, developing and transitional countries, Saget iden-
tified anomalies in some countries to the effect that their minimum wages 
are so low in the wage structure that the minimum wage is not a significant 
constraint for enterprises (the so-called ‘mini minimum wage’). On the other 
hand, in some other countries the minimum wage appears to be very high 
in the wage distribution – to the point that it is in fact too high to be consid-
ered a genuine minimum wage (and is referred to by Saget [2008] as a ‘maxi 
minimum wage’). Saget (2008) considers Indonesia to be among the latter 
countries, which she claims are characterised by poorly developed collective 
bargaining. As Saget notes (2008: 26): ‘if minimum wage consultations are 
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the only forum where trade unions can make their demands known, there 
is a danger that the resulting minimum wage is not a genuine threshold, but 
rather the actual wage earned by most formal workers.’
The Reformasi era in Indonesia has made it possible for unions to be more 
involved in the minimum wage setting processes, and now at least pro-
vides unions with a chance to practice collective bargaining and develop 
their capacity, with the facilitation of the state. Moreover, there is a grow-
ing understanding among union leaders that minimum wage setting, par-
ticularly through the Wage Councils, is largely a political process, and thus 
should be responded to politically; through the organization of their col-
lective powers. Such an understanding is beneficial in the current situation 
in Indonesia, as it provides both insights and opportunities for Indonesian 
unions to analyse the problems they are facing and identify their positions; 
providing further evidence for the the proposition in this study that labour 
law is part of a historical process and the outcome of struggle between dif-
ferent social groups and of competing ideologies. In the longer term, how-
ever, Indonesia’s unions should understand that the minimum wage must 
also be combined with other considerations, to ensure it remains reasonable 
and avoids the problems typical of ‘maxi minimum wage countries’, such 
as widespread non-compliance and under-developed collective bargaining. 
This is a challenge Indonesia needs to tackle, and it requires positive con-
tributions from all parties in the industrial relations process, including the 
unions, the employers, and the state. For the time being, as we have seen in 
the case studies above, the mainstream trade union movement, at both the 
regional and national levels, has chosen political strategies to effect change; 
frustrated by what they see as the continuing ignorance of both the state and 
employers, and the continuing lack of respect for their concerns.
8 Conclusion
Instead of being a wage floor, the minimum wage in Indonesia has generally 
become the effective wage for most workers in the absence of an effective 
collective bargaining system. Indeed, the minimum wage setting process 
within Wage Councils is the only forum through which the newly-devel-
oped trade union movement can demonstrate what they are doing to defend 
their members and workers in general; especially given that attempts to 
negotiate wages at the plant level run the risk of resulting in the dismissal of 
the unions’ officials. With social dialogue dealing mainly with the fixing of 
a minimum wage, considerable pressure is exercised within the arena of the 
Wage Councils, leading to demands for increases that may seem excessive. 
In sum, minimum wage setting in Indonesia has become a serious source of 
conflict. Although during the New Order era the state pursued a low wage 
strategy in order to attract investment, and thus used the minimum wage as 
a tool by which to control labour unrest, during the Reformasi the state seems 
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to be more ambiguous with respect to minimum wages, and has consider-
ably weakened. On the one hand, the state would be keen to retain control 
over the setting of minimum wages (and thus to some extent control over 
labour); but on the other hand, the state is reluctant to place wage setting 
fully in the hands of collective bargaining, which would require clear protec-
tion and facilitation for the development of stronger trade unions as impor-
tant actors in collective bargaining, alongside employers’ organizations.
It is the opinion of the author that in the current situation, it is better for 
labour groups in Indonesia to use political strategies to achieve their ends, 
as such strategies appear at present to provide the best opportunities. Taking 
into account the recent successes and challenges associated with the politi-
cal approach to addressing minimum wages in Indonesia, there appear to 
be at least three benefits of adopting such an approach, which are likely to 
be useful for the Indonesian labour movement. The first benefit of a political 
approach is that it gives unions the opportunity to critically analyze wage 
policies both in theory and in practice, outside of the free market and com-
petitive economic paradigms that have reigned over government policies for 
more than four decades. By seeing minimum wage issues as largely politi-
cal issues, rather than merely economic ones, unions can identify the politi-
cal interests of key influential players, by employing or testing particular 
economic models to assist with the setting of minimum wages. This does 
not mean that the traditional economic approach to minimum wages has 
no place; only that such an approach will be more useful when it is situated 
within local political contexts, and is tempered by the understanding that 
public policy processes are a function of different variables, many of which 
are highly contingent on the wide range of interests, motivations and actions 
of the actors involved.
The second benefit of adopting a political approach to minimum wages is 
that a decline in the minimum wage, seen through a political lens, can more 
readily be recognised as a sign of a decline in union power. Minimum wage 
policies thus become useful indicators of the unions’ level of influence in 
society and in the workplaces. In countries and locations where pro-labour 
forces are weak or in decline, arguments in support of increasing the mini-
mum wage focus mainly on the issue of relieving poverty, particularly for 
low-skilled workers. Although this may be a useful social policy goal, look-
ing at labour issues through a political lens will enable activists to consider 
whether or not this argument is likely to produce the level of political sup-
port that a more traditional labour issue may generate – especially in situa-
tions where the identified target group (for example, low-skilled workers) is 
highly stigmatized and thought of in pejorative terms; as is arguably the case 
in Indonesia. By considering the persuasiveness and power of one’s current 
argument from a political point of view, the argument can be amended as 
required.
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The third benefit of taking a political approach is that when minimum wage 
policies are seen as a political issue, this perspective may also give unions 
a useful broader view: that labour policies and legislation, especially min-
imum wage policies, are in fact the outcomes of struggles between differ-
ent social groups, and between competing ideologies and interests at both 
the group and individual level. That view, which is also the view arrived at 
through the analyses in this study, leads to another potentially useful con-
clusion: that in the future, as in the past, the crucial element in the making of 
labour policies will be the power of capital, and the countervailing power of 
organized labour.

6 The Industrial Relations Disputes Court, 
quo vadis?1
Is it possible to legalize the class system in a class-divided society and to make it a 
component of the legal system? Can the state recognize the idea of class and yet remain 
‘neutral’? Must not the conflict eventually break up the legal system or the legal sys-
tems suppress the conflict?
(Kahn-Freund, 1981: 190-1; cited in Hepple, 1986: 30)
1 Introduction
The instrumental aspect of labour laws requires enforcement and, in the 
event of a dispute, a formal examination and adjudication process. Indeed, 
while labour inspection and prosecution have developed as means of enforc-
ing protective legislation,2 the enforcement of employment contracts is very 
much dependent upon an effective labour dispute settlement mechanism.3 
In the case of Indonesia, the mechanism for settling industrial disputes was 
originally marked by excessive government involvement; particularly dur-
ing the authoritarian New Order regime. This led some observers to call for 
the establishment of special court to deal with industrial relations issues, 
(see, e.g., Boulton, 2002, Mizuno, 2009). In particular, two benefits were 
claimed. First, the establishment of such a court would provide the oppor-
tunity to develop greater legal certainty – as the labour dispute settlement 
would not be directly controlled by the executive branches of government, 
thereby reducing the political influence that had plagued labour law prac-
tices in the country over recent decades (see Chapter 3). Second, there would 
be an important benefit in having a clear and accessible history of court deci-
1 Some parts of this chapter draw on Tjandra (2007) ‘The Industrial Relations Court in 
Indonesia, Quo Vadis? Some Notes from the Courtroom’; an article presented at the 
Conference on Current Issues in Indonesian Law: In Honour of Professor Daniel S. Lev, 
University of Washington School of Law in Collaboration with the University of Indone-
sia, Faculty of Law, Seattle, February 27-28, 2007.
2 For a discussion on the development of labour inspection and prosecution in Europe, 
see Ramm, 1986: 73-113.
3 As noted by Ramm (1986: 270-274), one of the most important developments in labour 
law was the establishment of special courts, designed to overcome the problems com-
monly encountered in ordinary courts, including the judiciary’s class bias and lack of 
industrial experience; and the costs, delays and formalities of the courts which made the 
legal process inaccessible to the majority of workers. The fi rst labour court was estab-
lished in France (1806 – the conseils de prud’hommes), followed by Belgium (1809), Italy 
(1893 – magistratura non togata, literally meant ‘gownless’ courts) and Germany (1890, 
1904, 1926 – Arbeitsgerichte). Ramm (1986) also outlined the major problems normally 
found in ordinary courts. 
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sions; in order to establish precedent and thus provide the opportunity for 
a self-sustaining labour law system to develop, in which matters involving 
labour relations are handled independently and fairly (see also Cooney and 
Mitchell, 2002: 254).
However, such a proposal may face challenges in its implementation – as 
this Chapter and the case of Industrial Relations Court in Indonesia will 
demonstrate. Indonesia’s Industrial Relations Court ((Pengadilan Hubungan 
Industrial, PHI), which was established as a special court within the scope 
of the general court, has seen major challenges to its operations from the 
beginning; both from within the system and from without. These challenges 
include ongoing internal problems related to the generally high levels of 
corruption within the Indonesian judicial system; the problematic relation-
ship between ‘special’ and ‘ordinary’ civil procedural laws predominant in 
the PHI; problems related to the technical competence and legal integrity of 
career judges, ad hoc judges and registrars; and external problems includ-
ing the workers’ lack of competence in civil litigation procedures and thus 
access to the court’s litigation processes. Together these problems have led to 
declining public confidence in the performance of the PHI; a situation which 
has a greater adverse effect on employees and trade unions than on employ-
ers. Given this situation, it is clear that the PHI needs to be reformed; for 
example, by turning it into a special court equal to the civil court as suggest-
ed by several ad hoc judges from union circles (see Tjandra, 2014). Such pro-
gressive reforms, however, require strong political commitment both from 
the judiciary and government; both of which appear currently to be mired 
in the past.
1 The Industrial Relations Court (PHI)4
The Industrial Relations Court is a ‘special court’ within the scope of the 
court of general jurisdiction, commonly referred to as the District Court 
(Pengadilan Negeri).5 According to former Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Bagir Manan, the term ‘special court’ refers not only to the special 
case objects of focus – namely, labour disputes in labour relations – but also 
to the special composition of the panel of judges in this particular court, 
and the use of special procedures. Uniquely, this court uses a judging panel 
which comprises one ordinary judge (a career judge) and two ad hoc judges 
(so-called expert judges, sourced from within union and employers’ circles 
respectively); and special procedures including the waiving of case fees for 
certain cases, as well as strict time limits for court hearings (a maximum of 
50 working days in the PHI, plus 30 working-days in the Supreme Court), 
4 See Tjandra and Suryomenggolo, 2004, which provides critical notes on Law No. 2/2004, 
especially from the perspective of labour unions. See also Tjandra, 2006 and 2009.
5 Article 55.
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and a restriction on appeals in certain types of dispute.6 During the estab-
lishment of the PHI, the initial selection of ad hoc judges began with the 
nomination of tens of potential candidates by the employers’ organization(s) 
and trade unions, for consideration first by the Ministry of Manpower, and 
then by the Supreme Court; with the latter responsible for assessing the 
nominees’ credentials with respect to relevant legal knowledge and techni-
cal skills. The Supreme Court was then also responsible for training the ad 
hoc judges in the specifics of civil procedural law, finalizing the the selection 
process, and submitting the names of the accepted ad hoc judges to the Pres-
ident for formal appointment. The Supreme Court was also responsible for 
preparing the career judges who were to be assigned to the PHI.7 This selec-
tion process presently continues to occur on an occasional basis, as required 
to replace judges in the system.
1.1 Birth of the Industrial Relations Court
As stipulated by Law No. 2/2004 on Industrial Relations Dispute Settle-
ment, the Industrial Relations Court should have become effective and com-
menced operations one year after its enactment.8 This was postponed, how-
ever, due to delays in building the infrastructure,9 and the PHI only began 
official operations on January 14, 2006. On the same date, the ad hoc judges, 
half from labour organization circles and half from employers’ organization 
circles, were symbolically ‘inaugurated’ by President Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono, in Padang, West Sumatera province, in the presence of the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan. PHIs were to be established in 33 
District Courts in 33 provincial capitals throughout Indonesia (Kompas, Janu-
ary 15, 2006). Effective operation of the PHIs commenced in April-May 2006, 
with the release of Presidential Decree No. 31/M/2006, which appointed a 
total of 155 ad hoc judges for the PHIs in the provincial capitals, and an addi-
tional four ad hoc judges for the PHI at the Supreme Court.
6 ‘The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court inaugurates 33 Industrial Relations Courts’, 
Tempo Interaktif, January 14, 2006.
7 Nine career judges from the Supreme Court, and  an additional 90 career judges from 33 
District Courts around Indonesia, were trained for this purpose (Suparno, June 2006).
8 Article 126 of Law No. 2/2004. Hereinafter, unless otherwise stated, all articles referred 
to in footnotes are articles from Law No. 2/2004.
9 Based on Government Regulation In Lieu of Law No. l/2005; also Law No. 2/2005 
regarding the Delay in the Implementation of Law No. 2/2004 concerning Industrial 
Relations Dispute Settlement.
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In conjunction with Law No. 2/2004 coming into effect, two other laws 
were annulled – Law No. 22/1957 on Labour Dispute Settlement, and Law 
No. 12/1964 on Termination of Employment in Private Enterprises.10 Also 
annulled was the existing labour dispute settlement system, which has been 
known as the ‘P4P/D’ (Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan Pusat/Dae-
rah; Central/Regional Labour Dispute Settlement Committee). The P4P/D 
system was considered no longer suitable to meet the community’s needs for 
a ‘fast, precise, fair, and cheap’ dispute settlement mechanism (Introduction, 
Law No. 2/2004). The Director of the ILO in Jakarta, Alan Boulton, assessed 
the future of Indonesia’s labour relations structure as follows: ‘the needs felt 
by the new economic, social, and political environment with respect to the 
formation of a legal framework for the development of a fair and effective 
industrial relation that is capable of assisting the settlement of industrial dis-
putes’ (Boulton, 2002: 5).
The decisions to annul Law No. 22/1957, Law No. 12/1964 and P4P/D-
based labour dispute settlement mechanism were based on three main argu-
ments (see Hanartani, n.d., also Boulton, 2002). First, after Law No. 5/1986 
concerning the State Administrative Court came into effect, the decisions 
reached through P4P/D, which had previously been final and binding, could 
be challenged by submitting a lawsuit to the Administrative Court (Penga-
dilan Tata Usaha Negara), and in addition, could subsequently be appealed 
via the Administrative Appellate Court and the Supreme Court. This pro-
cess took considerable time, which was not considered ideal for labour cases 
(labour relations); where quick settlement would benefit employment and 
the production process. The establishment of the PHI was expected to tackle 
these problems by providing a new system of labour dispute settlement.
The second argument to support the annulment of the two laws and the 
existing settlement system involved the recognition, under Law No. 22/1957, 
of the authority (or ‘veto’ right) of the Minister of Manpower to delay or can-
cel the decisions of P4P. Supporters of the annulments considered this veto 
right by the Minister to be an example of excessive government interference 
in labour issues and labour dispute settlement, which, they argued, should 
be abolished.11 The third argument concerned the application of Law No. 
21/2000 on Trade Unions. This law was originally inspired by ILO Conven-
tion No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organize, which was ratified by Indonesia in 1998; based on which all 
workers should have the same opportunity to form or participate in any 
organization. However, as a consequence, the rights of workers not to par-
ticipate in an organization should be respected as well; and this right was 
not currently recognized. Thus, Law No. 22/1957, which required that the 
10 Article 125.
11 See also Bappenas’ ‘White Book’ (2003) on ‘Employment Friendly Labour Policies.’
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disputing party be a worker/labour union,12 was considered unsuitable for 
the ‘new paradigm’ in the field of labour relations; namely, the ‘democratiza-
tion at the workplace’ (Boulton, 2002). The preservation of Law No. 22/1957 
would have meant that individual parties in labour disputes could only seek 
assistance through the general court, based on civil law procedures.13
1.2 The industrial relations dispute process
As a special court, the PHI is authorized to examine, adjudicate, and decide 
on ‘industrial relations dispute’ cases, defined in Law No. 2/2004 as: a dif-
ference of opinion resulting in a dispute between employers or an association of 
employers with workers/labourers or trade unions due to a disagreement on rights, 
conflicting interests, a dispute over termination of employment, or a dispute among 
trade unions within one company.14 By this provision, the Law limits its juris-
diction, and therefore the PHI’s authority, to four types of labour disputes; 
namely disputes over rights,15 disputes over interests; disputes over termi-
nation of employment (PHK); and disputes among worker/labour unions 
within a company.16 Before a case can be brought before the PHI, the par-
ties concerned are required to attempt a bipartite (two party) negotiation 
between worker and employer.17 This negotiation must be completed with-
in 30 days,18 and minutes of each negotiation meeting must be drawn up 
12 Law No. 22/1957 (article 1 subsection 1.c.) defi ned a ‘labour dispute’ as: confl ict between 
employers or employers’ associations with a combined trade union or trade union in relation 
to the lack of understanding regarding the employment agreement, terms of employment, and 
or labour circumstances. Thus, Law No. 22/1957 was concerned with collective dis-
putes between employers/employers’ organizations and unions, rather than disputes 
between employers and individual workers; and only organizations (not individu-
als) could be parties to the dispute with the P4P/D as the settlement institution. Some 
argued that such provisions encouraged individual workers to join unions, and empha-
sized that unions were essential to defend the interests of individual workers (Tjandra 
and Suryomenggolo, 2004).
13 In practice, however, with the enactment of Law No. 12/1964 on the Termination of 
Employment at Private Enterprises, most individual cases concerning termination of 
employment could be brought before the P4D/P. Indeed, few such cases were brought 
to the civil court as a tort action. This was related to the expense of the civil court system 
for plaintiffs (in particular for the dismissed workers who brought the cases), while the 
P4D/P was generally free of charge (see Tjandra and Suryomenggolo, 2004).
14 Article 1 subsection (1).
15 As noted by Mizuno (2009), with reference to Soepomo (1994: 177), before the establish-
ment of the PHI few disputes over rights were brought to the regular courts. Instead, 
any claims that companies were not meeting their normative obligations would be 
investigated by labour inspectors, who would issue a report based on their investigation 
if necessary. If a rights dispute was passed onto the P4P/D, a labour inspector would 
be appointed to handle the case, and dismissals would not be permitted if they were in 
contravention of the law.
16 Article 2.
17 Article 3 (1).
18 Article 3 (2).
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and signed by the parties concerned.19 If no resolution can be obtained, the 
PHI’s Panel of Judges will use these minutes during their consideration into 
whether to accept or reject a case.20
In the event that the bipartite negotiation fails, or a decision is not reached 
within 30 days, one or both parties are required to register their dispute with 
the Regional Manpower Office at the district level, including providing the 
minutes of their bipartite negotiation as evidence.21 In the event that the com-
plainant fails to provide this evidence, the Regional Manpower Office, to 
be completed within seven days, may return the case file to the complain-
ant.22 After receiving the written complaint, the Manpower Office is required 
to offer both parties the option of a settlement through either conciliation 
(through a private institution), or arbitration (through a private institution 
with the authority to make final and binding decisions).23 The parties have 
seven days in which to select either conciliation or arbitration, after which 
time, if a decision has not been reached, the Manpower Office will refer the 
dispute to mediation (by a government institution).24 According to Law No. 
2/2004, labour disputes may be settled in different ways, depending on the 
type of dispute in question. The first and second type of disputes (disputes 
over interest, and disputes among the trade unions in one company) may 
be settled through mediation, conciliation or arbitration. The third type of 
19 Article 6 (1).
20 Article 83 (1). The use of the term ‘minutes’ in this article sometimes leads to confusion 
over whether the ‘minutes’ in question are those from the bipartite negotiation between 
the employer and worker(s), or the written records of the mediation undertaken by the 
Regional Manpower Offi ce. Technically, the term ‘minutes’ is reserved for the records 
produced through the bipartite negotiation, while those produced during the media-
tion at the Regional Manpower Offi ce are referred to as ‘written recommendations’. This 
distinction can prove diffi cult however, with some panels of judges requesting to see the 
‘written recommendation’ from the mediator or conciliator, while other panels request 
instead to see the minutes from the bipartite negotiations.
21 Article 4 (1). As noted by Mizuno (2009), such a requirement as established under Law 
No. 22/1957 and maintained in Law No. 2/2004, is unique. It differs from the labour 
laws of many countries, in that in Indonesia, workers and employers can request help if 
they cannot resolve a dispute; and the government can intervene if the dispute is seen to 
threaten the national interest (see also Hanami and Blanpain, 1984: 81-106).
22 Article 4 (2).
23 Article 4 (3).
24 Special offi cials in the local Manpower Offi ce (regents/cities) are assigned to under-
take the mediation. Many of these offi cials were previously members of the abolished 
P4P/D. The provision to make mediation compulsory using these nominated offi cers 
is an interesting aspect of the new general labour dispute settlement system developed 
through Law No. 2/2004. According to one government offi cial, the provision arose 
largely as a concession during the Law’s formulation; in order to appease the many for-
mer mediators from the abolished P4P/D who faced the loss of their jobs once the new 
Law on labour dispute settlement was enacted (Personal communication with Syaiful 
Bahri, Ministry of Manpower, Jakarta, 9 January 2010). Mizuno (2009) notes that the 
requirement for mediation using the appointed mediators is one of the main weaknesses 
in Law No. 2/2004, because it will just prolong the process of reaching a fi nal decision.
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dispute, disputes over termination of employment, may be settled through 
either mediation or conciliation; while the last type, dispute over rights, may 
only be settled through mediation. In each dispute, the mediator, conciliator 
or arbiter must complete their duties within 30 working days after receiving 
the transfer of responsibility for settlement of the dispute (see the Dispute 
Settlement Scheme, based on Law No. 2/2004, below).
Image: The Dispute Settlement Scheme, based on Law No. 2/2004
When an industrial relations dispute can be settled through mediation, a col-
lective agreement is drawn up and signed by the parties involved, witnessed 
by the mediator, and registered at the PHI in the District Court within the 
relevent jurisdiction; whereupon the parties can obtain a registration deed.25 
If no agreement can be reached through mediation, the mediator will issue 
a written recommendation, and the parties are required to provide a written 
answer to the mediator within 10 working days after receiving the recom-
mendation, to indicate whether they accept or reject it. If one of both of the 
parties fail to provide their answer within the allotted time period, this is 
taken as a rejection of the written recommendation,26 and either of the parties 
may then file to continue with settlement of the dispute through the PHI in 
the local District Court.27
25 Article 13 (1).
26 Article 13 (2).
27 Article 14 (1).
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Law No. 2/2004 on the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement states that 
the PHI has the duty and is authorized to examine and make a decision at 
different stages in the dispute settlement process, depending on the type of 
dispute in question. For cases involving disputes over rights and disputes 
over termination of employment, the PHI is the deciding authority at the 
first stage of the process; while for cases involving conflicts of interest and 
disputes among the worker/labour unions in a company, the PHI may 
be the deciding authority at both the first and final levels of the process.28 
As stipulated in article 100 of Law No. 2/2004, the judges must take into 
account all relevant laws, existing agreements, customs and justice in reach-
ing a verdict.29 The procedural law which is applied at the PHI, is the Civil 
Procedural Law, which is also used in the courts of general jurisdiction.30 
Law No. 2/2004 also stipulates that for lawsuits worth not more than Rp 150 
million (based on the figure requested as compensation when the lawsuit is 
filed), there will be no case fee, including for execution.31 The Law stipulates 
that a PHI is to be established in each District Court within the capital city 
of each province, with the court having jurisdiction over the particular prov-
ince.32 Subsequently, PHIs are also to be formed under Presidential Decree 
in certain other regencies/cities, especially those that are heavily industrial-
ized.33 Below is the summary of dispute settlement roles of mediator, concili-
ator, arbiter, Industrial Relations Court, and the Supreme Court, as provided 
by Law No. 2/2004 on the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement.
One important strength of the PHI’s dispute settlement process is the right 
of unions and employers’ organizations to act as attorneys to represent their 
members during litigation at the PHI.34 A similar provision was included in 
Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions, specifically article 25 paragraph (1) point 
b.35 Another important new development is the composition of the panel of 
judges at the PHI, comprising the single career judge and two ad hoc judges36 
as nominated by the employers’ association and trade unions respectively. 
28 Article 56.
29 For the P4P/D there was one more consideration: ‘Interest of the State’.
30 Article 57.
31 Article 58.
32 Article 59 subsection (1).
33 Article 59 subsection (2). The elucidation of the Law states that ‘immediately’ is ‘within 
6 (six) months after the Law comes into effect’, or in July 2006.
34 Article 87.
35 This paragraph states: ‘A trade union/labour union, federation or confederation of trade 
unions/labour unions that has a record number has the right to: […] represent workers/
labourers in industrial dispute settlement.’
36 The composition of the panel of judges at the PHI is very different from the P4P/D, which 
consisted of government offi cials and representatives of the unions and the employers’ 
association, each fi ve persons, and was headed by an offi cial from the Department of 
Manpower. 
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The term of office of the ad hoc judges is five years, following which they 
may be reappointed for another five years.37
Table 6.1: Summary of the Typology of Mediator, Conciliator, Arbiter, Industrial Relations 
Court (according to Law No. 2/2004)
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Not regulated One or more One or more Three 
(one career 




judge, two ad 
hoc judges)
Jurisdiction District/city Province All Indonesia Province All Indonesia
Type of 
hearings
Not regulated Not regulated Close Open Close
Appearance 
of attorneys
Not regulated Not regulated Allowed Allowed Allowed
37 All ad hoc Judges appointed for the fi rst term (2006-2011) were reappointed for the sec-
ond term, excepting those who had resigned or reached the stated maximum age of 62 
(interview with Saut Manalu, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, June 2011).
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Concerning the time limit for examination of disputes, Law No. 2/2004 
states that a PHI’s Panel of Judges must pronounce a judgment within fifty 
working days from commencement of the first PHI hearing.38 The PHI’s Sub-
stitute Registrar must then issue the copy of the decision within fourteen 
days after the signing of the decision.39 This copy must be delivered to the 
parties within seven days.40 An appeal may be made by submitting a written 
request to the substitute registrar’s office of the PHI, which will forward the 
request to the Court of Cassation.41 The brief must be conveyed to the Head 
of the Supreme Court within fourteen days following the appeal application 
receipt date.42 The Law also sets forth that in disputes over rights, or disputes 
over termination of employment, the examination of the case at the Supreme 
Court must be concluded within thirty days following the date of the receipt 
of the appeal application.43 The composition of the panel of judges (one 
career Judge and two ad hoc judges) also applies to the Supreme Court.44 The 
ad hoc judges at the Supreme Court will have been nominated and will have 
followed the same recruitment procedures as those at the district level; but 
the judges directly apply for their position at the Supreme Court.
Under the aforementioned system, the proponents of Law No. 2/2004 claim 
that the Law can provide a ‘fast, precise, fair, and cheap’ labour dispute set-
tlement mechanism.45 Key questions include: does the system work in prac-
tice? How do we understand the practice of Indonesia’s new labour dispute 
settlement mechanism, with the PHI as the core; and its impact upon labour? 
How do labour groups respond to this system? These questions will be the 
focus of the discussion in the following section of the chapter.
1.3 Key aspects of administration of the dispute process
The PHI system commenced operations officially on 14 January 2006, and 
the ad hoc judges began examining cases between May and June 2006. How-
ever, the Presidential Decree on allowances and other rights for ad hoc judg-
es in the PHI was not released until 7 December 2006; and the disbursement 
of the state budget for honorary payments for ad hoc judges was not issued 
until around two years later, in 2008. This means that for over two years after 








45 See specifi cally the section on ‘Consideration’.
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payment.46 One ad hoc judge from union circles complained, ‘How can we 
work properly and not commit corruption if our most basic rights are not 
even fulfilled?’47 He described how difficult it was for him to refuse offers 
from employers to go out for ‘lunch’ or accept ‘gifts’ from one of the parties 
in a case being handled by him. ‘I am only human, I also have needs,’ he stat-
ed.48 The lack of payment led several ad hoc judges to threaten to conduct 
public action if they were not paid soon, including to go on strike by refus-
ing to attend court hearings in the PHI Tanjung Pinang, Riau Islands, caus-
ing delays to court hearings (Batam Pos, 23 November 2006). When asked 
about the issue, the Director of Law and Judicature of the Supreme Court, 
Suparno, said: ‘[The issue] is still with the State Secretary.’49 One problem 
was that a partial budget for the infrastructure development of the PHI had 
already been disbursed while the budget for the salaries of the ad hoc judges 
was in limbo. This budget included funds for an official vehicle for the chief 
justices of the district courts, ex officio chief justice of the PHI, who were able 
to enjoy their new cars (a Toyota Kijang Innova or Toyota Vios) soon after 
PHI operations began in May 2006.50
For the ad hoc judges who came from employer circles, this discrepancy 
in disbursement of funds was not usually a significant hardship, as most 
retained their previous paid positions while acting as judges part-time. But 
for ad hoc judges from labour unions, the ongoing lack of funds posed a seri-
ous problem, as many had quit their previous jobs to become ad hoc judges 
full-time (Tempo Magazine, 12 November 2006). As reasons for choosing a 
full-time role, some cited their new position as a ‘noble responsibility’, or 
a ‘calling to fulfill their duties’,51 while for others, becoming a judge was 
an opportunity to upgrade their social status and position in society. One 
ad hoc judge in the PHI Jakarta, for example, prior to his appointment as a 
judge, worked as a ‘barefoot lawyer’ at the legal aid office in the Jakarta Dis-
trict Court, with no certainty of income.52 For him, becoming a judge signifi-
cantly raised his income and his social position in the eyes of his neighbours 
46 Several ad hoc judges from larger district courts, such as Jakarta and Bandung, did actu-
ally receive their salaries, which in these cases were paid directly from the district court 
budget at the discretion of the Chief Judge of that particular district court.
47 Interview Muhamad Mushlih, an ad hoc judge at the PHI Serang, June 2006.
48 Among ad hoc judges, one widely-circulated joke about their missing allowance held 
that there were ‘three phases of one’s career’: ‘mantab’ (‘makan tabungan’, or living from 
one’s savings);  ‘matang’ (‘makan utangan’, or living from debts); and ‘makar’ (‘makan 
perkara’, living from cases).
49 Stated in the Workshop of Ad Hoc Judges from Labour Union circles (so-called Labour 
Judges) throughout Java, organized by the Trade Union Rights Centre, June 2006.
50 Interview with Asmiwati, an ad hoc judge at the PHI Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, 
June 2008. Other ad hoc judges from various PHIs confi rmed this, joking that ‘Our chief 
judges are driving cars with two wheels,’ (as the chief judge had previously enjoyed 
offi cial cars as chief judge of the district courts as well).
51 Interview with Saut Manalu, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, June 2008.
52 Interview with Tri Endro, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, June 2008.
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and colleagues, and he felt proud when people called him ‘Pak Hakim’ 
(‘Mister Judge’). Similar sentiments were expressed by ad hoc judges from 
employer circles, but to a lesser extent than by those from union circles. Once 
working in the position full time, most ad hoc judges were highly depen-
dent on the salaries they were entitled to: Rp 3,750,000,-/month for ad hoc 
judges at the district level, and Rp 7,500,000,-/month for ad hoc judges at 
the Supreme Court level (based on Presidential Decree No. 96/2006).53 This 
amount was relatively small, and less than the salaries some ad hoc judges 
received in their jobs before joining the PHI; particularly those from employ-
er circles. Several chose to resign after a couple of years of working with 
the PHI.54 This led to a shortage of ad hoc judges from employer circles in 
some regions.55 In response, after five years of PHI operations, in 2011 the 
President raised the salaries of ad hoc judges at the PHI to Rp 5,5 million/
month, and those at the Supreme Court to Rp 10 million/month (Presiden-
tial Decree No. 20/2011). These new salaries were enjoyed immediately by 
newly recruited ad hoc judges, but not by the original cohort. In January 
2013, a new salary scheme was implemented, with ad hoc judges at the PHI 
receiving Rp 17.5 million/month, and those at the Supreme Court receiv-
ing Rp 25 million/month, regardless of whether they were new or earlier 
recruits. As explained by one ad hoc judge from union circles, these signifi-
cant increases of salaries encouraged many people to apply for the position 
of ad hoc judges at the PHI.56
The salaries received by the ad hoc judges still required a deduction of 15 
percent income tax, which was controversial, given the existing government 
regulation which ruled that ‘state officials’ were exempt from income taxes 
53 This district level amount was smaller than that received by ad hoc judges at various 
other special courts, such as the Fisheries Court, which was Rp 4 million/month (see 
Presidential Decree No. 23/2008). Even more was received by ad hoc judges at the Cor-
ruption Court, which equated to Rp 10 million/month at the district level, Rp 12 mil-
lion/month at the higher court level, and Rp 14 million/month at the Supreme Court 
level (see Presidential Decree No. 49/2005).
54 Personal communication with Abdul Khakim, an ad hoc judge from PHI Samarinda, who 
later resigned and then worked with an oil company in Kalimantan as Human Resources 
Manager. While he was a judge he wrote several books on industrial relations dispute and 
also undertook university teaching; activities he gave up after his resignation from the PHI.
55 One ILO report (Fajerman, 2011: 17) noted that in some PHIs there were no ad hoc 
judges available from employer circles at all, leading to the Supreme Court having to 
transport ad hoc judges from nearby provinces to hear cases. As the report detailed: 
‘In Denpasar, there are fi ve career and four trade union-nominated ad hoc judges, but 
no employer-nominated ad hoc judges. In Semarang there are seven career and seven 
trade union-nominated ad hoc judges and no employer-nominated ad hoc judges, and 
in Bengkulu there is one career judge, four trade union-nominated ad hoc judges and 
no employer-nominated ad hoc judge.’ The ILO report expressed concerns that the 
Supreme Court apparently did not engage in greater efforts to recruit ad hoc judges 
from employer circles for these regions.
56 Personal communication with Joko Ismono, ad hoc judge at the PHI Surabaya, Septem-
ber 2013.
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(which were covered by the government as the employer). Ad hoc judges 
were concerned that they were not recognized as ‘state officials’ by the gov-
ernment, despite the fact that they were appointed by the President with 
Presidential Decrees published in the State Gazette, as per normal proce-
dures for ‘state officials’. Indeed, the ad hoc judges at the Supreme Court 
even held the right to stay at ‘the official apartment for state officials’ in 
Kemayoran region, Jakarta.57 Some ad hoc judges, particularly from union 
circles but also from employer circles, brought the issue to the attention of 
the Tax Offices in their regions, as well as to the Ministry of Finance in Jakar-
ta, arguing that they should be exempt from taxes and treated as full ‘state 
officials’. These efforts failed: in late 2010, the Minister of Finance issued a 
letter stating that ad hoc judges were not ‘state officials’ and thus not exempt 
from taxes. The letter did not provide any explanation.
Initially the Supreme Court seemed to support the formation of the PHI, at 
least to a degree. This was despite the fact that the PHI was considered to be 
‘a project of the Ministry of Manpower,’ which had drafted Law No. 2/2004 
without close consultation with the Supreme Court. This lack of consulta-
tion was considered to be a factor in the subsequent problems with payment 
of ad hoc judges. As the Director of Law and Judicature of the Supreme 
Court, Suparno, observed later regarding the year-long delay in payments, 
‘[The situation] would not be this messy if we had been involved since the 
beginning’. Given these issues, it is clear that at the beginning, both the 
government and the Supreme Court were unprepared to provide the full 
infrastructure to enable the PHI to operate effectively; and with the previ-
ous institution which had handled labour disputes (the P4P/D) no longer 
functioning, many labour dispute cases were cancelled without proper reso-
lution.58
During their early days as ad hoc judges at the Industrial Relations Court, 
while waiting for payment, many people survived through their incomes 
from side-jobs or other side-activities. Some ad hoc judges, for example, ran 
small shops at home, while others worked part-time as human resources 
consultants at the companies where they had previously worked. One com-
mon side-job was the position of resource person for training workshops 
about PHI procedures. Such training was held frequently by companies 
in the PHIs’ early days, and was referred to by ad hoc judges as ‘socializa-
tion,’ in reference to the formal activities of the Supreme Court during the 
57 This unclear status of ad hoc judges at the PHI was similar to that experienced by ad hoc 
judges from other special courts. The most outspoken were the ad hoc judges at the Cor-
ruption Court, who voiced public complaints several times (Detiknews, 16 June 2011)
58 Personal communication with Sahat Butar Butar, a union activist who had been a mem-
ber of the P4P/D before the establishment of the PHI, June 2007. Butar claimed that dur-
ing this transition period, many workers he knew had to ‘give up’, and chose instead to 
accept their employers’ offers, although these offers were below those required by law.
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early stages of PHI operations.59 One human resource manager from a pri-
vate bank in Jakarta, who frequently organized such workshops for his staff, 
referred to the training instead as ‘networking’, observing that the primary 
intention was to develop closer contacts with judges from the PHI and the 
Supreme Court.60
These ‘socialization’ activities were preferred, by some ad hoc judges, to 
their primary task of ruling on disputes – as the training tasks were straight-
forward and therefore relatively ‘easy money’, requiring only that the train-
er explain the contents of the law. The financial returns were reasonable: for 
a two-hour presentation, focusing mostly on normative parts of the Law, ad 
hoc judges at the district level could expect to be paid around Rp 6 million; 
almost double their monthly PHI salaries, while career judges, especially 
those from the Supreme Court, could expect up to around Rp 8 to 10 million 
per session.61 Such opportunities for side-incomes, however, could be prob-
lematic, for several reasons. First, these opportunities were distributed ineq-
uitably among the ad hoc judges, with those from big cities such as Jakarta 
or Surabaya receiving higher income than those from smaller, less industrial 
cities. Second, despite the claims from organizations that the ‘socialization’ 
and training were focused on legal issues, it is doubtful that the companies’ 
motives were purely related to capacity building. Instead, they may have 
been interested in influencing judges, and the important question emerged 
as to whether the ad hoc judges and career judges recruited by companies to 
run their training would be able to maintain their impartiality in future cases 
involving those companies – or would they then feel, as one ad hoc judge 
confessed, ‘morally obliged’ (berhutang budi) to the company.
59 The Supreme Court, as the institution responsible for the operation of the PHI, conduct-
ed a series of socialization activities around Indonesia to introduce the new court to 
the public and to respected parties such as employers and workers. Interview with Tri 
Endro, ad hoc Judge at the PHI Jakarta, June 2008.
60 Personal communication with Sigit Bintoro, HRD Manager in Jakarta, June 2008.
61 This discrepancy led some career judges at the district and Supreme Court levels to pref-
erentially offer training to companies rather than unions, given that the latter could not 
pay the same as the former. One Supreme Court judge complained that he only received 
Rp 750,000 for a training session organized by a labour NGO in Jakarta, and observed 
that he could get much more from companies (interview by Dela Feby, Secretary of 
TURC, June 2008). The director of the NGO in question heard about the complaint sec-
ond hand (from an ad hoc judge who had been speaking with the disgruntled Supreme 
Court judge), and immediately wrote an offi cial letter to explain why his organization 
could only pay a limited amount. The letter also referred politely to the duty of judges to 
socialize or introduce the new law to all parties indiscriminately. This letter was copied 
in to all the key related authorities, including the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court, the 
Minister of Manpower, and the Director of the ILO Offi ce in Jakarta. The judge who had 
expressed the complaint did not respond to the letter (interview Tri Endro, ad hoc judge 
at the PHI Jakarta, June 2008).
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The conditions described above in relation to salaries and other challenges 
left many ad hoc judges discouraged. One ad hoc judge explained why he 
felt discriminated against: ‘maybe because we’re considered as “contract 
judges”, therefore they don’t feel it necessary to treat us well, or at least as 
equal to other state officials.’ Another said, ‘I feel really like the ordinary 
worker that I used to be. I just have to demand my own rights just to gain 
what I deserved.’ This statement was in reference to his new obligation to 
pay income tax for his PHI work, once the Minister of Finance had revoked 
the exemption which had been granted by the Chief Judge of the PHI. ‘I 
don’t know how I can pay all those taxes, as my salary [including taxes] has 
already been used up.’62 Some confessed that they thought of quitting their 
PHI roles because of the taxes issue, but kept working for the PHI due to 
what they referred to as a ‘higher calling’. As one ad hoc judge explained, 
‘I just thought that the job was honourable, and I wanted to prove to myself 
that I could stay at least until the end of my term in 2016.’63 For other ad 
hoc judges, who received additional income from side-jobs and other side-
activities, their role as an ad hoc judges was not a negative experience at all, 
but rather an opportunity to make a better income than before. This was par-
ticularly the case for some ad hoc judges from union circles, many of whom 
had been working previously as union advocates, whose income is uncer-
tain. For these individuals, becoming an ad hoc judge was seen as a stepping 
stone to enable access to new payment opportunities, such as the aforemen-
tioned ‘socialization’ training.
The difficulties encountered in the recruitment of ad hoc judges to the PHIs 
were mirrored by similar challenges in recruiting career judges, as summa-
rized in a report on the issue by the ILO (Fajerman, 2011: 16-18). With refer-
ence to the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, the ILO report noted critically that 
not only were many ad hoc judges merely job seekers, but the career judges 
applying for the positions were of similarly questionable quality – often 
recruited from mid-level law faculties in Indonesia, while the best gradu-
ates instead chose careers as lawyers or in private business. The report also 
noted that for the most recent recruitment of ad hoc judges, so few appli-
cants were put forward from employer circles that the Ministry of Manpow-
er and the Supreme Court were required to lower the recruitment standards 
for employer-nominated candidates. Despite this, only 11 candidates were 
appointed from 23 applicants. Overall according to the ILO report, there was 
a shortage of judges in the PHIs, with only eight of the country’s 33 dis-
trict-level PHIs having an adequate quota of both career and ad hoc judges. 
Similarly, at the Supreme Court level there were only eight ad hoc judges 
available, who were expected to deal with over 400 cases a year. As another 
example, the PHI in Jakarta had only four career judges to deal with over 30 
new cases per month (which would add to the burden of the ongoing cases). 
62 Interview with Bahal Simangunsong, ad hoc judge from the PHI Palu, July 2010.
63 Interview with Juanda Pangaribuan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, December 2010. 
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The report further observed that many career judges were reluctant to be 
appointed to the PHI, ‘due to the highly sensitive nature of labour disputes, 
frequent demonstrations outside of the courtroom and the (often) inconve-
nient distance between the IRC and the District Court.’ (Fajerman, 2011: 18).
Another concern with respect to the operations of the PHIs was related to the 
working hours of the ad hoc judges. Although the PHIs operated officially 
from 8 am to 4 pm, Monday to Friday (the same hours as the District Court 
opening hours) in practice the PHI’s court hearings were only held two or 
three days per week. In the PHI in Jakarta, for example, hearings were held 
from Monday to Wednesday only; while in the PHI Tanjung Pinang, Riau 
Islands, hearings were only scheduled on Thursdays and Fridays. According 
to the ad hoc judges, the other days were used by the judges to conduct inter-
nal examinations among the judging panel, and to make decisions.64 They 
also claimed that the typing of judgments was often performed by them 
personally, rather than being undertaken by substitute registrars65; while the 
career judges were too busy to carry out their primary duties in the district 
courts (that is the handling of civil, criminal and commercial cases). Various 
parties from the unions also claimed that non-hearing days during the week 
were sometimes used to extend case registrations. For example at the PHI 
Jakarta, a case could be registered on Monday, but it would be forward-dat-
ed the subsequent Thursday, when the ad hoc judges were working. Accord-
ing to one plaintiff, he agreed to this practice of changing registration dates 
in order to ensure that the hearing period, at least formally, did not take too 
long and did not exceed the 50-day limit of the PHI.66
In sum, it is clear that when the PHI commenced operations in 2006 (one 
year later than the date stipulated by Law No. 2/2004), the operational infra-
structure was not fully prepared; a situation exacerbated by the lack of com-
munication between the Ministry of Manpower, which had drafted the law, 
and the Supreme Court, whose duty it was to run the court. This lack of 
preparedness led to several problems, most critically the delaying of pay-
ment of salaries for ad hoc judges; the uncertainty surrounding the status of 
ad hoc judges as ‘state officials’ (or not) and the consequences with regard to 
tax exemption; and the lack of clarity or consistency around working hours. 
Together these issues had a negative impact on the performance of the ad 
hoc judges, and thus on the performance of the PHI as an institution. Fortu-
nately, as described above, after five years of operation the PHI was subject 
64 Interview with Saut Manalu, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, December 2010.
65 In the early period of the PHIs’ operations, many ad hoc judges, especially those from 
union circles, expressed their reluctance to assign their typing work to substitute reg-
istrars (Panitera Pengganti, who were offi cially supposed to perform such work), out of 
concern that their decisions could be ‘sold’ by the substitute registrars through bribery 
and corruption.
66 Personal communication with a lawyer at the PHI Jakarta, December 2010.
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to a number of changes with the goal of improving the courts’ effectiveness, 
including regular and higher salary payments for the ad hoc judges; and 
revisions to other administrative issues. It remains to be seen to what extent 
these administrative changes will result in a better performance of the PHIs. 
We will return to this question later.
1.4 Effects of the PHI on unions
To examine the effects of the PHI on unions, it will be useful to begin with a 
summary of the relationship between the PHI, trade unions, and the ad hoc 
judges from union circles. As stipulated in Law No. 2/2004 (article 1 subsec-
tion [19]), both unions and employers’ organizations have special roles in 
the PHI system: in particular, they have the right to propose candidates to 
selection as ad hoc judges. In practice, however, proposing candidates to be 
ad hoc judges simply required a piece of paper from the union or employers’ 
organization, stating that the organization supported the person concerned 
in their application to become an ad hoc judge at the PHI. It was only at 
the subsequent stages of the application process – the administrative selec-
tion by the Ministry of Manpower, and the testing of legal knowledge by 
the Supreme Court,67 that the candidates were assessed in a more impartial 
manner. These latter two stages of (relatively) independent assessment, in 
combination with the doctrine of impartiality of judges as emphasized by 
the Supreme Court, may go some way to explaining the relative detachment 
of ad hoc judges from the unions which had originally nominated them.
Despite concerns from certain observers that some unions might not be able 
to nominate candidates as ad hoc judges (see Fenwick et al., 2002), currently 
any union which has met its legal requirement to be a union, and has been 
registered as a union in the Regional Manpower Office, is officially able to 
nominate a candidate – regardless of the union’s background, number of 
members, level (regional or central organization), location of their domicile or 
other variables. The selection committees, both within the Ministry of Man-
power and within the Supreme Court, have demonstrated their willingness to 
select ad hoc judges from a wide variety of different unions and backgrounds. 
Only on occasion has this led to unexpected situations, for example since ad 
hoc judges can be nominated by either national- or regional-level unions 
(the latter sometimes with no affiliates in other regions), on one occasion an 
ad hoc judge in the PHI Medan had been nominated by a union from the 
local Medan area, yet after he became a judge, that particular union’s activi-
ties declined to the point that it was barely operating as a union anymore.68
67 Article 64 (g) requires that ad hoc judges at the PHI have a relatively high level of educa-
tion: they must have at least a university degree (S1) which at the district level can be 
from any discipline, and at the Supreme Court level, must be a law degree.
68 Interview with Christina Tobing, an ad hoc judge from union circles at the PHI Medan, 
August 2008; she was nominated by the union KBM (Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis, the Mar-
haenist Labour Union).
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Most ad hoc judges from union circles were people who were already well 
known to the unions; either former union officials, or legal advocacy practi-
tioners for the unions; or NGO activists and academics who supported the 
unions.69 With such backgrounds, many of these ad hoc judges, particularly 
with the support of the Trade Union Rights Centre (TURC), have been active 
in pushing for PHI reforms, including through the judgments they make, 
and through activities designed to advance the judicial system. Such efforts, 
however, have not led to significant reforms to date, due to structural obsta-
cles from within the judiciary itself. We shall return to this in later sections of 
this chapter.
According to Law No. 2/2004 (article 67 subsection [1f]), unions have the 
power, if they so choose, to request the removal of the ad hoc judge they 
originally proposed, by requesting the court to ‘honorably discharge’ the 
particular judge. This power has, to date, only been exercised once, accord-
ing to Supreme Court judges quoted in an ILO report (Fajerman, 2011: 17). 
The request was granted, but the report does not mention the details of the 
case. The same report noted that two other ad hoc trade union-nominated 
judges at the Supreme Court had been at risk of being recalled by their trade 
union confederation, KSPSI, due to internal disputes that had split the con-
federation into two. This discharge did not, in the end, eventuate. Even in 
cases where unions may request that a judge be removed, this may not be 
implemented as the Supreme Court has the final authority as to whether to 
discharge the judge, and according to one Supreme Court official, it would 
usually decline to do this.70 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been particularly 
critical of this provision in the Law, calling it a violation of the principle of 
judges’ freedom, whereby judges should only be discharged if they have 
committed a criminal act, not merely because their performance is not con-
sidered acceptable to the organization which nominated them. Ad hoc judg-
es from union circles also expressed some concern about this provision, but 
to a lesser extent, tending to avoid controversy on this issue and stating that 
such a ‘recall’ mechanism should not be implemented arbitrarily.71
69 There were, however, exceptions, such as the ad hoc judge from union circles in the PHI 
Surabaya, East Java province. Although he was nominated by a union in East Java, (FSP 
KEP; an affi liate of the KSPSI), his background was from the employers’ organization 
Apindo. Union offi cials claimed that he had bribed the union to give him the recom-
mendation letter, after he failed to obtain one from his own organization (interview with 
Pujianto and Jamaludin, union offi cials in East Java, August 2009). When asked direct-
ly about this allegation, the ad hoc judge, Hardi Purwanto, replied ‘It was just a ticket 
to the nomination. I didn’t bribe the union, just gave them an expression of gratitude’ 
(interview with Hardi Purwanto, January 2010). 
70 Presentation by Suparno, the Director of Law and Judicature of the Supreme Court, 
December 2010. See also article 68 subsection (1.a) of Law No. 2/2004.
71 Personal communication with Junaidi, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, December 2010.
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The impartiality of ad hoc judges is a point of particular concern in this sys-
tem. During the 21-day training and selection process for ad hoc judges at 
the Supreme Court, the principle of impartiality is the most emphasized 
issue.72 The judges are told that from the moment they are appointed and 
begin to work for the PHI, they must ‘take off their clothes’ as union’s or 
employers’ representatives, and become totally independent and free from 
any intervention from their organizations. Ad hoc judges from both union 
and employer circles stated this in interviews, and emphasized that there 
was no obligation whatsoever for them to continue serving either the unions 
or the employers organizations which had nominated them.73 One ad hoc 
judge from union circles, for example, said: ‘I understand the union would 
expect us to work for their interests, but I am bound by the principle of 
impartiality. At the time we serve as judges, we have to take off our labour 
status.’
It is obvious from interviews that at the start of their appointment as judges, 
most ad hoc judges from union circles are concerned about this requirement. 
On the one hand, they feel they must take the side of the workers; on the oth-
er hand, they recognize their obligation to be impartial. This issue, appears 
to be less of a concern for ad hoc judges from employer circles, who often 
appear happy to remain more tightly associated with their employers’ orga-
nization. They gather regularly at annual ‘development conferences’ orga-
nized by Apindo, in order to ensure their ‘maintenance’ as their employers’ 
representatives at the PHI.74 As explained by Hasanuddin Rahman, Head of 
the Central Leadership Board of the Apindo, ‘They [the ad hoc judges from 
employer circles] need to be fostered as our representatives at the PHI.’75 
Having learned that the ad hoc judges from employers’ circles were still act-
ing as ‘representatives’ of Apindo’s interests in the PHI, some ad hoc judges 
from union circles became more relaxed and certain about maintaining their 
own impartial position. As noted by one ad hoc judge from union circles, 
‘We in fact become partial when we pretend to be impartial. So what I do is 
simply look at the law and try to do my best to apply it in my judgments.’76
72 The fi rst training for ad hoc judges was held in August 2005, at the Bidakara Hotel in 
Jakarta. The 240 candidates competing to be ad hoc judges were trained from 9 am to 
5 pm during weekdays, with weekends free. At the end of the training, 215 contenders 
were accepted as ad hoc judges, and distributed to 32 PHIs in 32 provinces in Indonesia. 
At the same time, in July and August 2005, 90 career judges from 32 District Courts were 
also trained to become PHI judges.
73 Interview with various ad hoc judges from union and employer circles, at the PHI Jakar-
ta, March 2006, just after the appointment ceremony at the PHI Jakarta.
74 2006 Activity Plan of the Industrial Relation Permanent Committee of the Indonesian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry’, undated, presented by Hasanudin Rahman of 
Apindo, August 2008.
75 Stated in the workshop of ad hoc judges from the Labour Union (Labour Judge) 
throughout Java and Sumatra, in Jakarta, organized by the Trade Union Rights Centre, 
August 2008.
76 Interview with Daulat Sihombing, ad hoc judge at the PHI Medan, June 2008.
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The issue of impartiality in the special courts, with workers and employ-
ers both seeking representation, is often problematic. As noted by Cordova 
(1984: 236), the experience of Latin American countries shows that attempt-
ing to have fair representation of employers and workers in the composition 
of judging panels is, in practice, useless, because in most cases it leads to 
judges systematically awarding their votes on behalf of their own organiza-
tion, and any claim to impartiality is merely a formality. In the case of Indo-
nesia, however, one could argue that despite the inherent problems with 
respect to the position of the ad hoc judges at the PHI, the system is nonethe-
less better and fairer than not having the ad hoc judges at all. We shall return 
to this point later.
In the first half of this chapter, we have discussed the PHI in general, includ-
ing its origin, the processes of labour dispute settlement through the PHI, 
its administration and associated problems, and the involvement of the 
unions and Apindo. The second half of the chapter will focus on how the 
court functions in practice, by looking at the context in which the court oper-
ates, including the daily activities of the judiciary, the transitional issue of 
the cases bestowed from the previous labour dispute settlement institution 
to the PHI, key problems associated with its procedures, the costs of cases, 
the length of time for handling case, and the consequences of these problems 
for labour.
2 The Industrial Relations Court (PHI) in practice
Law No. 2/2004 on Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement has been criti-
cized since it first appeared as a draft Bill, not only by labour unions and 
NGOs, but also by academics contracted by the ILO. Various labour unions, 
for example, argued that Law No. 2/2004 had been formulated based on 
‘false assumptions’ (see Tjandra and Suryomenggolo, 2004). First among 
these is the assumption that the opportunity to provide work (of any kind) 
for workers was considered ‘fortunate,’ due to the existing high levels of 
unemployment in the country. According to this assumption, it was accept-
able to boost the economy by increasing ‘flexibility’ in the labour market – 
including by relaxing regulations to make it easier to hire and fire workers, 
and by adopting efficient and cheap dispute settlement mechanisms.77 Sec-
ond is that the public judicial system was already reliable, unbiased, and 
‘clean’ of corruption; when in fact the court institutions had never been 
reformed from either within or without, and corrupt practices were still the 
norm. A third false assumption was that workers and labour unions had 
sufficient legal skills to take part in litigation processes at the court; when 
77 This assumption was closely related to the so-called ‘trade-off between job security and 
job opportunity’ policy, developed by the Indonesian government after the economic 
crisis in 1998 (Bappenas 2003, see also Chapter 4).
The Industrial Relations Disputes Court, quo vadis? 225
in reality many workers and unions did not understand the complex civ-
il litigation mechanisms. Together, these false assumptions resulted in the 
impairment of the role of labour unions in the process of labour dispute set-
tlement; and many union officials became so busy handling cases that they 
had insufficient time to organize their members; which is arguably the most 
important task to be undertaken by Indonesian labour unions.
Some labour law scholars, including those hired by the ILO to assess the 
draft Bill, expressed early concern about the Bill’s lack of conceptual clar-
ity (see Fenwick et al., 2002: 65-74). One example is that in the provisions 
for bipartite negotiations, the Law did not include a provision to specify 
how any agreed outcome of negotiations was to be enforced. Nor did the 
Law specify either a requirement of good faith negotiation, or any negative 
incentives to discourage either side from failing to implement the agreed 
outcome.78 Likewise, the decision to classify disputes about termination of 
employment (‘PHK’) in a separate category from disputes over rights has 
led to confusion; specifically, as to whether a dispute arising from dismiss-
al is a ‘dispute over rights’ or a ‘dispute over termination of employment’. 
This problem, scholars argued, needed to be considered carefully, because 
the PHI would have the ‘first and final’ jurisdiction for disputes over rights, 
but not for disputes over termination of employment. Fenwick et al. (2002: 
79-80) have described several additional shortcomings in the Bill. These 
included the lack of clarity around the power of the Court to give orders, 
which is arguably critical for the court to function.79 The Bill was also limited 
with respect to the types of labour disputes over which the PHI had jurisdic-
tion, with five important types of disputes left out of it, including disputes 
between a labour union and its members; disputes between workers and the 
government; disputes between employer organizations; disputes between 
an employer organization and its members; and internship disputes.80 Many 
of these early criticisms of the Bill were not heeded, with the points of con-
cern remaining as part of the final Law that was enacted. These concerns 
78 The ‘good faith negotiation’ concept is stipulated in the explanatory notes of Article 116 
(2) of Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower, stating that collective labour agreements ‘must be 
made in good faith’. The Law, however, does not state any requirement of good faith in 
relation to individual work agreements.
79 As noted by Fenwick et al. (2002: 80), the question of remedies was important particular-
ly in disputes over termination of employment, whereby there were international labour 
standards that made specifi c provision for particular remedies in the case of unfair dis-
missal, i.e. reinstatement. There was not, however, any clear provision as to whether the 
court had the power to undertake this reinstatement, nor how it could be exercised.
80 Much of the subject matter of industrial disputes in Law No. 2/2004 is dealt with in 
other legislation, in particular in Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower. However, none of 
the issues described here are covered by Law No. 13/2003. There is no report, as yet, 
concerning disputes between employers’ organizations and their members; or between 
employers’ organizations, and there is only one report regarding a dispute between 
trade unions in Tangerang, which was brought to the PHI (see Rokhani, 2008).
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have posed challenges for the PHI in practice and have the potential to affect 
confidence in the effectiveness of the new court.
2.1 Cases bestowed from the P4P/D
As described earlier, the PHI was established to replace the earlier P4P/D 
(Central/Regional Labour Dispute Settlement Committee), the govern-
ment’s institution to resolve labour disputes based on Law No. 22/1957. As 
stipulated by Article 124 (1) of Law No. 2/2004, the P4P/D was required 
to continue to carry out its function until the PHI was established. Further, 
based on Article 124 (2) of Law No. 2/2004, once the PHI was established 
any disputes over industrial relations or termination of employment which 
had already been submitted to the P4P/D, but not yet adjudicated were to 
be settled by the PHI at the local district court. Any disputes from the P4P/D 
that had already been rejected but were in the process of being appealed by 
one or both of the parties were to be settled by the Supreme Court. The new 
Law, however, did not provide clear guidance as to how exactly this transi-
tion from the P4P/D to the PHI would be managed. The transition posed a 
significant problem, given that thousands of unresolved cases were put on 
hold after the official dissolution of the P4P/D, while waiting for the PHI to 
become fully operational.
The numbers of unresolved cases bestowed on the PHIs by the P4P/D 
varied by region, but were frequently high. Those on the PHI Jakarta, for 
instance, during the transitional time between January and September 
2006, reached approximately 138 cases. This was in addition to around 130 
newly submitted cases, bringing the total to around 268. In 2007, only 100 
cases were decided. The problem, as explained by a substitute registrar at 
the PHI Jakarta, is that cases bestowed from the P4P/D were not prioritized 
by the PHI. Instead, priority was given to newly submitted cases; because 
the newly established PHI wanted to be sure to meet the 50-day time limit 
for examination of newly submitted cases, to be sure that decisions were 
issued on time. No limitation of deliberation was imposed for cases that had 
been bestowed from the P4P/D, either in Law No. 2/2004 or in the Techni-
cal Instructions for the Implementation of Law No. 2/2004 as issued by the 
Supreme Court later on.81 This led to very long delays for the parties con-
cerned.
81 Decisions of the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court Nos. 034 and 035 in 2006. It was only 
in 2009 that the Supreme Court started to pay attention to this issue, by limiting the time 
for judgments to be reached (see the Supreme Court Annual Report 2009).
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According to a 2010 report from the Bandung District Court,82 during 2006 
the PHI Bandung received 125 cases from the P4P/D Bandung region. Cases 
that had been decided by the P4P/D’s regional committees but had been 
appealed, along with all cases awaiting either decision or appeal through 
the P4P/P’s central committee, had [as of the time the report was published] 
never even been bestowed. During this time the PHI Bandung received a 
large number of review applications for P4P/D decisions, and in response, 
on 17 July 2006 the PHI Bandung, sent a letter to the Head of Manpower 
Office Bandung, requesting that the mentioned cases be bestowed imme-
diately. The aforementioned 2010 report from the Bandung District Court, 
however, did not mention whether or not the Manpower Office met the 
request. Either way, the cases formerly handled by the P4P/D were left in 
limbo, with no clarity as to when, how or even if they would be addressed, 
given the dissolution of the previously-responsible institution and the ongo-
ing issues with regard to the PHI not having received the cases, let alone 
examined them.
For new cases being handled by the PHI, disputes over termination of 
employment were the most frequent, as shown for instance in table 6.2 below 
for cases submitted to the PHI Tanjung Karang, Lampung. As can be seen, 
very few disputes over interests, or disputes over rights, were submitted to 
the PHI; and not a single dispute among trade unions. By far most cases 
(90%) were submitted by workers. A similar situation existed for PHIs in oth-
er regions; which had also been mirrored the situation in the P4P/D, where 
the majority of cases submitted by workers rather than employers. The 
confusion and delays associated with the transition between the two insti-
tutions placed workers – most of whom were disputing their dismissals –
in an extremely difficult situation.
Table 6.2: Cases at the PHI Tanjung Karang, Lampung (2006 – 2010)
Year Number 
of cases












2006 9 - 1 8 - 8 1
2007 19 1 - 18 - 17 2
2008 10 1 - 9 - 9 1
2009 13 - 1 12 - 11 2
2010 11 - - 11 10 1
TOTAL 62 2 2 58 - 55 7
82 Accessed through http://pn-bandung.go.id/uploads/profi l%20phi%20bandung2.pdf 
in December 2010. This  report is exceptional, as in general, Indonesian courts have not 
yet developed such transparency in policy.
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2.2 Which procedural laws?
With a few exceptions as specifically set forth in Law No. 2/2004, the proce-
dural law applicable in the PHI is civil procedure (Article 57). The legal basis 
for the procedures at the PHI, based on both Law No. 2/2004 and the Deci-
sion of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (as the implementing and case 
administration guidelines during the transition between the old and new 
systems), consists of four key instruments, namely:
1. The Herziene Indonesisch Reglement (HIR) or the Revised Indonesian Reg-
ulation (Staatsblad 1848 No. 16; Staatsblad 1941 No. 44), applicable in Java 
and Madura;
2. The Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten (RBg) or the Outer Islands Regulation 
(Staatsblad 1927 No. 227), applicable in areas outside Java and Madura83;
3. Law No. 2/; and
4. Decision of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court No. KMA/034/SK/
IV/2006 regarding the Instructions for the Implementation of Law No. 
2/2004, and Decision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court No. 
KMA/035/SK/1V/2006 concerning the Guidelines for the Implementa-
tion of Case Administration at the Industrial Relations Court, both is-
sued on April 19, 2006.
In practice, there has been significant variation between different PHIs, and 
even among different panels of judges within the same PHI, with respect to 
interpretation and implementation of procedural law. With respect to dif-
ferences between judges, career judges tend to comply closely with the civil 
procedural law from het HIR or the RBg, while ad hoc judges are more likely 
to make ‘adjustments’: ad hoc judges from union circles favouring workers’ 
interests, and ad hoc judges from employers circles favouring employers. 
Key issues, which were decided differently by different PHIs, include the 
question as to whether particular Heads of Personnel, or Human Resourc-
es Development (HDR) officials, are entitled to represent their employer 
organization at the PHI (as regulated under Article 87 of Law No. 2/2004).84 
Some panels of judges in the PHI (including the PHI Bandung) rejected any 
HRD officials from representing their employers if they could not present 
a membership card to the Indonesian Bar Association85; while other PHIs 
(such as the PHI Jakarta) were content to accept the officials, with the inten-
tion of ‘expediting and facilitating the examination process at the PHI’, 
and considered their actions to be ‘an existing practice in the civil litigation 
83 The HIR and RBg were the main procedural law used in the civil and criminal court 
in the Netherlands Indies. In content they were generally the same. After Indonesia’s 
independence they continued to be used as part of the colonial legal legacy. In 1981, 
Law No. 8/1981 on the Code of Criminal Procedures replaced the criminal procedure 
part of the HIR.
84 This issue had previously been complained about by Apindo, see statement by Djiman-
to, Apindo Vice President, as quoted in HukumOnline, 24 September 2007.
85 Interview with Tony Suryana, ad hoc judge at the PHI Bandung, July 2007.
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mechanism’.86 Similarly, some PHIs prohibited trade union officials at the 
branch level from representing their members at the plant level, even when 
no plant level union existed. Another issue that was addressed differently by 
different PHIs was whether or not workers who were still working for their 
employer could become witnesses for the same employer in the PHI. Some 
PHIs chose to allow workers to be a witness for their employer, although as a 
witness the employee was not sworn in on the ground that they were depen-
dent and potentially under the influence of their employer. Other PHIs did 
allow workers to be sworn in; while still other PHIs prohibited such witness-
es entirely. As stated by Djimanto, Apindo’s Vice-President, ‘This ambiguity 
has created confusion in practice’ (HukumOnline, 24 September 2007).
In relation to these issues, it is interesting to look at the Supreme Court and 
its role in promoting uniform interpretation of the law. Despite being con-
sidered generally to have played a role in this regard, the Supreme Court 
has also been criticized for being too ‘formally legal’ in its approach – for 
instance by sticking closely to the civil litigation procedural laws, while 
neglecting the actual social conditions surrounding the cases.87 In the case of 
whether or not branch level union officials could represent their members at 
the plant level, for instance, panels of judges in the PHI Jakarta held different 
opinions. Some judges allowed the representation, based on the argument 
that in the current situation it remained difficult for workers to establish 
unions at plant level, and thus they were likely to become members of the 
union at the branch level instead; and besides, the Trade Union Law No. 
21/2000 stipulated that workers could become members of unions at both 
levels. Other judges, however, did not allow such representation, based on 
the argument that branch level union officials had no direct responsibility 
for plant level workers. The Supreme Court generally took the latter posi-
tion, and cases that supported the former position were normally overruled 
at the casation level. Despite this, some judges, mostly from union circles, 
urged each other to stand by their decisions to allow such practice, even 
though they knew the Supreme Court would likely reject the decision. As 
one ad hoc judge from the PHI Jakarta explained: ‘This is not merely proce-
dural law we hold, but also justice. I think the Supreme Court is wrong on 
this issue, and it also concerns our principles.’88
86 Interview with Juanda Pangaribuan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, August 2007.
87 I am grateful to Juanda Pangaribuan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, who brought this 
issue to my attention.
88 Interview with Juanda Pangaribuan, August 2009.
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2.3 Law No. 2/2004 versus HIR/RBg?
Compared to the regular civil litigation procedural laws applied in the 
civil court (HIR/RBg), there are several procedures stipulated in Law No. 
2/2004 which in practice have led to problems; especially when judges 
have emphasized the HIR/RBg rather than the Law. One of the most con-
troversial issues for workers and employers is related to the injunction as 
specified in Article 96 of Law No. 2/2004. This article states: ‘If in the first 
court session it is decidedly proven that the employer is not performing 
his/her obligations as meant in Article 155 (3) of Law No. 13/2003 con-
cerning Manpower, then the Chair of the court session should immediately 
pass the injunction in the form of an order to pay the wage and other rights 
that are normally received by the concerned worker/labourer.’ Article 155 
of Law No. 13/2003 guards against arbitrary termination of employment, 
stipulating that any termination of employment without the decision of the 
industrial relations dispute settlement should be considered ‘null and void’ 
(subsection (1)); and as long as there is no such decision, both employers 
and workers should continue to perform their obligations (subsection (2)): 
workers to work; and employers to pay their wages. However, the employ-
er is allowed to suspend a worker who is in the process of having his/her 
employment terminated, although until a decision is reached, the employer 
must continue to pay the worker’s wages and other entitlements that he/
she normally receives (subsection (3)).
The problem in practice is that there are not many injunctions passed, as 
judges normally rely on what is stipulated in article 185 (1) of the HIR, 
which states: ‘Decisions of judges that are not the final verdict, though they 
be stated in the trial, are not made separately, but only recorded in the min-
utes of the trial.’ Such a provision could be interpreted to mean that the 
civil court does not recognise the injunction; and since the PHI is under the 
jurisdiction of the civil court, Article 96 of Law No. 2/2004 is effectively not 
applicable in the PHI. This special procedure in Law No. 2/2004 is slightly 
different from the one recognized in the HIR and others; but according to 
many union activists, the PHI judges tend to adhere relatively strictly to 
the HIR, rather than trying to implement the procedures in Law No. 2/2004 
– which arguably is more protective towards labour. Many ad hoc judges 
from union circles confess that they have difficulties in implementing the 
provision on injunction, because other judges, both career judges and ad 
hoc judges from employer circles, tend to avoid it. ‘So it’s like two against 
one, and I always lose,’ said one ad hoc judge. Some other judges, as report-
ed by the ILO (Fajerman, 2011: 20), justified their reluctance to implement 
the provision on injunction by reasoning that there may be little practical 
impact either way, and such an attempt may be costly and time consum-
ing, as ‘employers generally ignore such decisions and workers are forced, 
due to the PHI’s lack of execution powers, to petition to the district court to 
ensure enforcement.’
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Another issue of concern is the debate as to whether or not a dwangsom 
(daily fine) should be imposed in the PHI’s decisions. The dwangsom was 
considered a way by which the law enabled the enforcement of the court 
decision. One viewpoint on this issue, held for instance by a Chief Justice 
from the PHI Tanjung Pinang, Riau Islands, was that a dwangsom could not 
be imposed through the PHI’s decisions, because a rule existed which stat-
ed that a dwangsom could not be imposed in cases of monetary claims. This 
rule referred to Article 606a Rv (Rechtsvordering),89 which provides reference 
on such cases in civil litigation procedures.90 It may be true that many PHI 
cases and judgments deal with monetary claims for compensation or sever-
ance payment; but not all cases do. Some ad hoc judges from union circles 
held the opinion that a dwangsom could be imposed through the PHI’s deci-
sions, arguing that not all claims in labour disputes were related to money; 
for example the claim for reinstatement in cases of the arbitrary termination 
of employment. They were aware that companies were often reluctant to 
implement verdicts to reinstate their workers unless they were forced to do 
so, even in unfair dismissal cases.91 Yet, even in such cases judges remained 
less than enthusiastic about the dwangsom and to the present, PHI judgments 
with dwangsom in them remain rare.92
2.4 ‘The case is free, but costly’
In accordance with Article 58 of Law No. 2/2004, in litigation processes at 
the PHI the litigants whose lawsuits are worth not more than Rp 150 mil-
lion are not subject to payment of any expenses, including execution expens-
89 This states: ‘All of a judge’s decision contain a penalty for something other than paying 
some amount of money, then it can be determined that all or any times the sentenced 
does not meet the punishment, to him should be handed over an amount of money 
which amount set out in the decision of the judge, and the money called dwangsom (daily 
fi ne).’ This translation will not be understood clearly by English readers – a better trans-
lation may need to be provided. In particular, there are several grammatical errors.
90 Rv (Reglement van de Rechsverordering, Staatblad 1849 No. 63) was a regulation for civil
litigation procedures during the Dutch colonial time specially applied to European and 
Foreign Orientals in the court. Indonesian civil courts still use it as a supplement to 
HIR/RBg.
91 See the ILO Termination of Employment Convention No. 158, adopted in 1982, which 
entering into force on 24 November 1985; and the Termination of Employment Recom-
mendation No. 166 in 1982.
92 One of the fi rst such decisions was a judgment from the PHI Serang, Banten. Apart from 
the order of reinstatement of the worker, the ruling also imposed a ‘dwangsom’ to the 
amount of Rp 400,000.-/day for each day the company was not willing to implement 
the verdict voluntarily (see PHI Serang Judgment No. 18/G/2006/PHI.SRG, in Tjandra 
and Pangaribuan (Eds.) 2007: 987-1027) One ad hoc judge from union circles who played 
a key role in this decision claimed that he had to ‘really struggle’ to ensure the verdict. 
This judge observed that his colleagues in the panel of judges (the career judge and the 
ad hoc judge from employers circles) were both inclined to reject the worker’s claims 
before looking closely at the case (interview with Hotlan Pardosi, July 2007).
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es.93 Based on an a contrario interpretation, if a lawsuit is worth more than 
Rp l50 million, it is subject to payment of certain expenses. Problems arise in 
practice, however, because for lawsuits worth more than Rp 150 million, the 
actual amount of expenses to be paid was not set forth expressly in the Law; 
leading to ambiguity and frequent examples of discrimination. According to 
the Technical Instructions for the Implementation of Law No. 2/2004, issued 
by the Supreme Court, the amount is to be stipulated by the Chief Justice of 
the PHI (ex officio the Chief Justice of the District Court), and this instruction 
has often led to differences in interpretation among PHIs in different regions. 
Problems also arose for cases worth less than Rp 150 million. Although these 
are supposed to be exempt from fees, field observations indicate that in prac-
tice, fees are are being imposed unlawfully on the person filing the case, 
varying from Rp 1 million to at least Rp 1.5 million. One lawyer from a law 
firm in Jakarta claimed that he was forced to pay case fees of Rp 1.8 million 
for one labour case handled by himself (although the case was worth less 
than Rp 150 million), simply because he represented an employer.94
Although the intention of the law is to assist workers by not imposing case 
fees for many cases, the law appears far from achieving its goal. The value 
of Rp 150 million is relative, depending on the individual payee. For cases 
submitted by individual workers, or small numbers of workers, the afore-
mentioned figure is substantial. However, if a labour case involves hundreds 
or even thousands of workers, the total value will reach well beyond Rp 150 
million, although the individual contributions, divided among many, will be 
small. Therefore, cases involving large numbers of workers are subject to case 
fees. One strategy often used by union officials is to split a case into several 
lawsuits, with each lawsuit not exceeding the maximum value allowed for 
exemption from case fees. The problem is that then these lawsuits are dis-
tributed among different panels of judges, and there is the risk that the judg-
ments may different from one panel to another.95 There are no data available 
to indicate how often this approach is actually adopted in the PHI, but one 
ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta claimed it occurred ‘quite often’, and one 
union official said that he always used the strategy in cases involving many 
workers (where the amount exceeds the limit of Rp 150 million). This official 
claimed that since 2006, he had filed lawsuits using this strategy for about 20 
93 According to Franky Tan (interview in June 2008), who was one of the workers’ repre-
sentatives involved in the ‘Tim Kecil’ (‘small team’) during the formulation of the Law 
(see Chapter 4), such an exemption from case fees for cases worth a maximum Rp 150 
million was a result of a compromise during the deliberation process, as there had been 
no such provision in the original draft. In the beginning, workers wanted the amount to 
be Rp 300 million, arguing that under the previous system of the P4P/D, there had been 
no fee at all for cases to be submitted. The amount of Rp 150 million was proposed by 
the Minister of Manpower, Jacob Nuwa Wea, as a ‘third way,’ to reach a balance between 
what workers demanded, and the regular practice in the civil court.
94 Interview with a lawyer from RSD Law Firm on September 28, 2006.
95 Interview with union advocate Timboel Siregar, July 2007.
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cases, to various PHIs; and he claimed that many other union officials, as well 
as employers in mass dismissal cases, often used similar strategies.96 Some 
ad hoc judges, especially those from busy PHIs like Jakarta, have labeled 
these strategies as ‘cheating’; and have attempted to deal with such practices 
by holding regular meetings between panels of judges to coordinate their 
approach and avoid inconsistencies in their judgments for split cases.97 Inter-
estingly, in some PHIs with relatively few cases to adjudicate, for example 
PHI Yogyakarta, the strategy of splitting cases seems to be well liked by ad 
hoc judges who even suggest that the plaintiffs split their case.98 One reason 
for this may be, that the ad hoc judges get extra income for each case they 
handle; receiving Rp 250,000,- in ‘case support’ (‘tunjangan perkara’).
To date, the regulation of fees for civil cases in Indonesia is set forth in Arti-
cle 121 (4) of the HIR or Article 145 (4) RBg, which state that the listing of 
the case in the case registry may only occur if the parties have paid a sum 
of money to cover registration fees, summoning fees, and fees for notifica-
tion to the parties. The article does not, however, mention a specific amount 
for case fees nor a sanction imposed on parties committing case fees manip-
ulation. As specifically ruled for the PHI, and as further conveyed by the 
Supreme Court Junior Chairman for Civil Law, the state had provided funds 
amounting to Rp 7.5 million for each industrial relation dispute case submit-
ted to and examined by the PHI.99 In practice, however, various additional 
fees needed to be paid by the parties, such as fees for the legalization of the 
power of attorney and legalization of evidence (the official amount being 
Rp 11,000,-100), and several other ‘unofficial’ charges such as: ‘folder fees’ (for 
folders for the case documents), ‘typing fees’ (charge for typing the deci-
sions101), ‘electricity fees’ (for typing the decision at home), ‘copying fees’ (for 
the copying of decisions when asked by parties), fees for ‘delivering briefs to 
the Supreme Court’, and other non-specific fees.
The total figure for unofficial fees varies highly between cases, and depends 
on who the litigants are, and who handles the case. If, for example, the case 
was filed by a worker and was handled by the worker him/herself person-
96 Personal communication with Timboel Siregar, August 2008.
97 Interview with Junaedi, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, July 2007.
98 Interview with ad hoc judge at PHI Yogyakarta. The PHI Yogyakarta receives only some 
5 cases every year.
99 ‘MA: Biaya Perkara Bukan Pungli’ [‘Supreme Court: Case Fee is not a Bribe’] (hukumon-
line.com 16 August 2006)
100 In June 2005, Pos Indonesia Ltd. issued a Circular Letter stating that the fee for the legal-
ization of items of evidence at Court was Rp 5,000.- per item, in addition to a Rp 6,000,- 
stamp duty for each item of evidence.
101 In reality, the substitute registrar only asks for the soft-copies of the documents submit-
ted by the parties, which are subsequently merged to be included in the judgment. In 
addition, the ad hoc judges usually typed the main points of the judgment personally, 
not the registrar.
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ally, or if he/she was accompanied by a union official, the unofficial fees 
would be relatively small, or even zero. However, for cases filed by employ-
ers, especially if handled by professional lawyers, higher unofficial fees were 
likely imposed. As one professional lawyer at the PHI explained, the sub-
stitute registrars were the primary drivers of this practice. According to a 
substitute registrar at the PHI Jakarta,102 no unofficial fees were imposed for 
duties such as legalization (see table 6.3 below). However, for some cases, 
the registrar admitted that fees were allowed, insofar as parties paid them 
‘voluntarily’. In his own explanation: ‘to help cover the operational costs of 
the court.’ These remarks were made as part of a complaint about the lack of 
attention to the new court from the District Court, with the registrar giving 
examples that the ad hoc judges’ room still had no air conditioner, although 
it had at that point been in use for a couple of years already.
Table 6.3: Details of official and unofficial fees at the PHI Jakarta (September-October 2006)103
Types of Expenses Official Fee Unofficial Fee
Legalization of power of attorney None Up to Rp 50,000,-
Legalization of evidence at post office Rp 11,000,- per piece 
of evidence
Often requested again 
at the court
‘Folder Fees’ None Rp 50,000,-
‘Typing Fees’ None
Fees for the copying of the decision, by 
the registrar (‘for electricity’ because the 
registrar types the Decision at home)
None Rp 100,000,- (or more, 
depending on the 
person taking the 
copy; e.g. lawyers pay 
more than workers)
Fee for delivering appeal brief to the 
Supreme Court
None Rp 50,000,-
‘Miscellaneous’ Fees None Rp 159,000,-
For some parties, especially workers, the establishment of PHIs in provincial 
capitals only was a major handicap. For workers who live in Bekasi, West 
Java, for example, their homes are closer to Jakarta than to Bandung, (Bekasi 
is 30 km east of Jakarta). However, they have to file their lawsuits in Band-
ung, (180 km from Bekasi), since the PHI in West Java is located in Band-
ung, the capital of West Java. The travel costs from Bekasi to Bandung to 
attend hearings are about nine times higher than to Jakarta. This is obviously 
burdensome, especially when compared to the previous dispute settlement 
mechanism under the P4P/D, which was free and was always held near the 
parties’ own domiciles. These financial, travel and time costs associated with 
the PHI system are discouraging workers from bringing their cases to the 
102 Interview with Asri Tajudin, substitute registrar at the PHI in Jakarta, September 2006.
103 Data collected at the PHI Jakarta (September-October 2006).
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PHI, instead often forcing them to choose bipartite resolution directly with 
the employers, although the amount they tend to receive in compensation 
through this avenue is typically much lower that that stipulated by law.104 
Thus, as one union official observed, ‘Although the case fee is free, bringing 
cases to the PHI is costly and burdensome, especially for workers.’105
2.5 Time for case proceedings
As stipulated by Articles 103 and 115 of Law No. 2/2004, the PHI must settle 
an industrial relations dispute within less than 50 working days after the 
date of the first court session; while the Supreme Court must settle the case 
within 30 working days. Almost all the parties involved with the PHI, how-
ever, report much more time for a case to reach a final decision, both at the 
PHI and, in particular, the Supreme Court. In an evaluation of the PHI’s 
performance, the Chairman of Apindo, Sofyan Wanandi, blamed the large 
number of cases at the PHI, observing that this will ‘create conflicts between 
employers and unions, and may create a mess [in the system].’ (Kompas, 6 
February 2008). In contrast, Junior Chairman of Special Civil Cases of the 
Supreme Court, Kaddir Mappong, blamed Law No. 2/2004 itself, which 
he stated: added an additional burden of cases to the already overloaded 
Supreme Court (Hukumonline, 29 September 2007). He claimed that ‘The 
30 days requirement of case-handling at the Supreme Court is impossible. 
Even for the commercial court, which gave us 60 days, we could not reach 
decisions on time’. To resolve this problem, Mappong suggested an amend-
ment of Law No. 2/2004 to extend the time limit, which he claimed would 
be more realistic for the court.
Further investigations into the situation at the PHIs and the Supreme Court 
indicated that case handling at the district court level was relatively on 
schedule (approximately 30 days per case); but that it was at the Supreme 
Court that cases tended to take very long. This was due to time delays in 
internal case administration within the Supreme Court itself. A conservative 
estimation suggested that it would take at least eight months for one case 
to go through the full process, from registration to decision, in the Supreme 
Court (see table 6.4 below). Such an amount of time was considered normal 
at the Supreme Court, and despite efforts to cut time and accelerate the pro-
cess, there appeared to be little that Supreme Court judges could do to avoid 
104 Interview with Machmud Pedmana, a union offi cial in Karawang, West Java, September 
2007. See also the ‘Joint Statement’ resulting from the Labour Law Practioners’ Confer-
ence, Cipayung, 5 March 2007, organized by the TURC and ACILS (American Center 
for International Labor Solidarity), gathering around 50 labour law practitioners from 
various unions, labour NGO activists, ad hoc judges, etc. claiming that labour dispute 
settlement under Law No. 2/2004 is ‘not quick, inappropriate, unjust, and expensive’, 
causes widespread labour rights violation and forces many workers to reach ‘under the 
table agreement’ with employers.
105 Interview with Indra Munaswar, August 2008
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the delays, as they involved established stages; the same stages as other cases 
in the Supreme Court.106 Some union activists claimed that in many cases, the 
time needed at the Supreme Court was even longer than eight months (see 
Munaswar, 2008).107
Table 6.4: Stages and times for case handling at the Supreme Court
No. Stages Time lenght
1 Administration Two months
2 Directorate for Civil Case (analyzer and registrar)
3 Special Civil Case Registrar 
4 Junior Chairman of the Supreme Court on Special Civil Cases 
(choosing the member of the panel of judges – consisting of three 
people: one career Supreme Court Judge and two ad hoc judges)
5 Chair of the panel of judges (career Supreme Court Judge) Two months
6 Reader 1 (Pembaca 1 – P1) – member of the panel of judges (ad hoc 
Judge from employer circles)
7 Reader 2 (Pembaca 2 – P2) – member of the panel of judges (ad hoc 
Judge from union circles)
8 Reader 3 (Pembaca 3 – P3), Chair of the panel
9 Meeting of the panel for case deliberation and the reading of the 
decision
Two months
10 Operator (typing the decision)
11 Registrar (correction of the decision)
12 Operator (revision of the decision)
13 Reader 1 and Reader 2 (further revision of the decision)
14 Chair of the panel (further revision of the decision)
15 Signing (Reader 1, Reader 2 and Reader 3)
16 Decision finalization (by the Special Civil Case Registrar) Two months
17 Expediting the decision to parties through the PHI/District Court 
(Directorate for Civil Case)107
TOTAL Eight months
But even at the PHI of first instance there are delays. Article 106 of Law No. 
2/2004 stipulates that the substitute registrar must have produced a copy 
of the judgment within 14 working days after it is signed. Article 107 then 
requires the registrar of the district court to dispatch the copy to the par-
ties within seven working days after receipt of the judgment. In practice, as 
noted by one union activist (Munaswar, 2008), two months after a judgment 
106 Interview with Fauzan, an ad hoc judge at the Supreme Court from union circles, May 
2009.
107 The time needed to expedite the decision from the district court in which the case was 
registered to the parties takes twp additional months.
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has been read, it has often still not been signed by the judges – sometimes 
because the chair of the panel is too busy with his duties as a career judge.108 
As Munaswar has noted, ‘This situation is detrimental to workers, because 
it hampers the preparations they need in order to prepare for cassation or a 
counter memory cassation. If you encounter this problem, then the only way 
to resolve it quickly is to ask for “good service” from the substitute regis-
trar, of course with some money, in order to get a photocopy of the unsigned 
judgment, to be able to draft the cassation document.’
The problems with time delays continue once an appeal is made. As noted 
by an ad hoc judge at the PHI Tanjung Pinang, Riau Islands, after an appeal 
has been requested, the person requesting the appeal must wait at least four 
months before the documents are sent from the PHI Tanjung Pinang to the 
Supreme Court (see Agung 2009: 89). Indeed, in one case at the PHI Tanjung 
Pinang the documents were only sent to the Supreme Court after a 1.5 years 
delay. The reasons given were a lack of substitute registrars at the PHI Tan-
jung Pinang, combined with unwillingness on the part of the substitute reg-
istrars available to work on the PHI cases.109 For them, handling the PHI cases 
was an additional burden and cost, over and above their regular work. One 
judge observed that ‘Going to the PHI, which was located far from the District 
Court where they have to go every morning, requires extra costs for transpor-
tation; and there were no subsidies from the District Court for this.’110
Many ad hoc judges and union activists from various regions shared the 
experiences and opinions described above with respect to time delays. The 
Indonesian judiciary is notorious for lengthy processes (see Pompe, 2005); 
and delays are clearly the norm. But arguably many cases, especially those 
involving workers, are also bound by requirements and standards devel-
108 Ad hoc judges cannot sign the judgement, as according to the guidelines, the chair of the 
panel of judges is required to sign the form fi rst.
109 According to Article 77 (1) Law No. 2/2004, registrars at the PHI are appointed from 
‘Civil Servants of Government Agencies that are responsible in the manpower sector’, 
i.e., the P4P/D in the regions, particularly the former registrars (panitera) there. In prac-
tice, not many former P4P/D registrars wanted to be assigned to the PHI. One key rea-
son mentioned by them was lower allowances. In the P4P/D they had been ‘registrars’ 
and employees of the Regional Government; whereas in the PHI they were only ‘substi-
tute registrars’.
110 According to Agung (2009: 88-90), an ad hoc judge in the PHI Tanjung Pinang, this situa-
tion, combined with the high travel costs for ferries between Batam city on Batam island 
(where most of industries were located) and Tanjung Pinang city (Bintan Island; where 
the PHI is located) contributed to the declining number of cases brought to the PHI Tan-
jung Pinang. This judge also explained that local unions had sent a petition to the Min-
ister of Manpower and the Supreme Court about this issue, and asked for a PHI to be 
established in Batam instead of Tanjung Pinang, or for trials to be held on site by judges 
who could visit Batam. The Minister replied that this could not be done, since the Law 
stated that ‘the PHI had to be in the capital of the province’ (as did the Supreme Court). 
The Minister did not address the possibility of amending the Law to address this obvi-
ous problem.
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oped internationally, for example by the ILO, through its conventions and 
recommendations. ILO Convention No. 151 (1978) concerning Labour Rela-
tions, for example, emphasizes that labour dispute settlement procedures 
need to be ‘established in such manner as to ensure the confidence of the 
parties involved’. Likewise, ILO Recommendation No. 92 (1952) concerning 
Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration states that ‘The procedure should 
be free of charge and expeditious’, and adds that ‘such time limits for the 
proceedings as may be prescribed by national laws or regulations should 
be fixed in advance and kept to a minimum.’ PHI practices in relation to the 
time for case handling clearly deviate greatly from these international stan-
dards, which, eventually, will be felt most severely by Indonesia’s workers.
3 Consequences of the PHI for labour
In addition to the problems discussed above, the PHI system has experi-
enced other problems as well. One significant issue involves the rules of 
evidence and the burden of proof, and associated problems with the execu-
tion of the PHI’s decisions. While this will be discussed in detail later, one 
important initial point here is the question of whether ‘pure’ civil procedural 
law must be applied in labour dispute settlement. As the founders of the 
PHI system emphasized from the beginning, as a discipline, labour law is 
an effort to surpass the dichotomy between private law and public law (see 
also Hepple, 1996). Unlike common private law labour law and labour rela-
tions are about human work, which cannot be separated from workers as 
human beings. Therefore, if the labour law courts focus too much on civil 
litigation procedures, this could hamper the disputing parties’ access to a 
fair and sound labour dispute settlement; particularly for the weaker party 
(usually the workers). The following discussion will provide a more detailed 
analysis of the consequences for labour if such is the case.
3.1 Conceptual inadequacy and enforcement issues
As described earlier, Law No. 2/2004 is conceptually inadequate in some 
respects, and contains several confusing provisions. One of the most obvi-
ous and recurring problems has been the law’s separation of disputes into 
different categories; specifically, the distinction between disputes over ter-
mination of employment, and disputes over rights – which has given rise to 
confusion over jurisdiction, with judges uncertain whether a dispute aris-
ing from termination of employment should be considered a ‘dispute over 
rights’ or a ‘dispute over dismissal of employment’. Actual practices indicate 
that cases brought before the PHI that initially involve disputes over rights 
can suddenly be transformed into disputes over termination of employment. 
As reported by one union alliance, labeling a dispute as ‘a dispute over ter-
mination of employment’ has become an easy way for a company to prevent 
its workers from fighting directly for their rights (see, for example, KSN, 
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2009). This situation has forced workers and their unions to find other ways 
to redress their grievances, such as through initiating criminal legal proce-
dures, in preference to the regular industrial dispute settlement mechanism.
One well-known case that exemplifies this issue is one involving a Japanese 
subsidiary company, King Jim Indonesia Ltd., located in Pasuruan, East 
Java. This employer dismissed four union leaders over a strike they had led, 
and when the case was brought before the criminal court, the court found 
the employer guilty of violation of trade union rights, leading to imprison-
ment of the company’s director (Tjandra, 2010). This is a clear example of 
how workers and unions can become ‘fed up’ with the problems inherent 
in the regular (PHI) dispute settlement mechanism, and choose alternative 
strategies, which they claim to be more effective and practical. Using mass 
action as a tool to enforce the rights they enjoyed based on the existing laws, 
workers and unions have often avoided the standard mechanisms for ‘dis-
pute’ (perselisihan) resolution, and instead chosen to attempt to enforce the 
law through focusing on rights ‘violation’ (pelanggaran) cases. This strate-
gy allowed them to alleviate their concerns around enforcement; with the 
labour rights enforcement system seen as problematic and not to be trusted. 
Workers believed that focusing on ‘violation’ procedures was a safer and 
more reliable approach than focusing on ‘dispute’ mechanisms, not least 
because there are stricter penal sanctions associated with violations of law.
According to the workers, the involvement of the PHI in the rights viola-
tion cases would have distorted the enforcement of labour law, and diverted 
attention away from the real issue at stake: the violation of trade union rights 
manifested in the dismissal of four union leaders. This would have allowed 
the company to hide behind the dispute process at the PHI, while its crimes 
continued with impunity. To prevent this, the workers focused on the police 
and the public prosecutor and succeeded; the employer was eventually 
jailed for 18 months for unlawfully dismissing union leaders in contraven-
tion of the Trade Union Law No. 21/2000.
But a major dilemma remains. Despite the unprecedented success of getting 
an employer into jail for misconduct against union officials, the four union 
leaders who had been unfairly dismissed were unable to get their jobs back, 
and, in addition, the initial problem of collective bargaining rights remained 
unresolved. The criminal justice system can not provide solutions to issues 
involving the dismissal of workers and the collective bargaining rights of 
union’ – these require resolution through the system of labour dispute settle-
ment with the PHI as the main institution. This system, as already noted, is 
seen as highly problematic by workers, partly due to its conceptual inad-
equacy, and partly because of the problems surrounding the enforcement of 
workers’ and trade unions’ rights.
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3.2 ‘Pure’ civil procedural law?
As already noted, civil litigation procedure, as regulated in the HIR/RBg 
and applied in the general civil court, also covers all court hearings in the 
PHI. One of the most important principles in the HIR/RBg is the passiv-
ity of the judge: the judges should be passive with respect to the evidence 
brought before them, and are not allowed to be proactive with respect to giv-
ing input and advice to the disputing parties. This passivity must be upheld 
even when it is clear to the judge that workers are not familiar with the civil 
litigation procedures applied at the PHI, and their case risks being annulled 
(see Batserin, 2009: 27-43).111
Field observations have shown that when ad hoc judges first examine the 
briefs of labour lawsuits, the main challenge they face is the incomplete pro-
cedural and standard requirements for a civil lawsuit. These include issues 
concerning power of attorney and formulation of lawsuits, i.e. consistency 
between posita (legal facts) and petitum (legal remedies); litigation techniques 
and techniques for raising questions; as well as incomplete lawsuit require-
ments with respect to evidence, witnesses and the like. The lack of under-
standing surrounding these formalities and requirements often results in 
the annulment of lawsuits by the court. As noted by an ad hoc judge at the 
Supreme Court, of 1000 appeal cases brought to the Supreme Court in 2008, 
the majority, particularly those filed by workers or unions, were overruled 
and annulled, due only to accidental errors in formalities (Fauzan, 2009: 95). 
Although in cases of annulment based on formalities, the procedural law 
allows the plaintiffs to file the lawsuits again (after revision), this tends not 
to happen, because from the workers’ perspective this only means further 
time in the attempt to reach resolution through the courts. Most appealsare 
filed by employers; indicating that workers win most cases at the PHI, and 
111 Batserin (2009: 35) also notes that the PHI Manado, North Sulawesi, once held a so-
called ‘dismissal process’ – a set of pre-trial hearings aimed at informing and guiding 
the plaintiffs on formalities. These hearings were considered to be extremely helpful in 
avoiding the risk of annulment of lawsuits due to procedural errors: ‘Especially those 
[lawsuits] applied by workers directly, without legal representation.’ These hearings 
were justifi ed by reference to Article 83 (2), which states that ‘The judge is required to 
examine the contents of the petition, and if there are shortages, then the judge should 
request the plaintiff to complete his/her petition’; and also to the Explanatory Notes, 
which state that ‘During the process for completion of a legal action, the Registrar or 
Alternate Registrar may assist in drawing up/completing the legal action.’ The practice 
of pre-trial hearings did not, however, continue for long; as cases began to be more fre-
quently handled with the assistance of unions’ legal aid offi cers, or professional advo-
cates; and other judges in the PHI Manado panel eventually rejected the pre-trial con-
cept on the basis that workers already had their own legal assistance.
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suggesting that for some employers, lodging an appeal serves as another 
tactic to avoid or delay the implementation of the PHI’s decisions.112
Field observations also indicate the risk of bias by career judges against 
labour disputes, in comparison to their views on ‘pure’ civil law disputes. 
One career judge in the PHI Tanjung Pinang, for instance, confided that he 
believed that unlike civil lawsuits, lawsuits at the PHI were ‘not real’113 – 
since the disputes were about rights and interests, which, according to him, 
were ‘vaguer’ than regular damage claims. Another career judge in the PHI 
Jakarta stated that handling PHI cases was a burden for him, with his work 
becoming ‘more intensive’ but with ‘less incentive.’ He compared his work 
at the PHI to his other work at the Corruption Court and the Commercial 
Court (both special courts like the PHI); at the latter two courts he could 
obtain additional income for additional work, to the value of more than Rp 
10 million above his regular salary.114 This situation has apparently reduced 
the interest of career judges in pursuing PHI work, and act as a greater disin-
centive than ‘the highly sensitive nature of labour disputes,’ as reported by 
the ILO (see Fajerman, 2011: 17). This may also explain the observation that 
most of the work required to draft judgments at the PHI is handled not by 
the career judges but by the ad hoc judges.
The presence of ad hoc judges on the judging panel appears to be helpful to 
address the problem of the bias towards ‘pure’ civil litigation procedures, 
but, as pointed out by one ad hoc judge, only if ‘career judges do not feel 
that they have to demonstrate their “authority” as Presiding Judge in the 
Panel’.115 Indeed, statements from several ad hoc judges from labour union 
circles indicate that at least some career judges disapprove of the use of ad 
hoc judges in the general court system, which they apparently deem to be an 
intrusion in the established general court system. Consequently, some career 
judges referred to ad hoc judges using insulting nicknames, such as ‘contract 
judge’.116
112 One ILO report (Fajerman 2011: 21) estimates that around 90 percent of labour dispute 
cases at the PHI have been and continue to be appealed to the Supreme Court. This 
refl ects the lack of trust in PHI decisions, and ‘serves as a tactic for (mostly) employers to 
circumvent and delay the implementation of court orders.’ 
113 Statements from career judge Ratmoho, in ‘Labour Judges Workshop’, Batam, 26 Novem-
ber 2006.
114 Interview with Heru Pramono, career judge at the PHI Jakarta, November 2008.
115 Interview with Daulat Sihombing, ad hoc judge at the PHI Medan, November 2006.
116 Bedner (2010: 212) noted a similar bias against ad hoc judges during the formation of the 
Administrative Court, during which ad hoc judges were perceived by some in the legal 
establishment to be a threat to the ‘closed-shop’ nature of the Indonesian judiciary. Later, 
ad hoc judges were removed altogether from the administrative court system.
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3.3 Problems of judicial corruption
While ad hoc judges face a range of structural challenges, the most concern-
ing one is probably the issue of corruption within the PHI; an issue which 
directly affects the performance and the existence of the new institution. 
According to one union official from Karawang, West Java province, corrup-
tion is typically seen in cases related to disputes over interests, and in cases 
of collective dismissal, which involve large amounts of money. The union 
official claimed that he was once approached by an ad hoc judge (from 
employer circles) in the PHI Bandung who asked him to provide some mon-
ey for the judges in return for a promise to help the workers win the lawsuit. 
The union official said that he was very worried, as the consequences of los-
ing the case would be serious for the workers involved, because the case was 
related to the annual wage increases in the company. ‘We wanted to give the 
[requested] money, for the sake of our members, and the risk was too high 
of losing the case. The problem was that our union did not have money for 
such purpose.’ The union officials were therefore unable to give the money 
to the judge, ‘But I’ve told the [ad hoc] judge that later if we win the case 
we would not forget about her and her colleagues [the panel of judges].’ In 
the end, the official and his union did win the case, and the court decided to 
award a wage increase of 14.8 percent – 4.8 percent higher than the employer 
had originally accepted. The union then gave the ad hoc judge an amount 
of money, which the union official believed would be divided among the 
members of the panel of judges. ‘It was not really a bribery’ the union official 
rationalized ‘As we only gave them our expression of gratitude.’
Various union activists in various regions have reported similar corrupt 
practices, although very few were made public. One exception was a case 
involving a cement factory, PT Semen Kupang, in East Nusa Tenggara; 
which gained widespread media attention. During the case, union officials 
claimed that one of the ad hoc judges at the Supreme Court, Arief Sudjito, 
had accepted a bribe of Rp 2 billion from the company, and claimed that 
they had lost their case after failing to give the judge a requested ‘handling 
fee’ of Rp 300 million. The union admitted their involvement in the brib-
ery, that they could only afford Rp 150 million, and that this was the figure 
that had been handed to the ad hoc judge. The union said they had been 
approached by the ad hoc judge who had advised that if the union wanted 
to win the case, they needed to give him the other half of the ‘handling fee’; 
the judge told the union that he had been offered Rp 2 billion by the compa-
ny to find in its favour. After losing the case, the union officials said that the 
ad hoc judge returned the union’s money. ‘We suspect the judge had [also] 
received a bribe from the company Semen Kupang,’ the union leader was 
quoted in the media (Koran Tempo, 5 May 2010). The company denied the 
allegation (Koran Tempo, 6 May 2010), while the ad hoc judge in question was 
later investigated and monitored by the Judicial Commission (Koran Tempo, 
7 May 2010). Although the Supreme Court said they would investigate this 
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judge for a possible violation of ethics, and although they had questioned 
the union officials (Kupang Metro, 7 May 2010), no follow-ups were reported, 
and the judge, Arief Sudjito, continued to work without any penalty.
The name Arief Sudjito appeared a year later in conjunction with a corrup-
tion claim involving another ad hoc judge. Imas Dianasari, an ad hoc judge 
from employer circles at the PHI Bandung, West Java, was arrested on 30 
June 2011 while taking a bribe, along with a lawyer representing the com-
pany PT Onamba Indonesia. The case was dealt with by the Indonesian 
Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), and received 
extensive media attention (Kompas, 1 July 2011, Koran Tempo, 1 July 2011). 
Imas Dianasari claimed that she had contacts who assisted with corrupt 
activities, including contacts in both the PHI and the Supreme Court. Impor-
tantly, she named ad hoc judge Arief Sudjito as her contact at the Supreme 
Court who helped preparing the cases she handled in the PHI Bandung 
which went to appeal. In response to these allegations, the KPK summoned 
Sudjito for interrogation as a witness (Inilah.com, 18 July 2011). He denied 
the allegations (Metronews.com, 26 July 2011), claiming that he only knew ad 
hoc judge Dianasari because they were both ad hoc judges at the PHI. ‘It 
is normal that we know each other from work,’ he explained. According to 
several union officials who were often involved with cases at the PHI Band-
ung, ad hoc judge Imas Dianasari was widely known for corrupt practices. 
‘We could feel it, but it is also very difficult to prove,’ said one union official, 
while mentioning several ‘big cases’ handled by ad hoc judge Dianasari he 
had lost in the PHI Bandung.117 Ad hoc judge Dianasari was later suspended 
by the President (Jakarta Post, 7 September 2011); however, ad hoc judge Sud-
jito continued to work.118
The above and similar reports suggest that the so-called ‘court mafia’ (mafia 
peradilan), common and widespread in other courts in Indonesia, has also 
infiltrated the PHI. Some complainants compare the situation to that of the 
commercial court, which they consider has ‘committed suicide’; such is the 
level of acute corruption taking place there.119 Given this reputation, the 
117 Personal communication with Saepul Tavip, union leader, July 2011.
118 Sudjito’s reputation preceded him even before he became an ad hoc judge at the 
Supreme Court. He had been chairman of the Plantation and Farm Union – an affi liate 
to the All-Indonesia Trade Union Confederation, a former New Order government-sanc-
tioned union – and obtained positions on several national tripartite institutions. Prior to 
his appointment as an ad hoc judge, he was also a union-backed member of the P4P/D. 
During that time he was already notorious among workers and union offi cials for his 
handling of disputes. One union offi cial described Sudjito as the key actor behind the 
so-called ‘death chamber’ – a particular chamber of the P4P/D in which, for cases that 
were brought before it, all workers could be sure they would lose the case (personal 
communication with Timboel Siregar, June 2006).
119 Interview with Muhamad Hafi dz, August 2010; a union offi cial who had fi led several 
judicial reviews against Bankruptcy Law No. 37/2004, for constitutional violation of 
labour rights.
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number of people willing to use the commercial court for case settlements 
has been decreasing; people are unwilling to deal with the court’s inefficien-
cy and corruption (see also Pompe, 2004).120 It is particularly interesting, and 
perhaps ironic, that the commercial court was the source of ‘inspiration’ for 
legislators when they established the Industrial Relations Court.121
3.4 Solutions outside the PHI
In most cases, it is the workers rather than the employers who file lawsuits to 
the PHI. In some locations, including Jambi, Bengkulu, Gorontalo and Palu, 
between 2006 and 2009 all lawsuits brought to the PHI were filed by work-
ers or unions. When asked why workers file the large majority of claims, 
one career judge in Jambi said that it was understandable, as a labour issue 
more often disadvantages workers than employers. Despite this, the number 
of cases brought annually to the PHI has stagnated, and in some places has 
declined (see table 6.5 below). According to some ad hoc judges, this is wor-
rying, and provides clear evidence of the need to amend Law No. 2/2004 
(Agung, 2009), to increase the effectiveness of the court and thereby increase 
confidence in the system.
Most disputes continue to be resolved by means other than the PHI. One sur-
vey conducted by the Research and Development Division of the Ministry of 
Manpower in 2009 indicated that around 20 percent of disputes were settled 
through bipartite negotiation; 20 percent through mediation; and 50 per-
cent through bipartite negotiation and mediation. It was not clear, however, 
whether the remaining 10 percent of labour disputes were actually being 
handled by the PHI. Research conducted by an alliance of labour NGOs and 
unions in East Java confirmed the findings above (see Jamaludin et al., 2008). 
Mediation in particular has proved a popular way of redressing disputes, in 
particular mediation by government officials. Indeed, many cases involving 
violations of labour laws, are being channeled to mediators instead of labour 
inspectors. Numbers of mediators, and their budgets, currently far exceed 
the numbers of and budgets for labour inspectors. Research also shows that 
despite some doubt about mediators from workers, who sometimes accuse 
120 The commercial court has often been in the spotlight due to the relative ease with which 
corruption can occur. As explained by a commercial court practitioner, businesses tend 
to have confi dence in this court not because it is free of corruption but because of its rela-
tive ‘predictability’ and, to some extent, ‘certainty’. Most people reportedly accept the 
corrupt practices of the court as granted, and are not concerned, as long as the court can 
provide them with decisions that enable them to continue with their business. There is 
little consideration for the point that in disputes between businesses, there are workers 
who may lose their jobs if their employer goes bankrupt (personal communication with 
Santy Kouwagam, October 2013).
121 Interview with Indra Munaswar, July 2006; a member of the ‘Tim Kecil’ (Small Team) 
of union leaders involved in the formulation of the new labour bills in 2002-2004 (see 
Chapter 4, also Suryomenggolo, 2008).
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them of being ‘in favour of the employers’, the workers and unions still pre-
fer mediation to conciliation or arbitration, due to the relatively cheap and 
easy procedure, reminiscent of the practice of the P4P/D.
Another reason for the workers’ and unions’ preference for mediation 
according to the Ministry of Manpower survey, was that the time frames 
were considered reasonable – the mediator’s ‘recommendation’ is given 
within 30 days. Another valid reason is, of course, that according to Law No. 
2/2004, mediation is a compulsory ‘second step’ in the dispute resolution 
process.122 If agreement cannot be reached during the initial bipartite nego-
tiations, the parties are required to see a mediator before progressing to the 
PHI. One professor of labour law at the University of Indonesia, Aloysius 
Uwiyono, argues that this highlights a problem with the formulation of the 
law; which prohibits arbiters from handling disputes over terminations of 
employment, even though this type of dispute accounts for, in the profes-
sor’s estimate, 98 percent of cases.123 As Professor Uwiyono noted, ‘As a con-
sequence, all disputes over termination of employment are pooled to the 
mediation and mediators [and then the PHI], and [eventually] will end up in 
the Supreme Court, causing a backlog of cases that cannot be resolved fast.’ 
He recommended for the law to be amended to make it possible for arbi-
ters to handle disputes over termination of employment, and in addition, to 
facilitate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to help resolve labour 
issues outside the courts.124 Unlike arbitration about other issues, such as 
trade agreements, arbitration in the context of labour issues seldom occurs 
– sometimes not once in a year, according to the Ministry of Manpower’s 
statistics for 2005-2010.125 The situation is similar for conciliation, which seems 
not to have contributed much to the dispute resolution process, despite 
efforts to increase recognition of the role of conciliators and encourage their 
use.126
122 Some ad hoc judges from union circles have expressed their disappointment in media-
tors, who reportedly often counsel workers not to go to the PHI, telling them that the 
PHI system will take a long time and that it will be expensive for workers to get a resolu-
tion.
123 Interview in the Indonesian Voice of Human Rights radio station, 26 July 2006.
124 Uwiyono may have vested interests in the the role of arbitration in labour disputes: 
apart from teaching labour law in universities and running a law fi rm, Uwiyono is also 
the Chairman of the Indonesian Labour Arbitration Association.
125 See ‘Data on Industrial Relations and Workers Social Security: 2005-2010’, which also 
revealed that most labour disputes were resolved during the bipartite negotiation.
126 One attempt to increase the profi le of conciliators was made by the Communication 
Forum of Conciliators of Jakarta, which placed a list of their members’ names and 
addresses on the announcement board at the Regional Manpower Offi ce of Jakarta. This 
seemed not to be effective, as parties attending the Regional Manpower Offi ce contin-
ued to attend mostly to see mediators (personal communication with Ekalaya Halim, 
chairman of the communication forum).
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Mediation, although the primary choice for workers looking to resolve 
labour disputes (as discussed above), has a major flaw: there is no provision 
in Law No. 2/2004 which stipulates that the settlement achieved through 
mediation is legally binding. Although Article 13 requires that the parties 
sign a written agreement, no part of the law gives unequivocal, legally bind-
ing force to the decision reached (see also Fenwick et al. 2002: 70). This is in 
contrast to the Law’s directives on arbitration: for which Article 51 (1) states 
specifically that the arbiter’s decision is legally binding. This difference 
means that the Law does not, in its present form, give any positive incen-
tive to the disputing parties to use mediation to resolve their disputes. Nor 
does the Law include any useful disincentives for non-compliance; the Law 
does not specify any consequences if one party chooses not to implement the 
recommended agreement – instead, Article 14 (1) states that ‘the parties may 
continue to file settlement of the dispute to the PHI’. By making mediation 
a necessary part of the process without ensuring that decisions reached are 
binding, the Law as it currently stands has ensured that the mediation pro-
cess prolongs the time that disputes take to settle, when arguably labour dis-
putes, because of the risks for workers, are the kinds of disputes for which it 
is most important that settlement times are kept to a minimum.
Employers have reportedly not hesitated to take advantage of the loopholes 
in the current Law. Union activists across several regions have reported 
there is now a tendency for employers to choose not to abide by the settle-
ment agreement following disputes – especially when dealing with indi-
vidual workers, who have neither unions nor lawyers to assist them.127 In 
many reported situations, once the first stage (bipartite negotiation) fails, 
and workers bring the dispute to mediation, the mediator often gives a rec-
ommendation in favour of the workers, in which case the employer often 
ignores the recommendation and does nothing – neither files the dispute to 
the PHI, nor implements the recommendation voluntarily. This leaves the 
workers in limbo. If they manage to negotiate with the union to push the 
employer to respond, the employer may eventually file the dispute to the 
PHI, but will often ensure that it is filed in such a confused and incomplete 
state that the PHI can be expected to reject it. As a last step, the employers 
often take the option of filing an appeal to the Supreme Court, which, as 
explained earlier, can take years. This practice has reportedly been repeated 
in several cases, including by several companies that were assisted by one 
particular lawyer.128
127 Interview with various union activists in East Java, November 2008.
128 Interview with Pujianto and Jamaludin, union activists in East Java, November 2008.
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Table 6.5 below presents some key statistics of cases brought to the PHI in 
the first four years of its existence (2006-2009). Many of the data will likely 
reflect the current situation at the PHI. The majority of cases were brought 
by workers and/or unions, rather than by employers, and the PHI’s Jakarta 
and Bandung received most claims. The most active PHI outside Java was 
the PHI Medan, while the most inactive were the PHI Papua and the PHI 
Banjarmasin. Despite the increasing number of cases brought to the PHI in 
some regions, such as Jakarta and Bandung, in general the trend was for the 
number of cases to be decreasing – even in PHI based in areas with large 
numbers of workers and industries (and, presumably, disputes), such as 
Semarang, Serang, and Makassar.
Table 6.5: Number of cases (lawsuits) brought to the PHI (Java, Sumatera, Kalimantan and 
Papua, 2006-2009)129
No. Industrial Relations Court
 (PHI – Pengadilan Hubungan 
Industrial)














































































129 There are no public data available concerning the number of cases brought to each of the 
33 PHIs around Indonesia. The Supreme Court data, as accessible through its website 
www.mahkamahagung.go.id mentioned only the total number of judgments of the PHI 
in the Supreme Court. Data shown here were collected from ad hoc judges at the PHI 
from various regions. Numbers of cases bestowed from the P4P/D were not included in 
the fi gures.
130 Source: Juanda Pangaribuan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta.
131 Source: Lela Yulianti, ad hoc judge at the PHI Bandung, West Java.
132 Source: Daryono, ad hoc judge at the PHI Semarang, Central Java.
133 Source: Hotlan Pardosi, ad hoc judge at the PHI Serang, Banten.
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134 Source: Christina Tobing, ad hoc judge at the PHI Medan, North Sumatera.
135 Source: Hermawan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Palembang, South Sumatera.
136 Source: Agung Widiyono, ad hoc judge at the PHI Tanjungpinang, Riau Islands.
137 Source: Hery Simanjuntak, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jambi, Jambi.
138 Source: Sardo Manullang, ad hoc judge at the PHI Pekanbaru, Riau.
139 Source: Janter Nababan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Tanjung Karang, Lampung.
140 Source: Charisman, ad hoc judge at the PHI Bengkulu, Bengkulu.
141 Source: Tommy Haras, ad hoc judge at the PHI Gorontalo, West Sulawesi.
142 Source: Bahal Simangunsong, ad hoc judge at the PHI Palu, Central Sulawesi.
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3.5 All parties disappointed
The PHI’s performance appears to have disappointed all parties involved. 
Workers and unions are complaining about the inaccessibility of the PHI, par-
ticularly given the lack of litigation skills among workers. They also complain 
also about the official and unofficial costs of the court, a well as about judicial 
corruption, and the lengthy and uncertain court processes just to obtain the 
first decision (so not even including the time and uncertainty associated with 
appeals). In particular, workers and unions have criticized the tendency of 
the PHI to apply civil procedural law in a strict manner. Some union officials146 
also criticize employers for being deliberately obstructive by using various 
techniques such as choosing not to conduct bipartite negotiations; not attend-
ing mediations meetings organized by mediators (thereby preventing work-
ers from obtaining the minutes of bipartite meetings required in order to take 
further legal action); ignoring the mediator’s recommendations if those rec-
ommendations support the workers, and choosing instead to ‘do nothing’ 
– neither accepting and implementing the recommendations nor filing to 
the PHI. These tactics, left unchecked, obviously discourage workers from 
using the PHI as a forum through which to resolve labour disputes. Work-
ers instead have tried to find other ways to redress their grievances, such 
as through using criminal procedures. Or, even more concerning for justice, 
they have simply given up, and accepted the employers’ offers of pay or con-
ditions, even if these are lower than those stipulated by the law.147
143 Source: Chandrayana, ad hoc judge at the PHI Makassar, South Sulawesi.
144 Source: Asmiwati, ad hoc judge at the PHI Banjarmasin, West Kalimantan.
145 Source: Delima, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jayapura, Papua. The PHI Jayapura only oper-
ated during 2008, therefore there were no lawsuits in the PHI Jayapura in 2006 and 2007.
146 Interview with FSPMI union offi cials, Surabaya, East Java, August 2009.
147 I have discussed these in detail elsewhere (see Tjandra 2010). Galanter and Krishnan 
(2009) conducted a study in India which showed a similar decline in the number of cases 
brought to court, indicating the declining confi dence of ordinary people in the court sys-
tem, due largely to ‘massive problems of delay, cost, and ineffectiveness’ (Galanter and 
Krishnan 2009).
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The employers have their own complaints about the PHI. Apindo has raised 
concerns about the inconsistencies between individual PHIs, and judges 
within them, in decisions on issues such as who can represent employers or 
whether their own staff is allowed to appear as a witness for them (Huku-
monline, 24 September 2007). One Apindo official was also concerned by 
what he called acts of ‘kidnapping’ and ‘contempt of court’ by unions, when 
they pressured the PHI by mass demonstrations during the court hearings. 
The official referred in particular to an incident in the PHI Jakarta, when 
hundreds of workers who just found out that they had lost their case ran-
sacked the courtrooms, leading to the judges fleeing from the angry masses 
through ventilation shafts (Hukumonline, 30 March 2007).
The Supreme Court has voiced its own concerns about the PHI. In an opening 
speech for the National Workshop of the Supreme Court in Makassar, South 
Sulawesi, on 2-6 September 2007, the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court,
Bagir Manan,148 called for a ‘re-examination of the PHI.’ This, he argued, 
should cover several key issues. First, labour disputes would be resolved 
more effectively if not conducted by judiciaries but instead by an institution 
other than a court, such as the National Mediation Body for Labour Dispute 
Settlement. Second, if the judiciary remained involved, the use of ad hoc 
judge representing both the unions and employers’ organizations should be 
abolished, and case deliberation should be handled by regular judges only. 
Third, the state should not be burdened with the costs for labour disputes; 
pro bono services (legal services performed free of charge for the public good) 
should be sufficient.
These negative perceptions towards the PHI from workers and unions are 
particularly interesting, because many cases brought to the PHI were actual-
ly won by workers. Apparently it is the overall system of dispute settlement 
mechanisms, including in the Supreme Court, that workers are concerned 
about149 (Batam Pos, 16 May 2007). Investigations did, however, identify a few 
ad hoc judges from union circles who were positive about the PHI. We will 
discuss this further in the following section.
4 Reformers from within?
Before making an assessment of the PHI based on the discussions above, I 
will be discuss the role of ad hoc judges, particularly those from union cir-
cles. Despite at least one instance of a corruption case involving an ad hoc 
judge from union circles (as discussed above), the performance of the ad hoc 
148 The complete opening speech of Bagir Manan can be found at in Varia Peradilan (No. 263, 
October 2007), the offi cial publication of the Indonesian Supreme Court.
149 Various union offi cials and ad hoc judges from various regions confi rmed this point, 
during the ‘Labour Law Practitioners Conference,’ Cisarua, 2-5 March 2008.
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judges has been reported as relatively sound, both with respect to their judi-
cial integrity and their level of knowledge and skills. Their roles are arguably 
crucial for the future of the PHI, and in particular for efforts to reform the 
judiciary to help it become more effective at resolving labour disputes. If this 
is the case, then efforts to remove their role may lead to additional problems 
for the PHI.
A consideration of the characteristics typical of ad hoc judges from union 
circles in the PHI suggests that in comparison to their counterparts in other 
special courts established in Indonesia,150 union-nominated judges at the PHI 
have some unique characteristics. Most are from trade union backgrounds,151 
and have had previous experiences with labour advocacy. Thus, most bring 
with them some form of idealism, to ‘defend workers’ rights’.152 In a meeting 
of ad hoc judges from various regions organized by the Trade Union Rights 
Centre on 7-9 April 2006 in Jakarta,153 just a few months after their appoint-
ment, ad hoc judges from union circles generally reported that being an ad 
hoc judge at the PHI was a ‘challenge’; a new ‘mandate’; and a ‘new stage’ in 
the struggle for workers – with the option to work ‘from within’.
The ad hoc judges from union circles also expressed pride at being chosen 
for what they considered to be an ‘honourable job’, with great responsi-
bility. However, there was also some concern at being ‘new people’ in the 
system, which they perceived to carry a risk of being easily ‘forced’ to go 
along with existing systems and customs in the court. Some ad hoc judges 
voiced concern about the many points of confusion at the start of the PHI’s 
operations, including the overdue salaries. There was in particular concern 
about the widespread corruption practices in the judiciary. They were also 
worried about their perceived unofficial duty to ‘side with the workers’, 
while at the same time needing to be impartial as judges. Nonetheless, many 
expressed hopes of being able to learn and exchange knowledge on the sub-
ject of labour law, and some even showed interest in pursuing further stud-
ies in the field.154 They mentioned the need to have solid networks among 
150 For a discussion of the special courts in Indonesia, see Arsil (2009).
151 Being union members has given these ad hoc judges direct experience with the problems 
faced by workers, enabling them to establish sensitivities toward workers and union 
interests, and appreciate the roles that workers and unions play in society. Often the ad 
hoc judges reported a perception of their ability to effect social change through the deci-
sions they make.
152 Various statements made by ad hoc judges from various PHIs, at the opening of ‘Labour 
Judges Workshops’, organized by the Trade Union Rights Centre, on 17-20 August 2006.
153 The offi cial title of the meeting was ‘Empowering Ad Hoc Judges, Towards Fair and 
Trustable Decisions.’ The meeting was designed as a planning workshop to draft a series 
of further workshops for ad hoc judges from union circles.
154 Indeed, many ad hoc judges have actually been taking post-graduate studies while 
working at the PHI. Most of them choose labour law for their theses, in particular 
aspects of dispute settlement mechanisms. This enables them to gather data and infor-
mation from their daily work on cases at the PHI. Some have gone on to become lectur-
ers, teaching labour law subjects at various universities in their regions.
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the ad hoc judges, including some kind of ‘information centre’ along with 
‘supporting systems’, to help them to support each other and work properly. 
All these sentiments were nurtured during the series of workshops that fol-
lowed and will be discussed further below.
While working within the PHI system, many ad hoc judges from union cir-
cles continue their contact with unions, albeit informally.155 One ad hoc judge 
from union circles in Pekan Baru, for example, explained that although she 
was no longer registered as an official of her union, she continued to attend 
regular meetings with her former colleagues, mainly to discuss cases and to 
provide input if they wanted to file a case to the PHI. The judge commented: 
‘I have to do that, since many of my colleagues are unfamiliar with processes 
at the PHI. And it is important that they will not be misled by the mediator, 
who seems to scare workers not to bring cases to the PHI.’ In this way she 
justified her continued contact with the union, despite her awareness of the 
requirement for judges to be impartial. Another ad hoc judge, from Palem-
bang, justified his continued contact with unions by referring to the non-
permanent nature of his work as an ad hoc judge. ‘When I finish my term, 
it is likely that I go back to my own union. So it is important to maintain my 
communication with them.’
Where ad hoc judges from union circles maintained contact with unions, this 
was at their own initiative. The unions, even those that had nominated the 
ad hoc judges, seemed disinclined to take the initiative and left it up to the 
ad hoc judges to decide what they would do.156 This led to disappointment on 
the part of some ad hoc judges. One ad hoc judge from Medan complained 
that his union seemed disinterested in his work, since there had never been 
any effort to contact him. ‘We need to be watched by unions, otherwise we 
could become a “wild ball” [bola liar] in the court,’ he said, referring to the 
notorious corruption problem in the judiciary, which, he believed, had start-
ed to infect the PHI as well.
In order to provide support for the ad hoc judges from union circles, a series 
of training workshops has been held in Jakarta annually since 2006, and it is 
likely to continue. The main organizer has been the TURC, but the trainings 
were usually facilitated by two ad hoc judges chosen by the ad hoc judges’ 
155 Similarly, all ad hoc judges from employer circles are brought together regularly at the 
headquarters of their organization, Apindo (the Indonesian Employers’ Association), 
to discuss and share cases which have been heard at various PHIs. The Norwegian 
Employers Association, in cooperation with Apindo, has funded the gathering.
156 Some unions, e.g., SBSI – Indonesian Prosperous Labour Union, once gathered togeth-
ere several of ad hoc judges, which they had nominated, in a meeting to coincide with 
their national congress. Some of these judges responded negatively because, while other 
union offi cials attending the congress had their transport costs covered by the organiz-
er, the ad hoc judges were asked to cover their own travel costs to attend the congress 
(interview with Juanda Pangaribuan, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta).
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collective itself – normally one judge from the district PHI, and one from the 
Supreme Court. Selected ad hoc judges from union circles from various PHIs 
across Indonesia are invited. The subjects discussed include recent develop-
ments and issues in the PHI, including those related to court administration 
(undue salaries, tax, facilities and the like), and issues arising from actual 
cases handled by the PHI. The ad hoc judges are also asked to bring their 
recent verdicts to be shared and discussed with other ad hoc judges, and in 
this manner they often obtain new perspectives and insights. Since ad hoc 
judges at the Supreme Court sometimes came to the training workshops as 
well,157 an exchange of ideas between the two levels withing the judiciary 
can take place, which provides an opportunity to address differences among 
PHIs and between the district PHIs and the Supreme Court.158 Later on, the 
ad hoc judges participating in the training also drafted an academic paper 
on proposed reforms for the PHI and amendments to Law No. 2/2004 (Tjan-
dra, 2013).159
The training of ad hoc judges by TURC was well received according to an 
independent evaluation (see Ford, 2007: 8). Many of the participants said 
that the program was ‘a top priority’ for them, and that ‘they would put 
aside other activities in order to be able to attend the training sessions for 
ad hoc judges.’ The evaluation showed that as well as increasing their con-
fidence ‘the training had resulted in tangible improvements in their [ad hoc 
judges] practice, in particular on their ability to think critically about par-
ticular cases and to develop and apply an understanding of the labour law 
framework as a whole to particular cases.’ There was another important and 
unexpected benefit from this training: it generated the view among ad hoc 
judges that they were ‘being watched’ by an ‘outsider’ (TURC), as well as 
by other colleagues.160 This both directly and indirectly deterred them from 
157 The TURC normally invites three ad hoc judges from union circles at the Supreme Court, 
but only one always attends: His name is Fauzan, and he is also one of the two facilitators 
of the workshops. 
158 Two books were produced as a result of the workshops: a compilation of early PHI deci-
sions, and a book with ‘critical notes’ about the PHI written by ad hoc judges (see Tjan-
dra and Marina (Eds.), 2007 and Tjandra (Ed.), 2010.). The compilation book in particular 
was praised by the ILO as an important step to more accessible and consistent decisions 
of the PHI, especially when neither the Supreme Court nor the Ministry of Manpower 
took the initiative. The same book was popular with unions’ offi cials, as it gave them 
access to key examples of legal documents needed to draft lawsuits, based on particular 
issues that are often found in labour disputes. In fact, union offi cials sometimes used 
the book as ‘evidence’ to convince the Panel of Judges at the PHI about certain issues, 
and about certain interpretations of issues (statement by Jazuli, a union activist from 
Pasuruan, East Java, August 2009).
159 After being postponed for several years since 2012, fi nally the amendment of Law No. 
2/2004 on Industrial Relations Disputes Settlement has become a priority in the parlia-
mentary session in 2015; at the time this dissertation was submitted the parliamentary 
discussions had not yet started.
160 Personal communication with Tri Endro, ad hoc judge at the PHI Jakarta, June 2007.
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becoming corrupt. As Dela Feby of TURC explained, ‘Ad hoc judges who 
attended our training could be said to be relatively “clean” compared to 
those who did not. We received confirmation of this from our union net-
works in various regions. In fact, those who were reported by unions to be 
“problematic” normally chose not to attend the training, although they were 
still invited.’161 She also explained that it was at TURC’s full discretion to 
choose which ad hoc judges were invited to the training. ‘If we think he/she 
is not appropriate anymore, or we suspect his/her judicial integrity, based 
on our direct knowledge or as reported by our networks, we simply won’t 
invite them anymore.’
The training thus subjected the ad hoc judges to some level of social control 
for their behaviour and integrity. The training coincided with several posi-
tive breakthroughs in PHI practices, with the initiatives driven largely by 
the ad hoc judges from union circles. One of the most important of these 
was an increased sensitivity to labour perspectives, which were mentioned 
by members of the panel of judges before passing judgement. This resulted 
in a range of notable judgements, including those regarding ‘dwangsom’ 
discussed earlier; and efforts to relax some of the procedural laws in order 
to increase access for ordinary workers. The increased sensitivity to labour 
issues also led to initiatives uncommon in Indonesian judicial procedures 
– such as ‘dissenting opinions.’ Some judges even sent a ‘petition letter’ to 
the President of Indonesia regarding the overdue salaries for ad hoc judges.162 
This letter in generated concern among some career judges at the PHI, who 
stated that it was a ‘direct attack’ on the ‘harmonious’ environment of the 
courts.163
On another occasion, the same innovative ad hoc judges who sent the peti-
tion letter also submitted a petition to the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, regarding ‘improvement of the PHI’s performance’.164 This let-
ter summarized their evaluation of the PHI’s performance in the first year 
after it commenced operation, and included suggestions for reforms. More 
recently, these same ad hoc judges drafted amendments to Law No. 2/2004, 
including various reforms, which they considered would make the PHI 
161 Interview with Dela Feby, Executive Secretary of TURC, June 2007.
162 See the ‘Batam Petition for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: Resolve the Overdue 
Ad hoc Judges’ Salaries,’ dated 25 November 2006, signed by 16 ad hoc judges from the 
union circle in Sumatra. In part, the petition claimed that the government’s lack of atten-
tion to the matter ‘had led to speculation about asystematic effort to undermine ad hoc 
judges and damage the PHI.’ This was quite a strong statement; unusually strong for 
members of the judiciary.
163 Noted by Eko Pristiwantoro, ad hoc judge at the PHI Semarang.
164 The petition, dated 11 June 2007, was signed by 38 ad hoc judges from 26 district PHIs, 
and one ad hoc judge from the Supreme Court. It was submitted to the Director of the 
Special Civil Case Division of the Supreme Court, after a three-day workshop facilitated 
by TURC on 9-11 June 2007 in Jakarta.
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more effective.165 These included ensuring that the burden of proof lies with 
those most capable of finding the resources to present the evidence (employ-
ers, rather than workers); the establishment of a special chamber for labour 
disputes at the Supreme Court; the empowerment of the Court of Appeal at 
the provincial level, to become he final instance; the revision of the compli-
cated procedural mechanism in the PHI; the establishment of PHI in indus-
trial dense areas; and the appointment of full-time career judges to the PHI.
All these recommended amendments were based on the judges’ own experi-
ence of real problems faced by the PHI during its daily work; which, com-
bined with their expertise in the field, gave the judges’ recommendations 
credibility and quality. It remains to be seen whether the government and the 
judiciary (the Supreme Court) will support the recommendations. According 
to the Indonesian government’s Legislative Program 2012, parliamentary 
discussions about the recommendations were to be conducted during 2012. 
However, parliament ended up not discussing the document or associated 
issues during 2012, citing that it was caught up with other ‘urgent’ matters,166 
and the deliberation about amendments to Law No. 2/2004 were postponed 
until 2015 at the earliest. This indicates a lack of political will and attention 
to issues of justice in labour law, from both the executive and the legislature. 
As with the judiciary, as reflected in the speech of the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Bagir Manan,167 the political will to resolve the problems has 
not been as strong as hoped. In this situation, removing ad hoc judges from 
the system would arguably only cause new problems, rather than resolve 
the existing problems.
165 These were compiled at the ad hoc judges’ workshop on 27 March 2010.
166 An example of the lack of support includes the controversial bill on ‘community orga-
nizations’ and ‘national security,’ which recently raised concern and protests from civil 
society organizations. The bill was promulgated as Law No. 17/2003, and was imme-
diately considered by civil society groups to be a setback for justice in Indonesia, and 
a real threat to democracy and popular participation; its aims were considered to be 
based more on meeting the pragmatic needs and interests of the government on the eve 
of the 2014 elections, than on meeting any needs of the people. Some large civil society 
organizations, including Muhammadiyah – the second largest Moslem organization in 
the county with millions of members – have fi led a judicial review against the Law to 
the Constitutional Court (for the resume of the judicial review see http://www.mah-
kamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.Resume&id=1&kat=1&cari=82%2FPUU-
XI%2F2013; and for a critical review from the civil society perspective, see www.yap-
pika.or.id/uuormas; accessed in October 2013).
167 See Varia Peradilan (No. 263, October 2007).
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5 Conclusion
The establishment of special courts and tribunals, with workers’ representa-
tion has been an approach taken first by European and then by other coun-
tries worldwide, to overcome some of the problems found within ordinary 
courts (Ramm, 1986: 270), Problems special courts intend to address include 
the resentment harboured by some groups toward the ‘spirit’ or aims of 
labour legislation; the inaccessibility of legal processes to most workers; the 
class bias of many career judges; the lack of experience by the judiciary in 
labour issues; and the burdensome cost, delays and formalities normally 
found in ordinary courts. Addressing these issues formed a large part of the 
motivation behind the establishment of the Industrial Relations Court (PHI) 
in Indonesia as well. However, once established as a special court within the 
scope of general court, the Industrial Relations Court in Indonesia has found 
itself in a difficult position since the beginning of its existence. Issues such as 
conceptual inadequacy and the obscurity of some of the provisions in Law 
No. 2/2004; the problematic relationship between the PHI and the district 
court it is a part of; and corruption from the lowest level of substitute reg-
istrar at the District Court right through to the ad hoc judge at the Supreme 
Court, have all combined to increase the challenges for the disputing parties 
– particularly workers – in their efforts to maintain confidence in the court 
and resolve their disputes adequately.
It is important to mention that there have been some efforts, particularly 
from ad hoc judges from union circles, to be sensitive to labour needs; and 
to try to optimize dispute resolution within the PHI, as originally intended. 
Examples do exist of PHI practices and case decisions that represent fresh 
interpretations and the courage to maintain integrity. These include the deci-
sion about dwangsom (daily fine); the initiative to maximize pre-trial hear-
ings in order to explain to litigants the administrative requirements of law-
suits, and thus reducing the risk of annulment of lawsuits based on small 
errors during submission; and the efforts to reduce corruption in the court 
by preventing any person from taking case documents home to type the 
decisions. As discussed, many of these efforts were challenging, as the exist-
ing judiciary apparatus, which saw the changes as an attack on the ‘inter-
nal harmony’ of the judiciary, and may have often held an unconscious bias 
against, or a sense of superiority over, the non-permanent judges, did not 
support most initiatives.
Any positive, creative initiatives and proposals have also been overshad-
owed by the structural problems, which continue to plague the Indonesian 
judiciary in general, and the PHI in particular. Inconsistencies and some-
times obscurity in the court’s practices, low levels of technical knowledge 
and legal integrity of both career and ad hoc judges as well as the court’s 
registrars, and the lack of competence of workers and labour unions to con-
duct litigation, have all contributed to the declining confidence in the court. 
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Further ongoing problems include the long duration of the process before a 
verdict is reached, when a quick resolution is so crucial in labour disputes. 
The tendency of the Supreme Court to act merely as a guardian of proce-
dural law has also contributed to the growing distrust and disappointment 
in the PHI among workers. The absence of an effective enforcement mecha-
nism has moreover encouraged unethical employers to ignore the court’s 
decisions, knowing that they are unlikely to face negative consequences. The 
existence of ad hoc judges, particularly those from union circle, may pro-
vide the foundation for future reforms of the PHI. For this to happen strong 
political commitment will be required from both from the judiciary and gov-
ernment; and this may arguably be unlikely in the near future.
Just as courts cannot work well when they are overwhelmed with cases, 
courts cannot function properly without the confidence of the parties who 
are using them to resolve conflicts. Thus, perception plays a very important 
role in the success of the court system: courts must not only be able to per-
form their main duties – conflict resolution, social control, and lawmaking – ; 
they must also be perceived to be doing so (Shapiro, 1981). The case of the 
PHI in Indonesia is a story about Indonesia’s effort to channel labour dis-
putes into a legal mechanism, and while labour dispute resolution is much 
needed, to date these efforts have tended to fail. The PHI courts still operate 
in Indonesia, but until reforms are tackled to ensure consistently fair and 
effective outcomes, the PHI will be as unlikely to elicit confidence in the sys-
tem, as any other court in Indonesia today (cf. Bedner, 2009).

This dissertation has presented and described the struggles of Indonesian 
workers and unions for better working conditions, within the context of the 
creation and enforcement of labour law. After almost three decades of sup-
pression under the authoritarian New Order regime, workers organized in 
the form of trade unions have thrived since the 1998 Reformasi, assisted by 
the changing social and political situation in the country. Trade unions are 
now important actors in the application of Indonesia’s labour law, working 
to ensure employers’ compliance with the law, and encouraging the spirit of 
the law in the workplace. As discussed in this dissertation, Indonesia’s trade 
unions have advanced to the point that they have also become law-makers; 
pushing pro-workers’ legislation and regulations, as demonstrated in the 
case of the social security reforms in 2010-2011.
This final chapter summarizes the findings of this research, and addresses 
the study’s primary questions – how has labour law changed the institutional 
landscape in Indonesian workplaces since the Reformasi, and what roles have 
organized workers played in these changes. The chapter starts with summa-
rizing the findings of this dissertation’s analyses of the three most important 
issues in labour law in Indonesia: trade union legislation; minimum wage 
setting; and the Industrial Relations Court; and how these have influenced 
and been influenced by the new industrial landscape. The chapter ends with 
suggestions for further research, and summarizes this study’s contribution to 
the socio-legal debate concerning labour law enforcement, including the ten-
sion which labour law faces between the demand for efficiency-prosperity on 
the one hand, and social justice-fair distribution on the other.
1 The new institutional landscape: changes and continuities
As discussed in detail in the previous chapters, Indonesia’s new institu-
tional landscape includes both changes and continuities. The 1998 Reforma-
si has had a wide range of impacts on Indonesian society. Overall, there is 
now much greater individual freedom vis à vis the state, and Indonesia has 
developed into a relatively open society. In the context of labour law, there 
have been dramatic changes, in particular since the enactment of Law No. 
21/2000 on Trade Unions/Labour Unions, which have provided opportuni-
ties for the development of independent trade unions in Indonesia. Workers, 
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individually as well as collectively, are now relatively free to speak out pub-
lically about their concerns and grievances. They can usually do this with-
out significant hindrance – although employers may still not respond as the 
workers may hope or expect. The organization of workers, in the form of 
national federations of trade unions, has mushroomed from only one federa-
tion in early 1998, to more than one hundred federations registered at the 
national level in 2014. In addition, thousands of plant-level trade unions are 
registered at the district level. Workers can now also exercise their influence 
through demonstrations and strikes, which have become regular activities 
of trade unions today. In conclusion, trade unions have become important 
actors in the social and political landscape in Indonesia’s democracy today. 
However, in other ways the traditional practices of labour relations have 
continued, to the detriment of workers.
Despite the state’s recognition of trade unions, particularly through the 
enactment of Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions/Labour Unions, employ-
ers at the factory level still tend not to accept or readily accommodate trade 
unions. In particular, there have been many reports of the harassment and 
dismissal of trade unionists due to their union activities (see, e.g., LBH 
Jakarta, 2014, also Tjandra, 2014c). Essentially, there remains a lack of trust 
between unions and employers; which helps explain the low number of 
collective bargaining agreements at the factory level (Isaac and Sitalaksmi, 
2008). This situation leads to workers having to continue to depend on the 
state to guarantee their welfare, rather than being able to rely on industry 
self-regulation through direct negotiation with employers. This is particu-
larly obvious in the case of minimum wage setting (see Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation). The situation is likely due to the previous history, and ongo-
ing influence, of authoritarianism in Indonesia – during which time the state 
and employers treated unions predominantly as threats to economic stabil-
ity and development, while workers saw the state and employers primarily 
as oppressors. As a result of these perceptions, too much energy continues 
to be spent on fighting between the parties. This conflict accelerated during 
the period 2010-2015, particularly in relation to the annual minimum wage 
setting processes.
Concerns have also been that too much focus on minimum wage setting as 
the only way to increase wages for workers might undermine the primary 
role of minimum wage policies -to provide a social safety net for workers at 
the lowest levels of work – and that it might increase the disparity between 
formal workers and the majority of the workforce in the informal economies 
(Papanek, 2014). In the short term, strikes and demonstrations, including 
those targeting the Wage Councils, may be useful as tools to obtain imme-
diate results; such as increasing the nominal value of wages, and educat-
ing members about their rights. Longer-term change will, however, likely 
require dialogue between the parties to develop more sustainable support 
mechanisms for workers.
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The challenge for Indonesia today with regard to the workplace is how to 
harness the energy of workers and employers to develop a more productive 
system of negotiation, either between workers and employers alone, or with 
the facilitation of the state. It will be important to appreciate that Indone-
sian living standards are still very low by international standards, and that it 
will take a lot to increase workers’ conditions to the level currently expected 
by some workers. In addition, Indonesia’s labour market is still comprised 
largely of workers in the informal economies, who remain outside the pro-
tection of labour law. While no country is likely to perceive that it could 
bring around 250 million people quickly into the formal economies, to date 
Indonesia has not appeared to make the effort it could readily make, to intro-
duce positive changes gradually, as it arguably has occurred in Europe (see 
Hepple, 1986, 2002, 2009). The challenge which remains for Indonesia is how 
to develop a system which strikes the right balance with regard to the two 
aims of labour law: efficiency-prosperity on the one hand, and social justice-
fair distribution on the other (see also Collins, 2000).
Given this context, the discussion below will highlight the major findings 
of this dissertation with regard to the three key issues of labour: trade union 
legislation; minimum wage setting; and the Industrial Relations Court; and 
the changes and continuities in these issues in Indonesia in the recent past.
1.1 Trade union legislation
Chapter 4 of this dissertation explained how the enactment of Law No. 
21/2000 on Trade Unions/Labour Unions facilitated the rise and develop-
ment of trade unions in Indonesia. One of the most important provisions 
in the Law is that any group of 10 or more workers may freely form a trade 
union and register their union at the regional manpower office, where the 
registration is usually accepted without reservation. Likewise, any group of 
five or more plant-level unions may establish a union federation; and five 
or more union federations may form a confederation. These provisions in 
the law have led to a significant increase in the number of trade unions, at 
both regional and national levels, and an associated increase in the politi-
cal influence of organized workers. Trade unions have mushroomed, from 
only one national federation during the New Order, to over a hundred regis-
tered today, not including the thousands of plant level unions. As collective 
organizations of workers, the unions are now able to voice their demands 
with relatively few restrictions, including through strikes and public dem-
onstrations, which have become common phenomena, particularly in the 
large industrial cities such as Bekasi, West Java, and Jakarta. The unions also 
celebrate International Labour Day on May 1st every year and since 2012 the 
state has recognized Labour Day as an official public holiday. In regional 
areas, union alliances have grown to become important pressure groups, 
promoting better condition for workers and society in general.
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One of the trade union movement’s most important achievements over the 
last few years was their success, in collaboration with various NGOs and 
individuals, in pushing for the enactment of Law No. 24/2011 on the Social 
Security Executing Agency (Badan Pelaksana Jaminan Sosial, the BPJS Law), as 
implementing legislation of Law No. 40/2004 on the National Social Secu-
rity System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional, the SJSN Law). These two laws 
are important in that they provide the foundation for the development of 
universal social security coverage for all people in Indonesia; not only for 
those working in the formal sector, who traditionally formed the backbone 
of the trade unions, but also those working in the informal economies. The 
trade unions, united in a front organization called the Action Committee for 
Social Security Reforms (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial, the KAJS) comprising 
trade unions, labour NGOs, students’ groups, peasants’ groups and others, 
emerged as a key pressure group during the parliamentary deliberations 
and eventual enactment of the BPJS bill (see Chapter 4). The KAJS’s com-
bined strategy of litigation through court and non-litigation through lobby-
ing and demonstrations, and its cooperation with several reformist politi-
cians within the parliament, enabled it to be the most important pressure 
group behind the enactment of the BPJS Law, to the point that without the 
efforts of this group, the enactment of the Law may not have been achieved 
(see also Thabrany, 2014).
These efforts, in particular the success of the KAJS in its efforts to encour-
age the Indonesian government and parliament to pass the BPJS Law, 
inspired the trade union movement and demonstrated its potential, encour-
aging unions to advocate for their rights through more advanced political 
manoeuvers. These included, first, the establishment of the Council of Indo-
nesian Labourers (Majelis Pekerja Buruh Indonesia, the MPBI) and the National 
Labour Movement Consolidation (Konsolidasi Nasional Gerakan Buruh, the 
KNGB), which led two national strikes in 2012 and 2014 and pushed the gov-
ernment to develop several new regulations that were pro-workers, such as 
the regulations regarding the additional components to be surveyed during 
minimum wage setting; and the further restrictions on outsourcing practices 
at the company level. The national-level unions’ alliances were, however, a 
short-lived phenomenon; due to internal competition and conflict among the 
leaders, and loss of focus on common goals as a coalition of unions. Despite 
their transience, the national-level response and its success with respect to 
positioning trade unions, as important social and political groups in Indone-
sia were noteworthy developments for a new democracy like Indonesia.
Although the movement as a whole disbanded, some parts of the move-
ment, in particular the Federation of Indonesian Metal Workers Unions 
(Federasi Serikat Pekerja Metal Indonesia, the FSPMI), and the Confederation 
of Indonesian Trade Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia, the KSPI), 
which had been key elements of the KAJS, remained active and took further 
steps, including entering the legislative and presidential elections in 2014, 
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during which they sent their cadres to run in the elections, and supported 
one particular candidate for the Indonesian President. As we will discuss lat-
er, these endeavours have led to both gains and losses for the trade unions’ 
struggle for political influence in Indonesia, and lessons learned from these 
efforts may change the future course of the union movement in the country.
1.2 Minimum wage setting
As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, since its rise to power in the early 1970s 
the authoritarian New Order government used the process of minimum 
wage setting as a tool to control workers. Only after the Reformasi were work-
ers and their unions able to negotiate with employers about their welfare in 
the forms of wages, particularly in regional areas, following the increase in 
regional autonomy. Where the specific wage setting processes established 
in various regions have continued to prevent unions from using collective 
bargaining mechanisms at the company or industry level, the Wage Coun-
cils have now become the main avenue by which labour can participate in 
the wage setting process, with unions relying on a combination of legal and 
political activities to assist their struggle. This is considered the preferred 
option for the unions, in comparison to the difficulties they faced in the past 
when wage setting was done through direct negotiation with workplace 
employers; a process that often led to the unfair dismissal of the union offi-
cials involved. The reliance on Wage Councils has, however, led to pres-
sure being placed on the Wage Councils in regions where minimum wages 
are negotiated, often exacerbated by conflict between the trade unions and 
employers’ association, and by the politicization of minimum wage setting 
by both the employers’ organization and the unions.
Union leaders today (2014-2015) tend to perceive minimum wage setting 
through the Wage Councils at the district level to be primarily a political pro-
cess, to which they respond politically through the organization of their col-
lective powers. They tend to use the process as entrance means by which to 
encourage the government to develop new regulations that support workers. 
As this dissertation has argued in Chapter 5, treating minimum wage setting 
as a political process (which in fact it is) has had some benefits. It is through 
a political lens that trade unions and all the parties involved in negotiations, 
may be able to widen their perspectives away from the more narrow econom-
ic focus that has dominated the minimum wage discourse for so long, which 
has missed the crucial political aspect of state policy through minimum wage; 
that is, to protect particular vulnerable sectors of Indonesian society.
Although political approach may be beneficial in the short term, providing 
new perspectives on the current situation and new directions for the future, 
in the longer term the sustainability of the political approach (as a domi-
nant tactic) is questionable. It will likely be necessary for unions to start to 
consider other factors related with minimum wage setting, including the 
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need to develop collective bargaining between unions and employers: par-
ticularly on the issues of wages; increasing inflation and it effects on mini-
mum wages; unemployment and job creation; and the increasing disparity 
between formal sector workers and those working in the informal econo-
mies, who have still not received the support of minimum wages.1 To suc-
ceed, this broader approach will require willingness and a commitment from 
the union movement to reconsider and move beyond its political strategies, 
which have been the focus over the last few years.
1.3 Industrial Relations Court
Chapter 6 discussed the dynamics within the Industrial Relations Court 
(Pengadilan Hubungan Industrial, the PHI) and argued that the PHI, estab-
lished as a special court within the scope of the general court, has been in a 
difficult position since its establishment; due to latent internal problems of 
the corrupt judicial system in Indonesia, as well as the conceptual inadequa-
cy and confusion surrounding some of the provisions of Law No. 2/2004 
on the Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement, under which law the PHI 
was established. All parties involved appear to have reservations about the 
PHI. Workers complain about the PHI’s tendency, especially in the Supreme 
Court, to focus predominantly on civil procedural law, which causes difficul-
ties for workers without knowledge of procedural law. Employers, in their 
turn, are concerned about the lack of clarity around a number of the pro-
cedures directing the PHI’s operations, including whether or not legal staff 
of the company involved are permitted to represent the employer, and the 
consistency of the PHI, given that the decisions of PHIs often differ between 
regions. Even the Supreme Court has voiced concerns, with one former 
Chief Judge of the Supreme Court stating that they system needs to be ‘re-
examined’, including by abolishing the ad hoc judge system representing 
unions and the employers’ organization, and the pro bono services of the PHI.
The PHI has also demonstrated a tendency to deny the abundance of exam-
ples which point to the structural limitations which the individual courts 
face (as discussed in Chapter 6); and in addition the Supreme Court has 
tended to act like a guardian of the civil procedural law, including by annul-
ling some of the breakthrough decisions made by the PHI at the lower levels. 
As Chapter 6 has argued, these tendencies have emerged as major obstacles 
preventing the PHI from functioning, as it was intended to function. Never-
1 Indeed, as observed by leading US economist Gustav Papanek (see Transformasi.org, 
2014, also Papanek, 2011), although in the last six years (2008-2014), the average provin-
cial minimum wage in Indonesia has increased by 115 percent (more than doubled), only 
20 percent of workers have enjoyed such an increase in the average provincial minimum 
wage. The remaining 80 percent of workers, in particular the agricultural and informal 
sector workers, have not received this benefi t. On the contrary, their average wage has 
gone down. As a result, Papenek argued, ‘labour prosperity in Indonesia becomes more 
unequal.’
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theless, the involvement of ad hoc judges in the PHI system, especially the 
judges from the trade unions, gives some hope for reform from within the 
PHI, especially given the ad hoc judges’ efforts to make decisions and rulings 
that are progressive, and which could resolve some of the problems in both 
the procedural and material aspects of the law. However, the structural prob-
lems faced by the PHI, as described in Chapter 6, have overshadowed and 
continued to hamper these initiatives and efforts. This demonstrates clearly 
that no amount of good court decisions alone will resolve the PHI’s structural 
problems, without also implementing reforms to the PHI’s existing structure 
and system; including focusing on amending the Law No. 2/2004 concern-
ing Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement. Concerningly, an agenda for the 
amendment of Law No. 2/2004 had been listed on the national parliament’s 
legislative program for the years 2009-2014, but each year has failed to pro-
ceed, as parliament has chosen not to make it a priority. The agenda is again 
on the list of the new legislative program of 2014-2019, and it is therefore 
expected that there may be deliberations on the matter in the parliament dur-
ing this current term. In the meantime, several evidence-based recommen-
dations have recently been published regarding the content of the amend-
ments of Law No. 2/2004 (see, for example, Tjandra [2012], which provides 
evidence-based recommendations for the law’s amendment based on input 
from the PHI’s ad hoc judges from various regions; also Isnur et al., [2014], 
which provides insights into the Supreme Court’s decisions in industrial rela-
tions disputes). These recommendations, based on direct research, should 
prove to be useful references to inform the official processes when they com-
mence in parliament, and to guide best-practice decision-making.
2 The re-emergence of the labour movement: opportunities and 
challenges
It has been argued that there are two key features which differentiate Indo-
nesia’s contemporary institutional landscape, in structural terms, from that 
of many countries in Western Europe a century ago: first, the absence of a 
social democratic movement and strong organized working class which 
can influence politics; and second, the relative deficiency of the rule of 
law (Aspinall, 2013). Thus, any manifestation of a systematic involvement 
of organized workers in politics in a developing country like Indonesia, 
and any effort by organized workers to uphold the rule of law, in particu-
lar through the enforcement of labour law, is very important for helping to 
understand the broader political and social change occurring in the country, 
as well as the opportunities and challenges which arise from these efforts. 
The labour movement, in the broader sense of the collective organization 
of working people campaigning for their interests – specifically, for better 
treatment from their employers and government through the implementa-
tion of labour related legislation – is not without precedent in Indonesia (see 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation). Yet only after the Reformasi has the labour 
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movement, particularly through the Action Committee for Social Security 
Reforms (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial, the KAJS), been able to undertake strong 
rights-related activities involving organized workers and their supporters 
(intellectuals, NGOs, and some sections of government), in order to repre-
sent the interests of the working class (see Chapter 4, also Tjandra, 2014b). 
The KAJS, with the Indonesian Metal-Workers Union Federation (Federasi 
Serikat Pekerja Metal Indonesia, the FSPMI) as its backbone organization, is 
perhaps the best example available of how far trade unions can advance, 
in their efforts to play important, beneficial roles in Indonesian society. The 
recent history of the KAJS and the FSPMI signal an important paradigm shift 
in the focus of Indonesian trade unions, from an economic to a social orienta-
tion (see Chapter 4); and has given trade unions both inspiration and confi-
dence in their capabilities and potential to influence future progress.
As a sequel to the KAJS’s success in pushing for the enactment of the BPJS 
Law as the implementing legislation of the SJSN Law, the FSPMI developed 
confidence as a rising political group, and continued to involve itself in 
practical politics through the general elections for parliament and president 
in 2014.2 The intention behind the decision to become involved was to use 
the existing momentum to increase the bargaining position of workers and 
unions, especially at the state level; and through this, to demonstrate that 
workers were fighting not only for the interests of workers, but for all of 
society – a concept captured during the elections by the colloquial phrase 
‘dari pabrik ke publik’ (‘from factory to public’) (see Koran Perdjoeangan, 9 April 
2014, the FSPMI’s official media). These efforts involved sending the unions’ 
cadres, mostly union officials, to run as regional members of parliament; and 
by supporting a particular candidate for president. The unions’ strategies for 
winning votes from their members also provided the opportunity to edu-
cate workers on their political rights, and their opportunity to contribute to 
the country’s development and positive change. The unions and members 
believed that by joining parliament, they could become more effectively 
involved in changing the country’s policies and regulations, to ensure they 
are fair to workers and all Indonesia’s population in general.
In the legislative elections, these efforts were well supported in that the 
majority of the unions’ officials and members were supportive or partici-
pated directly. The initiative to participate so directly in the elections in fact 
came largely from below; involving members at the grass-root level. In addi-
tion, several individuals and activist groups from outside the union joined 
the efforts, including academics from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 
and labour and peasant NGOs including the Trade Union Rights Centre (a 
labour service NGO based in Jakarta), and Omah Tani (a peasants’ group 
based in Batang, Central Java); and these individuals and groups were able 
2 The discussion in the following section is based on Tjandra, 2014a.
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to undertake activities that could not be done by the union itself. These activi-
ties included training workers on the processes of voting, election monitor-
ing, and political campaign strategies. These collaborative efforts between 
the unions, academics and NGOs were successful; following three months of 
effort, the FSPMI managed to win two seats for its legislative members, from 
the important industrial regency of Bekasi, West Java. This achievement was 
significant not only for the FSPMI, but for Indonesia’s labour movement in 
general; as it was the first time that a union had successfully obtained seats for 
its candidates in parliament through coordinated efforts between the union 
and its supporters, rather than through the candidate’s individual efforts.
In the presidential elections, however, the union’s approach was very dif-
ferent. The decision to support a particular candidate for president came 
from the union’s most senior leader, with little if any consultation with other 
union leaders, let alone with ordinary members, who were simply expected 
to obey their leader’s decision. There were reports that the FSPMI leaders 
undermined and even aggressively suppressed their members’ concerns; 
and other reports that many union officials had different opinions from their 
leader, and held concerns about his decision (see Tjandra, 2014a, also Soli-
daritas.net for various reports during the campaign in April-July 2014). The 
situation was worsened as there were only two candidates running for presi-
dent, with very different backgrounds and characters. One candidate was 
Prabowo Subianto, a representative of the military who came from a politi-
cal dynasty with close ties to President Soeharto’s family and the former 
authoritarian New Order regime; and who, despite allegations of links to 
human rights violations while he was commander of the Indonesian Special 
Forces was supported by the largest political parties in parliament. The other 
candidate was Joko Widodo, who represented ordinary civilian politicians 
from a younger generation. Joko Widodo came from a region with no links 
to any political dynasty, and was supported only by the opposition party 
and some smaller parties, but gained strong support from middle-class 
groups in the so called ‘Jokowi’s volunteers,’ which became an an interesting 
phenomenon in Indonesian politics in 2014 (see Samah and Susanti, 2014, 
also Nugroho and Setia, 2014).3
3 As noted by Samah and Susanti (2014), the 2014 Indonesian presidential election showed 
a different phenomenon in the political history of Indonesia. Public participation to sup-
port Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla as the President and Vice President candidates ahead 
in the presidential election appeared so massive.  Called ‘volunteers’, it comprised of 
individuals and communities who were engaged in the 2014 presidential election moti-
vated to see a ‘better Indonesia’. Several volunteer groups were indeed driven by cadres 
of the political parties, but many more new groups were born because of the fear that the 
authoritarian regime of the New Order would return, as represented by the other Presi-
dent and Vice President Candidates, i.e., Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa (see also 
Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014). Nugroho and Setia (2014) even called this phenomenon 
‘people power’, describing the unprecedented movement of some of groups in society 
and political passions that occurred exactly when the public’s trust in the performance 
of political parties had almost collapsed.
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As there were only two candidates for President (and two for Vice President), 
the competition was fierce and even brutal, causing polarization in society, 
which according to some observers placed Indonesia’s young democracy in 
grave danger (Aspinall and Mietzner, 2014). The situation was worsened by 
the strategy of using negative campaigns, including sectarian and hate mes-
sages, particularly from Prabowo Subianto’s camp attacking Joko Widodo 
(Supriatma, 2014). The polarization also occurred within the trade unions. 
The FSPMI and its confederation, the Confederation of the Indonesian Trade 
Union (KSPI), decided to support Prabowo Subianto, and this support was 
declared in front of around eighty thousand members during International 
Labour Day celebrations, held at Indonesia’s largest football stadium Gelora 
Bung Karno in Jakarta on 1 May 2014, and covered by almost all Indonesia’s 
media (Ford and Caraway, 2014). Other groups of unions, including the All-
Indonesia Workers Union Confederation (KSPSI) and the Indonesian Pros-
perity Labour Union (KSBSI), supported Joko Widodo. Both groups claimed 
that their preferred candidate was better for labour rights than the opposing 
candidate, and asserted that they were running the best campaign for the 
candidate they supported. A consideration of campaign strategies indicates 
that at least the FSPMI-KSPI, in its support of Prabowo Subianto, became 
very deeply involved in the election campaign, although perhaps with ques-
tionable integrity, as discussed directly below.
Observers of Indonesia’s 2014 presidential election have argued that the 
heavy use of negative campaigning appears to have encouraged the rise of 
‘groupthink’ in society (Poerwandari, 2014); a phenomenon whereby those 
with different views and values may experience psychological and social 
pressure to such a great extent that they eventually choose to be silent, or 
even unconsciously begin to deny their own values and instead express the 
views of the group, because they find it too difficult to withstand the pres-
sure to conform. This phenomenon was reported to occur within the FSPMI 
during the election campaign, with many of the union’s members who held 
different views reporting intimidation by their own group, and choosing to 
keep silent to avoid further intimidation. The FSPMI’s leaders allowed the 
widespread use of negative campaigns, including sectarian and hate mes-
sages, both by and directed towards their members (see Solidaritas.net, 31 
December 2014). Although some may argue that this policy helps to achieve a 
decision-making consensus within a union, especially when the organization 
is interested to choose a particular, single political options, such actions were 
clearly not democratic, and therefore directly contradicted the founding prin-
ciples of trade unions as democratic organizations of workers (see Michels, 
[1911] 1962). These events have demonstrated that even the FSPMI had not 
yet been able to find the right balance between the needs for organizational 
efficiency and internal democracy. There was also a strong tendency for the 
union to focus merely on the sectorial interests of the workers, even when 
these interests may not be in line with the interests of society as a whole (as 
was arguably the case during this presidential election) (see Tjandra, 2014a).
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This situation may be an example of what Robert Michels calls ‘the iron law 
of oligarchy’ (Michels, 1962). Drawing on his own experiences as a member 
and supporter of a social democratic party in early 20th century Germany, 
Michels described a number of conditions and processes that inevitably 
impel even the most democratically-committed organizations to become 
divided into a set of elites or oligarchs – each with their own set of distinctive 
interests within the organization – and the rest of the membership; whose 
labour and resources were exploited by the elites, especially through the 
hierarchy and bureaucracy of the organization. Michels’ argument has been 
criticized for being too deterministic and over-critical to bureaucracy (Lip-
set, 1962, in Michels, 1962); yet it can still provide useful reflections, and can 
encourage observers to consider the level of internal democracy that may 
be present in voluntarily social organizations such as political parties and 
trade unions. This is especially valuable in countries like Indonesia, which 
have only recently embraced democracy with the view that that freeing the 
country from an authoritarian regime will lead to better, more equitable 
standards of living (Bhakti, 2004). Meeting these aspirations remains a chal-
lenge for Indonesia’s government, and for all supporters of democracy who 
seek to persuade electorates that a democratic system of government is bet-
ter than surviving under an authoritarian regime (Ghoshal, 2004).
The FSPMI was arguably the most advanced trade union in Indonesia, in 
terms of its ability to mobilize its members; a necessary prerequisite for 
becoming an influential political power (see Ford and Caraway, 2014). 
Indeed, this union was the backbone of the KAJS movement, driving the 
eventual enactment of the BPJS Law (see Chapter 4). The KAJS movement 
was the first successful, systematic engagement of Indonesia’s labour move-
ment in the development of alternative policies, outside the frames con-
structed and maintained by elitist parties and leaders. With support from 
a trade union such as FSPMI, from a modern and relatively strong indus-
trial sector, there was a good opportunity for the KAJS (and the FSPMI) to 
become an alternative political power and develop transformative policies 
-policies to improve the capacity of ordinary people and progressive actors, 
including trade unions and other people-oriented organizations, to strength-
en democracy and pro-people development (see Stokke and Törnquist, 
2013). Despite this potential, as described above, in the 2014 elections the 
FSPMI categorically failed to become the alternative political power many in 
Indonesia were looking for.
3 Theoretical considerations: the effectiveness of the labour law
Several observers have argued that in many East Asian countries, labour law 
has been beset by problems of ineffectiveness (see Introduction of this dis-
sertation, also Cooney and Mitchell, 2002, and Frost, 2002), and that these 
problems are manifested in the relative absence of the law from the construc-
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tion and functioning of labour markets (Fenwick and Kalula, 2005). With 
some exceptions in the developed East Asian countries, in particular Singa-
pore and Japan, most of the developing East Asian countries, including Viet-
nam, the Philippines, China, India, and Indonesia, have experienced these 
problems. Two main explanations are postulated for the problems besetting 
labour law: (1) ongoing deficiencies in the wider legal systems of the coun-
tries in question, and (2) the hindering influence of other social systems, 
such as the political, economic and social systems prevalent in the countries 
(Cooney, 2006: 38-45). The first explanation lays the blame on the ineffective-
ness of the legal institutions that are meant to implement labour law, with 
reasons for the ineffectiveness including inadequate staff and uncontrolled 
corruption, particularly among judges and labour officials. This will lead in 
turn to mistrust by the main stakeholders (employers and workers) and a 
lack of expectation that the law will be interpreted and applied reasonably 
and fairly. The second explanation lays the blame for the ineffectiveness of 
labour law on the interactions between the law and other social systems, 
in which the law does not have enough autonomy, and has become subor-
dinate to other social systems, particularly the country’s political and eco-
nomic systems. This tends to occur during authoritarian rule in countries 
that have incorporated workers and labour law into the political strategies 
and development goals set by the state.
The wave of democratization that swept Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 
1990s, particularly South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, weakened authori-
tarian corporatism and may have been expected to strengthen society and 
thus the rule of law (Dorsen, 2001). However, the impact of democratization 
on the social system of any country is unpredictable and sometimes paradox-
ical (Cooney and Mitchell, 2002). Although democratization may undermine 
the system of state corporatism and the exercise of political power by the state, 
it often has less impact on other social systems, including industrial rela-
tions. Indonesia’s recent history is an example of this. The efforts to change 
the corporatist nature of labour law through the Indonesian government’s 
labour law reform program, with the assistance of the International Labour 
Organization – in particular the relaxation of trade union registration –
did not necessarily encourage collective labour agreements, which were 
still widely ignored in the country (Isaac and Silalaksmi, 2008). This demon-
strates that the unions were still relatively weak, and that in general, employ-
ers have remained unwilling to respect unions and comply with the law.
The situation described above explains the relatively high dependency of 
Indonesian workers and their unions on the state to increase their welfare; 
as the example of minimum wage setting demonstrated. Dialogue between 
employers and workers has not developed effectively, due largely to a lack 
of trust between the two parties. The establishment of the Industrial Rela-
tions Court in 2006 has not addressed the significant problem of the lack 
of enforcement of labour law; partly because when the court was formed 
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it inherited problems from the previous judicial system. There seems to be 
a vicious cycle with respect to the enforcement of labour law in Indonesia, 
with all enforcement processes tending to lead to new problems rather than 
solutions. Then the question that presents itself is: how can the enforcement 
of labour law in Indonesia be made more effective? The following discussion 
will focus on the debate surrounding this question, which may suggest some 
possible solutions to the problem.
3.1 Effective labour law enforcement
Labour law, referring both to collective labour law and to individual 
employment standards, will always face challenges with respect to com-
pliance and enforcement (Davidov, 2010). Labour laws usually include the 
options of both self-enforcement and state enforcement; the latter through 
civil, criminal and administrative procedural laws and institutions. How-
ever the laws can suffer from inherent difficulties which hinder compliance 
and enforcement: in particular, employers often have a strong incentive for 
non-compliance; employees often face various barriers to self-enforcement; 
and effective enforcement by the state is often costly and complicated. Nev-
ertheless, as suggested by Malmberg (2003, 2009), a threefold strategy can 
be effective, comprising (1) an industrial relations strategy through collec-
tive bargaining and industrial action; (2) a state-oriented strategy, based 
on administrative measures; and (3) a judicial strategy, based on the proce-
dures and decisions of courts and tribunals, as well as the implementation 
of these decisions.
To examine this tripartite strategy in detail: first, the industrial relations 
strategy should deal with the distinctions between different kinds of nego-
tiations, such as negotiations about the regulation of labour and employ-
ment relations; negotiations aimed at influencing managerial decisions; 
and negotiations about the application of rules. It is important to analyze 
whether the negotiations are supported in the national labour laws; includ-
ing whether there is a duty to negotiate; whether there is recognition of 
representatives; whether there is disclosure of negotiations; and whether 
there is competence to start negotiations (see also van Peijpe, 2003: 105). As 
the second component of the tripartite strategy, administrative processes 
need to provide a non-judicial way to control and enforce the application of 
labour law, at both central levels, and decentralized to lower levels. These 
administrative processes should, if required, fulfill a complementary role 
ahead of or instead of judicial procedures. In some cases, there might be 
an eventual need for administrative intervention, especially when there is 
a lack of individual or collective action (see Chapter 6 of this dissertation); 
although administrative processes alone will not be effective as a means of 
enforcement (see also Laulom, 2003: 111). As the third component of the tri-
partite strategy, the judicial processes must deal with the legal conditions 
for initiating a judicial enforcement procedure, such as the requirements 
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derived from the rules and principles of law. The judicial processes should 
consider such questions as: the extent to which individuals, interest groups 
and representative bodies (including unions) are entitled to initiate judi-
cial procedures; questions about interim decision-making powers such as 
which party has priority of interpretation without waiting for the court’s 
decision; the time limit for claiming a right in court; the burden of proof; 
and the judicial interim measures in litigation, as an important element of 
equilibrium until the ruling. It is important to analyze the evolution of these 
three processes – industrial relations, administrative, and judicial – includ-
ing the relationships between them in particular contexts, in order to under-
stand the nature of the enforcement of labour law. Together, the intended 
functions of these processes are to ensure an effective enforcement of labour 
standards (Malmberg, 2003).
With respect to industrial relations processes, Indonesia’s labour law is 
ambiguous on the issue of the obligations of trade unions and employers to 
negotiate with each other. Trade union-employer negotiation is formally rec-
ognized by Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower (the Manpower Law), especially 
article 111 subsection (4), which states: ‘During the validity of the [term of 
the] company regulations, if the trade union within the enterprise requests a 
negotiation of the drafting of the collective labour agreement, the entrepre-
neur is obligated to do so.’ The problem is that there are no sanctions if com-
panies refuse to comply to this provision; and indeed, if there is no negotia-
tion (even if one party wants to negotiate), the law states that ‘the existing 
company regulations shall remain valid until their expiration’ (article 111 
subsection (5)). Moreover, the Manpower Law links the unions’ right spe-
cifically with ‘failed negotiations’; article 137 states: ‘Strike is a fundamental 
right of workers/labour and trade/labour unions that shall be staged legal-
ly, orderly and peacefully as a result of failed negotiations.’ Thus, while the 
Manpower Law provides no encouragement for negotiation between trade 
unions and employers, and no sanctions for employer’s non-compliance, 
the same law limits the contexts under which trade unions may exercise 
their legal right to strike. This leads to even less incentive for negotiations 
between trade unions and employers.
With respect to administrative processes, as this dissertation has observed, 
there has been strong criticism of the public authorities who are tasked 
to supervise and enforce labour standards in Indonesia, due to the many 
examples of dysfunction in the performance of this task (see also Ford and 
Tjandra, 2007). Labour inspection, for example, is hindered by the region-
al autonomy policy, which devolved many of the inspection tasks to the 
regions, where regional officials often lack relevant skills and knowledge 
about labour standards. Moreover, attempts to exercise workers’ rights, as 
set forth in Law No. 21/2000 on Trade Unions/Labour Unions, often lead to 
dismissal of the workers, leading some labour activists to advocate for strict-
er penal sanctions – particularly for the violation of the freedom of associa-
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tion as stated in the Trade Unions/Labour Unions Law4 – and to demand the 
establishment of a special unit at the Police office to handle relevant cases 
(Hutabarat et al., 2013). These issues highlight the problems associated with 
labour law enforcement mechanisms being managed through Indonesia’s 
public institutions, which seem caught up with their own problems. There 
is an immediate need, for example, to build the capacity of labour inspection 
officials in the regions, as these officials are the ones directly handling cases 
in their daily work. And this needs to be conducted in collaboration with 
national government, which has the capacity and responsibility to provide 
supervision and control over the observance of labour law, as suggested 
by ILO Convention No. 81 concerning Labour Inspection in Industry and 
Commerce (ratified by Indonesia through Law No. 21/2003). Adding such a 
criminal provision in the Trade Union/Labour Union Law would add to the 
provisions already set in the Law, and would likely increase company com-
pliance with the law. However, the transfer of labour enforcement to crim-
inal procedures and the police may not resolve the problems, as this new 
responsible agency would have very different functions and capacities, due 
to the repressive character of criminal law enforcement. When compared 
with regular labour law enforcement mechanisms through labour inspec-
tion, which encourages social dialogues through negotiation between the 
disputing parties, the alternative of criminal punishment for non-compliant 
parties may not be the most effective alternative.
In relations to the third set of processes within the tripartite strategy – judi-
cial processes – as discussed in Chapter 6, one of the most important argu-
ments for setting up a special court to deal with labour disputes was to 
achieve a more accessible, fast, and cheap procedure than that which was on 
offer through the ordinary courts; especially given the new court’s special-
ist jurisdiction and composition. The assumption was that the concepts and 
principles of the private law usually applied by the ordinary courts were 
based on individualism and freedom of contract; while the trade unions 
advocated collectivism and solidarity within the working class. Thus, in 
establishing a special court, there was a desire to create and maintain the 
labour law as autonomous from civil law principles, and also as indepen-
dent from the ordinary courts (see also Hepple, 1986). The establishment of 
the Industrial Relations Court (PHI) in Indonesia was based on this assump-
tion. In its current version, however, the PHI has continued to face structural 
problems from both inside and outside the legal system, for example the 
obligation to follow civil procedural laws purely (in contrast to the approach 
of labour law); and the dominant conservative views of the Supreme Court, 
which has often over-ruled regional PHI decisions, even decisions that have 
provided breakthroughs in terms of labour law interpretation in the regions 
(see also Tjandra, 2014c). This is of particular concern, given that the impacts 
4 The author has discussed such a case in Indonesia in detail elsewhere (see Tjandra, 2010).
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of dispute resolutions and rulings are not limited to the actual disputes in 
question, and that judicial processes in particular have the potential to be 
formative of the content of the law. The involvement of the ad hoc judges 
from unions and employers in the PHI, in order to give the court their rel-
evant knowledge and expertise, has not proven to be effective at solving 
other underlying problems. The PHI has not yet fulfilled the expectations 
for ‘accessible, speedy, and cheap’ labour dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Although both workers and employers are represented in the court, both 
parties have reservations about the PHI. In particular, the ad hoc judges 
have often reduced their effectiveness by becoming caught up in corruption 
within the regional district court, which has further limited the court’s capa-
bilities to contribute to effectively labour law enforcement (see also Tjandra 
et al., 2012, Tjandra, 2014c, and Isnur et al., 2014). So, how can labour law be 
made more effective?
3.2 How can labour law enforcement be made more effective?
The discussions in this dissertation have confirmed that there are at least 
two direct challenges faced by Indonesia (and other developing countries) 
to make labour law enforcement more effective (see Cooney et al., 2002). 
The first challenge is at the level of content, with many aspects of existing 
labour law applying only to certain categories of workers, while most of the 
labour market comprises vulnerable workers (including home-based work-
ers, casual and part-time workers, and those in informal economies), who 
remain excluded from the scope of labour law and its protection. The sec-
ond is at the level of results: at present, even many of the workers whose 
protection falls within the scope of labour law are seeing that labour law is 
not currently enforced properly, and is being weakened by the social, politi-
cal and economic forces surrounding it. It is important to address both the 
content issues and the results issues, in order to find ways of making labour 
law enforcement more effective; as both issues are interrelated. Focusing on 
reforming content alone will not render labour law more effective – as in 
many cases, as this dissertation has revealed, employers will simply ignore 
the basic protections demanded by the law, because they have the power to 
do so. This will lead many workers to accept the conditions they are offered, 
as they are faced with the prospect of losing their jobs if they do not agree. 
Based on these observations, some scholars have suggested four strategies 
for making the enforcement of labour law more effective (see, e.g., Cooney, 
2006, Malmberg et al., 2003, Malmberg, 2009, and Dickens, 2012), and these 
strategies are highly relevant for this dissertation. The discussions that fol-
low will highlight each of the strategies in turn, and relate them to this dis-
sertation’s findings, along with a discussion as to whether each strategy is 
likely to work in the current Indonesian context.
The first strategy that has been proposed to increase the effectiveness of 
labour law enforcement is through diversification of the enforcement strate-
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gies (Malmberg et al., 2003, Malmberg, 2009). This proposition states that 
it is not be enough anymore to rely on traditional forms of ‘command and 
control’ law, given the globalization of economies, and the growing power of 
private firms and economic markets. In the traditional ‘command and con-
trol’ form of law, the law will mandate standards, and will direct employers 
and employees to comply with it or be subject to sanction (Cooney, 2006: 
46-47, referring to Teubner, 1987). Although the command and control 
model can be crucial in sanctioning extreme labour abuses, it can also pro-
duce unexpected consequences, such as resistance from companies through 
various forms. It might not be realistic to expect a developing country like 
Indonesia, which has ineffective inspection mechanisms due to limited num-
bers of labour inspectors and widespread breaches of the law, to police com-
pany violations and enforce compliance. Further, over-policing might lead 
to resistance from the companies; including potential falsification of docu-
ments, coaching of workers under threat of dismissal, and even bribing of 
inspectors (see for instance the report by LBH Jakarta, 2014).
Given these concerns, Cooney (2006: 47-48) proposes the use of Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s ‘enforcement pyramid’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, see also 
Braithwaite, 2011). The enforcement pyramid approach proposes that a regu-
lator will be most successful at inducing a regulated party to comply with 
regulations; by starting with less formal (and less expensive) interventions 
such as dialogue, and only progressing to more serious measures such as 
fines and termination of business if the firms in question maintain their resis-
tance. Regulators, to ensure the success of their approach, would be expect-
ed to be responsive to individual circumstances and selective in their use of 
available sanctions: selecting sanctions higher up the ‘pyramid’ in order of 
severity when a firm fails to respond, but quickly de-escalating when a firm 
shows cooperation. Despite Cooney’s proposition, one immediate hurdle 
that comes to mind when considering the use of these strategies in Indonesia 
– particularly the use of the enforcement pyramid – would be the ongoing 
inconsistencies in the country’s labour inspection mechanisms. As observed 
in this dissertation, since the implementation of regional autonomy in early 
2000, labour inspection has been the responsibility of regional governments, 
and this has led to the implementation of very different policies and practices 
from one region to another. Further, regional-level labour inspectors are no 
more excluded than other officials from the serious corruption problems in 
Indonesia. Even those inspectors who demonstrate integrity against corrup-
tion will often lack the requisite skills and knowledge, or find that they do 
not have sufficient staff and resources to conduct their tasks, due to the inad-
equate budgets in the regions for labour inspection resources and training.
The second strategy proposed to increase the effectiveness of labour law 
enforcement is to involve trade unions directly as labour law enforcers 
(Cooney, 2006: 48-49, also Colling, 2012). This strategy aims to overcome 
the issue of limited resources within enforcement agencies, and in some 
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cases the issue of corruption; as well as helping to overcome the law’s lack 
of flexibility, given that flexibility is particularly important in the realm of 
employment issues, with views about rights are likely to remain complex 
and subject to dispute and change. This need for flexibility is exemplified in 
collective bargaining agreements, in which employers, workers, unions, and 
representatives for each group need to be able to adapt and develop con-
text-specific measures which they can agree upon, and therefore feel more 
bound by and committed to (Colling, 2012: 183). The evidence indicates that 
the presence of a trade union during bargaining leads to greater compliance 
with labour law, especially on the issue of occupational health and safety, 
with unions helping to focus attention on the importance of legislation in the 
workplace (Cooney, 2006: 49).
With this proposed strategy too, however, there would be some hurdles to 
overcome in the Indonesian context, as this dissertation has demonstrated. 
One hurdle would be the local trade unions’ capacity to fulfill such compliance 
functions. This capacity currently varies markedly between regions: in some 
areas the unions would perform this function effectively, but in others they 
would not. These differences are related partly to the number of unions in an 
area; – in low-union-density areas where unions may not even exist at some of 
the workplaces, compliance-related tasks could clearly not be performed by 
unions within those workplaces. Another problem is related to the member-
ship composition within the unions themselves. Even in regions which have 
high numbers of unionized workers, most unions will be comprised largely 
of regular workers, and their membership will still not include the more vul-
nerable workers, such as home-based and casual workers, who will remain 
unable to access the unions’ monitoring and protection. A third problem to 
overcome will be the corporatist character of some unions, which may be too 
close to employer groups or the state, potentially leading to a reduced will-
ingness to enforce the law; as happened, for instance, during the authoritarian 
New Order. Despite these challenges, the development of Indonesia’s labour 
movement over the last few years give hope for an increase in the effective-
ness of labour law enforcement. The re-emergence of the labour movement in 
some regions, notably in the industrial area of Bekasi, West Java, has clearly 
contributed to higher rates of compliance by firms, particularly with regard to 
provisions on outsourcing practices at workplaces (see also Mufakhir, 2014).
The third strategy proposed to increase the law’s effectiveness is through 
self-regulation and internal compliance by firms and employers themselves 
(Cooney, 2006: 48-49, also Arthurs, 2008, Estlund, 2008). This strategy sug-
gests that firms are encouraged to comply with labour law through their 
internal compliance processes. One well-known version of such processes is 
the codes of conduct adopted by employers, workplaces and organizations, 
particularly in developed countries, including well-developed management 
systems; and including requirements for their sub-contractors to comply with 
stipulated labour standards (including, for multi-national organizations, the 
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sub-contractors working in developing countries such as Indonesia). Labour 
standards feature frequently in these codes, which often encompass environ-
mental practices, commercial honesty, consumer protection, and integrity 
when dealing with government officials (Arthurs, 2001). The use of voluntary 
codes has become widespread, especially since the early 1980s. One reason 
that has been proposed for the development of voluntary codes is that the 
codes represent the principled acceptance by firms of their social obligations 
(with the implication that firms will indeed accept these obligations); another 
proposed reason is that such codes simply fill a regulatory gap left by a state’s 
inability to regulate the actions of corporations outside their own boundaries 
(see Arthurs, 2008, also Estlund, 2008). A third reason suggests that the vol-
untary codes represent an innovative shift in the means by which markets 
are regulated: from a pure-state-based command method, to a hybrid models 
involving a mix of public and private initiatives. It is important to note, more-
over, that the early 1980s saw the rise of the non-governmental organization 
movement, especially in Europe and the United States, with the involvement 
of consumers’ groups concerned about exploitation and abuse of workers 
both at home and abroad, and other groups concerned about environmen-
tal and social justice impacts of particularly multinational firms’ activities 
in developing countries. These groups pressured governments and firms 
through the strategy of ‘naming and shaming’, using media campaign and 
lobbying (see, e.g., Meernik et al., 2012). Confronted by such public accusa-
tions, one of the responses by organizations was to adopt a code of conduct, 
which declared the organization’s commitment to core values – including the 
commitment to respect fundamental labour rights such as freedom of asso-
ciation, safe work environments and the absence of coercion and discrimina-
tion (Arthurs, 2008: 21). Thus, so-called voluntary codes have often not been 
purely ‘voluntary’; rather, organizations have chosen to develop codes in 
response to intense public pressure from the civil society organizations, and 
the codes have become available not merely to become the firms’ ‘public rela-
tions ploy,’ but also to act as ‘workers’ tools’ (Wick, 2005).
The obvious challenges associated with this strategy include monitoring for 
compliance, and evaluation of effectiveness of individual codes, with both 
tasks depending very much on the firms themselves (Cooney, 2006: 49). In 
an assessment of Indonesia’s corporate social responsibility practices, Kemp 
(2001) identified several problems with this particular strategy. The use of 
the codes was found to be flawed, as the codes may place corporations out-
side the national regulatory system, bypassing the tripartite negotiation sys-
tem that has been one of the country’s major labour reforms. The process of 
monitoring, and associated outcomes, were usually confidential, with work-
ers in particular never involved in the process, and left without knowledge 
of the results. Sanctions for non-compliance were generally weak or non-
existent, while codes were usually developed at the head office, rarely in 
consultation with trade unions or others. Finally, corporations often insisted 
that affiliates and sub-contractors improve conditions, but provided limit-
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ed if any resources to support such changes. In the last few years, however, 
there have been some interesting improvements to this strategy across Asia, 
including in Indonesia, through the Asia Floor Wage Alliance, which focuses 
on the issue of decent wages for garment workers (see Merk, 2009). The ini-
tiative has been driven by a union in India, meaning that trade unions have 
been involved in the entire process – from the initial drafting to monitoring 
and evaluation, including negotiating with brand-name multinational cor-
porations. Another initiative has emerged in a form of the Play Fair Alliance, 
which on using the the momentum behind the Beijing Olympics in 2008 to 
raise issues of shoe workers. One important result of such efforts has been 
the first ever written ‘protocol’ on freedom of union association, which has 
been jointly signed by the representatives of the brand- name multinational 
corporations, sub-contractor firms, and trade unions (see Hutabarat, 2012). 
Both initiatives are relatively new, and the success or otherwise of their 
efforts is still unclear, but they represent important developments in this 
strategy which are worth noting.
The fourth strategy to improve the effectiveness of labour law enforcement 
is the use of multi-stakeholder regulations, by involving private and non-
governmental stakeholders in negotiating labour, health and safety, and 
environmental standards, as well as monitoring compliance with these 
standards, and establishing certification and labeling mechanisms which 
provide incentives for firms to meet the standards (O’Rourke, 2006). Some 
examples of initiatives which employ this strategy in Europe and the United 
States are: the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) certi-
fication program; Social Accountability International (SAI); the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA); the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI); the Fair Wear Founda-
tion (FWF); and the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC). All these initiatives 
operate as private internal monitoring initiatives, often with government 
support. The Ethical Trading Initiative (www.ethicaltrade.org), for instance, 
is supported by the British government, and brings together major firms, 
unions and community organizations to develop practical strategies to 
improve workers’ conditions; providing a model for developing countries. 
Some observers argue that this strategy may be appropriate for Indonesia, 
as it integrates the enforcement functions of state agencies, trade unions and 
other non-governmental organizations, as well as the self-regulatory efforts 
of firms, and therefore has the potential to be more flexible, efficient, demo-
cratic, and effective than traditional methods of labour regulation (Cooney, 
2006: 50). Others criticize the strategy as an attempt both to free industry 
from state regulation, and to hinder union organizing efforts and the cur-
rent role of trade unions (O’Rourke, 2006, also Justice, 2001). Both arguments 
have strong points, and a consideration of both is useful when developing 
the evaluation criteria for multi-stakeholder regulation processes, including 
criteria for evaluating both their general effectiveness, and their account-
ability to local stakeholders. O’Rourke (2006) concludes that several factors 
are important to support more effective non-governmental regulations such 
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as these, including: substantive participation of local stakeholders; public 
transparency of methods and findings; and mechanisms that bring market 
pressures to bear on multi-national corporations, while simultaneously sup-
porting the processes of multi-stakeholder problem-solving within factories 
and global supply chains (O’Rourke, 2006: 900).
The four strategies and approaches discussed above have been developed 
and applied in various contexts, with the aim of developing more systematic 
and effective methods of labour law enforcement. Each strategy depends 
partly on traditional forms of law enforcement, through state apparatus 
and mechanisms, but also diversifies into alternative enforcement strategies 
involving trade unions (to highlight the spirit of the law in workplaces); as 
well as the regulations and initiatives of non-governmental actors, includ-
ing firms, non-governmental organizations, and trade unions. Each of the 
four strategies and approaches, however, requires one basic and very impor-
tant action from the state: that is, the state must set supportive social goals, 
and uphold the freedom of civil society actors to organize and mobilize (see 
Graham and Woods, 2006). Thus, although the strategies for making labour 
law more effective may seem to be being shared among actors other than 
the state, in the end it is necessary to ensure the state is closely involved, 
and ready to intervene through its regulatory power to set the required 
standards. In these efforts, the state should be supported and monitored by 
non-state actors to ensure that it fulfils its roles correctly. In other words, 
these proposed initiatives are not intended to replace the role of the state, 
but rather to strengthen the role of the state in new ways, with more oppor-
tunities for participation and involvement of all stakeholders in labour law, 
while also allowing various stakeholders to maintain their original roles as 
protectors of citizens. This is the balance that Indonesia needs; and, as this 
dissertation has demonstrated, the foundation of such a balance lies in the 
union-based organization of working people themselves.
4 Suggestions for further research
This dissertation is a systematic study of the changes to Indonesia’s labour 
law, exploring the historical circumstances of labour law from colonial times 
to the Reformasi era. Particular attention has been paid to the Reformasi era, 
including examining closely the changes during that time, and the impacts 
of those changes empirically. Further research will be required to give a full-
er picture of these changes and continuities within Indonesia’s labour law 
reform. This dissertation provides the foundations for doing so. Following 
are several suggestions for further research that could be conducted to bet-
ter understand labour law reforms and their associated social and political 
changes; both in Indonesia and in other developing countries. For further 
research, it may be beneficial to consider the threefold strategy for labour 
law enforcement as suggested by Malmberg (2003, 2009); that is the indus-
280 Conclusion: In search of the right balance 
trial relations strategy, the state-oriented strategy, and the judicial strategy, 
and use this framework to consider the impacts and effectiveness of labour 
law and its enforcement in Indonesia. The question of the enforcement of 
labour law is probably the most interesting and challenging question from 
a socio-legal perspective, which is the perspective taken by this dissertation; 
and is an uncommon perspective, currently, in the literature on Indonesian 
labour law.
One important question to investigate in further research will be: to what 
extent, during the enforcement of labour law, is the role of negotiation recog-
nized and enabled within the Indonesia’s labour law system? This question 
is interesting from a comparative perspective, when comparing the many dif-
ferent roles and kinds of negotiation in the enforcement of labour law, partic-
ularly in different contexts. For instance, often the predominant type of nego-
tiation used during restructuring processes is a negotiation, which aims to 
influence managerial decisions. In the context of other workplace processes, 
such as when managing equality in the workplace, the more relevant type 
of negotiation may be one about the application of rules; while when mak-
ing decisions about working hours, one’s negotiations should focus bargain-
ing about labour and employment relations regulations (see van Peijpe, 2003: 
105). Other questions to be explored relate to administrative processes: for 
example, to what extent do administrative processes help the enforcement 
of labour law in Indonesia? When considering individual administrative 
processes, such as: the inspection mechanism; or the obligation to inform 
the authorities about collective redundancies, or the provision of assistance 
to victims of discrimination, or the promotion of equal treatment in firms, 
to what extent is each of these administrative processes effective at present? 
What types of administrative intervention may be needed, to improve the 
effectiveness of labour law enforcement in Indonesia? Investigating these 
questions would be beneficial; for instance it would provide empirical evi-
dence about the role of the state in labour inspection mechanisms in Indone-
sia, which currently appears to be relatively weak and ineffective.
Another useful research focus concerns the judicial process of enforcement. 
It would be useful to investigate the role of collective bargaining by unions, 
during disputes over the rights of individual workers. It would also be use-
ful to investigate the extent to which the Indonesia’s labour law system rec-
ognizes interim decision-making power; that is, which party has priority of 
interpretation, without awaiting the decision of a court? Further, if recogni-
tion is granted, which party is awarded priority, and what are the relevant 
processes? The point of departure for these questions is that each of the 
parties may, at their own risk, rely on their own interpretation of their legal 
duty. However, if the interpretation is wrong, the party makes itself liable to 
breach of contract. This is very much related to the time limit to claim a right 
in court, and the burden of proof among the parties, which are important in 
labour law. One may also want to analyze the importance of the develop-
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ment of ‘social law’ in Indonesia, which links labour law with social security 
law, as is common in Europe (see, e.g., Hervey, 1998). This may be particular-
ly of interest given the enactment in Indonesia of the two social security laws 
(Law No. 40/2004 on National Social Security System and Law No. 24/2011 
on Social Security Executing Agency), which complement the three labour 
laws enacted following the 1998-2006 labour law reforms (Law No. 21/2000 
on Trade Unions/Labour Unions; Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower and Law 
No. 2/2004 on Industrial Relations Dispute Settlement).
Finally, in the broader context of the legal, social, and political changes in 
Indonesia, it is crucial to identify clearly how the law is actually constructed, 
and how it influences the position of workers in practice; as well as investi-
gating how certain process escapes the law’s purview. The research question 
here is: how does labour law evolve in a relatively democratic and devel-
oping country, where establishing the rule of law requires much work and 
struggle, and where development is generally defined in economic terms? 
In considering this question, researchers could focus on the influence of 
key international actors such as the International Labour Organization and 
other international organizations and standards; in particular their influ-
ence on framing the new labour laws, and how their standards are reflect-
ed in the laws. Researchers could also consider the government’s efforts to 
introduce effective enforcement institutions; and the role of trade unions 
and other workers’ organizations in promoting their members rights and 
developing welfare policies for broader society. These questions all require 
an interdisciplinary approach to research, including linking the normative 
and non-normative aspects of law making and enforcement, and focusing 
on the law while also considering the other social sciences. An interdisciplin-
ary approach is likely to achieve a fuller and more nuanced understanding 
of the current problems, leading in turn to potentially effective solutions to 
these problems.
5 Final remarks
The main theoretical position of this dissertation is that labour legislation 
in Indonesia is part of an historical process, and is the outcome of a struggle 
between different social groups and competing ideologies (see Introduction 
of this dissertation, also Hepple, 1996, 2009). The making and the transfor-
mation in labour law are closely related, and influenced by various factors, 
including economic developments and policies; the changing nature of 
the state; the character of employers and the labour movement; the grow-
ing influence of civil society; and shifts in ideology (see also Hepple, 2011). 
This dissertation provides substantial evidence for this position, and argues 
that labour law in Indonesia is also best understood as the result of the 
struggles between different social groups and competing ideologies, which 
change with time and historical circumstance. This dissertation contends 
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that despite of all the challenges and problems, hope remains for the devel-
opment of a sound and effective labour law in Indonesia, due particularly 
to the development of the trade union movement in the country. There is 
considerable evidence that the presence of unions in both developed coun-
tries (for a classical account see Rubble, 1977) and developing countries 
(see Daniel, 1957) may lead to the enactment of important social legislation 
and greater compliance with labour law. Similarly, as this dissertation has 
shown, Indonesia since the Reformasi includes some encouraging develop-
ments: trade unions have started to play a role not only as a countervailing 
power against employers for the sake of member workers, but also as law 
enforcers and advocates of the welfare state, with benefits for society as a 
whole (see Chapter 4 of this dissertation).
Despite these positive developments, there remains a clear need for both 
unions and employers to have strength and integrity, so that industrial rela-
tions can develop effectively and fairly in Indonesia. It is important for both 
parties to respect to each other, and for demands to be reasonable. In some 
European countries this respect was facilitated by reforms among employ-
ers, who needed to cooperate with workers in the wake of the impacts of the 
most recent world war on workplaces (see Hepple, 1996). Indonesia has had 
no such impact from a major war, and the potential benefit to be gained from 
a temporary post-war surge in the working-age proportion, along with the 
possibility of benefitting from the implied human endowment via appropri-
ate development strategies, is arguably questionable (see Bappenas, 2005). 
This confirms the urgent need for strong alternative labour powers, which 
can influence politics and encourage government and employers to consider 
further reforms toward policies and practices that are both pro-worker and 
pro-people. Trade unions can play important roles in this process, by being 
the countervailing power against capital and corporate power, so that the 
results of development are redistributed fairly throughout society, and by 
being agents of education; for example their efforts to develop new labour 
laws and enforce labour standards provide an excellent opportunity for 
unions to show their their member-workers their rights, raise their aware-
ness, and develop a broader understanding about legal culture.
The Indonesian trade union movement must however, resolve several key 
problems that they currently face. Some of these problems are internal; such 
as low membership for most unions; tensions between organizational effi-
ciency and internal democracy; and the low proportion of collective bargain-
ing agreements that are concluded successfully, closely related to the lack of 
effective dialogue between social partners such as trade unions and employ-
ers. There are also problems from outside of the unions, including the high 
number of workers in the informal economies, the high levels of unemploy-
ment, and the issue of workers’ productivity. One particular challenge that 
may need extra attention is the tension between organizational efficiency 
and internal democracy; as the political exercises during the 2014 legislative 
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and presidential elections have demonstrated the strengths and liabilities of 
the trade union movement. The union movement needs to find the right bal-
ance for these dilemmas, so that unions can become an important alternative 
and much needed power in the new democracy of Indonesia, to help devel-
op better pro-workers legislation, and to contribute to the development of a 
better Indonesia. These are not easy tasks, yet the foundations are there.
Finally, with regard to the aims of this study – to examine the relationship 
between labour law and economic development in a developing country – 
this dissertation has demonstrated that labour law in Indonesia is one of the 
best examples of the most conflicting terrains of law for many conflicting 
interest groups in society. Labour law involves not only workers and their 
unions, but also business people and political elites; not only local actors but 
also global players, buttressed by the so-called ‘globalization’ of economy. 
This dissertation has been concerned with the ways in which labour law pro-
tects through labour rights, and thus constrains some of political power of 
the capital. In this context, the exercise of these rights, like war, is ‘politics 
by other means’ (see Abel, 1995, cited in Hepple, 2002: 16); that is, we are 
able see the twin roles of law in the struggle against oppression: ‘law as the 
sword of the oppressor, and law as the shield for the oppressed’ (Dyzenhuis, 
2008). With this view, and to end this dissertation, it is enlightening to con-
template the writing of leading labour law scholar, Bob Hepple (2002: 16):
[R]ights are not simply the reflection of the existing distribution of power in society. 
Study of the process of creation and enforcement of social and labour rights helps us to 
understand how far law can act relatively autonomously to restrain public and private 
power for the benefit of at least some of the people for some of the time. This is an inte-
gral part of processes of social and political change.

The creation and enforcement of social and labour rights in Indonesia reflects 
the broader processes of social and political change in the country. The mak-
ing of labour law has been a struggle rather than a smooth and cosy pro-
cess. Three decades of rapid economic growth under the authoritarian ‘New 
Order’ era were marked by political and economic subordination of many of 
those who made it happen. The New Order was notorious for its harsh and 
unsympathetic treatment of workers. Seeking an appropriate framework for 
the pursuit of industrialisation and economic growth, the New Order used 
corporatist structures to control labour, and by and large managed to over-
come resistance. The corporatist labour law framework assured managerial 
ascendancy and the restraint of labour costs, often with repression, for the 
sake of economic growth under the broad term of ‘development’.
The fall of President Soeharto in May 1998 marked a new epoch for the coun-
try. It opened the door for different forces to influence the formation of the 
country’s new social and political structures. The Habibie government need-
ed to distance itself from the previous regime and initiated many reforms, 
including new labour policies. This started by a new Ministerial Decree con-
cerning Trade Union Registration, which allowed workers more freedom to 
establish unions. This step was followed by the ratification of International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Asso-
ciation and Protection of the Right to Organise, which complemented ILO 
Convention No. 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right 
to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, which Indonesia had already rati-
fied in 1956. Within seven months of Soeharto’s fall, in December 1998, the 
Habibie government launched the so-called ‘labour law reform programme’, 
under the auspices of the ILO, with the ambitious goal of changing the entire 
structure of Indonesia’s labour law regime.
The main aim of the reform, however, was to make the labour law system a 
tool for promoting economic efficiency, among other things by reducing costs 
through a flexible labour market. This was one of the measures which Indo-
nesia was forced to implement after the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998 
in order to liberalise its economy. Indonesia’s labour law regime was thus 
transformed from a corporatist labour law model organised by a strong state, 
towards one that was largely market-oriented. As the new political arrange-
ment began to take shape, the Indonesian economy shifted from guided or 
state-led development to market-oriented reform and external liberalisation.
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This suggests a typical neo-liberal transition, which, however, is not the 
entire story. Despite their neo-liberal orientation, labour law reforms includ-
ed the adoption of many pro-labour regulations, which created new space 
for the development of a trade union movement. The reforms likewise shift-
ed some responsibility from the executive to other institutions – such as the 
judiciary – but maintained an important role for the government in regulat-
ing labour relations.
How can this development be understood and explained? What are the 
implications for labour? What challenges and opportunities has the coun-
try’s newly (re-)established trade union movement to face? What lessons 
can we learn from the development of these changing labour laws, in the 
relation between labour law and economic development in Indonesia? The 
study addresses these questions by first providing a general overview of the 
development of labour law and by then looking at three case-studies con-
cerning (1) trade unions; (2) minimum wage; and (3) the Industrial Relations 
Court.
These topics correspond to the three major pieces of labour legislation enact-
ed since the start of Reformasi in 1998 and constitute key elements of labour 
law. Trade unions are a crucial institution in any modern industrial capital-
ist society. They represent one of the few institutions capable of promoting 
some measure of equity and social justice. Minimum wage is important in 
labour law as a policy tool for poverty reduction, but also as an indicator 
of the extent of a government’s commitment to social justice. Finally, the 
Industrial Relations Courts are important because they represent the instru-
mental aspect of law in their role as adjudicator and enforcer. Together they 
also cover the two main facets of labour law that have been examined in this 
study, i.e. collective labour law (trade union, minimum wage), and individu-
al labour law (minimum wage, industrial dispute settlement).
As regards the trade union, the study finds various positive developments 
both at the national and the regional level. Several unions at both regional 
and national levels have developed alternative strategies to overcome the 
stagnation embodied in the structures of the existing national workers feder-
ations and confederations. Through the formation of regional alliances they 
now deal with local labour issues, such as regional minimum wage determi-
nation, and with local politics in its relation to labour. The national alliance 
with the KAJS (Action Committee for Social Security Reforms) even looked 
beyond traditional workers’ issues, and focused its struggle on reforming 
Indonesia’s social security system for the benefit of all citizens. Such allianc-
es represent an unprecedented development of the trade union movement 
in Indonesia, and they lend hope that the future will include the more active 
participation of unions in Indonesians’ social struggles.
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Concerning the minimum wage in Indonesia, the study shows how instead 
of being a wage floor it has generally become the effective wage for most 
workers. In the absence of a collective bargaining system these are still very 
much dependent on a raise in the minimum wage for getting higher wages. 
The minimum wage setting process within wage councils is where the new-
ly-developed trade union movement has to demonstrate its zeal in defend-
ing members’ and other workers’ interests. This focus is reinforced by the 
risk of dismissal of union officials when they attempt to negotiate wages at 
the plant level. As a result considerable pressure is exercised on the wage 
councils, and demands for increases that may seem excessive have turned 
minimum wage setting into a site of conflict. During the New Order the state 
pursued a low wage strategy in order to attract investment, and thus used 
the minimum wage as a tool by which to control labour unrest. Since 1998 
the state has become more ambiguous with respect to minimum wages: on 
the one hand, the state would like to turn minimum wages into the wage 
floor, but on the other hand officials are reluctant to leave wage setting to 
processes of collective bargaining. They also fear the stronger trade unions 
required for effective collective bargaining.
As regards the Industrial Relations Courts, the study finds that their estab-
lishment has raised concerns from labour about their inaccessibility to most 
workers as a result of high costs, delays, formalities, and a class bias of some 
career judges. These problems can be explained in part from the conceptual 
inadequacy and the obscurity of some of the provisions in Law 2/2004, the 
problematic relationship between the court and the court of appeal, and cor-
ruption from the lowest level of substitute registrar to ad-hoc judges at the 
Supreme Court. The efforts from ad hoc judges from unions to overcome 
such problems have to a large extent been outdone by the structural prob-
lems plaguing the Indonesian judiciary in general.
The study further shows how the making and transformation of labour law 
is influenced by various factors, including economic developments and poli-
cies; the changing nature of the state; the character of employers and the 
labour movement; the growing influence of civil society; and shifts in ide-
ology. It provides substantial evidence for the position that labour law in 
Indonesia is best understood as the result of struggles between different 
social groups and competing ideologies, which change over time. Despite 
the challenges and problems, hope remains for the development of a sound 
and effective labour law in Indonesia, due particularly to the development 
of the trade union movement in the country. Since Reformasi some encourag-
ing developments have taken place: trade unions have started to play a role 
not only as a countervailing power against employers for the sake of mem-
ber workers, but also as law enforcers and advocates of the welfare state, 
with benefits for society as a whole.
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Nonetheless, there remains a clear need for reinforcement of union and 
employers organisations so that industrial relations can develop effective-
ly and fairly. It is important for both parties to respect each other, and for 
demands to be reasonable. Trade unions can play important roles in this 
process, as a countervailing power against capital and corporate power, as 
redistributors of developmental results in society, and as agents of educa-
tion. Their efforts to shape new labour laws and enforce labour standards 
have helped unions in making their members aware of their rights, and to 
develop a broader understanding about the role of law as a tool for develop-
ment -not only for labour but also for society more generally.
De ontwikkeling en versterking van sociale rechten en rechten van arbeiders 
in Indonesië weerspiegelt de bredere processen van sociale en politieke her-
vormingen in het land. De ontwikkeling van het arbeidsrecht is eerder een 
strijd dan een vloeiend proces. Dertig jaar sterke economische groei onder 
de autoritaire ‘Nieuwe Orde’ van president Soeharto werd tevens geken-
merkt door politieke en economische onderdrukking van juist die groepen 
die een bijdrage leverden aan het realiseren van die groei. De ‘Nieuwe Orde’ 
was berucht om zijn harde aanpak van arbeiders. In de zoektocht naar een 
passend kader voor het realiseren van industrialisatie en economische groei, 
hanteerde de ‘Nieuwe Orde’ ideologische structuren om arbeid te controle-
ren en slaagde zij er veelal in om weerstand te overwinnen. De corporatieve 
vorm van het arbeidsrecht verzekerde bestuurlijk overwicht en beperking 
van arbeidskosten, vaak door middel van repressie omwille van economi-
sche groei, onder de noemer van ‘ontwikkeling.’
De val van president Soeharto in mei 1998 luidde een nieuw tijdperk in voor 
Indonesië. Het maakte de weg vrij voor verschillende groepen om de vor-
ming van de nieuwe sociale en politieke omstandigheden in het land te beïn-
vloeden. De nieuwe regering van president Habibie wilde zich distantiëren 
van het voorgaande regime en initieerde veel hervormingen, waaronder ook 
een nieuw arbeidsbeleid. Dit begon met een nieuwe ministerieel besluit met 
betrekking tot de registratie van vakbonden, dat arbeiders meer vrijheid 
gaf om vakbonden op te richten. Deze stap werd gevolgd door ratificatie 
van Conventie No. 87 van de Internationale Arbeidsorganisatie (Internatio-
nal Labour Organization (ILO)) betreffende de Vrijheid van Vereniging en de 
Bescherming van het Recht zich te Organiseren. Conventie No. 87 was een 
aanvulling op Conventie No. 98 van de ILO betreffende de Toepassing van 
de Beginselen van het Recht zich te Organiseren en Collectief te Onderhan-
delen die Indonesië al in 1956 had geratificeerd. Binnen zeven maanden na 
het aftreden van Soeharto, in december 1998, lanceerde de regering Habibie 
het zogenaamde ‘arbeidsrechthervormingsprogramma,’ onder auspiciën 
van de ILO, met de ambitieuze doelstelling om de gehele structuur van het 
arbeidsrecht in Indonesië te herzien.
Het belangrijkste doel van de hervormingen was nochtans om het systeem 
van arbeidsrecht instrumenteel in te zetten voor het bevorderen van econo-
misch rendement, onder andere door kostenvermindering als gevolg van 
flexibilisering van de arbeidsmarkt. Dit was één van de maatregelen die 
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Indonesië genoodzaakt was in te voeren na de economische crisis in Azië 
van 1997-1998, teneinde de economie te liberaliseren. Het Indonesische sys-
teem van arbeidsrecht werd getransformeerd van een corporatief model, 
georganiseerd door een sterke staat, naar een grotendeels marktgeoriënteerd 
model. Toen het nieuwe politieke beleid vorm begon te krijgen, transfor-
meerde de Indonesische economie van een staatsgeleide ontwikkeling naar 
een marktgeoriënteerde hervorming en externe liberalisering.
Dit duidt op een typisch neoliberale transitie, maar er is toch meer aan de 
hand. Een flink aantal hervormingen werkte gunstig uit voor de arbeids-
beweging. Zo werd onder meer nieuwe ruimte gecreëerd voor de ontwik-
keling van vakbonden. Bovendien werd een aantal verantwoordelijkheden 
wel verschoven van de uitvoerende macht naar andere instituties – zoals 
de rechterlijke macht – maar de rol van de overheid bij het reguleren van 
arbeidsrelaties bleef toch voor een belangrijk deel gehandhaafd.
Hoe kan deze ontwikkeling begrepen en verklaard worden? Wat zijn de con-
sequenties voor arbeid? Met welke uitdagingen en kansen worden de nieuw 
opgerichte vakbonden geconfronteerd? Welke lessen kunnen getrokken 
worden uit de ontwikkeling van deze veranderende arbeidswetgeving, in de 
relatie tussen arbeidsrecht en economische ontwikkeling in Indonesië? Dit 
proefschrift richt zich op deze vragen door eerst een algemeen overzicht van 
de ontwikkeling van het arbeidsrecht te geven en vervolgens te kijken naar 
drie casus betreffende (1) vakbonden; (2) minimumlonen; en (3) de arbeids-
rechtbanken.
Deze onderwerpen zijn gerelateerd aan drie belangrijke onderdelen van de 
arbeidswetgeving die zijn vastgesteld aan het begin van de Reformasi in 1998 
en die de belangrijkste elementen van arbeidsrecht omvatten. Vakbonden 
zijn cruciale instituties in een moderne industriële, kapitalistische maat-
schappij. Zij vormen één van de weinige instellingen die in staat zijn om 
maatregelen ter bevordering van gelijkheid en sociale rechtvaardigheid af 
te dwingen. Het minimumloon is belangrijk binnen het arbeidsrecht als een 
beleidsinstrument om armoede te bestrijden en tevens als indicator van de 
mate van de betrokkenheid van de overheid bij het bevorderen van sociale 
rechtvaardigheid. Ten slotte zijn de arbeidsrechtbanken belangrijk omdat 
zij het instrumentele aspect van het recht vertegenwoordigen in hun rol als 
arbiter en handhaver. Samen bestrijken zij ook de twee belangrijkste facet-
ten van het arbeidsrecht die in deze studie zijn onderzocht, namelijk collec-
tief arbeidsrecht (vakbonden, minimumlonen) en individueel arbeidsrecht 
(minimumlonen, arbeidsgeschillenbeslechting).
Met betrekking tot de vakbonden heeft dit onderzoek verschillende posi-
tieve ontwikkelingen geïdentificeerd, zowel op nationaal als op regionaal 
niveau. Verscheidene vakbonden hebben alternatieve strategieën ontwik-
keld om stagnatie, belichaamd in de structuren van bestaande nationale 
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arbeidsfederaties en confederaties, te overwinnen. Door het opzetten van 
regionale samenwerkingsverbanden, houden de vakbonden zich nu bezig 
met lokale kwesties van arbeidsrecht, zoals het bepalen van het minimum-
loon en lokaal beleid in relatie tot arbeid. De nationale alliantie met de KAJS 
(Aktiecommissie voor Hervorming van de Sociale Zekerheid) keek zelfs ver-
der dan de traditionele arbeidskwesties en richtte zich op de hervorming 
van het Indonesische sociale zekerheidsstelsel. Zulke allianties betekenen 
een ongekende ontwikkeling voor de vakbeweging in Indonesië en bieden 
hoop dat in de toekomst een actievere participatie van de vakbonden plaats 
zal vinden in de sociale strijd in Indonesië.
Met betrekking tot het minimumloon in Indonesië toont het onderzoek aan 
dat het minimumloon in plaats van een ‘bodemloon’ voor het merendeel van 
de werknemers een effectief loon is. Door het ontbreken van een systeem 
van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten is men nog steeds sterk afhankelijk 
van een verhoging van het minimumloon om loonsverhoging te realiseren. 
Tijdens het proces van vaststelling van het minimumloon in de ‘loonra-
den’, zal de nieuwe vakbeweging moeten tonen in staat te zijn de belangen 
van haar leden en andere arbeiders effectief te behartigen. Het belang hier-
van wordt versterkt door het risico dat vakbondsleiders en -medewerkers 
worden ontslagen wanneer zij proberen te onderhandelen over lonen op 
bedrijfsniveau. Als gevolg hiervan wordt er een aanzienlijke druk gelegd op 
het loonoverleg. Tijdens de ‘Nieuwe Orde’ streefde de staat een lage lonen 
strategie na om investeringen aan te trekken en gebruikte het minimumloon 
als middel om arbeidsonrust onder controle te houden. Vanaf 1998 is het 
overheidsbeleid ten aanzien van minimumlonen meer ambigu: aan de ene 
kant zou de overheid het minimumloon om willen zetten in een bodemloon, 
maar aan de andere kant zijn overheidsfunctionarissen niet bereid om het 
vaststellen van lonen te laten bepalen in collectieve arbeidsonderhandelin-
gen. Tevens vrezen zij de sterkere vakbonden die vereist zijn voor collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomsten.
Met betrekking tot de arbeidsrechtbanken is in dit onderzoek naar voren 
gekomen dat zij niet goed toegankelijkheid zijn voor de meeste arbeiders 
vanwege hoge kosten, vertragingen, formalisme en in het geval van sommi-
ge rechters een vooroordeel ten aanzien van maatschappelijke klasse. Deze 
problemen kunnen deels verklaard worden door de conceptuele tekortko-
mingen en de onduidelijkheid van een aantal bepalingen in Wet 2/2004, de 
problematische relatie tussen de rechtbank en het hof van beroep, en door 
corruptie – vanaf het laagste niveau van de gerechtssecretaris tot rechter-
plaatsvervangers bij het Hooggerechtshof. De inspanningen van rechter-
plaatsvervangers van vakbonden om zulke problemen aan te pakken, 
worden belemmerd door de structurele problemen waar de Indonesische 
rechterlijke macht mee te kampen heeft.
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Dit onderzoek laat verder zien hoe het ontwikkelen en transformeren van 
arbeidsrecht beïnvloed wordt door verscheidene factoren, zoals econo-
mische ontwikkelingen en beleid, het veranderende karakter van de staat, 
het type werkgever en arbeidersbeweging; de toenemende invloed van de 
maatschappelijke middenklasse en ideologische verschuivingen. Er is sub-
stantieel bewijs voor de stelling dat arbeidsrecht in Indonesië het best begre-
pen kan worden als het resultaat van strijd tussen verschillende sociale groe-
peringen en rivaliserende ideologieën, die in de loop der tijd veranderen. 
Ondanks de uitdagingen en problemen blijft er hoop voor de ontwikkeling 
van een gezond en effectief arbeidsrecht in Indonesië, wat vooral te danken 
is aan de ontwikkeling van de vakbeweging in Indonesië. Sinds de Reformasi 
zien we een aantal bemoedigende veranderingen.Vakbonden zijn een rol 
van betekenis gaan spelen als tegenwicht voor werkgevers in het behartigen 
van de belangen van vakbondsleden, maar ook als handhavers van de wet 
en verdedigers van de welvaartsstaat.
Desalniettemin bestaat er nog steeds een duidelijke behoefte aan verster-
king van vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties, zodat arbeidsrelaties zich 
effectief en op rechtvaardige wijze kunnen ontwikkelen. Vakbonden kunnen 
een belangrijke rol spelen in dit proces als tegenwicht tegen de macht van 
het kapitaal, in de herverdeling van welvaart binnen de maatschappij, en als 
behartigers van het bevorderen van bewustwording. De inspanningen van 
vakbonden om nieuwe arbeidswetten te ontwikkelen en arbeidsnormen te 
versterken hebben er toe bijgedragen dat vakbondsleden zich nu bewust zijn 
van hun rechten en ze hebben een breder begrip gekweekt voor de rol van 
het recht als instrument voor ontwikkeling – niet alleen met betrekking tot 
arbeid maar ook voor de maatschappij in het algemeen.
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